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1.1  This Report  is the.second of a  two part study, commissioned by the 
Directorate-General for  Competition of the Commission of the European Communities, concerning the 
U.K. alcoholic and soft drinks industries.  The first part, published in  September 1977,• considered aspects 
of industry structure and concentration over the period from  1969 to 1974.  This second part examines the 
distribution of alcoholic and soft drinks to the consumer. 
1.2  In  compiling this Report reference has been made to a  variety of sources, 
ranging from  articles in  the national finan·:::ial  press and trade journals to stockbroking and market research 
reports and the published results of Government investigations.  This  latter source has proved  invaluable 
particularly on  issues relating to the brewing  industry and the U.K.  liquor licensing system.  Since 1966 
the following Government reports have appeared: 
Costs,  Prices & Profits in  the Brewing  Industry. 
Beer -A Report on  the Supply of Beer 
Unilever ltd. and Allied Breweries ltd. -a report 
on the  proposed* merger and general observations 
on  mergers. 
Beer  Prices. 
Report of the Departmental Committee on 
liquor licensing 
Report of the Departmental Committee on 
Scottish licensing Law. 
Soft Drinks & Mixers in  licensed Premises 
* The proposed merger did not take place. 
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National Board  for  Prices and  Incomes. 
Report  No. 13.  April  1966 
The Monopolies Cornm iss ion, Apri I 1969. 
The Monopolies Commission,  June 1969. 
National Board  for  Prices and  Incomes. 
Report  No.136.  November 1969 
('The Erroll  Report•) December 1972 
('The Clayson Report
1)August  1973 
Price Commission.  lv\arch  1977 
Report  No. 23 Beer  Prices and Margins 
1.3 
Price Commission.  July 1977 
Report  No . 31 
In  May 1977 the National  Economic Development Office published 
11Brewing 
11 
- a  report by the Brewing Sector Working Group of the Food and Drink  Manufacturing 
Economic Development Committee.  More recently,  in  April  1978,  the Price Commission
1s investigation 
of Allied Breweries  Ltd.  was published* but unfortunately it appeared too late for any findings to be 
incorporated into this Report. 
1.4  From  the titles of most of these official reports it is clear that the 
brewing industry in the U.K. has attracted considerable Government attention, whilst the wines and 
spirits trades have been relatively free from  this scale of formal  investigation.  A question regarding 
what these reports on the brewing industry have achieved,in practical terms,  is a  relevant one.  The 
Monopolies Commission report of 1969 into the supply of beer for  retail sale on  licensed premises found 
that monopoly conditions prevailed.  This report concluded that these conditions: 
11 
••• operate and may be expected to operate 
against the public interest since the restrictions. 
on competition involved in  the  tied house 
·system operated by the brewer suppliers concerned 
are detrimental to efficiency in  brewing, whole-
saling and retailing, to the interests of independent 
suppliers (including potential new  entrants), and 
to the interests of consumers. 
11  + 
The report did recognise,  however,  that the conditions of restricted competition resulted from  the 
operation of the U.K.  licensing laws.which.the report recommended should be substantially relaxed.  It 
was on  this issue that the 
1 Erroll  Committee• was appointed to review the I  iquor I  icensing laws of 
England and Wales.  None of the 
1Erroll  Committee
1s
1  recommendations,  which included the  rel<;~xation 
ofcertain aspects of the liquor laws,  have been put into practice some 5-6 years after being submitted 
to the Government. 
1.5  Today,  the Price Commission  has echoed the sentiments of the 
Monopolies Commission
1s concern over ,monopoly conditions in  the supply of beer, the effects of the tied 
house system,  the structure of the industry,  the level of concentration,. and the state of competition.  If 
any of these issues are to be resolved,  the Price Commission  in  its Report on  Beer  Prices and Margins 
left no doubt where the responsibility lies: 
11Legislation over a  long period of time has 
undoubtedly contributed to the present 
situation.  Nevertheless,  the simple truth 
is that the way the  trade is  organised and 
run  has a  profound effect on  prices and 
profits.  The question which has to be asked 
is whether the present situation is  in  the 
public interest or is  contrary to the pubHc 
*Price Commission(April  1978)AII ied  Breweries(UK)Ltd .Brewing & Wholesaling of Beer  & Sales in 
Managed Houses. 
+The Monopolies Commission(1969) A Report on the Supply of Beer.para .415 · 
8 interest.  This  is  the question which 
must  be answered by the Government. 
11* 
1.6  The Monopolies Commission's report noted 
11the danger of local 
retailing monopolies  .. +which have emerged partly as a  result of take-over activity as well as because 
of the licensing system,  so that there is an 
11abnormally high concentration of ownership of public houses 
in  certain areas. 
11  +  Resulting from  these comme111ts on regional concentration, 
11 
••••••••  companies owning pubs  in  local 
areas of heavy concentration of ownership 
by the same brewer have been seeking to 
make their holdings in  these areas more 
diffuse.  It  is an extremely difficult operation, 
since quite apart from  the need to maintain 
efficient patterns of distribution and the 
question of valuations, the interests of employees 
in  production and distribution,  tenants and 
I  icencees and the customers of the pub concerned, 
are all  involved. 
11  ~ 
In  the event, Courage and Truman exchanged nearly lOO  housas in  1970, and 150 were exchanged 
between Courage and Watney in  1971.  On September 7th 1977 it was announced that a  total of 437 
houses were to be exchanged between Allied J3reweries,  Bass  Cherrington and Courage.  It  is  not known 
whether these exchanges have  yet taken plq<:le. 
Arrangement of the Report 
1.7  This Report  is arranged  in  the following  manner: 
Chapter 2: 
Chapter  3: 
This chapter contains an outline of the U.K.  liquor 
I  icensing system which has shaped the structure of 
alcoholic drink retailing.  The role of the brewers  is 
considered: it is shown  that brewery ownership of a II 
licensed premises fell  between 1967 and 1977,  but that 
the six major brewers increased their share of all brewery 
owned premises from  around 65 per cent in  1967 to nearly 
three quarters by  1975. 
The first  half of this chapter is  concerned with the 
channels of distribution through which beers, wines and 
spirits pass  into the retail trade, and hence the consumer. 
The value of the retail trade in alcoholic drinks is 
examined as is  the relative importance of the different 
types of outlet.  In  the second half of this chapter the 
prices of beer and spirits are discussed, drawing mainly 
upon the work of the Price Commission,  but utilising the 
results of our own price surveys in  retail grocers. 
*  Price Commission  (1977) Beer Prices and tv\argins,  para 6.6 
+  The Monopolies Commission  (1969) op. cit .para 391 
+  The Brewers Society (September 1977)Memorandum on  the Price Commission's Report  No .31: Beer 
Prices and Margins.  para 6.17 
9 Chapter  4: 
Chapter  5: 
Market i-rends  in  consumption,  expenditure and prices 
for beers, wines and spirits are analysed in the first part 
of this chapter.  Most  of the chapter,  however, 
endeavours to assess brand and market shares for the main 
product markets identified; namely, beer,  lager, whisky, 
gin,  vodka,  brandy,  rum,  table wines, sherry,  port, 
vermouth, and cider.  The brand share data is  summaris>ed 
in Appendix 1. 
The  U.K. market for soft drinks- squashes,  cordials, 
colas, carbonates, fruit juices and mineral waters- is 
detail.ed in  this chapter.  Prices in  the off-licensed 
·trade are discussed  using  Price Commission data, ·and  in 
the retail grocery  trade from  our own price survey research. 
Brand share data  is  summarised  in Appendix 1. 
10 ALCOHOLIC  DRINKS 2:  INSTITUTIONAL  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGES  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
The  Licensing  System 
2.1:  National control of premises used for the sale and consumption of intoxi-
cating liquors has a  history which can be traced back to the reign of King  Henry VII.+  This element of 
control  is  still with us  today and is  formalised by the Licensing Acts.  There are three different Acts which 
apply to the different realms of the United  Kingdom.  In  the case of England and Wales the legislation is 
embodied in  the Licensing Act 1964;  for Northern  Ireland it is  in  the main  the  Intoxicating Liquor and 
Licensing Act (Northern  Ireland) 1959;  and for Scotland the Licensing (Scotland) Acts of 1959 and 1962. 
Although the enactments of these laws produce some differences between each of the realms,  their essential 
similarity, as far as this report is  concerned,  in  relation to the retailing of alcohoiic beverages is  to provide 
for the granting of licences to premises where alcohol may be sold for  immediate or later consumption. 
2.2:  In  England and Wales (for  Northern  Ireland it is  similar) the granting of 
justices' licences take the following form:++ 
On Licence: 
Restaurant Licence: 
A  licence authorising the sale of alcoholic liquor for 
consumption on or off the premises,  i . e. a  fu II  on-
licence. 
A  licence authorising the sale of alcoholic liquor for 
consumption by persons taking  table  meals,  where 
the consumption of drink is ancillary to the meal and 
where the premises are used solely for the supply of 
meals. 
+TheMonopoliesCommission.A report on  the Supply of Beer (1969) HMSO Appendix 8.  Early History of 
Licensing. 
++  The definitions of the different types of licence are taken from  The  Brewers' Society Statistical 
Handbook (1976). 
13 Residential  Licence: 
Combined  Licence: 
Licensed  Club: 
Registered  Club: 
Off-Licence: 
Where the premises are let for board and lodging, and 
breakfast and at least one other main meal are also 
supplied,  then alcoholic liquor can be supplied to 
residents {and their guests). 
A combination of Restaurant and Residential  Licences •. 
This  is  usually a  club which is operated by  individuals 
or a  limited company as a  commercial enterprise and 
alcoholic drink is  sold only to members. 
This type of club is  run  by a  committee of members, 
and the members own  the stock of liquor;  a  non-
profit making organisation. 
A licence authorising the sale of alcoholic liquor 
for consumption off the premises. 
2.3:  In  Scotland the following  ~efinitions+ apply: 
Public House : 
Hotels: 
These are allowed to sell excisable liquor by retail 
for consumption,  either on or off the premises,  i.e. 
a  full  on-licence. 
as for  public house,  but where sleeping accommodation 
is provided for  travellers,  i.e. a  full  on-licence. 
Restaurant  Licence:  The same kind of licence as in  England and Wales. 
Restricted  Hotel  Licence:  The same kind of licence as the combined restaurant 
and  r~sidential licence in  England and Wales. 
Off-Licence:  The same form  of licence as in  Englandand Wales. 
Registered Club:  The same form  of licence as in  England and Wales. 
2.4:  Statistics on  the number and type of liquor  licences in  operation are 
available for a  period of years stretching back into the previous century.  However, attention here will be 
focused on  more contemporary events so  that details of licences in  force for the constituent parts of the 
United  Kingdom are presented in  Table 2.1 for  selected years between 1967 and 1975,  the most  recent year 
for  which these data are available.  Of the total number of licensed premises in  the UK  of 155,957 in  1975, 
89. 1 per cent  were to be found  in  England and Wales, 9. 1 per cent  in  Scotland and 1. 8 per cent  in 
Northern  Ireland.  These proportions have remained virtually unchanged since 1967. 
2.5:  The salient points of Table 2.1 are conveniently summarised  by Tables 
2.2 and 2.3.  For the United  Kingdom as a  whole the numberof fully on-licensed premises fell from  around 
75,000 in  1967 to stand at about 73,650 by 1975- a  fall of some  1.8 per cent.  Total  licensed premises,  on 
+  The  Brewers Society.  (1976) op.cit. 
14 TABLE  2.1 
Premises  Licensed and Registered for  the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages 
UK  Selected years 1967-75 
Type of Licence  1967  1968  1971  1972 
England and Wales 
Full  on-licences (mainly 
public houses)  651916  651541  641087  631732 
Restaurants  41590  51160  71100  71860 
Residential  11 191  11365  11804  11988 
Combined  Restaurant and 
Residentia I  11769  11917  2,324  2,489 
Licensed  Clubs  21377  21438  2,563  21659 
Registered  Clubs  221368  221705  231985  241368 
Off-licences  261702  261906  281166  281808 
1241913  1261032  1301029  131,904 
Scotland 
Public  House  Certificates  41230  4, 198  41 176  41064 
Hotel  Certificates  21404  2,449  2,6W  21646 
Restricted  Hotel  Certificates  184  212  250  270 
Restaurant  Certificates  221  274  406  431 
Registered  C I  ubs  11686  11793  2,073  2, 148 
Off-I  i  cences  31555  31630  31819  3,872 
12,280  12,556  131333  131431 
Great  Britain  1371 193  138,588  143,362  1451335 
Northern  Ireland 
On-licences  21451  21372  21244  21273 
Registered  Clubs  185  206  235  296 
Off-I  icences  108  97  105  101 
21744  21675  21584  21670 
United  Kingdom  1391937  141,263  1451946  148,005 
SOURCE:  The  Brewers' Society(1976)op.cit. 
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1974  1975 
631728  641614 
91176  9,599 
21354  2,532 
2,711  21763 
21854  2,802 
24,665  241931 
30,556  311644 
136,044  1381885 
31923  4,022 
21745  21755 
319  317 
540  587 
2,306  2,404 
41019  4,182 
13,852  14,247 
1491896  153,132 
21270  21285 
341  376 
137  164 
2,748  21825 
1521644  1551957 TABLE  2.2 
Number of Licensed and Registered  Premises  in  UK,  selected years 1967-1975 
Licensed and 
Full  On  +  Restricted *  Registered 
Year  Licence  On  Licence  Clubs  Off  Licences  Total 
1967  75,001  7,955  26,616  30,365  139,937 
1968  74,560  8,928  27,142  30,633  141,263 
1971  73, 116  11,884  28,856  32, roo_  145,946 
1972  72,715  13,038  29,471  32,781  148,005 
1974  72,765  15,100  30, 121  34,658  152,644 
1975  73,656  15,798  30,513  35,990  155,957 
TABLE  2.3 
Percentage Change and Share of Total  Licences in  UK,  1967 and 1975 
oer cent 
Full  On-Licences 
Restricted  On  Licences 
Licensed and Registered Clubs 
Off-Licences 
Total 
+  Full  On-Licences  comprised  of: 
Full  on-licences  England and Wales 
Public  House  certificates Scotland 
Hotel  Certificates  Scotland 
On-licences  N.  Ireland 
Change  Share 
1967-75  1967  1975 
- 1.8  53.6  47.2 
+98.6  5.7  10. 1 
+14.6  19.0  19.6 
+18.5  21.7  23.1 
+'11.4  100.0  100.0 
*Restricted On-licences comprised of: 
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Restaurants 
Residentia I 
Combined 
Restricted  Hotel  Certificates 
Restaurant Certificates 
England and Wales 
England and Wales 
England and Wales 
Scotland 
Scotland the other hand,  increased their numbers by  11 .4 per cent  or from  just under 14(), 000 in  1967 to nearly 
156,000 by  1975.  The fall  in  the number of fully on-licensed premises together with the growth of 
licences of all types was sufficient to reduce the on-licences share of the total from 53.6 per cent  to 
47.2 per cent  over the same period.  Restricted on-I  icences,  that is  restaurants and hotels,  increased by 
98.6 per cent  over the eight year period taking their share of all  licences from  5.7 per cent  to 10.1 per 
cent.  Licensed and Registered  Clubs grew by  14.6 per cent  and raised their share of the total by 0.6 per 
cent.  Off-licences grew numerically from  almost 30,400 in  1967 to virtually 36,000 in  1975 - an 
increase of 18.5 per cent  raising the proportion of total  licences attributable to them from  21 .7 per cent 
to 23. 1 per cent. 
2.6:  The increase in  the number of off-licences has been one of the most 
notable changes in  the pattern of alcohol retailing during recent years.  The reasons for  this stem,  first of 
all, from  the consolidating legislation of the 1964 Licensing Act which re-introduced the right of an 
applicant to appeal against the decisions of licensing justices,  thereby making it generally easier to obtain 
an off-licence.  This Act also altered the hours during which off-licences were permitted to trade with the 
result that they could remain open during normal  shop hours.  This  change,  taken together with the 
abolition of resale price maintenance in  1964 encouraged the establishment of off-licence departments 
within grocery supermarkets as well as laying the foundations for  the emergence of discount I  iquor stores. 
2.7:  In  1971  the Departmenta I Committee on  Liquor  Licensing was established 
with the task of reviewing the liquor licensing laws of England and Wales.  The Committee
1s Report+ was 
published in  December 1972,  the tenor of its recommendations favouring a  simplified  licensing system 
making  it easier for anyone to obtain permission  to sell alcohol.  As  yet this Report  has received no formal 
response from  the Government but it may well be the case that the spirit of the Report*  has been applied by 
licensing justices in  that they have been more willing to grant licences to restaurants, specialist retailers 
and to grocery retailers wishing to add an alcoholic drinks department to their stores.  It  should be noted, 
however,  that the fall  in  the number of on-licences does not necessarily imply a  hardening of the licensing 
justices attitude towards such premises but rather that this is  the result of rationalisation amongst the owners 
of such premises. 
Brewery  Ownership of Licensed  Premises 
2.8:  One of the most  characteristic features of the distribution of alcoholic 
drinks in  the United  Kingdom  is  the extent to which retail outlets fall  under the ownership of brewery 
companies.  A vertically integrated distribution system  has evolved whereby brewers manufacture, 
+  Report of the Departmental Committee on  Liquor  licensing.  (1972) HMSO- generally referred to as 
the Errol!  Report after the name of its chairman. 
*  A similar review of the licensing law  in  Scotland was undertaken and published as the Report of the 
Departmental Committee on  Scottish Licensing  Law  (1973)  HMSO 
17 wholesale and retail their own  product.  During  recent years the brewers• spread of interests has been such 
that they are also responsible for a  significant amount of the sales of alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks 
other than beer.  ~efore considering  the  contemporary  pattern  in  the  ownership  of 
licensed premises it is  useful  to examine how  the brewers•  role has been able to develop. 
2.  9:  As  part of the system of revenue control any manufacturer or whole5aler 
of intoxicating liquor must  hold an exise licence.  In  the case of the brewing industry any establishment 
e~aged in  this activity must  hold such a  licence and Table 2.4 sets out the number of licences held for 
~elected years over the period  1881  to 1976.  As  this table shows there were at the turn of the century 
j&st  under 6500 brewer for sale licences in  existence.  The  locational structure of the industry at this time 
wa~ne  of a  relatively large number of breweries producing for  essentially localised urban and rural 
markets and serving the populations through licensed premises,  mainly public houses.  The  constraint 
governing the physical size of a  brewery's market area was related to the nature of the product;  namely, 
beer was perishable, susceptible to the vagaries of the weather and manner of keeping,  so  that given the 
transport system available at the time it did not lend itself to extensive distribution. 
2.10:  The brewing industry has taken advantage of the technological innovations 
available to it in  both the manufacturing and distribution processes.  One of the most  important techno-
logical advances can be attributed to the pasteurisation of beer which had  the effect of reducing its perish-
ability.  This reduction in  peris~ability was enhanced with the introducing of carbon dioxide to store and 
pump beer under pressure in  casks and tanks:  for,  the use of pressurised containers meant that as beer was 
consumed from  a  cask the space left behind would be fi lied with carbon dioxide rather than air which could 
introduce impurities into the beer as well as encouraging bacterial growth. 
2.11:  The Monopolies Commission  Report+ noted that this type of beer, known 
as 'keg• or brewery conditioned beer, was first marketed by Watneys in  1933.  However,  the same report 
indicates that it was not until  the mid-1950s that the term  'keg
1  came into common  use with the marketing 
of *Flowers Keg  bitter, the first brew being made during the firstweek of May  1954.  Thus,  the transport 
and storage difficulties associated with traditional or cask conditioned beer were overcome enabling the 
notion of a  beer of constant quality and flavour for  national distribution to become a  reality.  Before this 
could happen,  however,  there was a  problem;  namely,  that the effective marketing of keg beers could not 
be achieved if the brewer did not own  the retail outlets (i.e.  licensed premises) in  the chosen area.  For 
the brewer with the financial  resources the remedy to this problem was to take-over other brewers thereby 
acquiring the retail ouflets owned by the acquired firm.  In  addition to businesses which failed in  the 
normal  course of events,  the fall  in  the number of brewer for  sale licences and brewery companies actively 
brewing shown  in  Table 2.4 can be attributed to mergers and take-overs which became an increasing aspect 
of brewers• behaviour from  the 1950s and into the early 1970s. 
+  The Monopolies Commission  (1969) op. cit. para. 22. 
*  Flowers Breweries Ltd.  are now  part of the Whitbread group. 
18 TABLE  2.4 
Breweries and  Brewery Companies actively Brewing,  UK  1881-1976 
1881 
1890 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Breweries ( i •  e . 
Brewer for Sale 
Licences) 
16,798 
11,364 
6,447 
4,512 
2,914 
1,418 
840 
567 
358 
244 
220 
177 
177 
170 
162 
162 
152 
147 
142 
SOURCE:  The  Brewers•  Society{l976)op.cit. 
19 
Brewery Companies 
(i.e. actively 
brewing) 
362 
247 
117 
96 
96 
92 
88 
88 
84 
82 
82 2.12:  Even  in  the absence of any desire to market beers on a  national basis the 
only way a  brewer could expand his business was by  take-over.  There is  little doubt that the incentive to 
acquire other brewers was directly as a  result of the licensing system:  this system ensures that at any one 
time there is a  fixed supply of licensed retail outlets available so  that the acquisition of a  brewer and his 
public houses ensures an immediate and rapid increase in  market share.  To  place in  perspective the scale 
with which such market share increases could come about it is useful  to refer to the Monopolies Commission+ 
report.  This  report states that during the period of its inquiry into the beer industry,  from  July 1966 to 
Apri I 1969, 
1120 brewery companies were taken over by other brewers. 
11  Furthermore, 
11in  1968 Bass 
Charrington acquired by takeover of other brewery companies a  further 842 premises (758 on-licensed and 
84 off-licensed),  bringing its total premises to 11,457.  Whitbread also acquired by  takeovers a further 
689 premises (647 on-licensed and 42 off-licensed} bringing its total premises to 9087.
11  In  terms of the 
geographical scale against which such take-overs occurred it is  interesting to consider the case of Watney. 
The acquisition of Tamplin  & Sons,  of Brighton,  Sussex gave Watney 400 public houses in  that area.  In 
1960 three take-overs were completed which increased the number of Watney public houses by  3195:  Phipps 
Northampton Brewery Co.  Ltd.  added 1171  pubs within a  60 mile radius of Northampton;  Ushers Wiltshire 
Brewery  Ltd.  added 900 pubs and a  brewery at Trowbridge; and the takeover of Wilson and Walker Breweries 
Ltd.  resulted in  an addition of 1124 pubs in  the Manchester area.  More recently,  the Bass  Charrington 
brewery at Runcorn  replaced the brewing capacity of nine local  breweries. 
2.13:  The Monopolies Commission++ reported extensively on  the brewery 
ownership of licensed premises in  relation to the data for  1967 which was the latest available at that time. 
This source is  used  here as a  reference point in  the discussion of changes in  the pattern of licence owner-
ship since that date. 
2.14:  Table 2.5 shows that in  1967 brewers owned 78 per cent  of full  on-
licences and  just under 30 per cent  of off-licences, equivalent to some 58 per cent  of all  UK  licensed and 
registered premises.  Distinct  regional differences in  this pattern of ownership are revealed by Table 2.6 
which credits brewers as owning 52.7 per cent  of licensed premises in  England and Wales,  but just under 
15  per cent  in  Scotland and none in  Northern  Ireland.  Once again, however,  there are differences in  the 
extent of brewery ownership of different types of licence within the different realms of the UK as Table 2.7 
demonstrates.  In  England and Wales in  1967 brewers owned 86 per cent  of fully on-licensed premises and 
just under 40 per cent  of off-licensed premises.  In  Scotland,  brewery ownership of on-licences extended 
to almost 27 per cent  of such premises but was not even 1 per cent  of off-licensed premises.  With the 
exception of one on-licence, brewery ownership of licensed premises is  notably absent in  Northern  Ireland. 
+  The Monopolies Commission (1969) op. cit. para.  12 and footnote (a} of Table 21. 
++  The Monopolies Commission  (196Y)op.cit.Chapter. 3 
20 TABLE  2.5 
Brewery  Ownership of Licensed and Registered  Premises,  UK,  1966 and 1967 
Total  Owned by 
Total  Premises in  UK  Brewers 
Type of Licence  1966  1967  1966  1967 
Full  on-licence 
(mainly pub I  ic houses)  75, 1<Jt  75,001  59,465  58,525 
Restaurant  4,217  4,811  15  40 
Residential  1,087  1, 191  Nil  Nil 
Combined  restaurant  and 
residential  1,991  1,953  Nil  Nil 
Registered  Clubs  23,652  24,268  Nil  Nil 
Licensed  Clubs  2,318  2,377  Nil  Nil 
Off-licences  30,203  30,365  9,554  9,084 
138,677  139,966  69,035  67,649 
SOURCE:  The Monoeolies Commission(1969) op.cit.  Table 17 
TABLE  2.6 
Brewery  Ownership of Licensed  Outlets in  England and Wales,  Scotland and 
Northern  Ireland,  1966 and 1967 
%Brewery Owned 
1966  1967 
79.2  78.0 
0.3  0.8 
31.6  29.9 
49.8  48.3 
All  Licensed  Outlets  % Brewery  Owned 
1966  1967  1966  1967 
England and Wales  124,003  124,913  54.2  52.7 
Scotland  11,968  12,309  15.4  14.8 
Great Britain  136,144  137,222  50.7  49.3 
N.  Ireland  2,706  2,744  (nil)  (nil) 
United  Kingdom  138,677.  139,966  49.8  48.3 
SOURCE:  The Monoeolies Commission  (1969)op.cit. Table 18 
21 TABLE  2.7 
Brewery Ownership of full  on-licences and off-licences in  England and Wales,  Scotland' 
and  Northern  Ireland,  1966 and 1967 
Total  Licences 
full  on/off licences  No.  Brewer  Owned  % Brewer  Owned 
1966  1967  1966  1967  1966  1967 
Full  On-licences 
England and Wales  66,373  65,916  57,648  56,741  86.9  86.1 
Scotland  6,541  6,634  11816  1,783  27.7  26.9 
Great Britain  72,914  72,550  59,464  58,524  81.6  80.7 
N.  Ireland  2, 195  2,451  1  1  (ni I)  (ni I) 
United  Kingdom  75,109  75,001  59,465  58,525  79.2  78.0 
Off-I  icences 
Eng land and Wa I  es  26,590  26,702  35.8  33.9 
Scotland  3,449  3,555  0.6  0.6 
Great Britain  30,039  30,257  31.8  30.0 
N.  Ireland  164  108  (nil)  (nil) 
United  Kingdom  30,203  30,365  31.6  29.9 
SOURCE:  The Monopolies Commission(1969) op.cit.Tables 19 and 20 
22 2.15:  It  has not proved possible to update this data on  the same scale as the 
Monopolies Commission  provided for  1967.  However,  by  taking the most  recent information that is 
available it is  possible to comment upon  how  the brewery ownership of certain licensed premises changed up 
to 1975.  Generally,  it remains true (as Table 2.5 shows) that brewery ownership of registered and licensed 
clubs is  virtually non-existent,  has no doubt increased in  the hotel and restaurant sections and has probably 
slightly increased to around 16.5 per cent  of all  licences in  Scotland.  Within the UK as a  whole,  how-
ever,  brewery ownership of all types of licence has fallen from  48.3 per cent  in  1967 to at least 36.0 per 
cent  in  1975. 
2. 16:  The data setting out the relative position of UK  brewers with respect to 
ownership of liquor licences is set out in  Table 2. 8 and based upon  figures for  1967 which have been 
extracted from  the Monopolies Commission+ report and those for  1975 taken from  the Price Commission* 
report.  It  is  clear that the number of full  on-licences and pubs has declined,  in  both absolute and relative 
terms,  between 1967 and 1975.  In  the words of the Errol!  Report% 
11the reasons for this are quite straight-
forward.  The brewing industry for most of this century has pursued a  policy of  'fewer and better'.  This 
has meant,  in  effect, a  continuous process of closing down  substandard pub I  ic houses while improving 
existing premises.  This process has been reinforced by a  number of factors.  These include increased costs 
of distribution,  changes in  population and major redevelopment schemes in  most of the country's large cities. 
The effect has been a  continued run  down  of public houses in  rural  areas,  the closure of smaller public 
houses in a  large number of towns and an increasing concentration on  larger outlets ... 
11  E9 
+  The Monopolies Commission(l969) op.cit. 
*  Price Commission  ( 1977)  Beer  Prices and Margins,  HMSO. 
%Errol!  Report(1972)  para. 2.16. 
E9  Brewers' Annual Reports and Accounts stand testimony to this quotation: 
Vaux Breweries ( 1976) 
11 
•••  acquired or completed 3 pubs and undertaken major improvements 
to 18 pubs and hotels ... sold  17 pubs,  of which 4 were compulsorily 
acquired. 
11 
Higsons Brewery (1975) 
Scottish & Newcastle 
Breweries (1975) 
Davenports Brewery 
( 1975) 
Boddingtons Breweries 
(1975) 
Greenall Whitley (1975) 
11Many of our building (new pubs) decisions will  be affected by the 
development or otherwise of devastated areas on  Merseyside -
1,200acres in  liverpool alone.  Much will also depend on the 
movement of population which sadly is  still outwards from  Merseyside. 
11 
11 
••• we have opened ten new public houses,  all of which are in 
development areas or replace licences lost through re-development. 
11 
11Two  small  unprofitable licensed houses were sold during the year, 
and we lost a  further one in  Nottingham by Compulsory  Purchase Order. 
11 
11 1n  1975  we  have  spent  £454,000 on  capital  projects and  a 
further  £291,000 on  maintaining  and  improving  the  comfort  and 
facilities  in  many  of our  existing  houses.  Three  new  public 
houses  have  been  opened  during  the year. 
11 
11We are actively seeking sites to off-set further losses under 
Compulsory  Purchase Orders.  During  1975 we opened six new 
public houses  • . . . . .  carried out major alterations to 19  public 
houses
11
• 
23 TABLE  2.8 
Estimated Changes in  Brewery Ownership of Licensed  Premises,  UK  1967 and 1975 
Licence and Ownership  1967  1975 
Total  Licences  1391937 %  155,957 % 
of which Full  on-licences  75,001  %  73,656 % 
(pubs)  (72,400)%  (66, ooo); 
off-1 i  cences  30,365  35,990 
%  % 
On-licences as %of Total  Licences  53.6  47.2 
Pubs as %of Total  Licences  51.7  42.3 
Off-licences as %of Total  Licences  21.7  23.1 
Brewer  Ownership: 
Full  On-licence  58,525  * 
(of which  pubs)  (58, 036) *  (50, ooo)+ 
(of  which  hotels)  (489) * 
Restaurants  40 * 
Off-I  icences  9,084 *  6,100  e 
Total  67,649  * 
%  % 
Brewer  Share: 
%  Full  on-licences owned by brewers  78.0 
%  pubs  owned  by  brewers  80.2  75.8 
%  off-licences owned  by  brewers  29.9  16.9 
%  pubs  and  off-licences owned by  brewers  65.3  55.0 
All  brewery ownership as% of all types of 
licence  48.3  (36.0)  understated 
SOURCES:  :¢  Table 1 .2 
*  The Monopolies Commission(1969)op.cit.footnote to Table 16,  Table 17 
and Table 22. 
+  Price Commission (1977)  Beer  Prices and Margins,  HMSO para. 6.6. 
e  estimate 
24 2.17:  The difference between the number of fully on-licensed premises and 
public houses is  comprised of hotels,  railway and air terminal refreshment rooms,  bowling alleys and dance 
halls etc.  In  1967 the number of such  licences stood at around 2,600 but by  1975  had grown  by 5,000 to 
just over 7,600 licences.  As  far as the brewery ownership of the 2,600 other than public house  licences 
in  1967 are concerned,  brewers were responsible for  489 all of which could be found  in  hotels. 
Unfortunately,  the element of brewery ownership in  this growth sector for  licences remains unknown for 
1975, and must therefore contribute to understatement in  our estimate of overall brewery ownership of 
licensed premises given in  the last line of Table 2.8. 
2.18:  Comprehensive data on  brewery ownership of licensed premises is 
presented in  Table 2. 8 for  1967 but only on a  much more restricted basis for  1975.  The  brewery ownership 
of both public houses and off-licences has fallen between  1967 and 1975 from  58,036 to 50,000 and 9, 084 
to 6,100 respectively.  The combined effect of this fall  in  ownership has reduced the brewers•  share of 
such premises from  just over 65 per cent  in  1967 to stand at 55 per cent  in  1975.  There has,  however, 
been a  differential impact upon  pubs on  the one hand, and off-licences on  the other.  The brewers•  share 
of total off-licences has fallen dramatically,  from  almost 30 per cent  in  1967 to  just under 17 per cent.  in 
1975, whilst at the same time they have been able to retain control of slightly more than three-quarters of 
the UK
1s pubs in  1975. 
2.19:  Thus,  it would appear that brewers accounted for 48.3 per cent  of a II 
licensed premises in  1967,  but bearing in  mind  that the full  extent of brewery ownership is  not known  for 
1975, the best estimate for  this penetration factor in  that year must  be that brewers were responsible for~ 
least 36.0 per cent  of all  licensed premises. 
The Tied  House System 
2.20:  The tied-house system  has evolved in  parallel with the licensing of 
premises for the sale of intoxicating liquor, and takes the form  of an exclusive supply contract whereby the 
licensee undertakes only to sell the products of the brewer who owns the premises.  This  tie extends not 
only to beers,  but to other alcoholic beverages as well as other brewers• beers,  where the landlord brewer 
acts as wholesaler for those products as well.  This  is  the general case, though there are a  few  small 
exceptions for  some tenants, so  that all the brewer-owners of licensed premises operate tied-supply arrange-
ments which cover both on  and off-licensed premises. 
2.21:  Of the licensed premises which are tied (or brewer-owned) there are two 
distinct categories;  the first of these is  where the licensee rents the pub from  the brewer-landlord and is 
thus a  tenant, and the second where  the licensee is  managing the pub directly on  the breweris behalf. 
The difference between these two types of licensee is  characterised by the fact that the former  is  self-
employed and the latter is  the salaried employee of the brewer.  Data on  the number of brewery-owned 
25 TABLE  2.9 
Brewery-owned  licensed premises under tenancy and management,  UK  1967 
Type of licensed  No.  Brewer- Tenanted  Managed 
premises  owned  No.  %  No.  % 
On-licences  58,525  44,696  76.4  13,829  23.6 
(pubs)  (58, 036)  (44,605)  76.9  (13,431)  23.1 
(hotels)  (489)  (91)  18.6  (398)  81.4 
Off-licences  9,084  5,157  56.8  3,927  43.2 
Restaurants  40  9  22.5  31  77.5 
Total  Brewer-owned  67,649  49,862  73.7  17,787  26.3 
SOURCE:  The  Monopolies  Commission  (1969).  Table  22. 
26 premises under tenancy and management is  provided by the Monopolies Commission  for  1967 and presented 
here as Table 2.  9, where it can be seen that nearly 74 per cent  of tied premises were under tenancy with 
the balance of 26 per cent  under management. 
2.22:  There has been a discernable trend towards the direct brewery  manage~ 
ment of licensed premises in  preference to tenancies.  Ten  years before the date to which the Monopolies 
Commission  reported the proportion of brewery owned  licensed premises under management was 22 per cent. 
(c. f. 26 per cent.).  Within the brewery owned public house sector the proportion under management in 
1967 was 23.1 per cent  (see Table 2.  9);  from  the Erroll  Report+ the derived figure would seem to be 24.5 
per cent  for  1972, with the Price Commission++reporting  around 25 per cent  for  1976. 
2. 23:  The proportion of public houses under management and tenancy vary from 
area to area as well as between brewers.  The Monopolies Commission% reported that management pre-
dominates in and around Birmingham,  liverpool and Newcastle, and amongst brewery owned premises in 
Scotland.  In  1966 the proportion of public houses under management in  London  was 12.5 per cent  where-
as by  1974 this share had  risen  to 35.5 per cent.* 
2.24:  There would appear to be numerous reasons for  the trend towards direct 
management, one of which is  po!;sibly related to the changing character of public houses.  Increasingly, 
the choice of drinking in  the public or lounge bar of a  public house  is  narrowing through the amalgamation 
of these two bars into one large bar of lounge standard.  Combined with this and the general drinking 
facilities has been the provision of restaurants and live entertainments suggesting the concept of a  public 
house a.s  one form  of leisure complex.  Not surprisingly such changes have occurred amongst the larger 
premises where the scale of operations requires an element of financing which a  tenant may be unable to 
provide.  ·This fact,  together with a  broader base of business offering potentially higher gross margins in-
evitably leads to the need for direct control by the brewer-owners.  The  Financial Times  has reported that 
"in the London area £40,000 spent on a  pub which is  put under management can increase retai I profits from 
£5,000 to £25,000 a  year .•... £24,000 (spent) on an outlet in  central Edinburgh saw weekly takings jump 
from  £250 to £1000 .•.•  "  *  Contributing to such returns in  managed houses is  the gross margin which the 
National Board  for  Prices and  lncomesEBdetermined from  a  sample survey carried out in  1968 to  be 27.7 per 
cent  as against that for  tenanted houses of 20.6 per cent.  The  latest information on  gross margins is 
provided by the Price Commission* report which indicates this relationship to be replicated  for  1976;  that is, 
a gross margin  in  managed houses of 37 per cent  ,  compared with 29 per cent  for tenanted houses. 
+ 
++ 
,0' 
* 
ED 
* 
Erroll  Report ( 1972) op. cit. para. 2. 30. 
Price Commission (1977) op  .. cit,para.1.16. 
The Monopolies Commission  (1969)op.cit.para 18.0 
-Financial Times.  24th April  1974.  Brewing Survey. 
National Board  for  Prices and  Incomes.  Report  No.  136  Beer  Prices.  HMSO.  para. 59. 
Price Commission op. cit.  Tables 23 and 25. 
27 The  Major  Brewing  Groups 
2.25:  The process of merger and acquisition has today provided an industry in 
which there are 82 brewery companies or groups of companies actively engaged in  the production and 
distribution of beer (see Table 2.4) but which is dominated by 7 enterprises responsible for around three-
quarters of UK  beer production and accounting for slightly more than 90 per cent  of beer sales.  In  1967 
following the merger between Bass and (harrington these seven companies - Bass  (harrington, Allied 
Breweries,  Whitbread,  Watney Mann (now Watney Mann and Truman  Brewers  Ltd.),  Scottish and 
Newcastle Breweries,  Courage,and Guinness- were responsible for 22.7m.  bulk barrels out of a  total  UK 
beer production of 31.2m.  bulk barrels, or 73 per cent.*  Eleven companies accounted for a  further 13 per 
cent  of production with the balance distributed amongst 93 separate enterprises. 
2.26:  The 
1odd-man-out
1 amongst the 7-major brewers is Guinness,  for as a  rule 
it does not own  licensed premises and is  therefore not involved in  the retail trade.  Guinness is sold to 
other brewers who act as wholesalers and retailers after bottling and packaging the product.  Only two 
other  UK  breweries operate in  this manner and both of them are lager brewers;  that is,  Harp  Lager Ltd., and 
Carlsberg Brewery  Ltd,  These two brewers,  together with Guinness
1 output of stout account for  13 per cent 
of UK  beer consumption,+  whilst Harp  claims to be 
11Britain
1s eighth largest brewer (1976 Turnover £66.9m.} 
and brews and sells more than 22 per cent  of all  lager in  the  UK  and Republic of Ireland. 
11  +1-
2.27:  Leaving Guinness aside,  therefore,  means that there are 6  large enter-
pris es that are both brewers and operators of licensed premises and their ownership of such retail establish-
ments in  1967 is  set out in  Table 2. 10.  At this time it is evident that some 70 per cent  of all the Big  6 
brewers• I  icensed premises were under tenancies;  for  public houses alone the comparable proportion was 
nearly 74 per cent  whilst the balance between tenanted and managed off-licences was more or less equal 
at 50 per cent.  The notable exception to this pattern of operations can be seen  in  Scottish and  Newcastle 
Breweries where getting on  for three-quarters of both pubs and off-licences were managed as opposed to 
tenanted. 
2.28:  Once again,  lack of comprehensive data I  imits the extent to which the 
data in  Table 2.10 can be updated.  However,  the Price Commission  reports that the 
11six major brewery 
groups own  more than 37,000 public houses
11,,0'  a  statistic which may  be combined with those presented 
earlier at Table 2.8 and used  in  an assessment of the Big-6 brewers•  role in  the retail distribution of 
alcoholic beverages.  Table 2.11 sets out such an assessment which shows that in .1967 the Big-6 brewers 
owned almost one-third of all  UK  liquor licences in  force at that time but that their share of all brewery-
* 
+ 
+1-
% 
The Monopolies Commission{1969)op.cit. Table 4 and para 15, 
Price Commission (1977)  op.cit.  para. 2.1(2). 
Financial Times  28th June 1977- advertisement for  Harp. 
Price Commission  (1977)op.cit. para .6.6. 
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TABLE  2.10 
Number and  Type  of  Licensed  premises  under  ownership  of 6-Major  Brewers,  {as  at 31st  December  1967) 
T  ota I  Licensed  Premises  Public  Houses  Off-licences 
Brewer  Total  Tenanted  Managed  Total  Tenanted  Managed  Total  Tenanted  Managed 
%  %  %  %  %  % 
Bass  Cherrington  10,615  63.0  37.0  8,977  64.3  35.7  1,545  58.7  41.3 
Allied  10,083  64.3  35.7  8,296  70.0  30.0  1,742  39.0  61.0 
Whitbread  8,398  76.6  23.4  7,260  80.2  19.8  1, 106  54.4  45.6 
Watney  7,947  81.8  18.2  6,555  86.6  13.4  1,342  59.8  40.2 
Courage  5,994  83.6  16.4  4,449  90.0  10.0  496  36.0  64.0 
Scottish and 
Newcastle  1,  915  25.3  74.7  1,803  26.0  74.0  62  29.0  71.0 
Totals  43,952  70.0  30.0  37,340  73.7  26.3  6,293  50.6  49.4 
------- ~-·- --------------~-----
SOURCE:TheMonopolies  Commission  (1969) op.cit.  Table  23. 
Hotels and Restaurants 
Total  Tenanted  Managed 
%  % 
11  3  8 
- - -
2  - 2 
- - -
- - -
1  - 1 
14  3  11 
-- - - -----~---owned  licences was almost two-thirds (65  per cent  ).  Between  1967 and 1975, no doubt because of 
acquisitions but irrespective of rationalisation programmes the 6 main  brewery groups increased their share 
of all public houses from  just under 52 per cent  to 56 per cent.  Over the same time their share of all off-
licenced premises fell  from  nearly 21  per cent  to just over 13 per cent.  The dominance of and therefore 
the importance that must  be attached to the role of the Big-6 is  exemplified by the figures in  the last three 
lines of Table 2. 11;  namely,  that the Big-6 increased their share of all brewery-owned pubs and off-
licences from  65 per cent  in  1967 to a  little more than 74 per cent  in  1975;  amongst pubs alone this share 
rose from  just over 64 per cent  to 74 per cent;  and for off-licences it increased from  69 per cent  to 
virtually 78 per cent. 
2.29:  Amongst the Big-6 brewers the general trend towards the substitution of 
managers for tenants can be revealed using data derived from  the Price Commission  report.  The  Price 
Commission at Table 25  in  its report+ has indicated that the 6  large brewers operated 11,777 managed pubs 
as at the 1st June 1976.  The difference between the 37,000 pubs they own  (mentioned in  the previous 
paragraph) and 11,777 implies some 25,223 public houses under tenancy.  Thus,  of total Big-6 pubs some 
32 per cent  are currently managed as against the balance of 68 per cent  which are tenanted.  These 
data compare with 26 per cent  and 74 per cent  respectively  1  shown  for  pubs in  1967 in  Table 2. 10.  So, 
there has been a  clear shift in  preference for  managed houses among the Big-6 brewers thereby strengthening 
their direct control of such outlets. 
The Free T  rode 
2.30:  Emphasis so  far has been placed upon  the role played by brewers in  the 
retail distribution of alcoholic beverages in  the UK.  In  terms of the total number of outlets it is clear from 
the foregoing that the brewers as a  whole have experienced a decline in  their relative importance.  That 
proportion of the total number of outlets which has increased in  importance may generally be referred to as 
11the free-trade" for  it has no formal  ties with brewers.++  Data on  the numbers of free-trade licensed 
outlets is  presented in  Table 2.12 which clearly demonstrates the increasing numerical  importance of free-
trade outlets,  notably the free-pubs and off-licences and the clubs trade. 
2. 31:  Each of the three types of free-trade outlet just mentioned reflect 
different elements of competition with respect to the brewery owned outlets.  In  the first instance, free-pubs 
are establishments similar in  nature and character to brewery-owned pubs and irrespective of the fact that 
the former  have a  lower frequency of national distribution they compete directly for custom at the retail 
level.  Furthermore,  not being tied to any particular brewer they are free to stock whichever alcohols they 
choose so that brewery companies acting as wholesalers of beers, wines and spirits are in  competition with 
each other to supply this sector of the trade. 
+  Price Commission  op.cit.  Table 25. 
++  but see para .  2. 37. 
30 TABLE  2.11 
6-Major  Brewers•  share  of certain  licensed  premises,  1967  and  1975 
1967  1975 
Total  Number of Licensed premises  139,937  155,957 
Total  Number of Pubs  72,400  66,000 
T  ota  I Number of Off-1 i  cences  30,365  35,990 
Brewery  Ownership of Licensed premises  67,649 
Brewery Ownership of Pubs  58,036  50,000 
Brewery  Ownership of Off-licences  9,084  6,100  e 
Big-6 Owership of Licensed premises  43,952 
Big-6 Ownership of Pubs  37,340 +  37,000 * 
Big-6 Ownership of Off-licences  6  293 +  4,750  e  I 
%  % 
Big-6
1s Share: 
of a II  Licences  31.4 
of all Pubs  51.6  56.0 
of all Off-licences  20.7  13.2 
of all Brewer owned  Licences  65.0 
of all Brewer owned  Pubs  64.3  74.0 
of all Brewer owned  Off-licences  69.3  77.9 
of a II  Brewer owned  Pubs and 
off-I  i  cences  65.0  74.4 
SOURCE:  as for  Table 2.8, but with the addition of: 
*  Price Commission.  op.cit. para. 6.6. 
+  The Monopolies Comm'ission op.cit.  Ta.ble 23 
31 2.32:  Numerically,  the most  important sector of the free-trade is  the Licensed 
and Registered Clubs, especially the latter of which there were just over 24,230 in  1967 and slightly more 
than 27,700 in  1975.  A distinctive feature of this part of the free-trade is  that there exist breweries 
whose output is specifically for  the clubs' trade and may  be referred to as the •clubs' breweries' and rather 
than owning  licensed premises these breweries are owned by the clubs themselves.  In  1967, there were 
four such breweries;  namely, The South Wales and Monmouth  United Club Brewery  Ltd., The  Northern 
Clubs' Federation Brewery  Ltd.,  the Midland Clubs' Brewery Ltd., and the Yorkshire Clubs'  Brewery. 
The Midland Clubs' Brewery reported to the Monopolies Commission  in  1969 that 
11due to poor trading, we 
have been forced  to close our  Brewery,  and are now  in  the hands of a  Receiver and Manager. 
11  +  The 
Brewers' Society+l-indicates that the Yorkshire Clubs' Brewery has been taken-over by The  Northern Clubs' 
Federation Brewers,  and has ceased to brew, so  that it appears there are now only two  Clubs' breweries 
actively brewing. 
2. 33:  It  is  necessary to set down  some additional facts to place the Registered 
clubs' trade in  better perspective.  Bearing  in  mind  that a  Registered club can be anything from  a  small 
bar in  a  tennis club to a  club with alcoholic drinks turnover in  excess of many pubs,  Registered clubs as a 
whole accounted for 20 per cent  of all beer supplied in  the  UK,  and for 60 per cent  of beer passing 
through all free-trade outlets in  1967.  Furthermore, as the clubs
1 breweries only accounted for  some 
2 per cent  of total  UK  beer production  in  1967 this market represents an area of considerable competition 
amongst  UK  brewers to supply these outlets.  The regional nature of this competition is evoked by the 
names of the clubs' breweries concerned and by the fact that the Jlclubs movement  is  particularly strong, 
and occupies a  special place in  the life of the people,  in  Yorkshire,  Durham and Northumberland,  South 
Lancashire,  South Wales,  Monmouthshire and the Midlands. 
11  * 
2.34:  It  is  the off-licensed secto_r as a  whole which provides the prime source 
of supply to the take-home trade, a  rapidly expanding market where price competition is especially acute 
not only between the free and tied off-licences but more particularly amongst the free-trade element. 
Table 2.12 shows that the number of free off-licences increased from  around 21,280 in  1967 to almost 
30,000 by  1975, whilst Table 2.13 provides an analysis of this latter figure in  terms of the different forms 
of business. 
2.35:  Amongst the 9,800 free-trade specialist off-licences shown  in  Table 2.13 
slightly more thaQ  half vvere  independent traders in  1975.  This group,  together with the specialist 
multiples,  has similar locational and trading characteristics as the brewery-owned groups so that Allied's 
Victoria Wine and Wine Ways (1200 branches),  Courage's Arthur Cooper (311  branches), Whitbread's 
Thresher (330 branches} and Grand Metropolitan's Peter Dominic and Westminster Wine (615 branches) 
+  The Monopolies Commission(1969)op.cit.footnote to para.12 
+1- The  Brewers' Society(1976)op.cit.  Table M3.p.80 
*  The Monopolies Commission  (1969)op.cit.para 247 and 248 
32 TABLE  2.12 
Free-trade  licensed  outlets  UK,  1967  and  1975 
1967  1975 
Free-pubs  14,364  16,000 
Free-Off-I  i  cences  21,281  35,645  29,890  45,890 
Registered  Clubs  24,239  27,711 
Licensed  Clubs  2,377  26,616  2,802  30,513 
62,261  76,403 
Restaurant/Residential  7,955  15,798 * 
Other  Full  On-licences  2,072  7,656 * 
T  ota I  Free-trade  Licences  72,288  99,857 
Brewery-owned  Licences  67,649  56,100 + 
--- ---
Total  Licences  139 I 937  155,957 
*  includes  unknown  element  of  Brewery  ownership. 
+  because  of *  this  figure  is  understated. 
33 TABLE  2.13 
Estimates of Off-licences by  different forms  of business,  UK,  1975 
No.  o/o 
Free-trade spec ia I  i  sts  9,804  27 
of which,  Multiples and Co-ops  (4,394)  ( 12) 
Independents  (5,410)  ( 15) 
Grocers  17,785  50 
of which,  Multiples  (4,334)  {12) 
Co-ops  (2,391)  (7) 
Independents  ( 11, 060)  (31) 
Other  types  (e.g .  chemists)  2,301  6 
'Free'-trade Total  29,890  83 
Brewer-owned  specialists  6,100  17 
Total  35,990  100 
34 outlets are common  high street names as are such free-trade multiples as Augustus Barnett ( 180 branches), 
Fairdeal Vintners (45 branches), Ashe and Nephew (160 branches),  Unwins (170 branches) and Gough Bros. 
(135 branches). 
2.36:  Fifty per cent. of off-licensed premises could be found  in  grocery stores 
in  1975, and of these some 62 per cent  (or 11,060) were independent traders.  The reasons for the growth 
in  the number of grocery shop off-I  icenses have been discussed earlier so  that it is worth noting that in  1965 
Tesco,  one of the UK's major retail food  distributors,  had  less than  10 in-store off-licensed departments but 
that by  1976 had  increased this to 378, of which 14 were opened during that year. +  Fine Fare, another 
leading multiple grocery retailer had some 453 "licensed grocery outlets" around the beginning of 1975. -1+ 
The Co-operative Societies, with getting on  for 2,400 in..:store  liquor departments, represent the largest 
single off-licence chain in  the  UK  and as such account for  the largest share of the take-home drinks trade 
with  sale~ in  1976 of around £90m. 
2.37:  One last paragraph needs to be written concerning the brewers' ostensible 
lack of control over free-trade outlets.  This control  is  exercised through the form  of loans at favourable 
rates of interest made to members of the free trade for,  for example, the maintenance,  improvement or 
extension of premises.  In  return,  the trader undertakes to buy a  certain proportion of his requirements of 
beers, wines and spirits from  the brewer concerned.  This  practice exists in  all areas of the free trade and 
The  Monopolies Commission stated that in  1967 the seven major brewers made loans to clubs of£  14m.  and to 
the rest of the free trade some £1Om.  was outstanding.*  More recently, the Price Commission  has 
reported that in  1976 the total sum  loaned by  brewers to free public houses was  "well near £115m."  % 
Other inducements to 'ties' are the granting of favourable discounts over a  fixed number of years. 
Conclusion 
2.38:  There can be little doubt that the liquor licensing system has shaped the 
overall structure of alcoholic drink retailing in  the United  Kingdom.  The brewery companies have emerged 
as the largest single group of owners and operators of licensed premises.  Whilst it is  true to say that the 
brewery ownership of all  licensed premises has fallen from  just over 48 per cent  in  1967 to probably around 
40 per cent  today,  it has been shown  that the six major brewing enterprises have as a  result of their 
acquisitions of other brewers increased their dominance over all brewery-owned pubs and off-licences from 
65 per cent  in  1967 to almost 75 per cent  by  1975. 
2.39  Over recent years many brewers, and the six majors in  particular,  have 
developed significant interests in  the distribution of wines and spirits, to the extent that they represent 
+  Tesco Stores (Holdings) Ltd.  Annual  Report and Accounts 1976. 
+t  Retail and Distribution Management Jan/Feb.  1975.  Market Report on  Wines & Spirit by R.  Cox. 
The Monopolies Commission(l969)op.cit.para 252 and 265 
Price Commission (1977)  op.cit. para. 4.1. 
* 
35 integrated producing,  wholesaling and retailing operations.  Although the brewers as a  group provide, 
for  example,  for  some 95 per  cent  of domestic consumer demand for  beer it must  not be forgotten that 
this demand  is  satisfied in  two  ways;  that is,  through retail sales from  both brewery owned and free-trade 
outlets.  Thus,  whilst competition exists amongst all retail outlets it  is  no doubt much keener amongst 
allwholesalers of alcoholic drinks especially in  providing for the diverse nature of free-trade outlets. 
2.40  The clubs
1 trade represents a  specia I  ised sector of free-trade demand. 
Changing socia I values and .consumer preferences have given impetus to the  take-home market and been 
met by increases in  off-licence facilities,  especially amongst grocery retailers which represent an 
emergent element of countervailing power.  The following chapter endeavours to assess the relative 
importance of these and the other channels of distribution by attaching trade values to the numbers of 
different outlets which have provided the substance of this chapter. 
36 3:  DISTRIBUTION AND  PRICES 
3.1.  The channels of distribution through which wines and spirits in  the U.K. 
pass to the consumer are diverse compared with beer which is distributed along far more clear-cut lines. 
The brewery companies, with three important exceptions*, act as the wholesalers of their own  beer 
production and their wholesale customers may be classified as follows: 
and 
i)  the tied estate whether tenanted or managed . 
i i) 
iii) 
other brewers and wholesalers. 
the free trade. 
The free trade customers are comprised of those who hold non-brewery owned on-licences for  pubs,  clubs, 
hotels and restaurants, and off-licef!Ces held by the specialist retailer and the licenced grocery trade. 
Increasing sales through clubs and the growth of the take-home market, which  has given rise to increased 
sales through  licensed grocers,  have resulted in a  lower proportion of wholesale beer sales being made in 
brewers tied estates.  The Price Commission  has shown that for  the Big-6 brewers 51  per  cent  of th·~ir 
wholesale beer sales in  1976 passed to the tied trade but that in  1974 this share had been 54 per  cent. 
This trend  is  repeated for  both regional and smaller brewers.+ 
3.2.  Spirits reach the consuming pub I  ic through a  variety of channels.  The 
larger brewers because of their control over retail outlets and the size of orders involved are often 
served direct by  many distillers who accord to them 'national account' status.  The brewers,  in  turn, 
then act as wholesalers not necessarily only to their own tied estate  but to the free trade also.  In  fact 
any purchaser requiring consistently large orders is  likely to be served direct and treated as a  national 
account; for  example,  multiple retail grocers such as Tesco,  Sainsbury and Asda, and the operators 
of retail off-I icence chains, whether independant (e.g. Augustus Barnett) or  brewer-owned  (Grants of 
* 
+ 
Arthur Guinness Son  & Co Ltd., Harp  Lager., and Carlsberg  Brewery 
11together account for 
about 13 per  cent  of U.K. beer consumption.  They brew only stout and lager,  normally 
selling  in  bulk to other brewers and wholesalers, who in  turn retail  it  in  their own public 
houses or through the free trade.  As a  rule they do not own public houses nor do they engage 
in the retail trade. 
11  Price Commission  (1977) op.cit. para 2.1. 
Price Commission  (1977) op.cit. para 2.3. 
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1s), and independent and voluntary (symbol) group wholesalers.  Those retailers not large 
enough to be served direct by a  distiller can obtain their supplies  from  cash and carry wholesalers, 
brewers acting as wholesalers of spirits or the larger wine and spirit merchants and wholesalers. 
3.3.  Data supplied by the Distillers Co.  Ltd.  (D.C.L.)* is  particularly useful 
in  that it  exempiifies the variety of wholesale customer that the company supplies as well as the range of 
•middlemen•  that are available to supply the retail trade.  This data is set out in  Table 3.1  for the year 
ended 31st  December 1977 and has been derived from  volume sales,  i.e. proof gallons, of D.C.L
1s own 
brands.  An interesting point to note in  Table 3.1  is  that for  Scotch whisky and gin the 37 largest 
customers accounted for  80.3 per  cent  and 90.5 per  cent  ,  respectively, of total sales volume, and that 
for  vodka 28 customers claimed 88.3 per  cent  of that spirits• sales volume.  It  is  understood that the 
balance of sales• volumes was made to some 600 other customers.  For each of the spirits shown  in  Table 
3.1  ,  the brewers (including the Big-6) represent the largest  single group of buyers,  followed  by 
buying groups and then grocers,  including such fh·ms  such as Tesco, Asda,  Safeway, Woolworth, 
Keymarkets,  International Stores and the Co-op. 
3.4.  The data in  Table 3. 1  must,  however be considered with caution for 
whilst it presents a  general scheme of how  sectors of the wholesale and retail drinks trade are supplied 
it is  by no means a  definitive analysis.  This  is  because it is  not always possible to determine mutually 
exclusive categories of customer.  For  example, the 
1buying groups•  category could include smaller 
grocers or brewers {or a  mixture of both) who have combined to take advantage of the favourable  A 
buying terms granted to those placing large orders.  Any grocers included in  the 
1buying groups• will 
therefore understate  the importance of the 
1grocers
1  category.  Similarly, smaller chains of off-I  icences 
which may  be included in a  buying group will  lead to understatement of the full  role of •specialists•. 
Conversely, it  is  known that one buying group,  Clansouth, composed entirely of brewers has .been 
classified to 
1brewers
1  in  Table 3. 1;  not to have done so  would  have understated the 
1brewers
1 
share of the1e sales,  but as it stands leaves the 
1bvying groups• understated. 
3.5.  In  addition to the qualifications contained in  the preceeding paragraph, 
the buyer categories in  Table 3. 1 should not be interpreted as being the final  sources from  which the 
consumer obtains supplies of spirits.  It  is  the case, already mentioned in an earlier paragraph, that the 
brewers as well as wholesaling beer also wholesale spirits (ar.d  wines) to the tied and free trade.  Table 
3.1 should,  therefore,  be taken as indicative of one distiller•s classification of its wholesale customers-
a  classification  in  which it is  not wholly possible to produce mutually exclusive categories of 
customer. 
*Data  supplied in  private communication from  The D.C.L.Ltd. 
38 TABLE  3.1 
Sales Volume of D.C. L.  Sales of Own Brands of Scotch, Gin and Vodka, an~~~i'~  of 
Wholesale Customer.  (year ended  31st December 1977) 
Brewers 
Grocers 
Buying Groups 
Symbol  Groups 
Spec ia I  i  sts 
110thers
11 
Sub-total 
(no of customers to which sub-total relates) 
Remainder 
SOURCE:  The  Distillers Co Ltd. 
Scotch 
30.4 
19.2 
21.3 
2.4 
3.4 
3.6 
80.3 
(37) 
19.7 
100.0 
39 
Gin 
41.4 
17.7 
24.2 
3.8 
2.4 
1.0 
90.5 
(37) 
9.5 
100.0 
per  cent 
Vodka 
53.2 
14.3 
15. 1 
1.9 
1.3 
2.5 
88.3 
(28) 
11.7 
100.0 3.6.  The traditional marketing network through which imported continental 
wines pass still operates; namely, from  grower or continental producer, via shipper, wholesaler and 
retailer to the U.K. consumer.  However, since the larger brewery companies extended their interests 
beyond beer only, the number of links in  the distribution chain have become less separately identifiable. 
lv\any of the larger U.K.  brewers now  own Continental vine )Ords so  that in  this respect they act as 
producers,  importers,  wholesalers and retailers of wine in  the same manner as they already do for beer. 
It  has been estimated * that five large groups of brewers acting in  this capacity accounted for  more than 
50 per cent  of wine imports to the U.K.  in  1974.  In  addition, these brewers also buy considerable 
quantities of wine from  sole agents thus possibly accounting for around three-quarters of retail wine 
sales. 
3.7.  An important role in  the wholesaling of imported alcoholic beverages 
is that of the sole-agent.  Overseas producers unable to establish a  direct marketing presence in  the 
U.K. often grant sole distribution rights to a  U.  K.  trader for the product concerned.  The appointment 
of a  sole  agent possibly offers the producer the most  cost effective  means, at least in  the short term, 
of getting his product onto  the U.K. market,  more especially,  if it is a  relatively new  or little known 
brand.  At the same time,  the holding of a  sole agency can confer particular competitive advantage 
upon the agent where the brand  involved holds an established position in  the market.  lv\any  brewers 
are sole agents for the branded wines and spirits of overseas producers.  In  such cases the appeal to the 
brand-owner in  appointing a  U.K. brewer  as his distributor would seem to be the relatively widespread 
exposure his product is  likely to have when distributed through a  brewers tied estate, as well as the 
attention such a  product may receive from an established sales force selling to the free-trade.  By  this 
method,  therefore,  brewers are often sole-agents for  leading brands of imported wines and spirits, 
though by  no  means to the complete exclusion of non-brewer owned firms acting in  the same capacity. 
For  example,  in  the cognac market,  the sole agency for the U.K. brand  leader,  lv\artell,  is  held by 
lv\atthew Clark & Sons  Ltd  - perhaps the largest ·independent wine and spirit merchants.  It  is  not 
uncommon for sole agencies to change hands,  either as the result of a  take-over, or through the 
relinquishing of agreements by  either party.  In  the Iotter case,  highly competitive opportunities for 
new  business are likely to become available. 
Wine and Spirit Merchants 
3.8.  That sector of the alcoholic beverages trade to which the appellation 
1wine and spirit merchants• can be attached represents a  diversity of interests which range from  the 
importation and bottling of wines and spirits to the wholesaling and retailing of liquors of all types, 
often including beers and soft drinks.  There are firms  whose sole concern is  the importation and/or 
*  E.I.U. Retail  Business  No.l91. Jan.l974 
40 blending and bottling of wines and spirits for sale to wholesalers,  though they may undertake a 
wholesaling role themselves from  time to time.  The task of the true wholesaler, i.e. buying wines and 
spirits from  importers and domestic producers and selling to the retail trade is  often combined with 
direct interests in  retailing through owned outlets.  lv\any  merchants,  whether sole traders or 
multiple concerns operate both the wholesale and retail functions whilst the brewers,  notably the larger 
ones,  represent that sector of the trade most  fully integrated through all the channels of distribution 
i.e. as producer/buyer, wholesaler and retailer.  Irrespective of the brewers' position in  the trade 
there continues to exist a  competitive non-brewer owned sector of a I  coho  I  ic drinks' importers, 
wholesalers and retailers.  However,  levels of sales vary between brewery-owned merchants whose 
turnover can be measured  in  millions of £'s to the independant trader with perhaps less than £500,000 
worth of annual sales. 
3.9  In  addition to its beer brewing,  wholesaling and retailing activities, 
Allied Breweries is  the company with the most  extensive interest throughout all the channels of 
distribution for wines and spirits in  the U.  K.  This position, with respeet to the U.K. Scotch trade 
has recently been enhanced by Allied's acquisition of Teacher (Distillers)  Ltd  in  1976.  Allied's 
subsidiary, Grant of St.  James's Ltd., operating as wholesale wine and spirit  merchants achieved a 
turnover of £98.763m.  in  its year end to September 1975.  Harveys of Bristol,  the Allied company 
responsible for the importing and blending of sherries,  port and table wines made sales worth £46.209m. 
during the same period.  Against such  large turnovers other Allied wire and spirit merchants had sales 
in  the same twelve months that ranged from  just over £~m. (Cockburn lv\artinez lv\ackenzie  Ltd., dea I  ing 
in  the import and sale of port and sherry) to £1.8m.  (Hatch,  Mansfield & Co  Ltd., a  company dealing 
in  fine wines and spirits operating almost exclusively in  London and supplying prestige restaurants and 
business houses in  the City) and to £3.096m.  (Tolchard & Son  Ltd). 
3.10  Brewer Bass (harrington's subsidiary Hedges & Butler  Ltd. "is the second 
largest distributor of wines and spirits in  the  United  Kingdom"  *, although the value of its turnover is 
unknown.  Other major brewers' interests in  wine and spirit wholesaling are Saccone & Speed  (1975 
turnover of £79. 8m.) for  Courage,the  Imperial Group's brewing subsidiary; Stowells of Chelsea  (1975 
turnover of £17.5m.) for Whitbread & Co.; and  International Distillers and Vintners (J.D.V.) for Grand 
Metropolitan.  I.D.V's turnover in  the year ended September 1975 amounted to some  £255.717m., 
but most of this was derived from activities other than wholesaling, such as the distillation and sale of 
spirits.  Regional and small  brewers are also engaged  in  the wholesale and retail wines and spirits trade-
for example, Blayney  & Co Ltd.(1975 turnover £5.9m.) for  Vaux Breweries ltd.,  Killingley & Co ltd. 
(1975 turnover £1 . 6m.) for the Home  Brewery Co Ltd.,  london 0 ff-li  cence Co. Ltd. (1975  turnover 
£0.5m.) for  Young  & Co's.Brewery Ltd., and Dent & Reuss  Ltd  (1975  turnover of £0.65m.) for cider-
maker H.  P.  Bulmer  Ltd.,  - though the majority are most  likely to be most active on the retailing side 
*  Report  & Accounts (1977) Bass  (harrington Ltd.p.9. 
41 through off-I  icensed departments attached to public houses. 
3.11  The major brewers• off-licensed retailing interests in  beers, wines and 
spirits are set out in  Table 3.2 together with the names of their wholesaling operations.  Although most 
brewers make retail sales for  consumption outside the public house,  either as over the counter sales at 
the bar or in  off-licences attached to pubs,  the estimates of number of retail outlets given in  Table 3.2 
for  five major brewers relate in  the main to retail shops that are not physically part of public houtt'e 
premises but may  be found  in  high streets and shopping centres.  As such, these represent national 
chains specialising  in  the retail sale of alcoholic liquor for consumption off the premises.  Leaving 
aside Bass  (harrington's outlets, the remaining four brewers• outlets in  Table 3.2 amount to just over 
2,400 shops and are equivalent to  just under 40 per  cent  of the 6, 100 brewer-owned specialist off-
licences estimated for  1975  in  Table 2.13.  In  the case of Bass  (harrington,  (the Galleon Wine shops 
are managed premises whilst those of Old Cellars are tenanted) the 200 outlets given in  Table 3.2  refer 
to only one of Bass's trading areas; that is,to the south. east of a  rough  line drawn between  The Wash and 
Portsmouth.  The company is  no doubt represented at other high-street locations in other parts of the 
country.  Once again, some of the largest levels of sales are generated through these brewery-owned 
retail wine and spirit merchants.  Bearing  in  mind  that these sales also include beer and soft drinks, 
Allied's Victoria Wine retailing interest (though possibly with some wholesaling) had a  turnover of 
£117.118m.  in  1975 and for Grand Metropolitan's Peter Dominic in  the same period to September 1975, 
the turnover achieved was  just under £69m. 
Non-brewery owned  interests in  wholesaling and retailing of alcoholic drink. 
Importers and Wholesalers 
3.12  Matthew Clark & Sons  Ltd  has already been mentioned as perhaps being the 
largest independant wholesaler of wines and spirits and in  the year to April  1975  its sales amounted to 
some £26-.030m.  Part of this turnover will have been derived from  British wine making but the 
company also acts as wine and spirit importers and distributors and holds sole agencies for many brands, 
including Martell the brand  leading cognac.  Grierson-Blumenthal  Ltd  is a  privately owned shipper of 
wines and spirits and produced a  1975 turnover of £8.527m.; Forth Wines Ltd., of Kinross,Scotland are 
a  buying group representing smaller grocers and specialist off-licence groups and had sales of £13.077m. 
in  the year to September 1974; and Haworth & Airey  Ltd.,  based in  Preston derived sales of £4.224m. 
in  the year to the end of the first quarter 1975 from  the importing,  blending, bottling and warehousing 
of wines and spirits.  ltalvini Ltd., a  company specialising in  the importing of Italian wines and their 
marketing  in  the U.K. had sales of £2. 122m.  in  the year to end June 1975.  Indeed, there are a  number 
of wholesalers who specialise in  the U.K. distribution of particular types of wine.  For  example,  Moet 
& Chandon  Ltd,  are concerned with the sale, distribution and promotion of Moet et Chandon,  Ruinart 
and Mercier champagne wines in  the U.K., from  which they made sales just short of £4.0m.  in  1975. 
42 TABLE  3.2 
Major Brewers' Operating Companies in  Wholesaling and Retailing 
Brewer  Wholesale Operation 
Allied .Breweries  Grant's of St.  James's Ltd 
Bass  Cherrington  Hedges & Butler  Ltd 
Whitbread  Stowells of Chelsea  Ltd 
Grand Metropolitan  International Distillers & Vintners  Ltd 
Courage  Saccone & Speed  Ltd. 
43 
Off- Licensed Retail Operation 
(no.  of  outlets) 
Victoria Wine  (c. 900) 
Wineways 
(c. 300) 
WineMarket 
Galleon Wine) 
(c. 200) 
Old Cellars  ) 
Threshers  (c. 330) 
Peter Dominic  (c. 600) 
Arthur Cooper  (c. 300) H.  Sichel  & Sons.  Ltd.  are engaged in the purchasing,  bottling and selling  of French and German wines 
and are noted for their Blue  Nun brand of German wine,  whilst Teltscher Bros.  Ltd.  import,  bottle and 
sell the brand leading Yugoslavian wine  Lutomer Riesling, amongst others.  For accounting years ending 
in  1975, these two companies had sales of £3.627m. and £4.804m., respectively.  The  Luis Gordon 
Group Ltd.  returned 1975 sales of about £8m. from  importing,  bottling, selling and distilling sherry 
(particularly the Domecq and Double Century  brands)  wines,  I  iqueurs and spirits.  Operating in  a 
similar market Gonzalez Byass  {U.K. )Ltd.  derived £9m.  worth of sales in  1975 from  its popular range of 
branded sherries.  In  this area of the trade that is  concerned with importing and/or bottling of wines and 
spirits much of the sales are made to other wholesalers before the products reach the retailer.  However, 
many of these traders are  likely to be engaged in  direct  sales to selected retailers.  For example, the 
U.K. importing,  bottling, distribution and marketing companies for the best  selling vermouths Martini 
and Cinzano are primarily engaged in  sales to U.K. wholesalers,  but for significantly large orders 
direct  sales to multiple retail grocers are not unknown.  Martini & Rossi  Ltd's  1975 sales amounted to 
£40m. and those for  Ci nzano {U.K. )Ltd.  £16. 3m. 
Speci  a I  i  st  Ret a i I  ers 
3. 13  Just as there is a  'grey area• in  the degree of involvement of importers acting 
as wholesalers,  the same  is  the case with wholesalers who are also engaged in  retailing, as we!!  as 
retailers who make wholesale sales.  It  is  impossible to apportion sales between the two functions. 
Table 2.13 in  the previous chapter estimated there to be some 9,800 free-trade specialist retailers 
selling alcoholic drinks in  the U.K. through off-licensed premises.  Of this total, some 5,400 were 
independent businesses and 4,400 were with multiple groups and Co-operative  societies.  Amongst the 
multiples, Augustus Barnett & Sons  Ltd.*  is  perhaps the only one that approaches anything like the 
national distribution of outlets operated by the larger brewery companies.  From  the 120 or so  outlets 
through which it is  thought to have operated in  1974, a  turnover of around £28m. accrued to the 
company.  Currently,  there are reckoned to be around  180 outlets in  the group. 
3.14  Table 3.3  ~ets out some data on the number of outlets and trading areas for 
some of the larger free-trade specialist multiple off-licensed retailers.  It  is apparent that these chains 
serve particular regions and localities, and it is worth noting that although Unwins  is  fast approaching 
Augustus Barnett in  terms of number of outlets,  Unwins sphere of operations is  concentrated in  London 
and the Home Counties whereas Augustus Barnett's is  spread across the country.  Sales by  Unwins  in  1974 
amounted to £16m.  compared to the figure already quoted for Augustus Barnett of £28m. The value of 
sales is  not known for all the drinks' retailers listed in Table 3.3, but Gough Bros.  earned £11m.  in  1975 
{possibly with some wholesaling),  Roberts of Worthing £8.8m.  {again,  possibly with some wholesaling), 
*Augustus Barnett & Sons  Ltd.  were acquired by Rumasa,  a  Spanish holding company,  in August  1977 
and who also own  Imported Wines {1975  turnover £5m.) and Williams and Humbert the makers of Dry 
Sack sherry. 
44 TABLE  3.3 
Specialist Off-Licence Multiple Retailers 
Company  No. of Outlets  Area of Operation 
Augustus Barnett  180  National 
Unwins  170  london and Home Counties 
Gough Bros.  135  London and South 
Goldfinch Wines  109  N.E.England,  Lancashire and Cambridgeshire 
Mackies Wine Co  Ltd  92  N.  W. England,  N .Wales,  Yorkshire,  Lincolnshire 
J. T.  Davies  77  London and Home Counties 
Ellis & Co (Richmond)  70  in and around  London 
Roberts of Worthing  55  Surrey,  Sussex,  Hampshire 
Sado and  King  46  London and Home Counties 
Underwood  36  Birmingham area 
Odd  bins  28  England and Scotland 
Agnews  Liquorworld  24  london 
Curtis Vintners  22  London and Home Counties 
Barratts Liquormart  6  London 
SOURCE:  Retail  Directory (1978) 32nd.ed.pub.  Newman Books  Ltd. 
45 Ellis of Richmond,  aided by  its chain of 54 outlets trading as Fairdeal Vintners, £7 .3m., Sado and  King 
£2m.,  Underwoods £2.1m., and Curtis Vintners £1.7m. 
Other Interests  in  the Distribution of Alcoholic Drinks- Retail  Grocers 
3. 15  Once again it  is  necessary to refer to Table 2.13 in  the previous Chapter, 
which estimated that for  1975 some 50 per.cent. of all off-licensed premises could be found  in  the 
retail grocery trade.  The development of the off-licensed trade in  this sector has already been 
described,  but of the 17,800 or so  licensed grocers estimated for  1975,  some 62 per.cent. were 
independent  traders,  13 per.cent. were Co-operatives, and 25  per.cent. were multiples.  Some of the 
Co-operative and multiple retailers have  become directly involved  in  the importing of wines for supply 
to their own  shops but few  company accounts reveal separate figures for any  stage of trading in 
alcoholic drinks.  This aspect can only be examined for all retail trade by  reference to the commodity 
ant~lysis of sales available in  the 1971  Census of Distribution and research estimates for  later years. 
This will  be considered in a  later paragraph,  but for the time being it is  interesting to note that multiple 
retail grocer  Lennons Group Ltd.does have a  separate subsidiary dealing  in alcoholic drinks.  Lennons 
(Wines and SFirits) Ltd.  is  the specialist drinks subsidiary of this supermarket chain, supplying both 
in-store and free- standing off-licences, and achieved a  1975 turnover of slightly more than £16m. 
During  1976 the Group was operating 49 off-licences,  15 off-licensed supermarkets and 8 combined 
freezer centres and off-licences.  Amos  Hinton & Sons  Ltd.  a  retail grocer operating in North East 
England with a  turnover of £41m.  in  the  year ended tv\arch  1976, acquired the wines and spirits 
business of Winterschladen & Co Ltd .in  July 1975.  After 33 weeks trading Winterschladen turned  in 
sa I  es of just short of £2m. 
Other Interests in  the Distribution of Alcoholic Drinks- Food  tv\anufacturers 
3.16  The multi-national trading company. Lonrho  Ltd.has wine and spirit whole-
saling  interests operating under names such as Rum  Importers  Ltd., Sherry Shippers Ltd. 1  John Holt 
Wines  Ltd., and J.  P.  Lebeque & Co  Ltd.  Lonrho also retails alcoholic drinks through a  160*  outlet 
chain of off-licences trading in  the North,  North West and Midlands as Ashe and Nephew, and  in  10* 
outlets in  London as Saker Ltd.  The Beecham Group Ltd.deal  in  the importing,  bottling and sale of 
wines and spirits through two subsidiaries; that is 1 Findlater  1  Mackie, Todd  & Co  Ltd. (1975  turnover 
£2.7m.) and F.S. tv\atta  Ltd.(1975 turnover £2.9m.) though it  is  believed that these two companies have 
been merged  into one and known as Findlatertv\atta Agencies and are U.K.  agents for the Campari 
spirit-based aperitif.  Cadbury-Schweppes Ltd.  acquired its CourtercyWines interest from  L.R.C. 
International  Ltd.  in  1973, and Courtenay wholesale the French aperitif Dubonnet for which Schweppes 
hold the U.K. agency.  In  addition Cadbury-Schweppes'other wine and spirit retailing and wholesaling 
companies are Andre Simon Wines  Ltd  (for which a  range of branded wines under the Andre Simon  label 
* Retail Directory (1978) op.cit. 
46 have  been developed) and R.  B.  Smith  & Sons  Ltd., which had  1974 sales of £1.0m. and £1.3m., 
respectively.  Reckitt and Colman  Ltd,  food,  household products and toiletries manufacturer, are 
engaged in  the wine and spirit trade through their subsidiary companies Coleman & Co Ltd.and 
Edouard  Robinson,  where the former achieved a  level of turnover in  1974 of just over £6m.  Between 
them  the companies distributed Bull's Blood  Hungarian wine,  Veuve de Vernay  French spark I  ing  wine 
and Charbonnierbranded table wines, as well as many others.  S & W Berisford,  multi-national food 
and commodity processors and distributors have a 50 per cent  stake in  Capital Wine and Travers  Ltd. 
which made £4.1m. worth of wine and spirit sales in  the  year to September 1975. 
Retail Outlets and Trade 
3.17  The  level of trade and numrer of retail outlets dealing in alcoholic 
beverages is  well chronicled in  terms of both government sponsored  censuses and industry and market 
research monitoring of developments.  The government's statistical  inquiry into the catering trades for 
1969*  did  not complete its data collection until August  1971  and was therefore not published until  1972. 
However,  this represents an important source of data on  sales made through premises other than retail 
shops.  Thus,  the total turnover of the catering establishments listed  in  Table 3.4 amounted to 
£2,968.6m.  in  1969 of which some 53 per  cent  or £1,561.3m. was attributable to sales  of alcoholic 
drink.  The proportion of alcoholic drink turnover to total turnover was greatest for  public houses, 
registered clubs and licensed clubs with 79.4 per  cent  ,  74.4 per.cent. and 60.3 per cent, respectively. 
Only some 25.6 per  cent of licensed hotels,  motels and guest houses' sales were of intoxicating liquors 
but this represented  the not  inconsiderable sum  of £96.3m.  in  1969.  Of the 1969 alcoholic beverages 
sales of £1,561.3m.,  just short of 89 per cent  passed through the public houses and the clubs' 
trades. 
3. 18  Unfortunately the 1969 inquiry into the catering trades has not been officio lly 
updated to the extent that it is  possible to differentiate between total sales and alcoholic drink sales. 
Table 3.5 shows the total turnover of public houses in  1976 to have been £3,238m. -a figure arrived at 
after applying the index of 240 published  in  Trade and  Industry+  to the base figure of 1969 = 100 at 
£1,349m. 
Off-licenced trade- Specialist outlets 
3.19  The Census of Distribution  undertaken in  1971  provides comprehensive 
data on the structure of the retail trade in Great Britain.  The off-licensed shops,  for which data are 
presented in  Table 3.6 are defined by this Census as  '~hops licensed to retail alcoholic drinks for 
*  Catering Trades -1969.  Statistical  tnquiry  (1972) HMSO 
+-Trade and  Industry 20th May 1977. p. 366. Turnover of the Catering Trades 1976 :  Index numbers 
of average weekly turnover.  HMSO. 
47 TABLE  3.4 
Catering  Trades  Turnover,  G.B.  1969 
Alcoholic 
Total  Drinks 
Turnover  Turnover 
(£m)  (£m) 
Pub I  ic  Houses:  1,349. 0  1,071.2 
(managed)*  (531. 0)  (435 .4) 
(tenanted)  (719.2)  (558.5) 
(free-houses)  (98. 8)  (77. 3)  ' 
Licensed  Clubs  64.2  38.7 
Registered  Clubs  371.8  276.8 
Licensed  Hotels,  motels  and 
guest  houses  375.5  96.3 
Restaurants,  cafes  etc.  499.6  67.0 
Catering  Contractors/canteens  94.7  5.2 
Company  Canteens  58.0  2.2 
Holiday  Camps  32.0  3.9 
Fish  and Chips shops  123.8  nil 
Total  2,968.6  1  ,561. 3 
SOURCE:  Catering  Trades  1969.  Statistical  Inquiry.  HMSO.  1972. 
*  includes  licensed  hotels,  motels  and  licensed  guest  houses 
managed  for  brewery  companies. 
48 
Alcoholic 
Drinks  as 
%  of Total 
79.4 
(82. 0) 
(77 .6) 
(78.2) 
60.3 
74.4 
25.6 
13.4 
5.5 
3.8 
12.2 
52.6 TABLE  3.5 
Public  House  Turnover,  1969-76 
Year  £m 
1969  *  1,349 
1970  % 1,470 
1971  %  1,632 
1972  %  1,794 
1973  % 2,010 
1974  % 2,333 
1975  % 2,830 
1976  +  3,238 
++ 
Index 
100 
109 
121 
133 
149 
173 
210 
240 
SOURCE:  *  as  for  Table  3. 1 
%  E. I. U.  Retail  Business.  No.  192,  Feb.  1974 
and  No.  220,  June  1976. 
+  T  rode  and  Industry.  20th  May  1977.  p. 366 
by  applying  the  Index  of 240  to  £ 1,349m. 
++  Index number of Average Weekly Turnover. 
49 TABLE  3.6 
Specialist  Off-licences by  form  of  Organisation 
Independents  Multiples  Co-ops  Total  Off-licences 
Shops  Turnover  Shops  Turnover  Shops  Turnover  Shops  Turnover 
Year  No.  £m.  No.  £m.  No.  £m.  No.  £m. 
1961  4,795  66.4  4, 147  72.8  58  1.3  9,000  140.5 
1971  4,489  140.9  4,735  208.0  213  10.2  9,437  359'.1 
1972  156  239  12  407 
1973  171  285  14  470 
1974  194  356  18  568 
1975  245  449  22  8,600  716 
1976  293  568  880(e) 
1977  324  670  ...  1,04o(e) 
SOURCE:  1)  1961  and  1971,  Business  Monitor SD10 Census of Distribution and Other Services,1971 
HMSO,  Table 3. 
2)  Total  Off-licences 1972-1976(e) and  1977(e), and Co-operatives turnover 1972-75, 
E. I. U.  Retail  Business  No. 226.  December 197  6 
3)  Independent and Multiples• turnover 1972 to 1977 derived from  indices of turnover(1971 
=100) given in  Business Monitor SD1.  Food  Shops•  Monthly Statistics,April 1978. 
(e)  estimate 
50 consumption off the premises only.  Those off-licences attached to public houses or with significant 
sales of groceries and provisions are excluded from  this heading.
11*  The  Census data for  1961  and 1971, 
presented in  Table 3.6 have  been augmented by  trade research  data for  1972-75, which also indicate 
projected sales values through these specialist outlets of some £880m. and £1,040m.  for  1976 and 1977, 
respectively.  It  would appear that between 1961  and 1971  the number of enumerated off-licensed shops 
increased from  9,000 to 9,437 and the level of sales at current prices rose by a  factor of 2.6 times over 
the ten years.  A I  so during these ten years, off-I  icences under independent operators fell  in  number 
whilst those under multiple and Co-operative ownership increased.  As far as the latter form  of owner-
ship  is  concerned, the number of premises increased by a  factor of 3.7 leading to an increase in 
turnover in  the order of some 7.8 times between 1961  and 1971. 
3.20  Market research data, shown  in  Table 3.6 for  the period  1972-75, indicates 
that the growth  in  these licensed outlets over the ten years to 1971  has been reversed during the most 
recent five year period; that is a  fall  of some 8. 8 per  cent  in  the total number of specialist off-licences 
since 1971.  On the other hand,  total  turnover to 1975 has virtually doubled to stand at an estimated 
£716m., whilst turnover per shop has more than doubled.  Amongst the different forms  of organisation 
sales through multiples and Co-operatives have increased by 2.16 times but through  independent 
traders by  only one and three-quarter times,  between 1971  and  1975. 
Off-licensed trade- All outlets 
3.21  The data in  Table 3.6 represents the Census enumerated and market research 
values of total turnover passing through specialised off-licence shops.  Table 3.7, on the other hand, 
presents data on  the total retail sales value of goods passing through all shops together with the retail 
sales value of alcoholic drinks made by these different outlets in  1971.  Thus,  total shop sales of 
alcoholic drink  in  1971  were £448.4m. equivalent to 2.87 per cent  of total retail sales.  Grocers and 
provision dealers handled some £137.6m. worth of liquor sales, or 3.84 per  cent  of their total trade, 
whereas for Co-operative Societies the comparable factor was 2.88 per cent.  Not surprisingly,  off-
licences exhibited the highest  degree of specialisation in alcoholic beverages, with some 78 per  cent 
of their total sales in  those products.  Indeed, off-licences with £263.5m. of liquor sales in  1971 
accounted for 52.5 per  cent  of all liquor sales, with 7.3 per  cent  of the total passing through 
Co-operative Societies and 30.7 per  cent  handled by grocers and provisions dealers. 
3.22  In  terms of the three main forms  of retail distribution, Table 3.8 shows that of 
the total retail sales value in alcoholic drinks of £448.4m.  in  1971, multiple retailers accounted for 
£252.2m. or 56.2 per  cent  ,  independent traders with £163.6m. of sales for 36.5 per  cent  and the 
Co-operative Societies with £32.6m.  had 7.3 per cent. 
*  Business Monitor SD 10  Report on the Census of Distribution and Other Services,  1971  HMSO 
Appendix B.p. ~). 
51 TABLE  3. 7 
Retail  Sales  of Alcoholic  Drink,  1971 
Multiples and  Independents 
Grocers and Provision dealers 
Other Food  Reta i I  ers 
(of which Dairymen) 
(Butchers} 
(Fishmongers} 
(Greengrocers} 
Sales  of Goods 
through  Shops 
£m. 
3,586.2 
2,280.3 
(384.2) 
(848.5) 
(Bread  & flour confectioners) 
(80.6) 
(358. 7) 
(270.4) 
(337.9)  (Off-licences} 
C. T. N. •s* 
Clothing and Footwear 
Household Goods 
Other Non-food retailers 
General Stores 
Cooperative Organisations 
Total  Retail  Sales 
11264.5 
2,338.6 
1,652.7 
1,553.6 
1,834.2 
14,510.2 
1,132.3 
15,642.6 
Sales  of 
Alcoholic  Drinks 
£m. 
137.6 
264.0 
(0. 1) 
( 0. 1) 
(0.0) 
(0.2) 
(0.2) 
(263.5) 
1.0 
0. 1 
0.2 
3.2 
9.9 
415.8 
32.6 
448.4 
Alcoholic  Drinks 
Sales  as  % of 
All  Shops  Sales 
3.84 
11.58 
(0.03) 
(0.01) 
(n i I) 
(0.06) 
(0.07) 
(77. 98) 
0.08 
n. s. 
0.01 
0.21 
0.54 
2.87 
2.88 
2.87 
n .s. not s1gn1hcant 
SOURCE:  Business Monitor SD22.  Report on the Census of Distribution and Other Services,  1971. 
HMSO.  Tables 9 and 9A. 
TABLE  3.8 
Retail  Sales  of Alcoholic  Drink  by  form  of  Organisation,  1971 
Organisation  Sales (£m)  Share (%) 
Multiples 
415.8 
252.2  56.2 
Independents  163.6  36.5 
Cooperatives  32.6  7.3 
448.4  100 
SOURCE:  Business Monitor  SD22.  Report on  the Census of Distribution and Other Services,  1971. 
HMSO.  Table 9. 
*  Confectioners, Tobacconists and Newsagents 
52 Grocery Stores with off-licences 
3.23  Table 3.7 showed  the relationship between sales of alcoholic drinks and the 
total sales made by different types of retail outlet.  However,  it may  be more relevant to show the 
relationship between liquor sales and the total sales in  shops which possess off-licence departments.  The 
Census of Distribution  is  helpful  in  this respect although it  is  necessary to  make a  small  estimate.  The 
first two columns of Table 3.  9 are taken directly from  the Census and show  the number of shops and 
turnover of grocers with off-licences, distinguishing between Co-operative Societies on  the one hand, 
and grocers and provision dealers, on  the other.  For  the latter, their sales of alcoholic drinks at 
£137.6m.  (as  in  Table 3.7) were equivalent to 10.7 per  cent  of their total turnover in  1971.  It  is 
necessary to estimate Co-operative Society grocers• sales of alcoholic drink  in  1971  as this is  not 
readily available in  the Census.  This has been estimated  in  the footnote to Table 3.9 at £22.4m. but 
for  the reason given there this mu.st  be taken as being understated.  Using  this figure,  however, shows 
that liquor sales were equivalent to at best 11.3 per  cent  of turnover in  Co-operative grocery stores 
with off-licences in  1971.  Overall, it would appear that around  11  per  cent  of 1971
1s sales by 
grocers with off-licences could be claimed by alcoholic drinks. 
Total Retail Alcoholic Drinks lv\arket 
3.24  For a  more  up  to date picture of the U.K. alcoholic drinks market, and 
changes since 1970, reference can be made to market research data.  This data is  presented in 
Table 3. 10,  but  it must  be stressed that both the values of trade and number of outlets cannot be 
directly compared with other tables contained in  this chapter.  The lower half of Table 3. 10  indicates 
that the total value of turnover in  alcoholic liquor passing through  licensed premises increased from 
£2, 140m.  in  1970 to £5,776m. in  1976, an increase of 2.7 times.  (This  compares with National 
Income and Expenditure * data on  consumers•  expenditure on alcoholic drink at current prices of 
£2,299m.  in  1970 and £5,912m.  in  1976, an increase of 2.6 times).  In  1970,  publicans are estimated 
to have accounted for  65  per  cent  of all alcoholic drink turnover,  but by  1976 the estimate  credits 
them with a  share which had fallen to 62 per  cent.  Brewer-owned specialist off-licenc.es can be seen in 
Table 3.10 to have  lost a  1 per  cent  share of the total market between 1970 and 1976 whilst the free-
trade specialist off-licences retained 7 per  cent  in  both years.  The most  notable change, overall,  is 
the increase in  market share attributable to multiple and Co-operative grocers, whose  1970 share of 
3 per cent  is  estimated to have stood at 7 per  cent  in  197  6. 
3.25  That the multiple and Co-operative grocery trade has benefited from  the 
development of the take-home market through off-licences is apparent from  the upper half of Table 3. 10. 
Here, the  multiple and Co-operative grocers can be seen to have raised their share of the off-licensed 
* National  Income and  Expenditure 1966-76. HMSO  Table 4.9 
53 TABLE  3.9 
Grocers and Co:-operative Soc'ieties with off-licences and Sales of Alcoholic Drink,  1971 
Sales of  % 
No. of  Turnover  Alcoholic  Alcoholic 
Shops  £m  Drink  Drink 
Cooperative Societies  1,994  198.4  *22.4{e)  11.3(e) 
Grocers and Provision  Dealers  14,736  1,286.7  137.6  10.7 
16,730  1,485.1  160. O(e)  10.7(e) 
SOURCE:  Business  Monitor  SD  10  Table  6  and  SD  22  Table 9A.  Report  on  the 
Census  of  Distribution  and  Other Services  1971.  HMSO. 
*  estimated  in  the  following  way: 
less: 
Alcoholic  Drink  Sales  through  Cooperatives 
Turnover  of  Specialist  Cooperative off-licences 
but,  because  turnover  represents  more  than  just 
drink  sales,  the  figure  of £22. 4m  is 
understated. 
54 
= 
£32.6ni 
£10.2m 
£22.4m 
(see Table 3.4) 
(see Table 3.3) TABLE 3.10 
Turnover  in Alcoholic Liquors by  different types of Licensed premises,  1970 and 1976 
Licence-type 
Publicans 
Restricted  I  icences 
Clubs 
A II  On-Licence Turnover 
Brewer-owned Specialist Off-licences 
Free-trade Specialist Off-Licences 
Grocers:  Multiples and Co-ops 
Independents 
Other Off-licences 
A II  Off-Licence Turnover 
All  Licences 
Pub I  icans 
Restricted  licences 
Clubs 
Brewer-owned Specialist Off-licences 
Free-trade Specialist Off-licences 
Grocers : Multiples and Co-ops 
Independents 
Other Off-licences 
T  ota I Turnover 
1970 
£m.  % 
1384  80 
50  3 
300  17 
1734  100 
120  30 
141  35 
73  18 
60  15 
12  3 
406  100 
1384  65 
50  2 
300  14 
120  6 
141  7 
73  3 
60  3 
12  * 
2140  100 
Great Britain 
1976 
£m.  % 
3607  79 
144  3 
792  18 
4543  100 
305  25 
408  33 
380  31 
122  10 
18 
1233  100 
3607  62 
144  3 
792  14 
305  5 
408  7 
380  7 
122  2 
18  * 
5776  100 
SOURCE:  Stats  (MR)/Off Licence News.  Data presented by  J. Sowle,  Joint tv\anaging  Director of 
Stats (MR)Ltd.  at Seminars on  Beer,  Wines and Spirits Markets,  London,  October  1976 and 
February 1978. 
*  less than 1 per .cent. 
55 retail trade in alcoholic drinks from  18 per  cent  in  1970 to 31  per  cent  in  1976.  This gain would 
appear to be  at  the expense of all other off-licensed outlets,  particularly the  ind~pendent grocers and 
brewer-owned specialist off-licences, but less  so for  the free-trade speciglist off-licences.  In  the 
on-I  icensed sector, pub I  icons, and that includes both brewery owned and free-trade on-I  icence 
operators, suffered a  marginal  1 per.cent. fall  in  their share of on-licensed trade between 1970 and 
1976.  However,  for  1976 they e~re estimated to have commanded about 79 per  cent  of on-licensed 
sales.  The  1 per  cent  loss  encountered by  publicans would seem  to have  been gained by  the licensed 
and registered clubs, who are reckoned to have taken 18 per  cent  of 1976's on-licensed sales. 
3.  26  Further evidence of the development and success of the take-home market 
can be gleaned from  Table 3.10.  In  1970,  81  per  cent  of all alcoholic drink  sales were estimated to 
have been made through on-licensed premises,  but by  1976 the estimate sets this proportion three 
precentage points lower at 78 per  cent.  Thus,  off-licensed liquor sales would  seem  to be fast 
approaching 25  per  cent  of all sales of alcoholic drink  through  licensed premises. 
The  Brewers and the Retail  Market 
3.27  The role of the brewers,and  in  particular the Big-6,in relation  ~o the value of 
retail sales in alcoholic drink can be examined by  reference to market research data for  1974.  This 
data is  given  in  Table 3.11 I  which shows the shares held by different licence operators in  the 1974 
market, distinguishing both the on  and off-licensed sectors.  The on-licensed turnover for  1974 is 
estimated to have been £3,217m., and that through off-licences £826m., giving a total value of 
£4,043m.  Within the on-licensed sector the brewers as a whole  am be seen  to have been responsible 
for  just under 55 per  cent  of alcoholic drink sales,  leaving 45  per  cent  in  the hands of the free-trade. 
However,  the Big-6 brewers are reckoned to have  accounted for 42.3 per  cent  of on-I  icensed sales, 
leaving other brewers 12.6 per  cent.  In  the off-licensed trade, trade-shares by  licence holders 
appear to be more evenly spread.  The brewers are still shown  to have accounted for  the largest share 
with 29.1  per  cent  ,  the specialist multiples and Co-operatives.  took 25.3 per  cent  ,  the grocers 
22.9 per  cent  ,  and other traders (mainly independent) 22.7 per  cent.  Once again,  however,  the 
6 major brewers shared 23.2 per cent  of off-licence sales leaving 5.9 per  cent  for other brewers. 
Across the trade generated by  all  licences,  the brewers in  1974 represented  just short of 50 per  cent * 
of the total, by  far the greater share than for any other group of operator.  Between them,  the Big-6 
brewers were estimated to command 38 per  cent  ofsales,,with other brewers retaining  11  per.cent. 
3.28  In  Table 3.12 the total trade in alcoholic drinks made by  the brewery 
companies is estimated for  1974 to have been £2,008m., with brewers• on-licences providing £1,768m. 
and off-licences £240m.  The  leading role of the 6 major brewers is  once again evident from  this table: 
*  This 50 per  cent  cannot be compared directly with the 62 per  cent  share of 1976's market 
attributable to Publicans in Table 3.10.,for Publicans include the brewers as well as the operators 
of free-trade pubs, and bars at airports and railway  stations. 
56 TABLE  3.11 
Shares  in  the Alcoholic  Drinks  Trade  by  Operator and  Licence,  1974 
Operator 
Brewers 
(Big-6) 
(Other  brewers) 
Specialist  Multiples 
and  Coops 
Grocery  Multiples and Coop 
Others 
Base  for  Percentages 
On-licence 
54.9 
(42.3) 
(12.6) 
45.1 
£3,217.0m 
Off-licence 
29.1 
(23. 2) 
(5. 9) 
25.3 
22.9 
22.7 
£826.0m 
p~r cent 
All  licences 
49.7 
(38.4) 
(11.3) 
5.2 
4.7 
40.4 
£4,043.0m 
SOURCE:  derived  from  L I. U.  Retail  Business  No.  224,  Oct.  1976. (Oiginal data from 
Stats  (MR)Ltd ./Off Licence News). 
TABLE  3.12 
Big-6-brewers
1 share of Brewery Sector trade in Alcoholic Drink,  1974 
Brewery Sector 
Big-6  brewers 
Other  brewers 
Base for  Percentages 
SOURCE:  As  for  Ta.ble  3.11 
On-licence 
77.0 
23.0 
£1,768.2m 
57 
Off-licence 
79.6 
20.4 
£240.4m 
per  cent 
All  licences 
77.3 
22.7 
£2, 008.6m overall they were responsible for 77 per  cent  of the 1974 liquor sales made by all brewery groups. 
This same proportion prevailed for their share of on-licensed trading,  but of all brewers' off-licensed 
sales their share reached almost 80 per cent. 
3.29  Finally,  it  is worth mentioning that the role of the brewers in  the retailing 
of their own  product (i.e. beer) would seem to have declined in  relative terms between 1967 and 1975. 
The  brewers,  through the Brewers' Society state in  their official response to the Price Commission  that 
in  1975 they owned some 36 per  cent  (already  estimated in Table 2.8) of the U.K.'s 156,000 
licensed outlets "accounting for 56 per  cent  of the volume.of beer sales."*  The comparable figures 
contained in  the Monopolies Commission report for:  1967 are 48 per  cent  and 66 per.cent., respective!! 
So,  the free-trade outlets have gained in  relative importance as far as  retail beer sales are concerned, 
though this of course by no means diminishes the importance of the brewers' wholesaling role. 
Prices of Beer and Spirits 
Introduction 
3.30  During the past ten years or so,  the U.K. brewing  industry has been the 
subject of numerous Government reports.  These reports and their specific areas of interest - which have 
ranged from  examining the structure of the industry and competition,  to prices, costs and margins -
received mention  in  the  Introduction to this report.  Today,  these reports  stand as an historical record 
of an important sector of British  industry and are likely to continue to provide a  tempting reference base 
for researchers until such time as more  comprehensive  information becomes available from  other sources, 
such as the brewers themselves.  However,  only the most  recent official reports on the industry-
the Price Commission  Reports on  Beer  Prices and Margins and Soft Drinks and Mixers in  Licensed 
Premises- will be referred to here as thi.s  is  more relevant to the immediate purpose and assumes that 
interested readers will make reference to earlier reports for  themselves. 
3.31  One of .·l·he  major drawbacks of earlier reports which have concerned 
themselves with the brewing  industry (with the possible exception of the 1969 Monopolies  Commission 
Report on  the Supply of Beer) is,  for example, thatwhen examining structure,  competition and prices 
they have been confined to an in-depth consideration of only one product; namely beer.  The  brewers 
are responsible for  the production,  importing,  wholesaling, and retailing of many more alcoholic 
drinks  than just beer alone.  Whilst it is appreciated that official reporting on beer is a  reflection 
of the terms of reference handed down by  the Minister concerned,  this has resulted  in  there being no 
* 
+ 
The  Brewers' Society (Sept. 1977) Memorandum on  the Price Commission's Report  No 31 
Prices and Margins. p.29 para.6.6. 
The Monopolies Commission  (1969) op.cit.p.49 Table 18 and footnote on p.14 
58· 
Beer comparable analysis of the wines, spirits* and soft drinks industries and markets. 
The  Price Commission's Report on  Beer  Prices and Margins  (1977) 
3.32  Since at least 1964 beer prices in the  United  Kingdom  have been 
controlled at various times either by Government order or voluntarily by  the brewers themselves, 
endeavouring to co-operate with Government anti-inflation policies.  In  1971-1972 the brewers were 
party to the Confederation of British  Industry's  (C. B. I.) voluntary price restraint scheme and more 
recently they took part in  the Government's 1976 Price Check exercise.  Since 1973 the Government's 
flag-ship in  the battle against inflation has been the Price Commission and its role in  overseeing the 
operation of the Price Code which remains in  force today,  though it was amended in August  1977. 
Inspection of the quarterly reports pmduced by the Price Commission gives an indication of the size and 
frequency with which brewers have notified the Commission of intended price rises.  Some of these 
notifications have not been challenged by the Commission,  others have been rejected or modified,  but 
the tendency until the latter part of 1977 was for  the major brewers in  particular to make price rises of 
1p-2p per pint at three monthly intervals.  With beer consumption exceeding 200 pints per head  in  each 
of the  years between 1974 and 1976, as well as having a  weighting of 46 out of 1,000 in  the Retail 
Price  Index, and probably accounting for some 3 per  cent  of household expenditure,  it  seems hardly 
surprising that consumers became increasingly aware of the upward movement  in  the level of beer prices. 
The complaints about beer prices that ensued would seem to be the reason for  the Commission's 1977 
inquiry, and in  the Commission's own words these "complaints fell  mainly under three headings; 
a )the high price of beer,  b)the frequency of price increases and c)the coincidence of price increases 
with announcements of higher profits by the brewers."+ 
3.33  When the Price Commission's Report on  Beer  Prices and Margins was 
pub I  ished  in  July 1977 it received criticism on numerous counts and from  a  variety of sources.  These 
criticisms originated,  not surprisingly,  from  individual brewers as well as their association The  Brewers• 
Society  +t-'  and from  analysts representing stockbroking firms.+  One area of criticism related to the 
relationship between conclusions reached and the terms of reference placed before the Commission. 
The Commission's terms of reference were to examine and report  "the prices and margins  in  the 
manufacture and distribution  in  the U.K. of beer which is  sold by  retail for  consumption on  licensed 
premises and the overall net profit margins of businesses licensed to sell beer by retail for consumption on 
the premises .. rJ  Having reached a  set of conclusiors on  beer prices and margins the Commission also chose 
to comment on  the structure of the industry and the state of competition.  On structure,  the Commission 
*  It  is  understood that the Scotch Whisky  industry  is  the subject of a  forthcoming  report by a  working 
party set up  by the National Economic Development Office. 
+  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit. para 1.3 
+t-The  Brewers Society(Sept. 1977)op. cit. 
t  Buckmaster and Moore and de Zoete and Bevan and others 
rJ  Price Commission  (1977) op. cit. The  Reference 
59 reiterates the view given by previous reports that the development of the brewers' role in  the alcoholic 
drinks trade has been conditioned by  legislation concerning the liquor licensing system.  On  competition, 
the conclusions reached are not relevant to the whole of the beer industry for the Commission's terms 
of reference both explicitly and implicitly excluded important sectors of the non-brewer owned outlets 
for the retailing of beer.  Explicitly,  the terms of reference were not concerned with the retailing of beer 
through off-licensed premises,  where the take-home market represents a  significant growth sector and 
where groups such as multiple retail grocers represent a  countervailing force in  terms of buying power. 
Implicitly,  the Commission resolved to exclude from  its investigation sales through hotels,  restaurants, 
and licensed and registered clubs, which Table 3.10 showed to account for an estimated 21  per  cent  of 
all alcoholic liquor turnover in  1976, whilst the club trade alone could be responsible for  18 per  cent 
of national beer sales.  The  Commission was,  however, aware of the increasing relative importance of 
these other markets for beer sales ,for the following appears in  the report: 
" Sales to the tied trade have tended to declirie in 
percentage terms as follows: 
1974 
Large  brewers  54 
Regional  brewers  70 
Sma II  brewers  73 
1975 
52 
69 
72 
per  cent 
1976 
51 
68 
70 
The movement of sales from  the tied to the free trade 
is  largely due to higher sales in  the grocery trade, 
and in  clubs,  hotels and restaurants."* 
3.34  Having noted the areas with which the  Price Commission did not concerm 
itself,  it  is  important to clarify the sectors of the trade which the Commission did examine.  With 
respect to both the wholesaling and retailing of beer the Commission's research has reflected the 
structure of the industry  in  that it differentiates between the "large" brewers (i.e. the Big-6),  "regional" 
brewers (such as Greenall Whitley) and the "small" brewers that serve more  localised markets.  In 
addition, Arthur Guiness Son  & Co Ltd.,  Harp  Lager., and the Carlsberg Brewery, as noted in  the footnote 
to paragraph 3.1., sell most  of their output to other brewers and are not involved in wholesaling. 
The output of these three brewers, termed  "specialist brewers" by the Commission,  is  wholesaled and 
retailed by other brewers and included  in  the latter's sales.  Of the 84 companies or groups brewing beer 
in  the U.K. today the Commission denoted the Big-6 brewers as "large
11
,  six others as "regional", 
69 as "small" and 3 as "specialist
11
•  For working purposes the Commission used a  sample of these brewers 
+  made up  as follows: 
Large  Brewers  6- operating 11,777 Managed  Public  Houses as at 1.6.76 
Regional  Brewers  6- operating  1,366 Managed  Public Houses as at 1.6.76 
Small  Brewers  12- operating  598 Managed  Public  Houses as at 1.6.76 
Specialist" Brewers  3- operating no retail outlets. 
The volume of wholesale sales made by the sample of large,  regional and small  brewers between 1974 
9nd 197  6 was thought to account for about 95 per  cent  of the market. 
*'Price Commission  (1977) op.cit.para.2.3(a) 
+Pnce Comm1ss1on  (1977) op.cit.para.2.1-2.3, and Table 25 
60 Wholesale Beer  Prices 
3.35  Prices charged by brewers to wholesale customers vary according to brewer, 
region, and type of beer.  The measure of average wholesale beer prices for the U.K. will  therefore 
obscure  these sources of variation but more  importantly, a  comparison of average wholesale prices 
between now and say ten, or even only five years ago will  be confounded by  changes in  the way in 
which brewers charge their wholesale customers.  Two  changes in  particular are of interest; first of all, 
the trend towards brewery management of pubs as opposed  to  leasing to tenants, and secondly,  movement 
away from 
1wet-rents
1  to 
1dry-rents•.  In  the past, more so  than today, tenants paid their brewer landlords 
rent in  a  combination of a 
1dri and a 
1wet
1  fee.  The 
1dry•  rent being a  low,  possibly uneconomical, 
fixed  sum;  the 
1wet
1  rent being a  variable amount charged according to turnover through a  surcharge on 
the wholesale price for certain beers.  Thus,  wholesale beer prices charged to tenants paying wet rent 
would be somewhat higher than prices to brewery managed premises, and wHh  the latter being the yard-
stick prices to the free trade could be less depending upon  the type of customer and discounts available. 
The system of charging 
1wet
1  rents was criticised in  the conclusions to The  Monopolies Commission report* 
and during  recent years many brewers have converted,  or are converting,  to a  (economicY dry rent only. 
These brewers are offering existing tenants paying a 
1wet
1  rent the opportunity to change to a 
1dri rent, 
whilst all new  tenancies are prepared on  this basis. 
3.36  Recent years have also witnessed an increasing number of public houses 
coming under brewery management,  thus giving the brewer both the wholesale  and retail margins on 
beer sales.  At the same time the wholesale price of beer charged by brewers to their managed houses 
has emerged as the equivalent cfa base price on  wholesale trade price lists.  Although tenants still 
paying  •wet•  rents will pay more than this 
1base price•, prices to 
1dry•  rent tenants will  be related to the 
managed whole5ale price, whilst sales to the free-trade wholesale customers could be lower because of 
discounts based upon quantity delivered, special promotions,  special status such as a  multiple retailer 
treated as a  national account, and overriding discounts related to annual quantities purchased. 
3.37  With the foregoing  in  mind  it  is  possible to present the data in  Table 3.13 on 
the U.K. average wholesale price per pint charged by brewers to managed houses  in  1974 and 1977 and 
taken from  the Price Commission  report.  From  this table it can be seen that that there were wide 
variations in average wholesale prices between the different types of beer in  both 1974 and 1977. 
Similarly,  for whatever type of beer, wholesale prices varied between the three classes of brewer 
identified in  the table, although the value of the average for all beers suggesls that this variation between 
brewer-type was  less  in  1974 than it was by  1977.  Thus,  between 1974 and 1977 the average wholesale 
price charged by  large brewers to their managed pubs rose  from  11.2p.per pint 1o19.2p.per pint, or by 
71  per cent.  For  regional brewers,  the increase was from  10.9p.per pint to 18.0p.per pint, or by 
*The Monopolies Commission  (1969)op.cit.para.387 
61 TABLE  3.13 
U.K. Average wholesale prices of beer in  June 1974 and June 1977,  including duty and VAT, 
charged by brewers to managed houses 
New pence per.pint. 
Types of Beer  Large  brewers*  Regional  brewers  Small  brewers 
1974  1977  1974  1977  1974  1977 
Bitter  10.1  17.7  10. 1  16.8  10.0  16.9 
Premium  Bitter  11.4  19. 1  10.6  18.0  11.5  19.2 
Mild  9.2  16.4  9.3  15.5  8.9  15.7 
Lager  12.2  20.3  12.2  19.5  13.0  20.4 
Bottled Stout  15.6  25.8  15.0  23.8  16.1  25.6 
Bottled  Pale Ale  12.7  22.5  12.0  19.7  11.5  19.5 
All beer  11.2  19.2  10.9  18.0  11. 1  18.5 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit. Table 3 
*prices vary by 1 per.cent. or2 per.cent. from  region to region. 
TABLE  3.14 
U.K. Wholesale Price  Indices for All "-Aanufactured. Products and Food  "-Aanufacturing compared with 
Percentage increases in Wholesale Beer Prices to "-Aanaged  Houses,  inclusive and exclusive Of duty and VAT 
U.K. Wholesale Price  Indices* for 
A II  "-Aanufactured  products 
Food  "-Aanufacturing 
Percent increases in  wholesale beer 
prices to managed houses: 
Large brewers 
Regiona I brewers 
Sma II  brewers 
Including 
Duty and VAT 
72 
65 
67 
SOURCE:  Price Commission(1977)op. cit. para. 2.5 
* rebased from  original  1970=100.  June 1977  is  provisional 
62 
June  June 
1974  1977 
100  174 
100  179 
Excluding  Increase in 
Duty and VAT  Duty and VAT 
68  77 
56  77 
61  76 65 per  cent  ,  and for small  brewers it went from  11.1p.per pint to 18.5p.per pint, or by 67 per cent. 
3.38  The wholesale beer price rises made by the I arge,  regional and small  brewers 
to their managed estates between June 1974 and June 1977 can be compared with movements in  the 
wholesale price indices for a II  manufactered products and for food  manufacturing over the same period. 
This the Commission did and the data which is  set out in  Table 3,14 shows that wholesale beer price 
increases made by  large brewers were getting towards a  magnitude similar to,  but  less than, the increase 
in  the wholesale price  indices on all manufactured products and food  manufacturing.  For  the regional 
and small  brewers,  their rates of wholesale beer price increases were considerably less than the levels 
achieved by the comparable wholesale price indices.  The data on prices in  Table 3.13 includes duty 
and VAT  levied at the wholesale stage, and Table 3.14 shows that the sum  of these taxes on  the 
wholesale price per pint increased for  large and regional brewers by 77 per  cent  in  the three years 
between June 197  4 and June 1977, and by 7 6 per  cent  for sma II  brewers.  When these taxes are set 
aside, the increase in  the average U.K. wholesale price for  large brewers amounts to 68 per  cent  , 
for  regional brewers 56 per  cent  ,  and for small  brewers 61  per  cent  -all less than the wholesale 
price indices for  June 1977 given in Table 3. 14. 
3.39  Ana lyses of the wholesale beer price,  inclusive of duty but excluding VAT, 
for  large,  regional and small  brewers are given in  Tables 3.15., 3.16 and 3.17, respectively.  Table 
3.15 is  based on  returns made to the Price Commission from  5, rather than 6,  large brewers and  in 
each of the three tables firms
1financial years ending during the 1974 and  1976 calender years have 
been used.  Selling, administration and distribution costs include central expenses and have  been 
obtained by allocating a  proportion of the totals to beer, the remainder being allocated to wines and 
spirits and other activities.  It  is  evident from  each of these tables that the cost of brewing materials 
accounts for  the smallest  proportion of the wholesale selling price whilst the cost of duty represents 
the greatest  share.  The cost of brewing materials did,  however,  increase for each class of brewer 
by between 45 and nearly 50 per  cent  between 1974 and 1976. 
3AO  For own-brewed beers the small  brewers• wholesale price per pint was  less  in 
both 1974 and 1976 than the prices for  the regional and large brewers.  In  fact,  in  1974 the wholesale 
sales price of large brewers• own  beer was some  11.3 per  cent  greater than the small  brewers• price, 
but by  1976 this difference had grown to just under 15  per  cent  above the small  brewers• price.  Besides 
brewing and selling their own  beers,  most  brewers purchase other brewers•  beers,  particularly the 
nationally known brands of beer, stout and lager, which they wholesale into their tied estates and to 
some extent the free-trade.  Such purchases and sales are known as "foreign beer 
11  and are denoted as 
such  in  Table 3.15-3.17.  The  last line of each of these tables indicates that in  1976 foreign  beer 
sales volume was equivalent to 11.5 per  cent  of all beer sales made by  large brewers,  10.2 per  cent 
for  regional brewers, and 20.7 per cent  for small  brewers.  It  is  not surprising that foreign  beer sales 
are of such relative importance to small  brewers for a I  though they may' brew  beers which are popular in 
63 TABLE  3.15 
Analysis of Wholesale Beer  Price for  (5)*  Large  Brewers 
New pence per pint excluding V .A.  T. 
%change  %of 
selling price 
1974  1976  1974-76  1976 
Own brewed beer 
Brewing  materials  0.78  1.16  48.7  7.7 
Duty  3.52  6.18  75.6  41.0 
Selling  Price  9.53  15.07  58.1  100.0 
Foreign beer + 
Purchase cost  9.07  13.45  48.3  71.1 
Selling price  12.32  18.92  53.6  100.0 
All  Beer  ----
Brewing  materials,duty and foreign beer purchase  4.86  8.04  65.4  51.8 
Production and packaging  1.74  2.68  54.0  17.3 
Selling, administration and distribution  2.16  3.14  45.4  20.3 
Net margin  1.10  1.65  50.0  10.6 
Selling  Price  9.86  15.51  57.3  100.0 
Foreign beer sales volume as a  percentage of all 
beer sales  11.8  11.5 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit. Table 4 
* based on data from  5  (rather than 6) large brewers 
+beer which brewers have not brewed themselves but have  obtained from  other(mainly British)brewers. 
64 TABLE  3.16 
Analysis of Wholesale Beer  Price for  Regional  Brewers 
Own brewed beer 
Brewing  materia Is 
Duty 
Selling price 
Foreign beer  + 
Purchase cost 
Selling price 
All  beer 
Brewing  materials, duty and foreign beer purchase 
Production and packaging 
Selling, administration and distribution 
Net tv\argin 
Selling price 
Foreign beer sales volume as a  percentage of all 
beer sales 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit. Table 5 
New pence per pint excluding V.A.T. 
%of 
%change  selling price 
1974  1976  1974-76  1976 
0.85  1.25  47.0  9.0 
3.38  6.23  84.3  45.0 
8.74  13.84  58.4  100.0 
9.91  15.28  54.2  78.0 
13.79  19.59  42.1  100.0 
4.83  8.28  71.4  57.4 
1.28  1.89  47.7  13. 1 
1.59  2.19  37.7  15.2 
1.57  2.07  31.8  14.4 
9.27  14.42  55.6  100.0 
10.6  10.2 
+beer which brewers have not brewed themselves but have obtained from  other (mainly  British)brewers. 
65 TABLE  3.17 
Analysis of Wholesale Beer  Price for Small  Brewers 
Own brewed beer 
Brewing  materials 
Duty 
Selling price 
Foreign beer  + 
Purchase cost 
Selling price 
All  beer 
Brewing  materia Is,  duty and foreign beer purchase 
Production and packaging 
Selling, administration and distribution 
Net margin 
Selling price 
Foreign beer sales volume as a  percentage of all 
beer sales 
SOURCE:  Price Commission(1977)op.cit. Table 6 
1974 
0.86 
3.28 
8.56 
9.02 
13.62 
5.16 
1.20 
1.37 
1.89 
9.62 
20.9 
New pence per pint excluding V ,A,  T. 
o/o  change  o/o  of 
selling price 
1976  1974-76  1976 
1.25  45.4  9.5 
5.94  81.1  45.3 
13.11  53.2  100,0 
13.46  49.2  68.6 
19.63  44.1  100.0 
8.49  64.5  58.7 
1.64  36.7  11.3 
1.98  44.5  13.7 
2.35  24.3  16.3 
14.46  50.3  100.0 
20.7 
+beer which brewers have not brewed themselves but have obtained from  other (mainly British)brewers. 
66 a  particular locality it is  commercially prudent for them  to provide the more widely know national beers, 
stouts and  lagers.  Many of the smaller brewers do not, for  example, have their own  capacity to brew 
lager - the growth  sector in all beers - so  for them to take advantaged this trend  it is  necessary for  such 
supplies to be bought in.  The provision of foreign beers for  wholesaling by small  brewers must  represent 
an area of competitive activity between the Big-6 brewers,  though not to the total exclusion of regional 
and medium-sized brewers,  in  supplying their national brands.  Competition for supplying small  brewers 
with foreign beer would appear from  Tables 3.15- 3.17 to work  in  the small  brewers• favour.  The 
buying-in price for foreign beers paid by  small  brewers was more or ·less the same per pint as paid by 
large brewers in  1976.  Furthermore,  in  being able to set their own wholesale prices on foreign beer, 
small  brewers were able to achieve a  1976 mark-up per pint  on foreign beer sales of 46 per  cent  , 
compared with 41  per cent  for  large brewers, and 28 per  cent  for reg iona I brewers. 
3.41  When  it comes to a  breakdown of the wholesale price of all beers the costs 
of brewing materials, duty and foreign beer purchases are greatest in  both absolute and proportionate 
terms for  regional and small  brewers.  By  the same token,  however, production and packaging, and 
selling,administration and distribution costs per wholesale pint are far greater for the large brewers than 
either of the regional or small  brewers.  The sum  of these two elements of cost for all beer were,  in 
1976 some 60 per  cent  greater per pint for  large brewers,  compared with their small  counterparts, 
that is, 5.82p.per  pint as against 3.62p.per  pint.  In  relation to the wholesale selling price per 
pint, production and packaging, and selling, administration and distribution costs represented 37.6 per 
cent  of this price in  1976 for  large brewers, 28.3 per  cent  for  regional brewers and 25.0 per  cent 
for  small  brewers.  These differences can no doubt  in  part be explained by the fact  that the  larger 
brewers operate across the nation and  incur  the additional costs of physical distribution that such a 
scale of operations implies, as well as expenditure on sales, advertising and promotional activities that 
competition demands.  Additional costs in  production and packaging credited to the large brewers 
are most  likely the result of a  broader product mix  compared to the other types of brewer; that is,  the 
large brewers produce a  wider range of products, with lager taking a  longer time to produce than 
ordinary bitter and keg bitter, as well as being more heavily committed to the packaging of beer in 
cans for the take-home market.  Unfortunately,  it  is  not possible to deduce from  the Price Commission 
report whether or not the large brewers are fully benefitting from  the economies of scale which are 
expected  to accrue in  multi-plant enterprises. 
3.42  Lower operating costs have been sufficient to off-set the higher input costs for 
regional and small  brewers with the result that they have been able to fix  lower selling prices per pint 
than large brewers and at the same time to earn higher net margins than the large brewers.  In  1976 the 
net percentage margin per wholesale pint amounted to 10.6 per  cent  for  large brewers,  14.4 per  cent 
for  regional brewers and 16.3 per  cent  for small brewers.  These data are inclusive of duty  (but 
exclusive of VAT) and are set out in  Table 3.18 for  the three years 1974-76 together with the net 
percentage margins exclusive of duty.  On a  duty inclusive basis net percentage margins have dec  I  ined 
67 TABLE  3.18 
Net (wholesale) profit margins as a  percentage of selling price per pint 
Large brewers 
Selling price including duty 
Selling price excluding duty 
Regional  brewers 
Selling price including duty 
Selling price excluding duty 
Sma II  brewers 
Selling price including duty 
Selling price excluding duty 
SOURCE:  Price Commission(1977)op.cit. Table 7 
68 
1974 
11. 1 
16.3 
16.9 
25.1 
19.7 
26.8 
1975 
10.9 
16.2 
15.2 
23.5 
17.3 
24.8 
1976 
10.6 
16.4 
14.4 
23.4 
16.3 
24.1 in successive years between 1974 and 1976 for  each class of brewer.  Exclusive of duty (and VAT)  these 
margins have remained virtually static for  large brewers,  but have fallen for the regional and small 
brewers. 
Retail  Prices of Beer  in  Public Houses. 
3.43  In  examining retail prices of beer in  public houses the Price Commission 
undetook a  sample survey by questionnaire and supplemented by personal  interviews.  Some  320 
public houses formed  the sample which was structured so that regional comparisons could be made as well 
as reflecting the intra-regional distribution of public housesbetween brewery managed and tenanted 
outlets and the free,  non-brewery owned pubs.  Thus,  some  32 per  cent  of the sample pubs were 
brewery managed, 49 per  cent  tenanted, and  19 per  cent  free houses.  In  the case of managed pubs, 
the Commission were usually able to obtain historic data, but this was rarely the case for the tenanted 
and free pubs. 
3.44  Prices in  managed pubs are set by  the brewer.  Such direct control does not, 
however,  extend to tenanted and free pubs which are free to fix their own  bar prices.  The  Price 
Commission  inquired of tenanted and free pubs how  they determined their prices and the response to 
five sets of criteria  is  set out  in Table 3.19.  The criteria to which most  importance was attached by 
these tenanted and free house  landlords was that of 
11ensuring that prices are competitive with those in 
other public houses
11
•  The financial  measure of return on capital  (represented by criteria number 5  in 
Table 3. 19) was on  the whole of little importance.  Other financial measures,  such as achieving a 
particular percentage or cash return on sales (criteria numbers 2 and 3 in  Table 3. 19) were of importance 
to more than 50 per  cent  of respondents.  It  would be interesting to see the response to these criteria 
analysed as between the tenants and the free houses for  it  is  sometimes the case that free houses are run 
as a  group or a  chain and as such they may exhibit a  greater awareness of financial management 
techniques than their sole trader/tenant counterparts. 
3.45  ·Public houses  in  the U.K. often provide more than one room  or bar for 
on-licensed consumption.  These bars usually vary in  their standards of fitting and amenity and bar prices 
differ accordingly. The cheapest bar,  usuallyknown as the  'public' bar will tend to cost  ~p. to lp. 
less per pint compared with prices in  either the 'lounge' or  'saloon' bar.  There is a  trend towards bars 
becoming all of one standard and in  which  'lounge' rather than 'public' bar prices are reflected.  The 
Price Commission  undertook a  survey of beer prices in  lowest price  bars during the period May 25th to 
June 1st  1977 and the results on average prices by type of beer and by type of public house  are 
presented in Table 3.20.  Differences in  these averages for  lowest price  bars between the brewery 
managed and tenanted pubs are very  slight indeed,  but on  the whole the tenanted prices are greater than 
the managed pubs' prices.  Free-house prices are, with few  exceptions, generally higher than those in 
both managed and tenanted houses.  The constraint of time precluded the Price Commission from  being 
69 TABLE  3.19 
Methods of setting bar prices in  tenanted and free houses 
percentage of respondents replying 
Slightly  Other/not 
Criteria 
Very 
Important  Important  Important  Important  T  ota I 
1  :  Ensuring  that prices are compet-
itive with those in other public 
houses  68  9  7  16  100 
2:  Achieving some particular 
percentage of net profit on  sales  28  34  11  27  100 
3:  Achieving a  particular cash 
profit  22  32  15  31  100  . 
4:  Following managed  house/ 
brewers•  recommended prices  19  4  77  100 
5:  Achieving a  particular percentage 
return on  capita I  6  20  16  58  100 
6:  Other  9  2  89  100 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit. Appendix D 
TABLE  3.20 
Bar  p·rices by type of pub I  ic house 
U.K. Average-lowest price bars  in  New  P~nce 
Brewery-owned 
Managed  Tenanted  Free 
Houses  Houses  Houses 
Draught  (per pint) 
28.9  Ordinary bitter  27.0  27.2 
Premium bitter  30.4  30.~  33.1 
Mild  24.6  25.3  26.7 
lager  34.7  34.1  35.2 
Stout  35.3  35.7  35.7 
Bottled  (per nominal  half-pint) 
20.4  Pale,  light and export  18.4  18.8 
Brown ale  17.0  17.8  19.9 
lager  24.7  24.7  24.6 
Stout  19.7  20.3  21.0 
All 
Houses 
27.4 
31.3 
25.1 
34.6 
35.5 
19.0 
17.8 
24.6 
20.3 
90 per. cent. Range 
Lowest  Highest 
24  31 
27  36 
22  28 
31  40 
33  40 
15  23 
14!  21 
18!  33 
18  23 
SOURCE:  Price Commission(1977)op .cit Table 18. Price Survey carried out 25th May - 1st June 1977 
70 able to fully explore the reasons for these price differences but as suggested  in  the previous paragraph 
a  breakdown of the response set out in  Table 3.19 may  have yielded some clues.  One clue may  lie with 
the geographical distribution of free pubs.  Is  there a  tendency for  free pubs to be loca_ted  in  remoter 
areas not served by brewery owned outlets?  If such  is  the case then higher prices may simply be the 
result of being relatively isolated from  competition. 
3.46  The  last two columns  in  Table 3.20 are interesting in that they provide 
details of 90 per  cent  of the range within which the average prices by type of beer fall. Leaving 
aside the extreme, possibly untypical observations nevertheless reveals some wide variations in  price as 
between the lowest and highest prices that a  consumer could be asked to pay.  For  example, Table 3.20 
indicates that for ordinary bitter there is a  difference of 7p. between the lowest and highest price.  In 
other words,  the consumer paying 31 p. per pint is  paying  just under 30 per  cent  more for that pint 
that the person paying 24p.  These relative price differences are much  less for the draught beers in 
Table 3.20 than for the bottled beers.  For the draught beer the relative price difference as a  percentage 
ranges from  21  per  cent  for stout to 33 per cent  for premium bi·tter.  For bottled half-pints the 
relative price difference ranges from  28 per cent  for stout to 78per  cent.  for bottled lager. 
3.47  The data on  U.K. average bar prices in  Table 3.20 obscures considerable 
regional  variations,  some of which are highlighted in  Table 3.21.  The  lack of a  full  range of prices 
data for  Northern  Ireland  reflects the Province•s preference for stout and lager.  With the exception of 
bottled lager, the average  prices shown  in  Table 3.21 for  Northern  Ireland are all above the U.K. 
average; draught premium bitter and bottled light, pale and export ales are also priced well above 
London and South  East  England  levels;  ho\1ever,  excluding bottled stout Northern  lreland
1s stout and 
lager prices are less than in  London and :·he South East.  Overall beer prices in  London are the most 
expensive though even here there are considerable variations within the capital.  On the other hand, 
Scotland would seem to offer the lowest  prices with five out of the seven beers identified in  Table 3.21 
costing less that the U.K. average price.  This in  itself is  interesting.  It  was stated earlier, and in 
relation to Table 3.20, that free house  prices tended to be higher than prewery owned public houses. This 
statement must  now  be qualified for  "in Scotland where 74 per  cent  of public houses and hotels are free, 
average prices in  free and tied houses are about the same,  and are among the lowest in  the United 
Kingdom,  especially for  lager* .•....  which is drunk there generally in  preference  to draught  bitter~" 
Is  the conclusion to be drawn that the preponderance of free houses  in  Scotland equates with greater 
competition and hence lower prices that are not dissimilar as between free and tied outlets?  In 
England and Wales,  where brewery ownership of public houses predominates,  is  it the case that beer 
prices are higher because brewers•  pubs,  especially the managed pubs where prices are fixed  by the 
brewers, act as price leaders?  This would seem to be the Price Commission
1s view for  it states that 
*  Price Commission(1977) op.cit. para .6. 1 (p) 
+  Price Commission(1977) op.cit. para 4.5 
71 TABLE  3.21 
Regional  Bar  Prices 
lv\anaged,  tena.nted and free houses-lowest price bars in  New  Pence. 
South East  Rest  of Eng land  Northern  U.K. 
London  England  and Wales  Scotland  Ireland  Average 
Draught (per pint) 
Ordinary bitter  30.8  28.7  26.7  27.0  *  27.4 
Premium  bitter  33.4  32.1  30.0  28.6  36.1  31.3 
Mild  *  25.9  24.8  *  *  25.1 
Lager  38.3  37.4  33.2  30.5  36.3  34.6 
Stout  37.7  36.9  34.4  33.4  36.1  35.5 
Bottled  (per nominal  half-pint) 
Pale,  light and export  20.4  19.0  18.4  19. 1  22.7  19.0 
Brown ale  19.0  17.4  17.7  *  *  17.8 
Lager  27.0  24.4  24.6  25.0  22.2  24.6 
Stout  22.4  20.8  19.8  19.6  21.8  20.3 
SOURCE:  Price  Commission  {1977)op.cit. Table 19.  Price survey carried out 25th MI::Jy- 1st  June 1977. 
*insufficient availability of this beer in  this region," 
TABLE  3.22 
Price  Increases in  bars of MI::Jnaged  Public Houses,  lst June 1974- 1st June 1977 
U.K. averages based on  lowest  I  ist prices. 
Draught (per pint) 
Ordinary bitter 
Premium  bitter 
Mild 
lager 
Bottled  (per nominal  half-pint) 
Light ale 
Stout 
Percentage  Increase 
Large  brewers  Regional  brewers 
72 
65 
79 
69 
76 
67 
73 
77 
65 
67 
69 
60 
SOURCE:  Price Commission(1977)op.cit. Table 20 
72 
Small  brewers 
66 
63 
71 
55 
66 
57 "the effect of price leadership by managed houses has been to lead prices up"* 
3.48  The  Price Commission also examined price increases for different types of beer 
in  managed houses over the period  lst  June 1974 to lst June 1977, and this is summarised  in  Table 3.22. 
It  did not prove possible to present comparable data for free and tenanted public houses.  The prices 
data upon which the percentage increases in  Table 3.22 are based were taken from  the lowest prices 
on brewers•  lists,  but it must be stressed that some  brewers use  higher priced lists so  that Table 3.22 
should not be compared with the  previous Tables 3.20 and 3.21.  In  the period under consideration 
the Commission states that the retail price index  (RPI)  rose  by 60 per cent.  (21st  May 1974 = 100). 
This change in  RPI  can be compared with the percentage increases in  Table 3.22, so  that in  large 
brewers• managed houses,  lowest prices rose by more than the RPI  for ordinary bitter,  mild,and  I  ight 
ale, whilst equalling it for draught lager.  Price increases on two beers from  regional  brewers 
exceeded the rise in  RPI  with one equalling it, whilst only mild  beer from  the small  brewers outpaced 
the change in  RPI.  It  is  clear from  this table that over thethree year period small  brewers• percentage 
price rises on beer in  managed premises were in  most  cases considerably less than for  large brewers. 
3.49  As part of its price survey research in  the period 25th M.ay  to lst  June 1977, 
the Commission also considered gross percentage margins by type of public house, as well as changes 
in  the gross percentage margins of managed pubs in  the period  lst June 1974 to lst June 1977.  These 
results are presented in  Tables 3.23 and 3.24,  respec~lvely.  The data in  Table 3.24, cannot however 
be directly compared with that in  Table 3.23 as the former  is  based on  brewers•  lowest list prices 
while the latter has been determined from  surveys of lowest price bars.  The pattern of gross percentage 
margins displayed in  Table 3.23 replicates that of Table 3.20 for  lowest price bars;  namely,  that there 
is  little difference in  gross percentage margins by type of beer as between the brewery managed and 
tenanted pubs, and that the largest  margins can be found  in  free bars.  On the whole average gross 
margins appear to be greater for  bottled beers than for the draught varieties,  but in  either case the 
highest  margins are taken on lager  - 38 per cent  in  the case of draught and 42 per cent  for  bottled. 
The variation in  percentage margins given by the 90 per cent  range shows that for  draught stout the 
highest margin could be as much as 83 per  cent  greater than the lowest margin on stout, with this 
same factor being 82 per  cent  in  the case of bottled lager. 
3.50  Changes in  gross percentage margins between lst June 1974 and lst  June 1977 
in  the managed pubs of large,  regional and small  brewers and across the different types of beer indicate 
that the regional brewers experienced the most  favourable change in  their margins.  Table 3.24 shows 
that this group of brewers were able to increase their margins by up  to 3 per  cent  in  the case of lager, 
whilst only mild  beer suffered a  fall  in  its gross percentage margin  over the period of 0.3 per cent. 
For  large brewers three of their beers shown  in  Table 3.24 enjoyed increases in  margins over the 3 year 
period but of these none exceeded 1 per cent..Of the three latge brewers' beers whose margins fell, 
that for ordinary bitter declined by 1 per  cent  and that for  premium bitter by  1.2 per cent.  It  is  clear 
* Price CommissJon(1977)op.cit.para 6.5 
73 TABLE  3.23 
Gross percentage (retail)margins by  type of public house 
U.K. Average based on  lowest price bc:lrs"suryey  25th May- 1st  June 1977. Percent on  Sales* 
Managed  Tenanted  Free  All  90 per. cent. Range 
Houses  Houses  Houses  Houses  Lowest  Highest 
Draught 
Ordinary bitter  33  33  37  34  26  41 
Premium  bitter  34  34  40  36  26  44 
Mild  31  33  36  32  26  40 
Lager  38  37  41  38  30  46 
Stout  31  31  37  32  24  44 
Bottled 
Pale,  light and export  38  39  44  39  30  47 
Brown ale  38  40  44  40  32  48 
Lager  40  40  46  42  28  51 
Stout  36  37  42  38  28  44 
SOURCE:  Price Commission(l977)op.cit. Table 21 
*A  wastage rate of 3 per.cent. has been allowed for periodic cleaning down  of pipes, drawing off waste 
at start of day, wasted orders etc. 
TABLE  3.24 
Changes in  the gross percentage margin of managed public houses,  1974-77 (inc. VAT) 
U.K. average based on lowest list prices. 
Large  breweries  Regional  breweries  Sma II  breweries 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Margin  Change  Margin  Change  Margin  Change 
1 June  '77  1974-77  1 June '77  1974-77  1 June '77  1974-77 
Draught 
Ordinary bitter  30.5  -1.0  31.7  +2.7  29.0  -1.6 
Premium  bitter  31.8  -1.2  32.7  +2.7  29.1  -1.8 
Mild  30.8  +0.1  28.9  -0.3  28.5  -2.5 
Lager  34.1  +0.7  35.9  +3.0  31.9  -1.0 
Bottled 
Pale  32.5  -0.7  37.4  +1.7  34.1  -1.5 
Stout  32.2  +0.8  34.2  +0.6  32.7  -0.7 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op .cit. Table 22 
74 from  this table that  sma II  brewers• gross percentage margins decreased for all types of beer. 
Retail  Price of Beer  in Airport and Railway Station Bars 
3.51  The retail prices and margins on beer supplied to the public at airpcrt and 
railway station bars also fell within the Price Commission
1s terms of reference.  At both these points 
of sale beer prices and margins were found  to be high by comparison with those same variables for 
public houses.  This data is set out for airports and railway bars in Tables 3.25 and 3.26, respectively. 
The Commission considered the reasons for higher prices and margins, and in  the case of airports this 
was found to lie essentiallywith their high running costs.  Seven major airports in  the U.K. are owned 
and managed by the British Airports Authority with the control of other airpo'rts in the hands of local 
authorities.  Such authorities own the airport bars which are leased to independent caterers who pay a 
rent generally based on  sales.  Both  the standard of service and prices charged by these caterers are 
approved by the airport authority concerned, and in the case of prices theie are set so that they are 
compatible with meeting the high level of rents, demanded by the airport authority, which form  a 
contribution to meeting the overall cost of running an airport. 
3.52  The Commission discussed rental  levels with the British Airports Authority and 
they found  that they were broadly justified in  relation to the cost of maintaining the airports in  which 
the bars were located.  However,  the Commission pointed out that 
11it must always be a  matter of 
opinion on  what basis these costs should be attributed to the various activities,  including the bars
11* 
As far as the customer in airport bars is  concerned the Commission commented that 
11The high level of rents which result is, therefore,a 
reflection of the extent to which both Airport 
Authority and caterer believe that the customer can 
be squeezed in conditions which amount to a  monopoly, 
albeit a  very localized one.  In  defence of the caterer, 
it can be said that he is  simply reacting to the terms 
presented to him.  In  defence of the Airport Authority 
it can be said that it makes 'only a  modes:~ profit ·overall, 
and if it;did not secure its revenue in  this way,  it would 
have to do so 'in some other.  Nevertheless the customer 
may well regard it as a  form  of exploitation. 
11+ 
3.53  The costs involved in running bars in  railway stations were found  to be 
higher than for  public houses.  Service is  often provided from  early morning to late evening, but the 
number of customers that can use these bars is  constrained by bars which are situated behind ticket 
barriers.  Costs and prices were also found  to reflect the fact  that  more than half of total receipts were 
derived from  the london and South East area. 
*  Price Commission  (1977) op .cit .para  5.7 
+  Price Commission  (1977) op. cit.. para  5.5 
75 TABLE  3.25 
Average cost and selling erices and gross margins in aireort barsl  1975 and 1977 
1st  June 1975  1st  June 1977 
Cost  Selling  Gross  Cost  Selling  Gross 
Price  Price  Margin  Price  Price  Margin 
p  p  %  p  p  % 
Drau9_b!_ (per pint) 
Premium  bitter  12.87  30  57  16.99  35.17  52 
Lager  13.29  36  63  17.66  42.5  58 
Bottled  (per nominal  half pint) 
Pa I  e,  I  ig ht and export  7.90  18.39  57  11.34  22.5  50 
Brown ale  6.77  17.25  61  9.43  21.5  56 
Lager  8.24  19.67  58  10.86  24.67  56 
Stout  9.21  18.92  51  11.77  23.67  50 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op .cit. Table 26 
Note: Cost and selling prices include VAT.  Cost price of draught beer is caleulated after allowing for 
1 per. cent. wastage. 
TABLE  3.26 
Cost and selling erices and gross margins in  British Rail  station bars,  1975 and  1977 
June 1975  June 1977 
Cost  Selling  Gross  Cost  Selling  Gross 
Price  Price  Margin  Price  Price  Margin 
p  p  %  p  p  o/o 
Draught  (per pint) 
Ordinary bitter  13. 19  22  40  16.84  32  47 
Premium  bitter  12.98  26  50  17.35  33  47 
Lager - Scotland  12.81  25  49  17.21  35  51 
Lager- England  & Wales  12.81  28  54  17.21  38  55 
Guinness  17.78  27  34  22.76  38  40 
Bottled  (per nominal  half pint) 
Light ale  7.02  15  53  9.90  21  53 
High gravity ale  8.01  18  55  12.06  25  52 
Brown ale  7.02  15  53  9.90  21  53 
Lager  6.84  18  62  9.18  25  63 
Stout  8.89  18.5  52  11.61  25  54 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit. Table 28 
Note: Cost and selling prices include VAT.  Cost price of draught beer is  calculated after allowing for 
3 per. cent. wastage. 
76 Retail  Beer  Prices and Tax 
3.54  The retail prices of beer mentioned so  far have concerned average prices for 
different types of beer in  the U.K. as a whole and for  selected regions.  little has  been said specifically 
about taxes, and  in  particular excise duty.  Excise duty on beer brewed  in  the United  Kingdom  is 
levied according to the brew's original gravity (o.g.), which  is a  measure of the fermentable materials 
(e.g. malted barley) prior to fermentation and which ultimately determines the alcoholic strength of the 
beer.  Generally,  the higher the original gravity the higher the post-fermentation alcoholic strength. 
Original gravity is  expressed  in  terms of degrees and against water which has an o.g. of 1,000°, a 
beer of, say,  1030° o.g. can be said to have 30 parts of fermentable material per each 100 parts of 
water.  However,  not all beers brewed in  the U.K. are of the same original gravity or final alcoholic 
strength so  that the duty element contained within the retail price of a  beer brewed with a  high original 
gravity will  be greater than for a  brew  having a  low  original gravity.  Customs and Excise reports* 
indicate that for  many years now  the average original gravity of beers brewed in  the U.K. has been 
1037°, and the duty element shown  in  the breakdown of the retail price of a  typical pint and given 
in  Table 3.27 is  based upon this level of original gravity. 
3.55  It  is  both useful and interesting to consider the effects of different levels of 
original gravity in  determining the duty content of the retail price of a  pint of beer.  There are two 
rates of excise duty on  beer,  one fixed,  the other variable.  The fixed rate is  levied per bulk barrel 
(288 pints) of 1030° o.g. and the variable charge rises for  each degree of original gravity that a  partic-
ular brew exceeds 1030° o.g.  This data is summarised  in  Table 3.28 for the period since April  1st  1973 
and from  which the examples of duty charged on  the three beers of different gravity given in  the table 
have been derived.  Thus,  taking the most  recent period, a  beer of 1030° o.g. would generate 6.0p. 
per pint in  excise duty; at 1037° o.g ., 7 .5p.per pint; and at 1055° o.g., 11.1p.per pint.  Since 
April  1st  1973 the excise duty per pint of beer at 1030° o.g. has  increased by a  factor of 2.5 times; 
at 1037° o.g. by 2.4 times; and at 1055° o.g. by 2.2 times.  Value Added Tax, which was  introduced 
on April  1st  1973 and which currently stands at 8 per .cent., is added to the duty paid price of beer so 
that it follows that if duty increases so does the VAT  element of the retail price.  The  total tax take 
(i.e. duty plus VAT),  on a  pint of beer has therefore more than doubled over the period shown  in 
Table 3.28. 
Profiteering on  lager? 
3.56  Different beers from  different brewers will all pay the same duty p~r barrel 
or per pint provided that the original gravity is  the same for all the beers.  Differences in  wholesale and 
retail prices will depend upon  each brewers• success in  controlling other cost items and the margins 
hoped to be earned.  Brewers•  have been accused of profiteering on  their lager sales in  that they charge 
* H. M. Customs and  Excise. Annual Reports.  HMSO 
77 TABLE  3.27 
Breakdown of the retail price for a  typical pint of beer 
New  pence. 
1974  1975  1976  1977 
Brewing  materials  0.8  1.1  1.2 
Other brewing costs  2.3  2.7  3.3  10.3 
Selling, distributing and overheads  2.2  2.6  3.1 
Brewers net profit  1.1  1.3  1.7 
Duty  3.8  5.4  6.6  7.5 
VAT  1.6  1.7  2.0  2.3 
Retaile,rs margin  (gross)  6.2  8.2  9.1  10.9 
Retail  price per pint  18.0  23.0  27.0  31.0 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit.Figure 2 
TABLE  3.28 
Variations in  Beer  Duty according to Original Gravity 
Rates of duty  Duty per pint  (New  pence) 
Period  per bulk barrel per additional  1030°  1037°  1055° 
@  1  030°  degree exceeding 
1030° 
1.4.73  to  27.3.74  £  6.90  £0.290  2.4  3.1  4.9 
27.3.74  to  16.3.75  £  9.36  £0.312  3.25  4.0  5.9 
16.3.75  to  7.4.76  £13.68  £0.456  4.7  5.8  8.7 
7 .4.76  to  l.  1.77  £15.84  £0.528  5.5  6.8  10. 1 
L  1.77  £17.42  £0.5808  6.0  7.5  11. 1 
SOURCE:  H.M.Custnms & Excise,  Annual  Reports HMSO and The  Brewers' Society, Statistical Handbook 
78 higher prices per pint for  lager than for a  pint of beer of the same original gravity.  lager, which is 
considered in greater detail in  the following chapter, came to the U.K. originally as an imported 
product at a  price which reflected this fact.  During the last 2 to 3 years the demand for  the product, 
which is  the growth sector of the beer market,  has been satisfied almost entirely from  domestic 
production but the premium price has been retained.  Some  interesting insights into the difference in 
p-ice between lager and beer of similar gravities is given in  Table 3.29.  This table shows Allied
1s 
Skollager and  lnd  Coope  bitter to be of the same gravities but that the lager in  mid-1977 was being 
charged at 5p. more than for the beer, on  the basis of recommended prices in  public bars of manageci 
houses.  Bass  Charrington
1s  I. P  .A. bitter of a  higher gravity than either of their brands of Carling and 
Tuborg  lager was selling for  less than both the lagers.  Whitbread
1s Trophy  bitter at 1035° o.g. was 
selling at 28p. per pint compared to their Heineken  ordinary lager of 1033° selling at 33p.per pint. 
These types of differences are repeated in  Table 3.29 for  Courage and Watney. 
3.57  The brewers defend the higher price of lager on the grounds that it involves 
a  longer production and pasteurisation process than for ordinary bitter and in  consequence attracts 
higher costs.  This  is  true:  however, keg and premium bitter have a  longer processing time than 
ordinary cask bitter and are often of greater alcoholic strength yet are still retailed below lager prices. 
The  Price Commission were particularly concerned with what seems to be an excessive price for  lager, 
and their comments are worth noting: 
"The difference in  production and marketing cost between 
lager and a draught bitter of the same gravity is a  little 
over 1p. per pint, yet at wholesale prices the difference 
is some 2p. to 3p. and at the pub I  ic houses the difference 
is about 6p.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that lager is  priced 
on the basis of what the market will stand".* 
"We are satisfied the brewers are simply following  the practice 
of 
1charging what the market wi II  bear•.  Thus  ,we found  that, 
while lager prices are significantly higher that beer prices 
generally, both at the wholesale level and the retail  (public 
house) level, the reason  is  not duty, which on average tends 
to be lower for  lager because of lower gravity.  The higher 
price is due to somewhat higher production,  selling and 
marketing costs and higher profit margins taken at both  whole-
sale and retail  levels".+ 
The question remains,  therefore, as to how  much of the  lager/beer price differential is  justified by  cost 
differences alone. 
Retail  Prices of Beer  in  Licensed  Grocers 
3.58  Retail prices of beer sold  in  off-licensed premises did not form  part of the 
*  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit.para 4.10 
+  Price Commission  (1977)op.cit .para 6.1 (c) 
79 TABLE  3.29 
Price comparisons for  beer  and lager of similar original gravities 
Brewer  Brand  Original  Recommended price in 
Gravity  public bar of managed 
houses. 
(New eence) 
Allied  Skol  lager  1037  31 
Allied  lnd  Coope Bitter  1037  26 
Bass  Charrington  Carling Black  label  Lager  1037.5  31 
Bass  Charrington  Tuborg  Pilsner lager  1030  31 
Bass  Charrington  IPA  Bitter  1039  . 28/29 
Courage  Harp Standard  lager  1032.5  32 
Courage  Best  Bitter  1039.5  29 
Scottish & Newcastle  McEwan•s Cavalier lager  1038  30 
Scottish & Newcastle  Tartan Special Bitter  1037  29 
Watney  Carlsberg  lager  1030  32/37 - Manchester 
34/45 - London 
Watney  Special Bitt.er  1037  28/38 
Whitbread  Heineken Ordinary lager  1033  33 
Whitbread  Trophy Bitter  1035  28 
SOURCE:  The Observer June 26th 1977 
11What do you pay for a  pint
11
• 
80 Price Commission 
1s brief.  However, as part of another programme of research being carried out by 
ourselves* on  behalf of the European Commission,  we are able to present some  information on  the 
retail price of canned beers sold  by  licensed grocers.  Within this scheme of research alcoholic drinks 
prices were first surveyed  in  the Croydon,  Greater tv\anchester and West Central Scotland  (Glasgow) 
areas between 12-15th July 1977.  A random sample of the products from  the major brewers was 
selected and  16 grocery stores with off-licences in  the Croydon area were visited,  together with 30 in 
Greater tv\anchester and 33 in  Scotland.  The  types of stores visited included the independent,  multiple 
and Co-operative grocers and encompassed a  diversity of trading stylesand locations including the 
corner shop,  the high street supermarket,discount stores and superstorP.s and hypermarkets. 
3.59  The  results for  Croydon,  Manchester and Glasgow are summarised  in  Tables 
3.30- 3.32, respectively.  The data on average prices shown  by these tables would seemro confirm 
the conclusion reached by  the Price Commission  in  relation to on-I  icensed beer sales;  namely that 
"for most  beers,  the cheapest region  is  Scotland. 
14- In  terms of the average price per can, the 
differences between the Croydon and tv\anchester sample products were very small  indeed.  Once again, 
echoing  Price Commission findings,  lager prices were higher than beer prices, when comparing cans 
of the same volume.  Scottish and Newcastle Breweries hold the largest share of the Scottish beer 
market and, perhaps not surprisingly,  their products are priced lower,  on average,  in  Scotland than 
in  the Croydon and Manchester sample areas.  lr  could also be reasoned from  the data that Scottish and 
Newcastle are price leaders in  Scotland for as far as other beers  are concerned they tend to be priced 
lower in  Scotland than they do in  either Manchester or Croydon. 
3.60  The  relative price difference columns in  Table 3.30- 3.32 express the 
highest prices found  in  the price surveys as percentages of the lowest prices and in  general the magni-
tude of these differences are at their narrowest for  the Scottish prices ;  where the level of canned beer 
prices is also lower in  this survey area than for the other two areas.  As  with the relative price 
differences for  on-licensed beer sajes discussed earlier at paragraph 3.46, lager on the whole exhibits 
the greatest differences for  sales through licensed grocers.  These relative price differences are an 
indication of the range spanned by canned beer prices and in  part are a  reflection of dissimilarities in 
the structure of retailing in  the three areas,  but more particularly,  perhaps,  they are conditioned by the 
relative buying power of the retailers concerned.  The take-home market through grocery retailers is an 
expanding and competitive market but whether or not the competition is  intensive enough to place 
*At 6-monthly intervals since January 1976 Development Analysts  Limited  have been conducting 
retail price surveys at stores in  the Croydon,  Greater Manchester and West Central Scotland 
areas on a  sample of packaged grocery, detergents,  household consummables and alcoholic and soft 
drink products.  Preliminary research results were published  in A Study of the  Evolution of 
Concentration in  the Food  Distribution  Industry for the United  Kingdom.  Vol.2: Price Surveys. 
Brussels,  November 1976.  The results of more recent price surveys are being prepared for publication 
in  1979. 
+  Price Commission  (1977) op.cit.para 4.5 
81 TABLE  3.30 
Retail  prices of selected canned beers  in  licensed grocers in  the Cro~don area,  Jut~ 1977 
Brewer,  Brand and  Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Can Size in  price  price  price  price  equivalent price 
fluid  ounces.  (p)  (p)  (p)  difference  per pint 
(%)  (p) 
ALLIED  BREWERIES 
lnd  Coope  Long  Life  9~  15.89  17.0  14.0  21.4  32.8 
lnd  Coope  Long  Life  15~  25.35  28.0  25.17  11.2  32.7 
Double Diamond  9~  18.51  19.75  16.0  . 23.4 
~ 
38.3 
Double Diamond  15~  23.84  25.0  22.67  10.3  30.7 
Skoi.L.ager  9~  18.44  23.33  16.33  42.9  38.1 
Skol  lager  15~ 
BASS  CHARRINGTON 
Bass  Special  Pale Ale  9~  16.42  17.5  14.75  18.6  33.9 
Bass  Special  Pale Ale  15~  19.92  25.5  17.0  50.0  25.7 
Toby light  9~  16.62  17.0  16.0  6.3  34.4 
Worthington  'E'  9~  17.98  19.0  17.0  11.7  37.2 
Carling Black  Label  9~  16.75  18.0  14.75  22.0  34.6 
Carling Black  label  15~  22.44  26.0  21.25  22.4  28.9 
T  ennants 'lager  15~ 
Tuborg  Ordinary lager  9~  16.38  18.0  15.0  20.0  33.8 
Tuborg  Gold  15~  26.08  27.0  24.75  9.1  33.6 
Breaker Malt  9~ 
COURAGE 
light Ale  9~  16.22  18.75  13.0  44.2  33.6 
Colt 45 Malt  9~  18.61  21.25  16.0  32.8  38.5 
Kronenbourg  lager  9~  20.80  24.75  16.5  50.0  43.0 
SCOTTISH  &  NEWCASTLE 
Tartan  15~  25.95  29.0  24.17  20.0  33.5 
McEwan's Export  15~  26.29  28.0  24.5  14.3  33.9 
Newcastle Brown  15~  26.84  31.0  21.5  44.2  34.6 
Sweetheart Stout  15~ 
WATNEY 
Pale Ale  9~  15.14  16 .. 0  13.75  16.4  31.3 
Carlsberg Special Brew  9~  24.32  27.25  19.0  43.4  50.3 
Carlsberg Special Brew  15~ 
WHITBREAD 
Pale Ale  9~  15.62  17.25  14.0  23.2  32.3 
light Ale  9~  17.00  22.0  14.25  54.4  35.2 
Gold  label Barley Wine  9~  30.8  32.0  29.3  9.2  63.7 
Heineken  lager  15~  24.0  26.5  17.5  50.0  30.9 
Mackeson stout  9~  17.25  19.0  10.75  76.7  35.7 
GUJNNESS 
Stout  9~  19.38  21.5  16.25  32.3  40.1 
SOURCE:  Development Analysts Limited  Price Survey,  July 1977 
82 TABLE  3.31 
Retail  erices of selected canned  beers  in  licensed grocers in Greater tv\anchester 1  Jul~ 1977 
Brewer  1  Brand and  Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Can  Size in  price  price  price  price  equivalent price 
fluid ounces  (p)  (p)  (p)  difference  per pint 
(%)  (p) 
A LLJED  BREWERIES 
lnd  Coope  Long  Life  9~  18.75  19.0  18.5  2.7  38.8 
lnd  Coope  Long  Life  15~  25.65  28.5  23.0  23.9  33.1 
Double Diamond  9~  18.19  20.5  14.0  46.2  37.6 
Double Diamond  15~  27.33  27.5  27.16  1.2  35.3 
Skol  Lager  9~  17.31  21.67  14.5  49.4  35.8 
Skol  Lager  15~  25.06  25.3  24.8  2.0  32.3 
BASS  CHARRJNGTON 
Bass  Special  Pale Ale  9~  17.0  17.25  16.5  4.5  35.2 
Bass  Special  Pale Ale  15~  26.25  27.0  25.5  5.9  33.9 
Toby  Light  9~ 
Worthington 
1E
1  9~  17.69  18.5  17.5  5.7  36.6 
Carling Black  Label  9~  15.25  16.25  14.75  10.2  31.5 
Carling Black  Label  15~  22.10  25.5  19.66  29.7  28.5 
Tennants  Lager  15~ 
Tuborg  Ordinary Lager  9~  15.62  16.50  14.75  11.9  32.3 
Tuborg  Gold  15~ 
Breaker tv\a It  9~ 
COURAGE 
Light Ale  9~  15.62  16.75  12.5  34.0  32.3 
Colt 45  Malt  9~  18.48  21.5  16.25  32.3  38.2 
Kronenbourg  Lager  9~  19.82  21.25  18.0  18.0  41.0 
SCOTTISH  & NEWCASTLE 
Tartan  15~  25.46  30.0  23.17  29.5  32.8 
McEwan•s  Export  15~  25.68  27.0  24.16  11.8  33.1 
Newcastle Brown  15~  26.97  29.0  24.5  18.4  34.8 
Sweetheart Stout  15~ 
WATNEY 
Pale Ale  9~  14.57  16.5  12.5  32.0  30.1 
Carlsberg Special  Brew  9~  25.93  27.25  24.75  10. 1  53.6 
Carlsberg  Special  Brew  15~ 
WHJTBREAD 
Pale Ale  9~  16.57  21.25  14.0  51.8  34.3 
Light Ale  9~  15.70  17.50  13.75  27.3  32.5 
Gold Label  Barley Wine  9~  29.10  32.0  24.0  33.3  60.2 
Heineken  Lager  15~  23.11  27.5  21.0  31.0  29.8 
tv\ackeson  Stout  9~  18.30  21.5  16.0  34.4  37.8 
GUJNNESS 
Stout  9~  19.57  20.5  17.25  18.8  40.5 
SOURCE:  Develoement Analysts  Limited  Price Survey  1  July 1977 
83 TABLE  3.32 
Retail  ~rices of selected canned  beers  in  licensed grocers in the Glasgow area,  July 1977 
Brewer,  Brand and  Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Can  Size  in  price  price  price  price  equivalent price 
fluid ounces  (p)  (p)  (p)  difference  per pint 
(%)  (p) 
ALLIED  BREWERIES 
lnd  Coope  Long  Life  9~ 
lnd  Coope  Long  Life  15~  21.75  23.0  20.5  12.2  28.1 
Double Diamond  9~ 
Double  Diamond  15~  21.88  27.0  17.5  54.3  28.2 
Skol  Lager  9~ 
Skol  Lager  15~  21.85  27.0  20.0  35.0  28.2 
BASS  CHARRINGTON 
Bass  Special  Pale Ale  9~ 
Bass  Special  Pale Ale  15~  23.1  25.0  22.0  13.6  29.8 
Toby  Light  9~ 
Worthington  'E'  9~ 
Carling Black  Label  9~ 
Carling Black  Label  15~ 
T  ennants  Lager  15~  20.16  23.0  19.0  21.0  26.0 
T  uborg  0 rd inary  Lager  9~ 
Tuborg  Gold  15~  26.25  27.0  26.0  3.8  33.8 
Breaker Malt  9~  27.22  29.0  25.0  16.0  56.3 
COURAGE 
Light Ale  9~ 
Colt 45  Malt  9~  25.9  27.0  25.0  8.0  53.6 
Kronenbourg  Lager  9~ 
SCOTT ISH  &  NEWCASTLE 
Tartan  15~  22.98  25.0  21.0  19.0  29.6 
McEwan's Export  15~  23.33  26.0  22.0  18.2  30.1 
Newcastle Brown  15~  26.12  29.0  24.0  20.8  33.7 
Sweetheart Stout  15~  22.81  24.0  21.0  14.3  29.4 
WATNEY 
Pale Ale  9~ 
Carlsberg  Special  Brew  9~  23.67  25.0  23.0  8.7  49.0 
Carlsberg  Special  Brew  15~  35.54  37.5  34.0  10.3  45.8 
WHITBREAD 
Pale Ale  9~  19.0  23.0  17.0  35.3  39.3 
Light Ale  9~ 
Gold Label  Barley Wine  9~ 
Heineken  Lager  15~  23.10  25.0  22.5  11. 1  29.8 
Mackeson Stout  9~  17.43  18.25  16.75  9.0  36.0 
GUINNESS 
Stout  15-~  27.15  30.0  25.0  20.0  35.0 
SOURCE:  Development Analysts  Limited  Price Survey,  July  1977 
84 .brewers in a  loss  making situation, as some  have claimed, cannot be determined from  the information 
available. 
3.61  In  the final  column of each of Table 3.30- 3.32 is  shown  for  each canned 
beer the equivalent price per pint, on the basis that a  pint equals 20 fluid  ounces.  If  this measure  is 
taken as the base for  comparing unit prices, then  in  virtually all cases,  irrespective of whether it be 
in  Croydon,  lv\anchester or Glasgow,  the equivalent price per pint from  a  9~ fl.oz.  can  is  considerably 
greater than that from  a  15~ fl.oz. can for the same brand.  For  example,  the Croydon survey data in 
Table 3. 30 indicates the average equivalent price per pint of Double Diamond  to be 38. 3p. from  a 
9~ fl.oz.  can and 30.7p. from a  15~ fl.oz. can.  This may  be an extreme example but it does illustrate 
the fact  that it  is  usually cheaper to drink a  pint of beer or  lager in  a  pub than from  a  can at home. 
This  is  especially so  in  the case of the 9~ fl.oz. can which may  retai I  "at 15p. upwards and the can 
cost is around 3p. of a  fifth of the price."* 
Spirits' Prices 
3.62  Discussion  in  this section concerns the prices of Scotch whisky,  gin and vodka 
and is  based to a  large extent upon  information made available in  private communications with The 
Distillers Co. Ltd.  In  addition reference has also been made to the E.E.C's decision of December 20th 
1977+concerning the D.C.L's dual pridng policy, a  topic which receives closer attention in  the 
following chapter. 
Discounts on  Scotch,gin and vodka offered by D.C. L. 
3.63  Earlier in  this chapter reference was made to the classes of customer to which 
the D.C. L.  sells its products in  the United  Kingdom.  Some 98 per cent  of these customers  purchase 
sufficient quantities of D.C. L.  spirits in a  year for  them to be able to take advantage of D.C. L's  basic 
wholesale allowance.  This  is  not intended to imply that D.C.L's customers are wholesalers in  the 
generally accepted sense but rather that they fulfil the conditions laid down by the company.  The whole-
sale allowances per case of Scotch whisky, gin and vodka are all different, as are the basic gross trade 
prices per case before the deduction of any discounts.  The  trade prices and basic wholesale allowances 
ruling  in  February 1973 and February 1978 are summarised  in Table 3.33 for D.C.L's standard brands of 
Scotch whisky  (such as Johnnie Walkerand Haig),  gin  (except the Tanqueray brand  ), and Cossack vodka. 
It  must  be emphasised that the prices data set  out in  Table 3. 33 refer to sales to D.C. L. customers 
selling to the home market, and are in  terms of under-bond prices, ie.  excluding duty. 
*  Buckmaster and Moore (October 1977). The  Price Commission  Report on  Beer  Prices p.3 
+  Official Jounral of the European Communities. No.l.50.  Vol.21.  February 22nd  1978 ppl6-33 
85 TABLE  3.33 
D.C. L
1s under bond selling prices to home trade customers. 
£  er case 
Percentage 
February  February  Increase 
1973  1978  (%) 
Standard brands of Scotch whiski' 
Gross price  8.25  13.61  65.0 
less:  wholesale allowance  3.00  4.00  33.3 
Trade price  5.25  "9.61  83.0 
Gin (except Tanguera~ brand) 
Gross price  7.80  11 .75  50.6 
less:  wholesale allowance  3.00  3.70  23.3 
Trade price  4.80  8.05  67.7 
Cossack vodka 
Gross price  8.70  12.07  38.7 
less:  wholesale allowance  3.50  4.50  28.6 
Trade price  5.20  7.57  45.6 
SOURCE:  The  Distillers Co. Ltd. 
86 3.64  From  Table 3.33 it can be seen that the wholesale allowance on D.C.L. 
Scotch whisky increased by  £1  per case of 12 standard bottles, or by one third  in  the five years between 
February 1973 and February 1978.  For gin and vodka the comparable increases were of 23.3 per  cent  , 
and 28.6 per  cent  ,  respectively.  The  increases in  the trade prices for  these products are, however, 
purely notional for they do not take account of any other discounts and rebates that the D .C .L. makes 
available to its customers.  Whilst the wholesale allowance is a  fixed sum,  other discounts can be 
earned by D.C. L.  customers according to the quantity (measured  in cases) of spirits• products purchased. 
In  the case of D.C. L.  standard blends of Scotch whisky the discounts and rebates offered as at February 
1978 were: 
(i)  the Aggregate Quantity Discount  (A.Q.D)- a 
maximum of £1.24 per case and a  minimum of 
£0.82 per case discount could be obtained 
depending upon a  minimum quantity of spirit 
purchased during a  particular period. 
(ii)  the Deferred Special Allowance (D.S.A.)- in 
effect a  loyalty bonus varying from  a  maximum of 
£0.25 per case to a  minimum of £0.15 per case. 
(iii)  the Performance Bonus  Rebate(P. B. R.) - was made 
available from  March  lst 1977 and 
11is a  target 
bonus for maintaining at least 95 per .cent. of 
direct purchases of D.C.L. brands in a  given year, 
compared with that in  the previous year. 
11*  A 
maximum of £0.16 per case could be earned. 
For D.C. L.  gin and vodka only the A .Q .D. could be earned in addition to the basic wholesale 
allowance, but at different rates than fo: each other and for Scotch whisky.  In  addition to the basic 
discount structure, all three spirit types attracted discounts for cash with order on duty paid sales, 
extending up  to a  maximum of £0.90 per case per spirit.  Overriding these allowances customers could 
negotiate rebates in  respect of special promotions for D.C.L. products. 
3.65  The  value of the allowances made under the D .C .L. discount structure have 
changed over time and information supplied by D.C.L. to the E.E.C. may  be used to examine these· 
changes during a  recent period.  The data in Table 3.34 is  expressed in  terms of £
1s per case of 12 
bottles and sets the maximum possible discounts (excluding any promotional payments) that could be 
obtained by a  D.C. L.  customer against the pre-duty gross prices for Scotch  whisky, gin and vodka. 
Gross prices,  the cash value of maximum discounts and net prices have increased for all spirits over the 
periods given in  Table 3.34.  However,  the values of maximum discounts to a  purchaser of Scotch whisky 
or gin have fallen,  in  relative terms.  That is,  in  the case of Scotch, the net price paid after deduction 
of maximum discounts was equivalent to 47.3 per cent  of the gross price per case in  February 1973,  but 
had  increased to 51  per cent  by July 1977.  The comparable factor in  the case of gin was 50.4 per  cent 
* 
Officia! Journal of the European Communities op.cit.p 20 
87 TABLE  3.34 
Effect on  under-bond gross prices of maximum discounts obtainable by  D. C, L.  customers 
Gross price  Maximum  Net price to  Net as percent. 
Product  Under-bond  discounts  U. K.whole- of Gross price 
possible  salers 
£ per case  £ per case  £ per case  (%) 
Standard brands of Scotch whisk}' 
as at,  Feb. 1973  8.25  4.35  3.90  47.3 
July 1975  11 . 71  5.55  6.16  52.6 
July 1977  13.61  6.55  7.06  51.8 
Gin 
as  at,  Feb. 1973  7.80 
July 1975  9.85  4.89  4.96  50.4 
July 1977  11.75  5.60  6.15  52.3 
Cossack Vodka 
as at,  feb. 1973  8.70 
July 1975  10.47  5.47  5.00  47.8 
July 1977  12.07  6.34  4.98  41.2 
SOURCE:  The  Distillers Co. Ltd.  and Official Journal of the European Communities op.cit.Annexes 
2,3 & 4 pp.32-33. 
TABLE  3.35 
Prices paid by  D ,C, L.  customers after payment of duty and receipt of maximum discounts,  July 1977 
£per case  £per bottle  % 
Scotch whisky,  net price  7.06  0.59  15.7 
0  37.92  3.16  84.3  Duty  (70  Proof) 
44.98  3.75  100.0 
Gin,  net price  6.15  0.51  13.9 
Duty  (70°  Proof)  38.05  3.17  86.1 
44.20  3.68  100.0 
Vodka,  net price  4.98  0.42  12. 1 
Duty  (65 .5° Proof)  35.60  2.97  87.9 
40.58  3.39  100.0 
SOURCE:  as for  Table 3.34 
88 in  July 1975 and 52.3 per  ~ent  in  July 1977.  For  vodka,  these terms to the customer  improved both 
absolutely and relatively between July 1975 and  July 1977.  tv\aximum discounts on  vodka  increased 
during this period to the extent that the net price per case was some 2p. less  in  July 1977 than it had  been 
two years earlier.  In  relative terms,  the wholesale customer obtaining maximum discounts paid a  net 
price for  vodka  equivalent to 47.8 per cent  of the gross  price in  July 1975,  but by  July 1977 he was only 
paying 41 .2 per  cent  of the gross price. 
Duty inclusive net prices to a 
1typical
1  D.C.L. customer 
3.66  Set out in  Table 3.35 are the net prices percase and per bottle paid by D.C.L. 
customers  after receiving maximum discounts and after paying duty.  Duty on  Scotch whisky and gin  is 
levied per case of 12 bottles, each of 26~ fl .ozs. and containing 70° Proof spirit.  Each bottle of vodka  is 
of the same capacity but the spirit  is  rated at 65.5° Proof,  with the result that duty on  vodka  is  less than on 
Scotch or gin.  On the basis of the data set out in  this table,  the price to the D.C. L.  customer of a  bottle 
of Scotch works out at £3.75, for gin £3.68, and for  vodka £3.38, all exclusive of V.A.T.  These prices 
should,  however,  be considered as untypical for  in  practice not all D.C.L. customers are able to benefit 
by obtaining the maximum discounts offered by the Company.  The  D.C. L.  has suggested that in  addition 
to the  basic £4 per case wholesale allowance on  their standard Scotch brands,  a  'typicafl customer might 
receive £1.18 per case under the Aggregate Quantity Discount scheme and that £0. 15per case would be 
1typicafl under the Performance Bonus  Rebate and Deferred Special Allowance schemes combined.  The 
value of these discounts when added together amounts to £5.33 per case (compared with £6.55 at the 
maximum  for  Scotch) and when deducted from  the gross price of £13.61  per case represents a 
1typicafl price 
paid forD .C. L's standard Scotch brands (such as Johnnie Walker and Haig) of £8.28 per case, excluding 
any cash and promotional discounts.  With the addition of duty the more 
1typicafl price to D.C. L. 
customers becomes £46.20 per case or £3.85 per bottle, not  including V .A.T. 
Spirits• prices in  retail grocers 
3.67  At the same time as carrying out our survey of beer prices in  retail grocers 
(see paragraph 3.58) in  the Croydon,  tv\anchester and Glasgow areas during  July 1977, we also collected 
the prices of leading brands of Scotch whisky, gin and vodka.  The results of this survey,  in  terms of 
average prices and the highest and lowest  prices found are presented in  Table 3.36.  In  relation to the 
four  leading brands of Scotch whisky identified in  Table 3.36, the differences in  their average prices as 
between and within the three areas are not particularly marked. With the exception of the Teachers 
Highland Cream brand  in  the Glasgow area it is clear that in  July 1977 the Teacher and BeiJls brands were 
priced above the D.C.L. brands of Johnnie Walker Red  l..abel  and Haig.  This relationship is  believed to 
have existed for some  time.  For the gin brands surveyed,  the difference in  average  prices are more 
noticeable between the three areas, particularly for  Beefeater and D.C. L's  Booths brand.  Differences in 
the average prices of the leading brands of vodka are less obvious between the three areas, than within 
89 TABLE  3.36 
Average erices of leading brands of seirits surve}::ed  in  retail grocers in  the Cro}::don,  lv\anchester & 
Glasgow areas,  Jult 1977 
Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Price 
Brands  Price  Price  Price  difference 
(£)  (£)  (£)  (%) 
CROYDON 
WHISKY-
Johnnie Walker Red  Label  4.34  4.46  4.19  6.4 
Haig  4.34  4.49  4.15  8.2 
Bell
1s Extra  Spec ia I  4.40  4.46  4.19  6.4 
Teachers Highland Cream  4.39  4.49  4.25  5.6 
GIN-
Gordons  4.24  4.44  4.15  7.0 
Booths  4.23  4.35  4.12  5.6 
Beefeater  4.22  4.44  4.15  7.0 
VODKA-
Smirnoff  4.23  4.39  4.09  7.3 
Cossack  3.99  4.08  3.85  6.0 
Vladivar  3.70  3.79  3.59  5.6 
WHITE  RUM-
Bacardi  4.96  5.39  4.69  15.0 
MANCHESTER 
WHISKY-
Johnnie Walker Red  Label  4.33  4.75  4.19  13.4 
Haig  4.28  4.39  4.18  5.0 
BeiPs Extra  Special  4.39  4.49  4.29  4.7 
Teacher•s Highland Cream  4.38  4.55  4.29  6.1 
GIN-
Gordons  4.22  4.60  4.15  10.8 
Booths  4.26  4.35  4.15  4.8 
Beefeater  4.08  4.19  3.79  10.5 
VODKA-
Smirnoff  4.13  4.45  3.75  18.7 
Cossack  4.06  4.75  3.79  25.3 
Vladivar  3.81  4.40  3.50  25.7 
WHITE  RUM-
Bacardi  5.00  5.65  4.75  19.0 
GLASGOW 
WHISKY-
Johnnie Walker Red  Label  4.35  4.45  4.17  6.7 
Haig  4.32  4.45  4.17  6.7 
BeiPs Extra  Special  4.37  4.40  4.27  3.0 
Teacher
1s Highland Cream  4.29  4.45  4.20  6.0 
GIN-
Gordons  4.24  4.39  4.15  5.8 
Booths  4.16  4.29  3.99  7.5 
Beefeater  4.19  4.19  4.19  0 
VODKA-
Smirnoff  4.23  4.49  3.99  12.5 
Cossack  3.97  4.30  3.85  11.7 
Vladivar  3.88  4.02  3.59  12.0 
WHITE  RUM-
Bacardi  4.96  5.30  4.49  18.0 
SOURCE:  Development Analysts  Limited.  Prices Survey,  July 1977 
90 them.  Within each of the Croydon,  tv\anchester, and Glasgow sample areas there is a  tendency for 
the Smirnoff brand to be priced as the most  expensive, followed by Cossack  and then Vladivar.  It 
should be noted,  however,  that the size of the bottle in  which Vladivar is  retailed is somewhat smaller 
than the Smirnoff or Cossack bottle.  The magnitude of the relative price differences for Scotch, 
which with one exception are of a  similar order in  each of the three areas, are not very large which 
suggests that the opportunity for the consumer to 'shop around' is  relatively constmined.  By the same 
token, the relative price differences on gin and vodka present the consumer in  tv\anchester with the 
greatest scope in  'shopping around' for these products. 
Implied gross margins on D.C.l. Scotch whisky sold  in  retail grocers. 
3.68  The data on D.C.l. prices to trade customers discussed earlier may be 
compared with the retail prices data derived from  the price survey.  This establishes a  purely 
hypothetical situation, but is one from  which an indication of retail margins on Scotch, gin and vodka 
may be determined.  The assessment of these hypothetical margins is  set out in  Table 3.37 and draws 
upon sources discussed  in  the last few  paragraphs and tables.  Confining attention to Scotch whisky and 
comparing the first two columns of Table 3.37 with the last two columns show  that there is a  lOp.per 
bottle difference in  favour of the D .C.l. customer who obtains  maximum discounts and against the one 
receiving 'typical' discounts other than cash discounts.  This  lOp. difference is  maintained for the 
hypothetical cash margins because of the uniform retail prices assumed to be faced by all consumers of 
Johnnie Walker Red  label and Haig whisky.  These uniform retail prices are based upon the prices 
found in  our price surveys and represent the average for the three sample areas taken together.  The  cash 
margins for D.C.l. Scotch whiskies shown  in Table 3.37 are intended to be no more than indicative. 
Having said that,  however,  there is  every reason to suppose that there are D .C .l. customers,  Such as the 
large brewery groups and ~orne multiple retail grocers, who  obtain maximum discounts.  These 
types of trader could therefore have been earning a  cash margin of 59p. on  Johnnie Walker and 
55p. on  Haig.  (13.6 per.cent. and 12.8 per.cent. of the average retail prices, respectively).  At the 
same time,  if these traders were also receiving promotional discounts then the margins on these brands 
could be greater, or they could be smaller if they were discounting on their retail prices.  The real point 
to be made  is  that the retail cash margins on these brands are fairly slender,particularly because no 
account has yet been taken of V.A. T  ., either charged by the retailer to the consumer or paid by the 
wholesale customer to D.C.l. 
3.69  The V .A.  T.  element of a  bottle of Scotch selling at £4.30- £4.34 is around 
32p. so  that together with duty of £3. 16 per bottle the total tax take represents some 80 per cent  of the 
retail price.  If  32p. for  VAT  is deducted from  the cash margins on Scotch shown  in  Table 3.37 the 
resultant gross margins  leave very little for contribution to overheads and profit.  As a  percentage on 
the average retail price these implied gross margins vary from 5-6 per cent  after maximum discounts 
have been obtained,  to 3-4 per  cent  after receipt of 'typical' discounts. 
91 TABLE  3.37 
Assessment of hteothetical retail margins on  D.C. L.  brands of Scotch whiskt, gin and vodka 
Selling Price after  Selling Price after  Selling Price after 
deduction of IV\ax.  deduction of Max.  deduction of 'typical' 
discounts  discounts other than  discounts other than 
Cash discount  Cash discount 
£case  £bottle  £case (3)  £bottle  £case (4)  £bottle 
Standard Brands of Scotch whisk}:' 
Net Wholesale Price  7.06  0.59  7.96  0.66  8.28  0.69 
Duty  37.92  3.16  37.92  3.16  37.92  3.16 
(1)  44.98  3.75  45.88  3.82  46.20  3.85 
Average Retail  Price in 
Sample Grocers (2) 
Johnnie Walker  4.34  4.34  4.34 
Haig  4.30  4.30  .,._  4.30 
Hteothetica I Cash IV\argin 
Johnnie Walker  0.59  0.52  0.49 
Haig  0.55  0.48  0.45 
Gin 
Net Wholesale Price  6.15  0.51  7.05  0.58 
Duty  38.05  3.17  38.05  3.17  38.05  3.17 
(1)  44.20  3.68  45.10  3.75 
Averase Retail  Price in 
Samele Grocers (2) 
Booths/Gordons  4.24  4.24  4.24 
Hteothetical Cash IV\argin  0.56  0.49 
Cossack Vodka 
Net Wholesale  Price  4.98  0.42  5.88  0.49 
Duty  35.60  2.97  35.60  2.97  35.60  2.97 
(1)  40.58  3.39  41.48  3.46 
Average Retail  Price in 
Sample Grocers (2)  4.01  4.01  4.01 
Htpothetical Cash IV\argin  0.62  0.55 
SOURCES:  (1)  as for  Table 3.34 and 3. 35 
(2)  Development Analysts  Limited. PriceS urvey  July 1977. Average from  data 
on  Croydon,  IV\anchester and Glasgow survey areas. 
(3)  as for Table 3.34, but adding back 90p.per case for  maximum  cash discount 
(4)  see paragraph 3.65 
92 Spirits' prices in  the on-licensed trade 
3.70  In  tv\arch  1977 the Price Commission reported on  the prices and margins of 
soft drinks and mixers sold  in on-licensed premises.*  As  part of their research  the Commission examined 
the prices and margins for  whisky and gin as these are commonly mixed with soft drinks such as tonic 
water and ginger ale.  Before proceeding to consider theCommission's findings it should be noted that in 
England and Wales spirits sold for on-licensed consumption are retailed in statutory measures of 1/6th 
gill  (0.24 decilitres) or multiples thereof, whilst in  Scotland and  Northern  Ireland this measure  is 
1/5th gill  (0.28 decilitres).  The  Price Commission,  however,  have standardised the prices data for  the 
unit measure of sales on the basis on  1/6th gill. 
3.71  The survey data gathered by the Commission relates to November 1976 and 
Table 3.38 summarises the results on average prices and margins for the U.K. regions and as between 
the different types of on-licencq.  i.e. tenanted,  free and managed pubs,  hotels, and railway station 
and airport bars.  Thus,  in  November 1976 the U.K. average price in  lowest  price  bars of tenanted 
and free public houses was 25.8p. per l/6th gill measure for both whisky and gin.  Prices in  Scotland 
were less than the U.K. average whilst those in  England  exceeded it.  The  U.K. average gross 
percentage margin on a  1/6th gill measure of gin amounted to 49.6 per  cent  in  November 1976 and for 
whisky 48.2 per  cent.  As  with prices, these margins were greater than the U.K. average in  England, 
but less  in  Scotland and  Northern  Ireland. 
3.72  Point 3  in  Table 3.38 shows there to be very  little difference  in  the prices 
charged for gin and whisky within the same type of on-licensed premise.  Gin and whisky prices are 
clearly at their most expensive in  railway station bars.  Against these selling prices can be set the data 
on purchase prices  shown at Point4in Table 3.38 from  which the average gross percentage margins on 
whisky and gin by type of on-licence can be computed and set down at Point 5.  The percentage gross 
margins,  so derived,  for  lowest price  bars are on  the whole greater for gin than for  whisky.  By  type of 
outlet, the higher selling prices in  station and airport bars when combined with comparatively lower 
buying prices are sufficient to push  margins on gin and whisky to and beyond 60 per  cent  ,  especially 
for railway station bars.  For tenanted, free,  managed and hotel bars the gross percentage margin on 
gin and whisky  is  nearer 50 per  cent. 
3.73  The data at Points 3 and 4  in  Table 3.38 can also be used  to show  the level of 
mark-ups applied on average in  lowest  price  bars.  Thus,  at Point 6 railway station bars also exhibit 
the greatest  mark-ups, reaching 181  per  cent  in  the case of gin and 176 per  cent  for whisky.  Airport 
bars show  the second highest mark-ups for these products,  whilst in  other bars the average mark-ups 
would seem, an average to be around 100 per cent  ,  and tending to be higher for gin than for whisky. 
*  Price Commission  (March  1977) Soft drinks and Mixers in  Licensed  Premises  .  H .M.S .0. 
93 TABLE  3.38 
Summarised  results of Price Commission data for whisky and gin sold  in  on-licensed premises, November 1976 
1:  Average prices in  lowest erice bars  of tenanted and free eubl ic  houses  (new  pence) 
London  S.E.  Rest  of  Scot- N.  U.K.  Range  Range  in 
England  England  land  Ireland  Average  f\.Aanaged  Houses 
& Wales 
Gin 
1/6th gill  27.4  27.1  26.2  21.8  23.3  25.8  18.7- 30.0  23.3- 32.0 
Whisky 
1/6th gill  27."4  27.2  26.3  21.6  23.3  25.8  18.7- 30.0  22.5- 30.0 
2:  Average gross p3rcentage margins  in  lowest  price bars of tenanted and free pub I  ic houses(eer. cent.) 
London  S.E.  Rest  of  Scot- N. 
England  England  land  Ireland 
& Wales 
Gin 
1/6th gill  52.1  52.6  50.3  41.9  44.7 
Whisky 
1/6th gill  50.5  51.3  48.8  41.6  43.3 
Tenanted 
& free 
houses 
3:  U. K.Average prices in  lowest price  bars(new pence) 
Gin 1/6th gill  25.8 
Whisky  1/6th gill  25.8 
U.K.  Range 
Average 
49.6  34.8-
48.2  33.6-
Wonaged  Hotels 
houses 
25.9 
25.7 
26.0 
26.0 
4:  U.K.Average cost prices of most  recent purchase(new pence) 
Gin 1/6th gill  12 •. 9  12.9  12.7 
Whisky  1/6th gill  13.3  13.3  13.0 
5:  U.K.Average gross percentage margins in  lowest price  bars(per.cent.) 
Gin l/6th gill  50  50  51 
Whisky 1/6th gill  48  48  50 
6:  U. K.Average percentage mark-ups in  lowest price  bars  (per .cent.) 
Gin 1/6th gill  100  101  105 
Whisky  l/6th gill  94  93  100 
Range  in 
Managed  Houses 
57.2  --------------
56.3  --------------
Railway  Airport 
Station  bars 
bars 
33.5  29.5 
33.5  29.5 
11.9  11.8 
12.2  12.2 
64  60 
64  59 
181  150 
176  142 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (March  1977)Soft f>rinks and Mixers in  Licensed  Premises, HMSO 
Points 1-5, Tables 3,4,6,9, 10. 
Point 6,  derived from  Points 3 and 4 
94 It  should be pointed out, however,  that the cost prices on  which these mark-ups are based depend in 
the case of managed pubs upon the brewers•  policy on transfer pricing. 
3.74  In  the case of managed public houses  the Price Commission was able to obtain 
historical data so that it is possible to compare the situation on  prices and margins in  November 1976 
with that three years earlier. Accordingly,these dataaresummarised in  Table 3.39 but it should not be 
compared to the previous table because of differences in  returns made to the Commission.  Although 
increases· in  selling prices per 1/6th gill of whisky and gin were the same in  lowest  price  bars of 
managed houses between November 1973 and November 1976,  cost prices rose faster for whisky than for 
gin- whether or not changes in  duty are included.  In  consequence, as Point 4 of Table 3.39 shows the 
growth in average gross percentage margins between 1973 and 1976 was held back to 2 per  cent  for 
whisky,  but moved ahead by  6 per  cent  for gin. 
Pub  prices versus supermarket prices 
3.75  It  is  interesting to consider the comparative cost to the consumer of drinking 
Scotch whisky  in  a  pub or buying a  bottle in a  supermarket and drinking  it at home.  Lack  of data for 
the same time period precludes being able to make precise comparisons but an indication can be 
gleaned from  the Price Commission data for  November 1976 and our own  price survey carried out in 
July 1977.  Using  the example of the D.C.L
1s Haigbrand of Scotch whisky  it was shown  in  Table 3.37 
that  the average price for  this brand amongst the retail grocers in  our sample was £4.30 per bottle.  If 
a  publican is able to extract 31  measures of 1/6th gill from  a  standard bottle  (26~ fl.oz. )then on 
average the equivalent price for  1/6th gill of Scotch whisky bought in a  grocery store is  13.8p. per 
statutory measure tax paid.  This was  in  July 1977.  In  November 1976 the Price Commission data 
given here at Point  1 in  Table 3.38 showed the U.K. average  retail price of 1/6th gill of whisky  in  the 
lowest  price  bars of tenanted and free pubs to be 25.8p., and 25.7p.  in  managed houses.  Over the 
bar prices no doubt  increased between  November 1976 and July 1977 so  it would  seem that by July 1977 
it cost at least twice as much to drink the same measure of Scotch in  a  pub as it did at home.  On this 
point a  comment made by the Price Commission  in  relation to the prices of soft drinks in  pubs and super-
markets is  of equal relevance, for 
"The comparison is  not,  however, a  fair one.  The public 
house is a  service establishment with expenses of 20 per 
cent  to 25  per  cent  and with a  conventional gross profit 
margin of 31  per  cent  to 34 per  cent  ,  while the super-
market would have an expense ratio of about 16  per  cent 
and a  gross profit margin of 18 per  cent  or 19  per  cent."* 
*  Price Commission  (March  1977) op.cit .para .4. 1. 
95 TABLE  3.39 
Summary of Price Commission data for changes in  managed houses•  prices and margins,  1973-76 
Gin  Whisky 
Managed  Houses  ~th gill  ~th gill. 
1)  Average price increase in  lowest price  bars, 1973-76 
Price November 1973  (new  pence)  16.4  16.3 
Price increase  (new  pence)  9.1  9.0 
(per  cent)  55  55 
Excluding duty increase  (new  pence)  6.1  6.0 
(per  cent)  37  37 
2)  Average cost  increase 1973-76 
Cost  November 1973  (new  pence)  8.8  8.8 
Cost increase  (new  pence)  4.1  4.5 
(per  cent  )  47  51 
Excluding duty increase  (new  pence)  1.1  1.5 
(per  cent  )  13  17 
3)  Average cost erice increase compared with average selling price 
increases,  1973 - 76  *  * 
Cost  Price  Increase  (per  cent  )  47 (13)  51 (17) 
Selling  Price  Increase  (per  cent  )  55(37)  55(37) 
Difference  +8(+24)  +4(+20) 
4)  Change in average gross percentage margins  in  lowest price 
bars,  1973 - 76 
1973 Margin  (per  cent  46  46 
1976 Margin  (per  cent  49  47 
Change in  Margin  (per  cent  +6  +2 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (March 1977) op.cit.Tables 5,7,8, 11 
* figures in  brackets are exclusive of increases in  duty. 
96 3.76  So,  in  terms of  unit prices it is  cheaper to drink whisky from a  supermarket 
at home than to drink it in a  pub.  At the same time,  it could even be cheaper for some publicans to 
buy their supplies of Scotch whisky from a  supermarket than from  the brewer to whom  they may be tied 
for  supplies.  This  is an opinion which has been voiced by publicans fairly recently and is  one which 
the facts to hand  tend to support.  For  example,  in  Table 3.38 the U. K.average cost price per 1/6th 
gill measure of whisky to tenanted,  free and managed houses was shown to be 13.3p.  If this figure  is 
multiplied by  31* then the equivalent cost to the publican in  terms of a  standard bottle of Scotch that 
he could purchase in  a  supermarket was £4.12 in  November 1976.  There is  no doubt that at this date 
standard size bottles of leading brands of Scotch whisky could be bot.:ght  in  supermarkets for  less than 
£4. 12. 
Transfer prices to managed houses 
3.77  The most  likely reason why a  publican could obtain cheaper supplies of 
Scotch from  a  supermarket is  that he  is  tied to a  particular brewer-landlord for  not only beer,  but also 
wines and spirits and at prices set by the brewer ..  In  the case of the brewery managed pub I ic house the 
13.3p cost price (Point 4, Table 3.38) for  1/6th gill of whisky that the  landlord  is  charged will, as 
noted by the Price Commission,  vary according to the policy on transfer prices adopted by the brewery 
company.  If,  for the sake of argument,  we assume there to be a  fictitious brewer, able to earn maximum 
discounts on  D.C.L. Scotch whisky,  then in  November 1976asa D.C.L.wholesale customer he could 
obtain a  case of standard Scotch whisky from  D.C.L. at a  cost of £6.41+, exclusive of any promotional 
rebates. Adding on duty,  which at that time amounted to £34.40 per case, and V.A.T. produces a 
tax paid price per case of £44.07.  This  is,therefore,the brewers' buying-in price. 
3.78  At 13.3p for  1/6th gill of whisky  (tax paid) the equivalent price per bottle 
has already been stated as £4. 12;  multiplying this by 12 gives a  case price of £49.44.  This represents 
the buying-in cost of a  case of Scotch whisky to the publican of a  managed house,  or in other words 
the brewers' transfer price.  The fictitious brewer-landlord,  therefore,  in  his role as a  wholesaler sets 
a  price which generates a  gross percentage margin on the transfer price of 10.8 per cent.  In  addition, 
as the brewer ulso manages the pub he takes the retail gross margin,  which the Price  Cory~mission 
showed to be 48 per  cent  in the lowest price  bars of managed houses  in  November 1976 (Point 5, 
Table 3.38).  In  view of this it  is  not surprising that there is a  trend towards brewers taking over 
the direct management  of their public houses. 
*  the number ofl/6th gill measuresobtainable from a  standard bottle of Scotch. 
+  Official Journal of the European Communities op.cit.Annex II  p.32 
97 4:  THE  PRODUCT  MA.RKETS 
Introduction 
. 4.1:  This chapter is  comprised of two parts.  The first,  based upon  nat iona I 
accounts and Customs and Excise data,  looks at broad trends in  consumption, expenditure and prices for 
the alcoholic drinks trade as a  whole and for  the three sub-divisions of beers, wines,and spirits during the 
period 1970 to 1976.  The second part, examines individual product markets paying particular attelition to 
the evolution of brand shares within each product market identified.  For a  number of products data are 
given on the shares of the retail market represented by  sales of different brands.  These data are subject to 
certain qualifications arising from  the methods by which they are compiled, and in  some cases they sum  to 
more than  100 per cent.  According to the I.P.C. Marketing Manual of the United  Kingdom,  the brand-
share data should,  therefore, be taken as indicative of the relative positions of the stated brands rather 
than as absolute precentages for shares of the total market. 
4.2:  The product markets considered are, beer and lager, whisky ,gin, 
vodka,  brandy,  rum  and wines (table wines,  fortified wines and cider). 
Market Trends in  Consumption,  Expendit,ure and  Prices 
4.3:  Table 4.1 sets out the data on consumers• expenditure on alcoholic 
drink between 1970 and 1976 in  terms of both current and constant (1970) prices.  In  addition, both these 
series are shown  indexed against the base year of 1970.  In  current price terms,  consumers increased their 
expenditure on all alcoholic drinks by  just over two and a  half times over the six year period.  However, 
when price increases are taken into account this translates into a  real growth  in  the volume of expenditure 
of 39 per cent.  Furthermore,  the proportion of total consumer spending devoted to alcoholic drinks rose 
from  7.25 per cent in  1970 to 9. 05  per cent in  1976*,  in  terms of constant 1970 prices, so  that overall 
*derived from  National  Income and Expenditure- 1966-76 HMSO 
99 TABLE  4.1 
Consumers•  Expenditure on Alcoholic Drink,  1970-1976 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
£m. at Current Prices 
Beers  1355  1526  1662  18J7  2071  2679  3282 
Spirits  611  670  777  1004  1140  1392  1625 
Wines,  cider and perry  333  397  471  604  715  831  1005 
2299  2593  2910  3415  3926  4902  5912 
£m. at Constant 1970  Prices 
Beer  1355  1419  1464  1549  1551  1609  1645 
Spirits  611  650  739  916  991  970  995 
Wines,  cider and perry  333  385  438  524  543  512  565 
2299  2454  2641  2989  3085  3091  3205 
Value  Index at Current Prices,  1970= 100 
Beer  100  113  123  133  153  198  242 
Spirits  100  110  127  164  187  228  266 
Wines,  cider and perry  100  119  141  181  215  250  302 
100  113  126  148  171  213  257 
Volume  Index at Constant Prices,  1970 = 100 
Beer  100  105  108  114  114  119  121 
Spirits  100  106  121  150  162  159  163 
Wi-nes,  cider and perry  100  116  132  157  163  154  170 
100  107  115  130  134  134  139 
SOURCE:  Nationa I Income and  Expenditure 1966-70  HM~O. 
100 it would seem that this sector has been fairly successful at attracting available spending power.  Part of 
the reason for this can no  doubt be explained by movements in  relative prices and in  this respect Table 4.2 
amplifies the point that the price of all alcoholic drinks rose at a  much slower rate than did the general 
level of prices faced by all consumers during the period- the price index on  alcoholic drink stood at 185 
in  1976 (1970 =  100) and for all consumers expenditure it was 208 (1970 =  100). 
4.4:  The variation in  price increases experienced by the beers, wines and 
spirits sub-sectors has had a  differential impact upon  the volumes of money expended on  them.  Between 
1970 and  1976 the price index for  beer shown  in  Table 4.2 implies that the price of this beverage doubled 
during those six years, whilst the volume of expenditure in  real  terms grew by only 21  per cent. (Table 
4.1 ).  In  the face of price rises amounting to 78 per cent  ,  wines,  cider and perry managed to attract 
an additional 70 per cent  of expenditure in  real  terms in  1976 compared with  1970.  Spirits would 
appear to have performed best of all - here. an increase in  real  expenditure of 63 per cent  exactly 
equalled the degree to which this products•  prices were inflated over the six year period. 
4.5:  Although wines showed the largest increase in  consumers expenditure in 
real terms between  1970 and 1976 their rate of advance was considerably slowed between 1973 and 1974 
when prices rose  by  just under 15  per cent  ,  and expenditure by just short of 4 per cent.  Between these 
same two years the price of beers rose at a  rate almost identical to that for wines,  resulting in  no real 
growth in  the beer market as exemplified by the index of consumers real expenditure  on  this product which 
stood at 114 (1970 = 100)  in  both 1973 and 1974.  In  the following  period,  1974 to 1975, all alcoholic 
drinks•  prices rose by slightly more than 24 per cent  with the result that both the wines and spirits 
markets contracted- in terms of consumers• expenditure this amounted to falls of 5.5 per cent  ,  and 1.8 per 
cent  ,  respectively.  Beer,  on  the other hand,  moved away from  the point of stagnation reached in  1973-
74 and recorded a  rise  in  real spending of 4.4 per cent.  Irrespective of any benefit beer may  have  enjoyed 
from  a  relatively hot summer  in  1975,  it would seem reasonable to infer from  the data in  Table 4.1 that the 
1974-75 price rises were sufficient to enlarge the differential between the prices of wines and spirits 
relative to beer and that as a  consequence there ~as an element of consumers•  trading-down to the 
relatively cheaper product, as well as to relatively cheaper wines and spirits. 
4.6:  Both  the wines and spirits sub-sectors revived between  1975 and 1976 after 
the downturn  in  consumers expenditure recorded for  1974-75.  Price rises on  wines were the lowest for  all 
three sub-sectors and consumers expenditure moved up  by 10.4 per cent  on  1975  to  produce an  index  in 
real  terms of 170 (1970 = 100) in  1976.  Although the real  volume of consumers•  expenditure on  whisky 
rose by 2.5 per cent  between 1975-76 the indexed value at 163 (1970 = 100)  in  1976 was only one point 
above the level  it had  been in  197  4.  Significantly large price increases were .recorded for  beers between 
1975 and 1976 with the result that real expenditure growth  in  this sub-sector was  I  imited to 1. 6 per cent. 
101 TABLE 4.2 
Implied Price  Indices for Alcoholic Drink and  Total  Consumers•  Expenditure,  1970-1976 
1970 =  100 
Year  Beer  Spirits  Wine,  cider, perry  All alcoholic  All Consumer
1s 
Drink  Expenditure 
1970  100  100  100  100  100 
71  107  104  102  106  108 
72  114  105  107  110  116 
73  117  109  115  114  125 
74  134  115  132  128  146 
75  166  143  162  159  180 
76  200  163  178  185  208 
SOURCE:  derived from  Table 4. 1, 
and  National  Income and  Exr;>enditure.  1966-76 Table 2.5.  HMSO. 
102 Beer 
4.7:  In  Table 4.3 the index of beer consumption has been added to the indices 
on expenditure and prices already discussed to complete the picture for trends in  the U.K.  beer market 
between 1970 and 1976.  That expenditure on  beer in  real  terms remained constant in  1973 and 1974 
whi 1st  the volume consumed  increased would tend to support the notion that consumers traded-down to 
cheaper beers.  On the other hand, with the consumption index standing at 117 (1970 = 100)  in  both 1975 
and 1976 it would appear that the real rise in  expenditure on  beers was wholly attributable to price rises. 
4. 8:  So,  the volume of all beers consumed  between 1970 and 1976 increased 
by 17 per cent  ,  as shown  in  Table 4.3.  In  addition, an attempt has been made to demonstrate how  the 
consumption of different types of beer changed over the same period.  Unfortunately,  it has not proved 
possible to disaggregate the data for  1970 on the same basis as for  subsequent years,  so  that the data set out 
in  Table 4.4 is  presented against 1971  as its base year.  However,  before this table is  interpreted certain 
qualifications must  be borne in  mind.  First of all, the total volume consumed (last row  of Table 4.4) 
represents actual consumption as given by the Brewers Society.  Secondly,  the indices in  the body of 
Table 4.4 have been derived from  data on  proportions of total sales in different kinds of beer published in 
the Brewers Society Statistical Handbook.  The overriding cautionary note,  therefore,  is  that whilst 
consumption may not equate precisely with sales the data in  Table 4.4 may  be taken as a  relative guide to 
the actua I volumes of different types of beer consumed. 
4.  9:  Thus,  Tab  I.~ 4.4 shows that the whole market grew,  in  terms of consump-
tion,  by 12  per cent.  between 1971  and 1976.  Amongst the different types of beer, five reflected 
declining areas of consumption; namely, 'Jraught mild and premium bitter and stout, and packaged light, 
pale and export ales,  brown ales, and stout.  The consumption of draught ordinary bitter rose by 10 per 
cent  in  the five year period whilst consumption of other beers (strong ales,  barley wine and party cans) 
rose by 21  per cent  ,  well above the volume growth factor for  the whole market.  Indeed,  the overall 
market growth would seem to have been sustained considerably by sales of lager- consumption of which 
may be indexed at 293 (1971  = 100)  in  the draught category for 1976 and at 208 (1971  = 100) for the 
packaged variety in  the same year.  Furthermore,  it may be stated that the volume of all types of lager 
passing to consumption in  1976 was some 2.7 times greater than that consumed  in  1971. 
4.10:  What is  not evident from  Table 4.4 is  that the consumption index for 
bottled and canned beers alone stood at 97 ( 1971  = 1  00)  in  1976 so that if' would seem that the growth in 
consumption of packaged lagers and 'other' beers was insufficient to offset the declining volume of other 
packaged beers.  Conversely,  the growth in  draught lager consumption aided by that for draught ordinary 
bitter was more than enough to counteract the declining consumption or'draught mild,  premium bitter and 
stout, as the index for draught varieties alone was 117 (1971  = 100)  in  1976. 
103 TABLE 4.3 
Beer: 
Indices of Market Trends in  U.K. Consumption,  Expenditure and Prices,  1970-76 
Year 
1970 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
SOURCES: 
1970 =  100 
Consumption  Expenditure  Prices  All Alcoholic Drinks 
Prices 
100  100  100  100 
104  105  107  106 
106  108  114  110 
111  114  117  114 
114  114  134  128 
117  119  166  159 
117  121  200  185 
Consumption  Index:  derived from  data on  volumes consumed supplied 
by Brewers Society. 
Expenditure and Price  Indices:  as for Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
104 TABLE 4.4 
Indexed Volume of Beer  Consumption  by Type of Beer and  Package,  1971-76 
(1971  =  1  00) 
Type of Beer and  Package  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Draught Beers: 
Mild  100  92  86  85  84  79 
Premium  Bitter and  Stout  100  105  104  106  103  98 
Ordinary Bitter  100  102  104  106  111  110 
Lager  100  124  170  195  247  293 
Bottled and Canned  Beers: 
Light, pale and  export  100  102  111  111  107  96 
Lager  100  114  138  145  173  208 
Brown  100  100  99  96  79  67 
Stout  100  100  98  92  80  67 
*Others  100  119  126  128  121  121 
Total Market Index  100  102  107  109  112  112 
Total Volume Consumed  35.8  36.6  38.2  39.1  40.2  40.1 
(m.  bulk barrels) 
SOURCE:  See  Para . 4 . 8 . 
*  comprised  of strong ales,  barley wine and party containers. 
105 Spirits 
4.11:  Table 4.5 summarises the spirits market trends data for the period 1970-76 
and shows that relatively moderate price increases were enjoyed by this sector up  to 1974 and with the 
indices on  consumption and expenditure moving more or less  in  line with each other.  In  fact  1  this 
relationship was maintained in  1975  in  spite of the unprecedentedly large 1974-75 price rise.  However, 
by the end of the period to 1976 the growth in  real expenditure had been constrained by price inflation to 
the extent that the former  just kept pace with the latter, as exemplified by the respective indices both 
standing at 163 (1970 = 100) in  1976.  Uncharacteristically, consumption  leapt ahead- its index being 
178 (1970 = 100) in  1976, and this must  be taken as further evidence of an element of trading-down to 
relatively cheaper spirits. 
4.12:  The growth in  consumption of individual types of spirits may  be discussed 
by reference to Table 4.6 which sets out consumption  indices for  the years ending on  31st March,  1971-
1977.  As  this data is  based upon  fiscal  years the total market index for  spirits consumed  is  not directly 
comparable to the data in  the previous table, nevertheless the trends by spirit type are clearly discernable. 
What lager has meant to the beer market,  in  terms of consumption,  so  has vodka to the spirits market. 
During  the six years to the end of the first quarter of 1977,  vodka consumption  increased just over three 
times,  clearly out pacing market growth generally.  The growth in  whisky consumption, on  the other hand, 
was 77 per cent  higher at the end of the 1976-77 fiscal  year,  the same as for  the total spirits market. 
Gin consumption recovered from  its post-1974 decline to stand 54 per cent  higher in  1977 than it had been 
six years earlier.  By  1973 consumption of both imported rum and brandy was 35  per cent  higher than  in 
1971  and whilst rum  moved ahead at a  faster rate they both peaked in  1974.  The data for  1977 indicates 
a  revival  in  brandy consumption which suffered a  marked decline after 1974, no doubt aided to some extent 
by a  deteriorating sterling exchange rate. 
106 TABLE 4.5 
Spirits: 
Indices of fv\arket Trends in  U.K. Consumption,  Expenditure and Prices,  1970-76 
1970 = 100 
Year  Consumption  Expenditure  Prices  All Alcoholic Drink 
Prices 
1970  100  100  100  100 
71  104  106  104  106 
72  120  121  105  110 
73  151  150  109  114 
74  165  162  115  128 
75  158  159  143  159 
76  178  163  163  185 
SOURCE:  Consumption  Index:  derived from  Customs and Excise data. 
Expenditure and Price  Indices:  as for Tables 4.1 and 4.2  •• 
107 TABLE  4.6 
Indexed Volume of Spirits Consumed  by Type,  1971- 1977 (years ending 31st March.) 
31st March 1971  = 100 
Spirit Type  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
U.K. Produced: 
Whisky  100  111  123  157  163  161  177 
Gin and other Compounded 
Spirits  100  102  113  149  146  136  154 
Vodka  100  109  145  200  236  263  309 
Imported: 
Rum  100  115  135  180  175  165  160 
Brandy  100  112  135  165  147  141  147 
Liqueurs  100  100  140 
200  200  228  228 
Other  100  200  100 
Total Market Index  100  110  125  162  165  163  177 
Total Volume Consumed  19.7  21.7  24.6  32.0  32.5  32.1  34.9 
(m.  proof gallons) 
SOURCE:  derived for The  Brewers•  Society Statistical Handbook based  upon Customs & Excise data. 
108 Wines 
4. 13:  The  indices in  Table 4.7 show  how  the rise in  consumption and rea I 
expenditure on  wines continued unabated until  1974 after which both measures faltered  in  the face of the 
1974-75 price rise of around 23 per cent.  Indeed,  the 1974-75 price rise  lifted wine prices to some 62 per 
cent  above their 1970 level with a  resultant dampening effect upon  consumption and expenditure to the 
extent that the indices on  both of these measures in  1975 were less than the peaks they attained in  the 
previous year, as well as being below the level to which the market had grown  in  1973.  Not withstanding 
the price rises that continued into 1976 the wine market recovered, and it would seem from  the differential 
growth rates of the consumption and expenditure indices that rather than consumption growing at the expense 
of dearer brands,  expenditure moved ahead by benefitting from  price rises. 
4.14:  Table 4.8 sets down the data on  the consumption of different types of 
wine during Customs and  Excise years ended on  31st March,  the base year being taken as 1971.  Against 
this base the consumption of all wines is  shown  to have increased by 73 per cent  by  the end of the first 
quarter of 1977,  representing a  resumption  in  the growth pattern for  this market which went into decline 
two years earlier.  The most consistent increase in  volume consumed of any wine given  in  Table 4. 8 is  that 
for  vermouth, which grew between each year to stand,  in  1977, at just over 3  times above the 1971  level of 
consumption.  Still table wine and sherry consumption both peaked in  1974,  thereafter going  into decline 
for  two years but recovering sufficiently in  1977 to stand at new  indexed peaks of 234 and 146 (31st March 
1971 =100~respectively  .Sparkling table wine and port also reached  levels of peak consumption  in  1974 but 
have not recovered to those  levels in  1977, although the post-1974 trend has been upwards.  The peak 
year for consumption of Commonwealth and British wines occurred in  1975,  but whereas the latter showed 
signs of moving ahead in  1977,  the former exhibited little evidence that the downward trend in  consumption 
was likely to be reversed. 
109 TABLE 4.7 
*Wine: 
Indices of tv\arket Trends in  U.K.  Consumption,  Expenditure and Prices,  1970-76 
1970= 100 
Year  Consumption  Expenditure  Prices  All Alcoholic Drink 
Prices 
1970  100  100  100  100 
71  117  116  102  106 
72  134  132  107  110 
73  171  157  115  114 
74  181  163  132  128 
75  169  154  162  159 
76  182  170  178  185 
SOURCE:  Consumption  Index:  derived from  Customs and Excise data. 
Expenditure and Price  Indices:  as for Tables 4. 1 and 4. 2. 
*  Wine is comprised of imported wines and British wines,  including cider and perry. 
110 TABLE 4.8 
Indexed Volume of Wine Consumed  by Type,  1971-77 (years ending 31st  March) 
31st March 1971  = 100 
Wine Type  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
Still Table Wine  100  125  148  206  192  204  234 
Sparkling Table Wine  100  115  140  170  130  135  150 
Port  100  107  128  157  114  114  121 
Sherry  100  114  124  141  112  111  146 
Vermouth  100  118  145  222  255  265  302 
Commonwea I  th Wines  100  105  122  124  128  113  106 
British Wines  100  105  114  142  153  105  113 
Other Wines  100  126  178  261  222  208  204 
Total Market Index  100  114  134  172  164  154  173 
Total Volume Consumed  48.4  55.4  64.8  83.5  79.4  74.8  83.7 
(m.  ga lions) 
SOURCE:  derived from  Customs and  Excise. 
Ill Product Markets,  Brands and Market Shares 
Beer and Lager 
4.15:  Unlike other national beer markets,  the U.K. beer market is characteris-
ed by a  wide range and diversity of choice amongst beers of varying alcoholic strengths and methods by 
which they are dispensed for  final  consumption.  This  has given rise to a  considerable number of different 
brands available to the U.K. consumer - a  situation which was criticised by the 1966 Prices and  Incomes 
Board  Inquiry* as leading to diseconomies in  production.  The  Monopolies Commission/ report of 1969 
indicated there to be about 3, 000 different brands of beer at that time,  of which 2, 000 were of the 
bottled variety.  Since then,  however,  the number of brands on the U.K. market has probably fallen to 
around 1,500 but whether this has stemmed from  deference to the P.I.B. report or reflects brand 
rationalisation programmes undertaken by brewers after merger/take-over activity,  is  not known.  With 
the increasing popularity towards drinking lager, the total number of beer brands on  the U.K.  market can 
be expected to increase. 
4.16:  The past 20 years have witnessed considerable developments in  the U.K. 
beer market,  the two most  important of which are probably the changes in the pattern of consumption from 
which the trend towards lager drinking may be discerned, and shifts in  the balance between the place of 
purchase and place of consumption from  which has emerged the growth in  off-sales and the take-home 
market.  However,  before looking at these changes in  more detail it may be as well to provide some 
descriptions of the different types of beers available and thereby avoid some of the confusion that may 
arise from  the way data on  the beer market has been presented over the past years. 
4.17:  There are three basic forms  in  which beer may be delivered to the final 
consumer;  on  draught - the main way that beer is  consumed  in  on-licensed premises,  in  bottle in  both on 
and off-licensed premises and in  cans- mainly from  off-licences.  Bottled beer and canned beer are self-
evident terms,  whilst draught beer is  perhaps less obviously precise.  The Monopolies Commission+ 
recognised draught beer 
11to include any beer which is  supplied to the retailer in  bulk containers and 
drawn  to order in  the pub for each customer. 
11  However,  draught beers themselves may be of two 
distinctly different types although the fermentation process is  fundamentally the same.  'Cask • beers may 
be put into woodden or metal containers for delivery to public houses often with fermentation continuing. 
It  is also often necessary for  'cask' beer to be left to stand for a  couple of days,  so  that any solids in 
* 
I 
+ 
National  Board  for  Prices and  Incomes ( 1966) Costs,  Prices & Profits in  the Brewing  Industry  HMSO 
The Monopolies Commission (1969) op.  cit. para 19. 
The  Monopolies Commission ( 1969) op.  cit.para .21 
112 suspension may be allowed to form  a  sediment on  the bottom of the cask,  before being served to a 
customer by gravity or suction or electric pump.  'Cask' beer brewed, stored and dispensed  in  this manner 
is  fashionably referred to today as traditional  English beer,  or real-ale to distinguish it from  other 'keg' 
draught beers.  'Keg' beer,  the development of which 'took-off' in  the mid-1950's (see para. 2.11), 
differs from  'cask' beer in  that before being placed into containers for delivery to pubs it is  filtered and 
pasteurised and then stored in  kegs under pressure from  carbon dioxide gas.  Generally,  this type of beer 
is drawn up from  the pub's cellar by further application of C02,  but it is  possible for  it to be dispensed by 
handpump or electricity,  just as a  'cask' beer may  be dispensed under pressure from  C~2·  A  'keg' bitter 
delivered through a  pressurised system  is generally light and sparkling in  appearance- an effect which has 
earned this type of beer the nickname,  "bright beer".  Traditional  English ale, on  the other hand,  may be 
slightly clouded and seem  lifeless - this is  often far from  the case - but has earned it the title in  certain 
quarters of "flat beer". 
4.18:  It  would certainly be no understatement to say that 'keg' beers 
revolutionised the way in  which beer was transported,  stored and served.  According to the Prices and 
Incomes Board*  draught cask  beers accounted for around 64 per cent  of sales in  1959 and 52 per cent  in 
1968/69.  By  1976,  these cask conditioned beers, according to the Price Commission+,  accounted for only 
14 per cent  of brewers' production.  At the same time,  the P.I.B.  report* shows  'keg' beers to have 
represented only 1 per cent  of 1959 beer sales and  14 per cent.  in  1968/69 whilst the Price Commission+ 
indicates brewery conditioned keg beer to have accounted for 63 per cent  of all beer produced in  1976. 
This  latter figure includes about 19  per cent  for draught lager and an  unknown element for draught stout; 
however,  the favourable trend towards 'keg' is  evident. 
4.19:  The different types of beer to which reference may be made in  the rest of 
this chapter are defined and summarised  in  this paragraph.  Ordinary bitter is  the brewers' cheaper 
draught bitter, on  sale as either a  'keg' or 'cask' beer and of low  to average alcoholic strength.  Premium 
bitter is  usually a  'keg' draught bitter,  costing more than ordinary bitter for  it is  usually of greater 
alcoholic strength.  Mild  is  on  the whole one of the least alcoholic beers,  normally sold on  draught with 
a  slightly sweeter taste than bitter and dark  in  colour.  Light,  pale and export ales are of varying alcoholic 
strengths,  perhaps slightly darker than ordinary bitter but with a  sparkling appearance similar to 'keg' beers. 
These beers are most often available in  cans and bottles,  however,  some  brands also appear on  draught 
where their higher alcoholic strengths may place them  in  the premium bitter category.  Stout is available 
on  draught and in  bottles and cans,  it can be much stronger,  in  terms of alcoholic content,  than bitter and 
is  much darker, almost black in  colour, and there are sweet and relatively bitter tasting varieties.  Strong 
ales, sold under that title or as "barley wine" are generally the strongest beers available.  Brown ale is 
*  National  Board for  Prices and  Incomes (1969) op.  cit.Table il 
+  Price Commission ( 1977) op. cit.· Table 1. 
113 similar in  stength to light and bitter beers with a  tendency to be sweet, and as its name implies is 
brownish in  colour.  Lager beer derives its name from  the German word  meaning  'storage' and it is  the 
length of time involved in  the fermentation process which distinguishes this type of beer from all other 
beers brewed in  the traditional  English way.  The most  concise way to describe this difference is  to say 
that different yeasts are used  to brew  lager and ale and that in  the former fermentation takes place at the 
bottom of the beer whi 1st  the latter is  top-fermented.  With  lager two periods of fermentation take place, 
the second known as the 'lagering period' and often lasting up  to three months.  Lager is available on 
draught, and in  bottles and cans and is  lighter in  appearance and on  the palate compared to  English ale. 
There is probably as much  variation in  the alcoholic strengths of different lagers as there is  amongst the 
different brands of non-lager beers. 
4. 20:  Table 4.  9  sets out the data on  the different shares of the U.K. beer 
market accounted for by different types of packaging in  1967 and 1976.  There has clearly been a  trend 
towards the consumption of draught and canned beers at the expense of the bottled varieties: draught and 
canned beers accounted for 70 per cent  and 1 per cent  of beer sales,  respectively in  1967 rising  to 77 per 
cent  and 8 per cent  ,  respectively by  1976.  Between the same two dates,  bottled beers' share of the 
market fell  from  29 per cent  to 15  per cent. 
4.21:  Table 4.10 has drawn  upon  various sources to underline long  term  trends 
in  shares of the U.K. beer market  held by different types of beer.  Forty per cent  of 1959's beer sales were 
of mild ales which together with 24 per cent  for draught bitter amounted to some 64 per cent  of all beer 
sales being of the cask conditioned variety.  Stout,  light and brown ales accounted for a  further 34 per 
cent  market share at that time,  leaving only one per cent  each for keg beers and lager - just about all of 
the latter being available in  bottle~.  Since 1959,  consumption has shifted away from  mild ales so  that by 
1976 this type of beer only held around 12  per cent  of sales.  At  least until  1974 stout, whether draught 
bottled or canned, would appear to have held on  to a  constant 10 per cent  share of the market.  Light 
and brown ales faired  less well,  losing market share to stand at 10 per cent  and 2 per cent  ,  respectively 
by 1976.  The form  and content of the data available on  beer market shares has changed over the years so 
that it has not proved possible to trace fully the development in  market share of draught keg  beers.  Table 
4.10 shows this type of beer to have grown  from  1 per cent  of the market in  1959 to 14 per cent  ten years 
later, and to 19  per cent  in  1972.  To  what extent this share increased after 1972 is  uncertain bu.t 
stockbrokers Buckmaster and Moore*  have commented that in 
11the last two to three years the relative 
importance of such beers has declined .••• 
11  All draught bitters are credited with 45 per cent  of the 
market in  1974, some  10 per cent  higher than in  1967, whilst cask conditioned draught bitter would seem 
to have stabilized in  1972 with just over one-quarter of the market.  The most spectacular gains in  market 
share have been achieved by lager sales - a one per cent  market share in  1959 evolved into just short of 
*  Buckmaster and Moore (October 1977)  The  Price Commission  Report on  Beer Prices p.3. 
114 TABLE 4.9 
Shares of U.K.  Beer Sales by Form  of Packaging,  1967,  1972 and 1976. 
per  cent 
Packaging 
Draught 
Bottled 
Canned 
SOURCE: 
1967 
70 
29 
1972 
73 
27 
1976 
77 
15 
8 
for 1967- The  Monopolies Commission  (1969) op. cit. p.6. para.  17. 
for  1972 - The Financial Times,  September 8th 1973 ex.  Brewers' Society 
for  1976- Price Commission (1977) op.  cit. p.2. Table 1. 
TABLE 4.10 
Shares of U, K.  Beer Sales by Type of Beer,  selected years 1959 to 1976. 
per  cent 
Type of beer  1959  1967  1969  1971  1972  1974 
Cask and  Keg  draught mild  30  18  14 
Cask draught mild  40  24  18 
Cask and Keg  draught bitter  35  46  45 
Cask draught bitter  24  28  27 
Draught Keg  bitter and mild  14  19 
Draught,  bottled, canned lager  3  5  10  9  15 
I 
Draught,  bottled, canned stout  10  10  10  10  10 
Bottled and canned light/pale  34  13  13  12  12  12 
Bottled and canned brown  9  6  4  5  4 
SOURCE:  1959- National Board  for  Prices and Incomes (1969) op. cit. p.5. Table 2. ex. 
Brewers' Society. 
1967,  1971,  1974- The  Financial 'Times,  February 5th.  1976. 
1969,  1972- The  Financial Times,  September 8th.  1973.  ex. Brewers' Society. 
1976- Price Commission (1977) op.  cit. p.2. Table 2 ex.  Brewers'  Society. 
ll5 
1976 
12 
24 
10 
2 a  quarter of the total beer market by  1976 and the industry's prognostications are that by the mid-1980's 
lager could represent between 30 and 45 per cent  of all beer consumed  in  the U.K. 
4. 22:  The most  recent data available for beer market shares on  a directly 
comparable basis for  consecutive years is  that provided by  the Brewers Society for the period 1971-76, and 
reproduced here as Table 4. 11.  The trend towards draught beer accounting for a  proportionately larger 
share of all beer consumption is  evident from  this table,  this share having risen from  73.5 per cent in  1977 
to 77.0 per cent in 1'976.The  increasing share of all beer sales taken by lager has already been outlined, 
but here it can be seen that draught lager accounted for 18.6 per cent  of the market and the bottled and 
canned varieties, 5.2 per cent  in  1976.  The  consistent rise  in  draught lagers'  share is  directly opposite 
to the experience of other draught beers,  between 1971  and 1976, although ordinary draught bitter still 
holds the largest share of beer sales,  with 30.7 per cent.  This table exemplifies the point that growth in 
the beer market as a  whole has been generated primarily through sales of lager,  its overall market share 
having risen from  just under 10 per cent  in  1971,  to stand at just under 24 per cent  in  1976. 
4.23:  Estimates of the U.K.  beer market handled by the on and off-licensed 
sectors vary considerably, as do the relati 1e  shares attributed to the different kinds of outlet.  However, 
Table 4.12 is  presented here as the best estimate of these market shares for  1975 and is  largely based on 
E.  I. U.  data,  whi~h shows  that some 88 per cent  of all beer sales passed  through on-licensed premises 
with the remaining  12 per cent  dealt with by the off-trade.  The  value of the take-home market is 
generally equated with the value of off-licence sales,  although there is  possibly a  small  element of 
understatement as some  take-away sales are made across-the-bar in  public houses.  This  same figure of 12 
per cent  for off-licence sales also appears in  the Price Commission  report* although it has been criticised 
by Buckmaster and Moore+ whose own  enquiries 
11suggest that off-sales account for over 12per cent  of the 
beer market ...• 
11  Unfortunately,  they fail  to provide an alternative estimate of what the relative on and 
off-licensed sectors trades in  beer should be.  If  the take-home market valuation of £322m.  shown  in 
Table 4. 12  is  set against the 1975  level of consumers'  expenditure on  beer at current prices of £2, 679m. 
then a  proportion of 12 per cent  can be derived.  It  would seem that in  the absence of information to. the 
contrary,  this will  have to suffice as the best estimate of the off-trade~ share of beer sales. 
4.24:  The  I.P.C,  Marketing Manual of the U.K. shows that the off-licensed 
trade in  beer accounted for 6-7 per cent  of sales in  1968/69,  Mintel shows  it to  have increased to 10 per 
cent  by  1971,  so  that with 12 per cent  in  1975 the increasing relative importance of the take-home 
market is apparent.  Of the 1975  take-home market,  trade research suggests that some 55 per cent  of 
sales were made by  specialist off-licences with the balance of 45 per cent  passing  to the consumer 
through the outlets of the grocery trade..  Amongst the specialists,  brewery-owned outlets accounted for 
* 
+ 
Price Commission  (1977) op. cit.  para  1.14 
Buckmaster and Moore (October 1977) op.  cit. p.3. 
116 TABLE  4.11 
Shares of  U.K.  Beer Sales by Type of Beer and Package,  1971-76. 
per  cent 
1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Draught 
Mild  17.7  15.9  14.2  13.8  13.3  12.5 
Premium  Bitter & Stout  17.4  17.8  17.0  16.8  15.9  15.2 
Ordinary Bitter  31.3  31.1  30.5  30.5  30.9  30.7 
Lager:  Premium  (  7.1  8.6  11.3 
0.6  0.7  (  18.6 
Ordinary  (  12. 1  . 14.9  ( 
Packaged 
Light,  pale, export: 
in  returnable packages  9.5  9.2  9. 1  8.6  7.4  ( 
in  non-returnable packages  (  9.9 
- bottles  (  2.0  2.2  2.8  0. 1  o. 1  ( 
- cans  (  3.0  3.4  ( 
Lager 
in  returnable packages  1.9  1.9  2.0  1.8  1.8  ( 
in  non-returnable packages  (  5.2  - bottles  ( 
0.9  1.2  1.6 
0.3  0.3  ( 
- cans  (  1.6  2.2  ( 
Brown  --
in  returnable packages  3.8  3.7  3.4  3.2  2.6  ( 
in  non-returnable packages  (  2.4  - bottles  (  - - ( 
0.2  0.2  0.3  - cans  (  0.3  0.2  ( 
Stout  --
in  returnable packages  6.7  6.5  6.0  ( 
5.9  5.0  4.2  in  non-returnable packages  0.3  0.3  0.4  ( 
Strong Ales and Barley Wine  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  ( 
(  1.3 
A:lrty  Containers  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.7  ( 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
Draught  73.5  73.4  73.0  73.8  75.7  77.0 
Returnable packages  22.5  21.9  21.2  19.7  16.8  ( 
Non-returnable packages  (  23.0  - in  bottles  (  0.6  o:5  (  4.0  4.7  5.8  - in  cans  (  5.9  6.9  ( 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
SOURCES:  Brewers Society Statistical Handbook ( 1976) and  Price Commission  ( 1977) 
op .  cit . T  clble 2. 
ll7 TABLE  4. 12 
U.K.  Beer t-.Aorket  1975 
Division of trade through the on and off-licensed sectors, and re1otive shores held by 
different types of outlet. 
On-licences 
Brewery Owned pubs 
Free trade pubs 
Clubs 
Hotels,  restaurants etc. 
Off-licences 
% 
52 
17 
18 
13 
accounting for 88 per cent 
of a II  beer so I  es. 
Toke-home market valued at £322m. at retail selling prices,  or  12  per cent  of all beer soles. 
Of which:  Specialists= 55%  (£177m.)  Grocers= 45%  (£145m.) 
(%)  (%) 
55  Brewery-owned 
27  Co-ops  14 
Multiples  47 
18  lndepend  em ts  39 
SOURCE:  mainly E. I. U.  Retail  Business  No.  226.  Dec.  1976. 
118 55 per cent  ,  Co-operatives and multiples for 27 per cent  ,  and independent traders for  18 per cent.  In 
the grocery trade,  14 per cent  of these off-licensed beer sales were handled by Co-operatives, 47 per 
cent  by multiples and 39 per cent  by  independents. 
4.25:  The  E.l. U. *report shows that in  1974 on-licensed pubs accounted for  69 
I 
per cent  of beer sales,  the clubs trade for  18 per cent  ,  with the balance in  the hands of hotels, 
restaurants etc.  Of the 69 per cent  of beer sales made in  pubs,  we estimate that brewer-owned premises 
comprised 52 per cent  ,  and free trade pubs 17 per cent  of this figure.  Reporting  in  1966,  the Prices 
and  Incomes  Board+ considered the club trade to be the "most rapidly expanding part of l'he  retail  liquor 
trade" and believed it to account for nearly 20 per cent  of total beer sales.  This same body,  reporting in 
19691,  understood the clubs trade to command about 20 per cent  of total  U.K. beer sales at that date, with 
expansion continuing.  Clubs fell  outside the terms of reference for  the Price Commission's  1977 inquiry 
but they commented that "hotels,  restaurants and licensed clubs represent only a  small  part of the market, 
and beer is an insignificant part of their total turnover".**  Whilst the latter part of this statement may be 
true the former part certainly is  not so as many commentators have pointed out.  One,  Buckmaster and 
Moore++ estimate that hotels,  restaurants and clubs account for  well over 25 per cent  of the beer market -
a  not insignificant proportion.  In  consequence, and allowing for a  small  share of clubs' beer sales in  the 
off-trade, we estimate the clubs share of the on-licensed beer market to be around 18 per cent  ,  leaving 
an imp I  i  ed  balance of 13  per cent  for  hotels and restaurants etc. 
4.26:  When  it comes to considering brand shares the familiar problem of 
defining a  market presents itself.  Strictly sp~.::aking,  the on  and off-licensed trades represent two 
distinctly different markets,  as do retail  saL~s through brewery owned outlets compared with the free-trade. 
What characterises this difference is  perha,.>s  the degree to which the retailer is able to influence final 
consumer choice.  In  addition,  the form  in  which a  beer is  sold,  whether draught,  canned or bottled can 
justifiably constitute three separate markets.  Furthermore,  where one sub-market is developing at a 
faster rate than the market as a  whole,  then this fact alone may be reason enough to consider it as a 
market in  its own  right;  for  example,  l~ger, and canned beer sales in  the take-home trade.  Comprehen-
sive brand share data for all these markets is  not generally available,  which is  perhaps hardly surprising 
bearing in mind  the proliferation of around 1500 brands.  The data that is available,  however, although 
not necessarily quantifying precisely individual brand shares relates to the brands receiving national 
distribution by  the major brand-owning brewers. 
*  E.l. U.  Retail  Business  No. 226.  Dec.  1976. 
+  National Board  for  Prices and  Incomes  (1966)  op. cit. para 10. 
National Board  for  Prices and  Incomes  (1969)  op. cit. para  15. 
Price Commission  (1977)  op. cit.  para 1.15 
Buckmaster and Moore  (October 1977)  op. cit. p.4. 
119 4.27:  Figures in  the I.P.C. Marketing Manual of the U.K., 1973* and which 
probably refer to 1972 show  that in  the keg  beer market Allied's Double Diamond  had a  25 per cent  share, 
Bass  Cherrington's Worthington  E had  15  per cent  ,  Whitbread's Tankard also 15  per cent  ,  Watney's Red 
14 per cent  ,  Scottish and Newcastle's Tartan 13 per cent  ,  and Courage's Tavern 9 per cent.  By  1976, 
E. I. U. **shows the rank order of the top-5 best selling keg beers to be Double Diamond,  Worthington  E, 
Tartan, Tankard and Tavern.  The  I.P.C.  (1973)*  data also states that Watney was probably the leader in 
the bottled light/pale ale market with  11  per cent  as well as being leader in  the bottled brown ale market 
with 15  per cent  -just ahead of Whitbread's Forest Brown at 10 per cent.  E.l. U. **also estimates Bass 
and Allied to be market leaders in  draught mild and bitter.  In  the stout market,  Guinness is clear leader, 
ahead of Whitbread
1s Mackeson and Bass's Jubilee.  The lager market will be considered in  more detail 
in  later paragraphs.  However,  when all brands of beer and lager are considered,  trade research has shown 
the market shares of the major brewers to be as given in  Table 4.13 for  1972,  1974 and 1976. 
4.28:  Table 4. 13 shows  that between 1972 and 1976 Bass  (harrington increased 
its share of the beer market by 1 per cent  and retained its leading role with an estimated 20 per cent 
of beer sales volume.  Both Allied and Whitbread managed to marginally increase their market shares 
between 1974 and 1976 giving them  17 and 13 per cent  ,  respectively,  in  the latter year.  These shares 
were,  however,  no higher than they had been four years earlier.  Grand Metrepolitanj\Natney lost market 
share by 2 per cent  between  1972 and  1976 whilst over the same period Scottish and Newcastle's share 
rose by 2 per cent.  Courage would seem to have retained a  constant 9 per cent  of the beer market in 
each year shown  in  Table 4.13 with Guinness gaining a  1 per cent  increase over the four years.  By 
difference,  the other brewers' share of the beer market is  ifllplied to have fallen from  11  per cent  in  1972 
to 9 per cent  in  1976.  Thus,  the data in  this table indicates the top-4 brewers to hold some 62 per cent 
of the U.K. beer market between them,  whilst the Big-6 (excluding Guinness who do not operate retail 
outlets) account for  82 per cent  of this market. 
4.29:  That  lager has been,  during recent years,  the growth sector of the U.K. 
beer market has been made clear in  earlier paragraphs,  lager's sbar~ of all beer sales having risen from  1 per 
cent  in  1960 to 23.8 per cent  by  1976.  With fewer than perhaps 5') brands of lager available in  the U.K. 
market today,  data on  individual brand shares is  much more reliable and readily available than for beer, 
and the position for  1976 is  set out in  Table 4. 14.  The  Harp  lager brand  is  generally acknowledged to be 
the brand  leader with around 21  per cent  of lager sales in  1976.  However,  it must  be borne in  mind  that 
this is a  consortium brew with sales being made through both the free-trade and the tied-estate of the 
consortium membership,  and with consortium members'  retail sales of Harp  lager remaining unknown, 
judgements of overall company shares in  the lager market are frustrated.+  Nevertheless,  the combined 
* 
** 
+ 
compiled from  E. I. U.  and Mintel research. 
E, I. U.  Retail  Business  No. 226.  Dec.  1976. 
Butseepara. 4.48. 
120 TABLE 4.13 
Brewers
1  Share of U.K.  Beer Market. 
per cent 
Share of Sales Volume 
Brewer  1972  1974 
Bass  Cherrington  19  20 
Allied Breweries  17  16 
Whitbread  13  12 
Grand Metropolitan )  14 
Watney Mann  )  14 
Scottish & Newcastle  9  10 
Guinness  8  9 
Courage  9  9 
Others  11  10 
SOURCE:  I.P.C. Marketing Manual of the U.K.  1974and 1976. 
compiled from  E. I. U. and Mintel. 
E. I. U.  Retail  Business  No. 226 Dec.  1976. 
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1976 
20 
17 
13 
12 
11 
9 
9 
9 TABLE  4.14 
Brand Shares in  U.K.  Lager Market,  1976. 
per cent 
Brand  Company  Share 
Harp  *  21 
Carling Black  Label  Bass  Charrington  20 
Skol  Allied Breweries  17 
Heineken  Whitbread  14 
Carlsberg  United Breweries  12 
Tennants  Bass  Charrington  8 
Others  8 
SOURCE:  E.I.L¥.  Retail  Business  No. 226.  Dec.  1976. 
*  Harp is the main  lager brand of a  brewers• consortium company,  Harp  Lager  Ltd. 
the shareholders of which are: 
Courage 
Greene,  King 
Guinness 
Scottish & Newcastle 
Breweries 
and  Wolverhampton and 
Dudley Breweries 
122 
32 per cent. 
2 per cent. 
32 per cent. 
32 per cent. 
2 per cent. brand shares of Bass  Cherrington's Carling Black  label and Tennants make it the company with the largest 
single share of the U.K.  lager market, at 28 per cent. 
4.30:  The data in  Table 4.14 cannot,  however,  be allowed to stand without 
further comment upon  the current state of the market where segmentation is  taking place and leading to the 
attraction of many new brands of lager.  But  first,  it is both necessary and relevant to look at how  the U.K. 
market for lager developed from  its 1 per cent  share of 1960's national beer market.  Since that date the 
base from  which the demand for  lager has been satisfied has switched from  one primarily based upon  imports 
to one almost entirely provided for by domestic production.  According to the Brewers•  Society,* imported 
lager in  1960 amounted to 234,000 bulk barrels and represented 86 per cent  of all lager consumption.  By 
1976, on the other hand, the volume of lager imports had  risen  to 679,000 bulk barrels but was only 
accounting for 7 per cent  of domestically consumed lager.  Whilst the volume of lager imports has 
continued to rise the fall  in  their proportion of U.K.  lager consumption obscures two important points 
concerning how  domestic producers have met the overall rise in  demand for the product:  this has been 
achieved first of all, by established U.K. ale breweries developing their own  brands of lager and secondly, 
by the brewing in  the U.K. of lagers under licence from  their (mainly) Continental brand owners. 
4. 31:.  The two main brands of lager developed within the British  Isles are 
Harp, and Allied Breweries Skol.  Harp was launched in  the Irish  Republic by Arthur Guinness Son and Co. 
Ltd.  in  1960, and from  there exported to the U.K.  With Guinness in  the unique position of being one of 
the U. K
1s largest brewers but without extensive interests in the retail trade the speediest way in  which 
~could  hope to gain widespread distribution in  the U.K.  was for Guinness to develop some form  of 
partnership with other U.K. brewers whose tied estates would provide such a  distribution base.  Agreement 
was reached with certain U.K.  brewers and the Harp  Lager consortium established.  Initially,  the 
members were Scottish and Newcastle Breweries to cover Scotland and North  East  England,  Bass  Mitchells 
and Butler for the Midlands and Courage in  South East  England.  Bass  dropped out in  1970 after their 
merger with Cherrington, for the merged company found  it already had two lager brands of its own 
(Carling and Tennants).  Today the consortium members are Guinness,  Courage,  Scottish and Newcastle-
each with 32 per cent  ,  and two smaller U.K. brewers- Greene,  King and Wolverhampton and Dudley 
Breweries ...  each with a  2 per cent  stake.  A  U.K. manufacturing base was established by Guinness for 
Harp  Lager in  1963 with the construction of a  brewery at Alton.  Since then  Harp breweries have been 
established in  Manchester and  Edinburgh with additional lagering capacity being made available at the 
breweries of the consortium members.  Over such a  relatively short space of time the consortium has  been 
very successful with the company claiming to brew and sell more then 22 per cent  of all  lager in  the  U.K. 
and the Republic of Ireland. 
*  The Brewers•  Society (Sept.  1977) Memorandum on  the Price Commission's Reoort  No.  31: 
Beer Prices and Margins.  para 6.21 
123 4.32:  Skol  was  launched by Allied Breweries in  1964 
11to do for a  beer brand 
what Coca-Cola Corporation had done in  the soft drinks market of the world 
11
• *  Today,  the brand  is 
credited with 17 per cent  of U.K.  lager sales and is on  sale in  70 countries and brewed under franchise 
and licensing arrangements in  fourteen.  The major brewers are not the only ones engaged in  brewing their 
own  brands of lager:  J.A. Deverish & Co.  brew Viking; Greenall Whitley brew Grunhalle; Vaux 
Breweries have Norseman;  Young  & Co.  have Saxon;  to name only a  few.  In  addition,  these brewers 
may also sell the major brands of lager alongside their own  brands in  their pubs whilst brewers without 
lagering capacity are more than likely to buy-in the national brands from  other brewers acting in  their 
wholesa I  ing  role. 
4.33:  The  Danish Carlsberg brand of lager achieved widespread distribution in 
the U.K. when it became the only lager to be available in Watney Mann outlets.  The  level of sales 
achieved by  this brand must  have satisfied both Watney Mann and  United  Breweries of Denmark (the brand 
owner) for  in  1970 they formed  a  joint company- Carlsberg Brewery  Ltd.  - to develop and operate a  lager 
brewery  in  the  U.K.  However,  in  1975 Watney Mann (as Grand Metropolitan) sold  its share in  Carlsberg 
Brewery to  United  Breweries leaving Carlsberg as the only wholly foreign owned brevyery  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  Nevertheless,  Grand Metropolitan continue to brew Carlsberg at their own  breweries (under 
-----
licence) and distribute it although this is  not now  the only lager to appear in  their tied outlets.  The 
Carlsberg company claims brand  leadership in  the take-home market with around 20 per cent  of sales;·  in 
the on-trade it claims 14 per cent  ,  whilst overall it reckons its sales to account for  14 per cent  of the 
+  lager market. 
4.34:  The successes achieved by  lager brewing in  the U.K. by brands such as 
Harp,  Skol  and Carlsberg have not gone unnoticed by other major U.K.  brewers.  However,  their first 
steps in  this direction have,  in  the main,  been characterised by the importation of foreign (mainly 
continental) lager brands,  with the initial product development resting with the bottled varieties distributed 
through brewers• tied outlets.  Hand  in  hand with the product/brand achieving successively higher levels 
of consumer acceptability have gone changes in  the products development in  terms of packaging,  the outlets 
in  which it can be bought and source of supply.  Thus,  a  process whereby bulk  imports for draught sales 
arrive to complement the bottled varieties and the product becomes available to the grocery/take-home 
trade culminates in  the decision to brew the lager brand in the U.K. 
* The  Financial Times  August 5th 1976. 
+The Grocer  October 29th 1977. 
124 4.35:  Information kindly supplied by Whitbread's Marketing  Information 
Department shows  that the Dutch Heineken brand of lager was first  imported to the U.K.  in  November 
1961  followed  by  bulk  imports for draught sales in  February 1968.  Whitbread  first  began to brew this 
lager in  the U.K.  in  May  1968 with the canned variety becoming available in  September 1970.  According 
to figures given at the company's annual Sales Conference in  April  1977*  Heineken accounted for  15  per 
cent  of the U.K.  lager market,  but with an estimated 40 per cent  market share in  multiples and Co-
operatives in  England and Wales- the latter measure reputedly being three times greater than the share 
held  by any other competitive brand.  The most  recent brand of lager to receive Whitbread 's attention is 
that of Stella Artois, originally imported from  Belgium as far back as 1937.  Whitbread first  imported this 
brand for draught sales during  1968, with  U.K. brewing taking place some seven years later in  October 
1975, and canning in  May 1977.  Six months after the brand became available in  10 oz. and  16 oz.  cans 
Stella Artois was credited with a  3 per cent  share of the canned lager market in  multiples and Co-
.  +  operat1ves. · 
4. 36:  Bass  Charrington are responsible for  the  U.K.  brewing and distribution of 
the Carling Black  Label  brand of lager under licence from  the Carling 0' Keefe Corporation of Canada. 
This brand was first brewed  in  the U.K., for sale in  bottles,  in  1952 at the Hope and Anchor Brewery in 
Sheffield.  It  is  believed that this brewery was acquired by (harrington  United  Breweries prior to merger 
with Bass  in  1967 when,  it is  understood,  the product was available in  cans from  the previous year.  The 
national development of Carling as Bass (harrington's major lager brand began when the product appeared 
in  draught form  in  1967, since when the brand has come to account for around 20 per cent  of the  U.K. 
lager market.  Bass's T  ennants lager,  brewed  in  Scotland,  is  reckoned to  hold around 8 per cent  of the 
U.K.  lager market,  but in  addition it is  the brand leader in the Scottish lager market where it is 
believed to have at least a  50 per cent  share. 
4.37:  It  was the appearance of lager in  the  U.K.  in  bottled form  which in  the 
early days of the products' development surrounded  it with  connotations of femininity.  With the switch 
to draught lager during the mid  to late 1960's the product almost instantly acquired a  masculine image and 
the market began to expand rapidly.  However,  not all lagers that have reached the draught stage in  their 
marketing programmes have achieved continued success.  Bass  (harrington imported the Belgian  lager 
Lamot,  which was available in draught form  in some of its pubs,  but it was withdrawn because of lack of 
sales in about late 1976 after probably a  life in  the U.K.  market of less than two years.  However, since 
1975 Bass  have been able to offer another brand of lager- the Danish Tuborg  - brewed by them  in  the  U.K. 
after taking over the licence from  Grand Metropolitan, the latter having relinquished their title to this 
agreement when they sold their stake in  Carlsberg Brewery  Ltd.  to United  Breweries of Denmark.  United 
Breweries own the Tuborg  brand, and in addition Bass also brew their Tuborg Gold brand  in  the  U.K. 
*  The Grocer  Apri I 9th 1977. 
+  The Grocer  November 26th 1977. 
125 4.38:  As the lager market has expanded so  too has the number of brands 
increased, and the rate at which new brands have come onto the market during the last two to three years 
has received impetus from  the major brewers• attempts to divide the market between ordinary and premium 
lagers.  This move towards segmentation of the market is  nothing new to the brewing  industry,  for  just as 
there were ordinary draught bitters so too was developed the premium draught bitter market with brand 
names such as Watney's Red,  Allied's Double Diamond and  Long  Life,  Courage's John Courage etc.  These 
beers, of relatively greater alcoholic strength command a  higher price over their ordinary bitter counter-
parts, and this is  the brewers' intention with respect to lager ,with Whitbread's introduction of Stella Artois 
representing just such a  premium  lager. 
4.39:  In  October 1977 it was announced that Grand Metropolitan, through its 
Watney Mann and Truman brewing subsidiary, would begin U.K.  licensed brewing of the German Holsten 
lager,  to stand as a  premium  lager alongside the Carlsberg brand distributed through its outlets.  In 
December 1976 Allied Breweries took over the  U.K. franchise for the German lager Lowenbrau which it 
commenced to brew for sale on draught beginning in May 1977.  This brand was previously available in  the 
U.K. mainly in  (imported) bottles but will now  represent a  premium lager possibly priced as much as 5p per 
pint dearer than Allied's own  Skol  lager.  Carlsberg,  in addition to its ordinary Carlsberg Pils brand of 
lager has had a  premium version Carlsberg Special Brewcon  the market for some time.  However,  in August 
1977 Carlsberg launched Hof- a  brand of lager to stand between the Pils and Special Brew although to be 
considered a  premium brand in  its own right.  Whilst initially available in cans,  it is  believed that this 
brand is  being  test marketed for eventua I nationa I distribution on draught. 
4.40:  The  Kronenbourg brand of French lager had been imported  into the U.K. 
in  a  relatively small way in  bottles until Harp  Lager Ltd.  acquired the U.K.  brewing  licence from  the 
French brand owning group B.S.N.- Gervais Danone towards the end of 1975.  Domestic brewing began 
in  early 1976 at Harp's Alton brewery with the product becoming available in  cans for the off-licensed 
trade and as a  premium draught lager in  the pubs of the consortium members alongside draught Harp. 
Courage, a  member of the Harp consortium is  reportedly test marketing Hofmeister lager from  Henniger of 
Germany, and should these tests prove acceptable,  it  is  I  ikely that  U. K,  brewing could begin.  Scottish 
and  Newcastle Breweries, another Harp consortium member,  began test marketing its own brand of lager in 
May 1976- developed as McEwan's Cavalier it is  primarily aimed at the Scottish market and will  be sold  in 
S & N's pubs with Harp.  That Courage and Scottish and  Newcastle, already with the Harp and 
Kronenbourg brands,  should wish  to brew and sell their own  lagers is  perhaps indicative of the competitive 
pressures accuring to a  fast growing market.  Should these new brands be successful, sales are likely to be 
achieved at the expense of Harp's lagers,  rather than other beers, which cannot be good for  Harp and the 
stabi I  ity of the consortium company. 
4.41:  Whilst it may be possible to brew beer in a  lager brewery,  that is  not the 
case when it comes to brewing  lager in  an ale brewery.  Consequently,  lagering capacity at U.K.  breweries 
126 has required additional capital investment and it is  clear from  the immediately preceeding paragraphs 
that it has been the major brewers, with the financial resources necessary,  that have been responsible for 
the spate of new  lager brands coming on to the .U.K.  market.  For example,  the Carlsberg Brewery spent 
some £27m.  between 1972 and 1977 on  extending its original brewery at Northampton, which was built in 
1972.  In  November 1977 it was announced* that this same company was  to spend a  further £7m., part of 
which would be used  to raise brewing capacity from  1 .5m.  barrels a  year to 2. Om.  barrels a  year.  Harp 
lager ltd. spent £14m.  between 1971  and 1974 on  raising capacity at its four  breweries, and at the 
beginning of 1976 its Manchester brewery was stated to be receiving £3*m.  to raise capacity to cope with 
the production of Kronenbourg  lager.**  More recently, Grand Metropolitan declared its intention to 
spend £4m.  on  its  Halifax brewery where Carlsberg lager will  be brewed.+  Thus,  the past growth of 
brewers through merger and acquisition which has elevated some of them to commanding positions in  terms 
of brewing capacity and outlets controlled,  leaves them poised,  today, with a  particularly strong 
comparative advantage over their smaller rivals in  the expanding lager market. 
4.42:  Irrespective of the comparative advantage that may be afforded to the 
larger brewers,  this has not prevented local  Kent brewers Shepherd  Neame from  undertaking the brewing  in 
the U.K. of the Swiss  lager Hurlimann.  This  lager was first  imported to the U.K. some  10 years ago and 
though the product is  now  brewed  in  Kent,  it is  canned by  the Jarvis Canning Co.  in  Bedford  - a  company 
jointly owned by  brewers G. Ruddle & Co. and Charles Wells ltd.  Draught Hurlimann  lager is  the house 
brand of lager in  Shepherd  Neame pubs, and in  those of Tollemarche and Cobbold  Breweries  Ltd.  (East 
Anglia) and S.A. Brain  & Co.  ltd. (South Wales).  Charles Wells Ltd.  are also involved  in  the  U.K. 
brewing of the Jamaican lager,  Red  Stripe.·  Red  Stripe is  the branded beer of Jamaican brewer Desnodes 
and Geddes and was first  imported to the U.K. some  10-12 years ago.  U.K. brewing and 10 oz. canning 
began in  May  1977 with 16 oz. cans being  launched the following  November.  The  U.K. marketing 
company Desnodes and Geddes hope that the product wi II  soon  become available on draught. 
4.43:  With the exception of Red  Stripe,  the lagers mentioned so  far have been' 
of  Continental European origin, and in  most  cases this is  used as a  key theme in  their promotion.  However, 
the growing  U.K.  lager market has begun to attract lagers from  much farther afield.  The Australian lager 
Fosters has been available in  the  U.K. for a  number of years and more recently it has been followed by  the 
Swan and Crest brands.  Whi 1st  not necessarily achieving national distribution these brands sell particularly 
well in  london, catering for a  more varied and cosmopolitan market.  The brand  leader in  the Brazilian 
beer market,  Brahma  Chop, was imported to the U.K.  towards the end of 1976, and nearer home the 
leading Spanish beer, San  Miguel was  launched onto the U.K. market around May 1976.  More recently, 
Grand Metropolitan have undertaken the licensed distribution in  the U.K. of the American brand, Schlitz. 
* 
** 
+ 
The  Financial Times  November 11th 1977. 
The  Financial Times  January 21st 1976. 
The  Financial Times  January 23rd  1978. 
127 4.44:  From  the trend towards lager drinking,  synonymous with a  move away 
from ale consumption,  has come the development in  the  U.K. of two new product markets;  namely,  low-
co Iori e/low-carboyhydrate lager, and ma It  I  iquor.  The low-carboyhydrate products have been in  the 
U.K. market for some time,  fulfilling the special demand of the diabetic beer drinking public.  One of 
the most  popular such lagers is  the German Holsten Diat Pils,  imported and distributed by Grand 
Metropoiitan.  Courage introduced Henninger Diat Pils from  Germany in  November 1977 and at about the 
same l"ime  Harp  Lager  Ltd.  launched a  new  U.K.  brewed brand - Satzenbrau Diat Pils.  The promotional 
budgei·s placed behind these and other similar brands would suggest that their appeal  is  to a  much wider set 
of consumers,  other than just those suffering from  diabetes.  The alcoholic  strength of some of these lagers 
may preclude them from  being considered as slimming  lagers,  so  to take advantage of this and other health 
conscious factors the growth market here is  in  combined  low-calorie/low-carboyhydrate drinks which have 
become known as 
11 Lite
11  lagers.  This market was developed in  the U.S.A. during  1973 by  Philip Morris
1s 
brewing subsidiary Miller Brewing,  and during  1977 Allied and Bass  (harrington introduced  Lite  lagers to 
the U.l<.  market with their respective Artie and Hemeling brands.  From  the beginning both brands were 
available in  bottles and cans and from  early 1978 draught distribution began,  with each company claiming 
a 
1first
1  for  Lite  lager sales on draught.  Sales of. Hemeling in  bottles and cans since it was  launched in 
May  1977 are considered by  Bass  to have accounted for H per cent  of the tota I lager market by the time 
the draught version became available.*  Bass also reckons that  Lites,  as a  product group,  will  eventually 
hold  10 per cent  of the lager market.* 
4.45:  The malt I  iquor market in the U.K.  is  represented by  two domestically 
produced brands- Breaker from  Bass  (harrington, and Colt 45  from  Courage,  brewed  in  the U.K.  under 
licence from  the National  Brewing  Co.  of the U.S.A.  Breaker was  launched in  Scotland in  1973 and  in 
mid-1975 became available in  North-West England,  London,  and the South and achieved national 
distribution in  1976 in  10 oz. and 16 oz.  cans.  There is  not very much  information available for  this 
comparatively young market but during early 1977 Bass  were claiming brand  leadership for  Breaker,  over 
-~olt 4?,  with at least 55 per cent  of the malt liquor market. 
4. 46:  Numerous sources confirm the brewing industris expectation that by 
1980 lager,  in  volume terms,  wi II account for around one-third of the U. K
1s total beer market.  One 
source in  particular;* published in  September 1976 prepared estimates of the annual growth in  lagers• 
market share up  to  1980 and this is  presented here as Table 4. 15.  On the basis of these estimates the 
same source projected the growth in  the total beer market between 1975 and  1980 and this data is  set out 
in  Table 4. 16.  This shows that the total beer market could grow form  40.22m.  bulk barrels in  1975 to 
43.31m.  bulk barrels by  1980, or by a  compound H per cent  per annum.  This compares with a  fall  in 
volume from  the non-lager sector equivalent to a  compound rate of decline of 2.0 per cent  per annum, 
whilst the lager sector is  expected to grow by  12~ per cent  per annum during the period.  The 
*  The Financial Times  February lOth  1978. 
Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co.  (Sept.  1976)  Lager  in  the  U. K:  A Growth Market.  ** 
128 TABLE 4.15 
Implied Growth of Lager's Market Share,  1975 - 1980 
Year  Volume  Share of T  ota I 
m.  bulk barrels  Beer Market 
(%) 
1975 (a)  8.00  19.9 
1976 (e)  9.40  23.6 
1977 (e)  10.81  26.7  {a) actual 
1978 (e)  12. 16  29.5  (e) estimate 
1979 (e)  13.38  31.7 
1980 (e)  14.38  33.2 
SOURCE:  Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co.  (Sept.  1976) op. cit. Table 7. p.  10. 
TABLE 4.16 
Projected Growth of Total  U.K.  Beer Market and its  Lager and Non-Lager Components 
1975- 1980 
Year 
1975 (a) 
1980 (e) 
SOURCE: 
Total  Beer 
40.22 
43.31. 
Non-Lager 
32.22 
28.93 
m.  bulk  barrels 
Lager 
8.00 
14.38 
Fielding,  Newson-Smith  & Co.  (Sept.  1976) op. cit. Table 6. p.  9. 
129 implications that these figures hold for  the brewing companies must  be that those who are under-represented 
in  terms of lager output may  not fare well  in  the U.K. beer market of the 1980•s. 
4.47:  For the major U.K. brewers,  Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co.* have 
derived the proportions of their total beer sales represented by  lager in  1975.  This assessment of lager
1s 
role in  each company has been based upon estimated brand share data and the volumes implied, and is 
shown  here in  Table 4. 17.  At this date,  Bass  Cherrington is  clearly the brewer with the largest lager/ 
total beer mix, at 26.1 per cent  ,  followed fairly closely by Whitbread with 23.6 per cent  of beer sales 
in  this product.  It  would not seem unreasonable to infer, therefore,  that these two companies with their 
relatively high lager bases are well positioned to take advantage of the growing  lager market, and indeed, 
in  the case of Bass a  recent statement in the press attributed to their director of marketing would  indicate 
that 
11by  1990 half the beers Bass  produces will be of the lager type. 
11** 
4.48:  It  is  possible,  by once again referring to the Fielding,  Newson-_Smith 
report,  to translate some of the lager volumes shown  in  Table 4.17 for  1975 into brand volumes,  and hence 
brand shares.  This volume and brand share data is presented in  Table 4. 18, from  which it would appear 
that Allied
1s lager sales volume of 1.275m. bulk barrels was entirely comprised of the Skol  brand.  A 
comparison of the lager volumes in  Table 4. 18 with those given in  Table 4. 17 for Heineken suggest that 
this brand accounted in  1975 for around 86 per cent  of Whitbread
1s lager output, with the balance 
presumably made up  by  Stella Artois.  Another table in  the Fielding,  Newson-Smith report+ (but not 
reproduced here) confirms that the estimated lager volumes shown for Courage, Guinness and Scottish 
and Newcastle in  Table 4. 17 were of Harp  lagers and when taken together represent some 98 per cent  of 
the total Harp sales estimated in  Table 4. 18.  Of the 2. 195m.  bulk barrels of Bass•s  lager sold  in  1975, 
and given in  Table 4.17, around two-thirds was of Carling and the remainder of Ter-ments,  as indicated by 
Table 4.18.  Out of Grand Metropolitan
1s estimated 1975  lager volume of 0.85m.  bulk  barrels Carlsberg 
accounted for 0.6m., Tuborg 0. 15m.  and Holsten 0. 1Om.  bulk barrels,++ with the Carlsperg volume 
representing some 61  per cent  of all Carlsberg sales estimated in Table 4.18. 
4.49:  Both  the Harp and Carling brands are amongst the oldest established 
lagers in  the U. K, developed and promoted at a  time when the brewers foresaw the potential of the lager 
market.  Not surprisingly, as more  lager brands came onto the market the increased competition placed 
pressure upon the market shares these brands had earned for themselves.  Bass  Charrington
1s lager market 
share from  Carling and Tennents of around 28 per cent  in  1975 was nearer 33 per cent  in  1971,  whilst 
that for  H~  in  1975 of 21  per cent  was more  like 25 per cent  in  1971.  Projections made by  Bass 
indicate a  return to their one-third share of the U.K.  lager market by  1984/85 but they will have to 
* 
** 
+ 
++ 
Fielding,  Newson-Smith  & Co. (Sept.  1976) op .cit. 
The Financial Times  February  lOth  1978. 
Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co. (Sept.  1976) op. cit. Table 27. p.22. 
Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co. (Sept.  1976) op. cit. Table 30. p.24. 
130 TABLE 4.17 
Estimated Total  Beer and  Lager Market Shares and  Implied  Volumes,  1975 
Company  Estimated Share  Estimated Share  Implied  Implied  Lager as% 
of U.K.  of U.K.  Beer  Lager  of T  ota  I Beer 
Beer Market  Lager Market  Volume  Volume  (%) 
(%)  (%)  m.b.b
1s  m.b.b's 
Allied Breweries  15.5  16.0  6.30  1.275  20.2 
Bass  Cherrington  21.0  27.4  8.40  2.195  26.1 
Courage  8.5  8.3  3.45  0.650  18.8 
Guinness  8.2  4.7  3.30  0.375  11.4 
Scottish & 
Newcastle  11.0  9.7  4.45  0.750  16.8 
Grand Metropolitan  10.5  11.3  4.25  0.850  20.0 
Whitbread  13.5  16.3  5.50  1.300  23.6 
SOURCE:  Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co.  (Sept.  1976) op. cit. Table 9. p. 11. 
TABLE 4.18 
Estimated Volume and Brand  Shares of Main  Lager Brands,  1975 
Brand  1975 Volume  1975 Share 
m.  bulk  barrels  (%) 
Harp  1.800  22.5 
Carling  1.450  18. 1 
Tennents  0.745  9.3 
Skol  1.275  15.9 
Heineken  1.125  14. 1 
Carlsberg  0.975  12.2 
Tuborg  0.150  1.9 
Other  0.456  5.7 
8.000  (1 00) 
SOURCE:  Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co.  (Sept.  1976) op. cit. Table 23. p.20. 
131 achieve this in the face of competition from  the spate of new  brands being placed on the market by other 
major brewers.  The brewers• arithmetic would seem to tell them 
11that no one brand of beer can be 
expected to achieve much more than 2m.  bulk barrels (576m.  pints) of total sales a  year
11* so that the 
product differentiation of recent years is unlikely to become a  defunct marketing tool. 
4.50:  The current lager brand representation in  the retail outlets of the major 
brewers is summarised  in Table 4. 19. 
*  The Financial Times  March 30th 1977. 
132 TABLE 4.19 
Brand  Representation in  U.K.  Lager Market 1977 
Company  Established  Brands  in  1975  New Brands/  New 
U.K. Brewing  Products 
since 1975. 
Allied Breweries  Skol,  Skol  Special,  Lowenbrau  Arctic Lite 
Lowenbrau (Bottled) 
Bass  Cherrington  Carling Black  Label,  *Tuborg  Breaker Malt 
Tennents,  *Tuborg Gold  Liquor 
La mot+  Hemeling  Lite 
Courage  Harp,  Harp Special  Kronen bourg  Colt 45 Malt. 
Hofmeister  Liquor 
Satzenbrau Diat Pils 
Henninger Diat Pils 
Scottish & 
Newcastle  Harp,  Harp Spec  ia I  Kronenbourg 
McEwan
1s Cavalier 
Grand Metropolitan  Carlsberg,  Carlsberg Special  Holsten 
Brew  Carlsberg Hof 
Holsten Diat Pils (Bottled) 
*Tuborg 
Whitbread  Heineken,  Heineken Special  Stella Artois 
Export 
Stella Artois 
* 
+ 
Tuborg: 
La mot: 
U.K.  brewing  licence taken over by Bass Cherrington in  late 1975. 
Withdrawn from  U.K. market in  late 1976/early 1977. 
133 Spirits 
4.51:  This section is  concerned with the major types of spirits consumed  in  the 
U. K;  that is, Scotch whisky, gin, and vodka derived from  domestic production and rum and brandy 
which are imported.  Table 4.20 sets out the data on  the volumes of these spirits consumed  in  the U.K. 
between  1971  and  1977.  The growth in  spirits consumption has been considered earlier (para. 4. 12) but 
the data in  Table 4.20 may  be utilised to consider changes in  market share by spirit type between 1971 
and 1977, and this is  presented in  Table 4.21.  With the exception of 1974, whisky has accounted for 
around 52 per cent  of domestic spirits' consumption during the period.  The trend for gin, on  the other 
hand, has been one of a declining share of the total spirits' market, this share falling from  just under 20 
per cent  of 1971's market to just over 17 per cent  in  1977.  Vodka's threefold increase in  volume 
consumed since 1971  enabled it to almost double its share of the spirits' market during the six year period, 
rising from 5.6 per cent  in  1971  to 9.7 per cent  by  1977.  The six year trend  in  market share for  the 
main  imported spirits- rum  and brandy - has been downwards:  rum's share falling from  about 10 per cent 
in  1971  to just over 9 per cent  by  1977, with brandy's share of the market declining from  almost 9 per cent 
to just over 7  per cent  over the same period. 
4.52:  An  indication of the value of the retail spirits' market for  1972,  and its 
division between the on  and off-licensed trades by spirit type is given in  Table 4.22.  In  value terms, 
therefore, whisky took  just over one half of the 1972 market, gin and vodka between them,  one-fifth, 
rum  13 per cent  ,  brandy one -tenth and liqueurs, around 5 per cent.  The  bulk of the sales of each type 
of spirit were made through on-licences, with the proportion of all on-licensed spirits' sales to total 
spirits' sales being 84 per cent.  However,  with the growth of the take-home market and increasing sales 
through off-licences, more recent data may well  indicate a shift on  this balance in  favour of the off-trade. 
Whilst Table 4.23 endeavours to bring  up  to date the values of the retail spirit's market the source from 
which the data is  taken points out that 
11these figures are not fully reconcilable with estimates of market 
value
11  given in  the previous Table 4.22. 
4.53:  Within the off-licensed trade the results of continous research by 
Nielsen have indicated that for 1976  ro~ghly 60 per cent  of the value of spirits' sales passed  through 
specialist off-licences as opposed to 40 per cent  through grocers.  The precise estimates are shown  in 
Table 4.24 where the multiple grocers' share of this sector ot the retail spirits' market was approaching 
one-quarter in  1976,  the Co-operatives took 8.6 per cent  ,  the independent grocers' 5.6 per cent  ,  and 
the specialist off-licences, 62.1 per cent. 
134 TABLE 4.20 
Volume of U.K. Spirits Consumption,  1971-77 (years ending 31st March) 
m.  Proof ga lions 
Spirit Type  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
U.K.  Produced: 
Whisky  10.3  11.4  12.7  16.2  16.8  16.6  18.2 
Gin and other Compounded 
Spirits  3.9  4.0  4.4  5.8  5.7  5.3  6.0 
Vodka  1.1  1.2  1.6  2.2  2.6  2.9  3.4 
Imported: 
Rum  2.0  2.3  2.7  3.6  3.5  3.3  3.2 
Brandy  1.7  1.9  2.3  2.8  2.5  2.4  2.5 
liquers  0.5  0.5  0.7  1.4  1.4  1.6  1.6 
Other  0.2  0.4  0.2 
Total  19.7  21.7  24.6  32.0  32.5  32. 1  34.9 
SOURCE:The  Brewers•  Society Statistical Handbook,dedved from  Customs & Excise data 
I 
135 TABLE 4.21 
Shares in  U.K. Spirits Market,  1971-77 (years ending 31st March) 
per  cent 
Spirit Type  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
U.K.  Produced: 
Whisky  52.3  52.5  51.6  50.6  51.7  51.7  52.1 
Gin and other Compounded 
Spirits  19.8  18.4  17.9  18. 1  17.5  16.5  17.2 
Vodka  5.6  5.5  6.5  6.9  8.0  9.0  9.7 
Imported: 
Rum  10.2  10.6  11.0  11.2  10.8  10.3  9.2 
Brandy  8.6  8.8  9.3  8.8  7.7  7.5  7.2 
Liqueurs  2.5  2.3  2.8 ) 
4.4  4.3  5.0  4.6 
Other  1.0  1.9  0.9  ) 
Base for  Percentages  19.7  21.7  24.6  32.0  32.5  32.1  34.9 
(m.  proof gallons) 
SOURCE:  derived from  The  Brewers•  Society Statistical Handbook1. based upon  Customs & Excise data 
136 TABLE  4.22 
The  1972 Retail  Spirits Market 
(£m.) 
On-licence  Off-I icence  Total  % 
Whisky  335  78  413  51.0 
Gin and  Vodka  153  15  168  20.7 
Rum  98  7  105  13.0 
Brandy  60  22  82  10. 1 
Liqueurs  38  4  42  5.2 
684  126  810  100 
SOURCE:  E.l. U.  Retail  Business  No.  193.  March  1974. 
TABLE 4.23 
Spirits• Market Values,  1973- 1975 
(£m.) 
1973  1974  1975 
Whisky  400  516  670 
Gin  150  230 
Vodka  30  80 
Rum  65  120 
Brandy  90  100  130 
Uqueurs  20 
780  1000  1140 
SOURCE:  1  .• P.C. Marketing Manual of the  U.K. 1975. 
137 TABLE  4.24 
'Shares in  Off-licensed Spirits
1 1\Aarkets,  1976* 
Co-operatives 
Multiples 
lnd epend  ents 
Grocers 
Specialist Off-licences 
per cent 
8.6 
23.7 
5.6 
37.9 
62.1 
100 
*  12 months ended Oct./Nov.l976 
SOURCE:  Nielsen Liquor  Index,  published  in  The Grocer, April  16th 1977, p.68 
138 Whisky 
4.54:  Most people would,  perhaps, acknowledge Scotch whisky as the aristocrat 
of all whiskies- the original and genuine product which has been distilled in  Scotland.  There are two 
distinct types of Scotch whisky:  malt whisky  is  made from  malted barley only, whereas grain whisky  is  made 
from a  mixture of malted barley mashed with other unmalted cereals.  Before any type of Scotch whisky can 
pass  for consumption however, there is a  legal requirement that it be allowed to mature for  three years, 
although in  fact most vyhiskies consumed have matured for  longer than this minimum period.  After maturation, 
the products which eventually become available for  consumption are of the following types: single whiskies 
(either malt or grain) are the product of one distillery only;  vatted whiskies are combinations of single 
whiskies (that is, grain or malt but not mixed); ond blended Scotch whisky which is  the result of blending 
a  large number of single malt and grain whiskies.  It  is  this latter product type which accounts for the bulk 
of the U.K. Scotch market. 
4.55:  The whisky industry in  Scotland is  organised around 122 distilleries {109 
malt and 13 grain distilleries were at work during the 1976-77 Excise year) that supply the raw  material for 
the blenders and bottlers.  The productive capacity of the grain distilleries is  believed to be around 125m. 
Proof gallons per annum,  the largest  having  a  capacity of some  16m.  Proof gallons per annum.  Some 30 
malt distilleries are thought to have an annual capacity in  excess of 1m.  Proof gallons each, with the 
largest, Tomatin Distillers having around 5m.  Proof gallons capacity.  The planning of the output of these 
distilleries can be of crucial importance to the distillers themselves for it is  necessary to finance the laying 
down of stocks for at least three years, stocks which become increasingly more expensive to replace as raw 
material and labour costs rise.  Obviously, one of the most  important factors in planning production is  the 
level of expected demand.  In  the U.K. the volume of whisky consumed grew at an annual average rate of 
13.5 per cent  between 1969 and 1974; between 1963 and 1973 export volume more than doubled, 
equivalent to a growth rate of around 10 per cent  per annum.  · The post-1973 performance has been quite 
different:  U.K. consumption of whisky remained virtually stagnant between 1974 and 1976;  the world's 
largest Scotch market,  the U.S .A. (accounting for around 30 per cent  of 1976's world sales of 11Om. 
Proof gallons) drank less Scotch whisky in  1975 than in  the previous year; total exports only increased by 
1.7 per cent  between 1975 and 1976, and by 2.2 per cent  during the following year.  The results of this 
slowing down  in  demand have been a  build-up in  stocks held by distillers and blenders and cut-backs in 
production.  According to Customs and Excise data production of grain and malt whiskies  fell  from  188.7m. 
Proof galls. during fiscal  1973-74 to 146.7m.  Proof galls- for fiscal  1976-77. 
4.56:  The rising  level of stocks,  often financed through  loans,  has led to cash-
flow problems for  many distillers,  especially during the recent period of unprecedentedly high interest 
rates.  This situation has been exacerbated by the fact that when maturing whisky is  removed from  bond the 
distiller becomes immediately liable to pay the Excise Duty on that volume of spirit.  The industry, 
139 through the offices of the Scotch Whisky Association has argued for a  credit period for  Duty payments,  for 
it  is sometime before sales are made and income generated.  For this reason,  it  has been estimated that in 
1975,176 the industry made  interest free  loans to the Government of around £1 00-120m.  Thus,  the need to 
carry  large stocksof maturing whisky for  blending and bottling; the increase in  replacement costs of stocks 
laid down  in  previous years; and high Duty payments with no credit period have combined to produce severe 
liquidity problems for  the industry during recent years. 
4.57:  Whilst the volume of whisky sent to export markets only increased by  19.7 
per cent  between the calendar years 1973 to 1977 the earnings received by the industry  in  respect of such 
exports virtually doubled from  £259.99 m.  in  1973 to £512.62 m.  in  1977.*  This achievement has no doubt 
been aided by pricing policies which reflect increases in  the U.K.  level of inflation and invoicing at a 
fixed dollar exchange rate which for some time has been greater than the rate determined in  the currency 
markets.  Furthermore,  these export sales have been attained in  the face of competition from  indigenous 
whisky production, for  example,  U.S.A, Canada and Japan, but more particularly in  the shadow of policies 
which discriminate against Scotch whisky.  Taxation policies in  Denmark,  Italy and France, for  example, 
place Scotch at a  considerable disadvantage by comparison with locally ,produced spirits. 
4.58:  Scotch whisky not exported is  invariably destined for sale in  the home 
market, a home market which has become increasingly competitive during recent years with the result that 
there have been some notable changes in  market shares.  The demand for whisky in  the home market  is 
particularly sensitive, at least in  the short-term, to price changes,  whether they emanate from  the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in the form  of additional  Excise Duty and Value Added Tax, or from  the 
producers themselves.  The threat of an impending Duty  increase on whisky (and this is  true for all wines 
and spirits) gives rise to a  particular kind of hysteria whereby producers have to meet the increased stock 
requirements of a  retail trade experiencing a dramatic up-swing  in  consumers' off-take.  Part of this 
hysteria  is  no doubt fuelled by consumers'  indignation that more tax is  being  levied on  a  product already 
highly taxed, and that the total tax element appears so disproportionately large  in  relation to the value of 
whisky  in the bottle.  The aftermath of a  Duty rise results in  a  considerable slow-down in  consumers' 
demand allowing both retailer and producer to replenish stocks.  Wholesalers,  on  the other hand,  may  have 
stocked-up well  in advance of a  Duty rise so that Customs and  Excise statistics often reveal a reduction in 
clearances from  bonded warehouses,  with a  consequent fall  in  Excise revenue, during a short period after 
the increase.  However,  the real increase in  consumers' expenditure on spirits would seem to offer evidence 
that whisky,  perceived as a  luxury product by many,  is  price-inelastic exhibiting a strong element of 
resilience to price increases over the longer-term. 
*  The  Scotch Whisky Association  (1977)  Statistical Report. 
140 4.59:  Increases in  Duty and VAT are applied at standard rates irrespective of company 
and brands, and are passed on  in full  to the consumer.  Producer price rises ore another matter altogether, 
for their timing and magnitude are often the determinants of short -term shifts  in  brand and company market 
shares.  Unfortunately  1  the information that could indicate these market share changes, such as that 
provided by  Neilsen, remains confidentail to the companies concerned.  It  has been suggested that the 
problem for  D. C.l
1s  (fhe Distillers• Co.  ltd.) market share started  after the price rises introduced  by the 
Company in  October 1975 were not immediately followed by  the rest of the industry.  Whilst this certainly 
affected D .C .l
1s market share in  the  short-tlrm  D .C .L would most  I  ikely dispute this and  similar  price 
changes as being a  fundamental cause of the long-term fall  in  their share of the  UK  Scotch market;  more 
pertinent reasons for  their loss of market shore will  emerg~ in  due course.  However, The  Distillers•  Company 
in  marketing around 40 per cent of all world  Scotch sales enjoys the fact that around  85  per cent of its 
total Scotch sales are in  exports from  the UK.  This  high  proportion  of exports to total sales and the level 
of income so derived have in  the past possibly combined to  give D .C.l. a particular comparative  advantage 
over rival distillers,  namely,  the chance to forego price rises on  the home market thereby  preserving 
domestic market shore.  There is  every likelihood that this  policy may  have caused D.C.l's home  market 
competitors  to hold back on  price rises and for them to view  D.C.l. as a price-leader.  The D.C.l. 
instituted  a series of home  market price rises in  1975-lst January,  1st April,  1st  July and  1st October-
which,  incidentally,  would  have had to undergo  Price Commission scrutiny and which  were  generally 
welcomed and followed  by  the industry.  The  first three of these price rises were in  fact followed exactly 
one month  later by price rises from  Teacher, one of Distillers• main  rivals,  but they did not follow suit  with 
the October price rise until nearer Christmas when most  buyers had stocked up  for the festive period.  This 
price advantage in Teachers• favour  was certainly enough  to reduce  D.C.l
1s market shore  at this critical 
time of the year for the Scotch trade.  However,  D.C.l. have not always been the first  to raise prices,  and 
in  the short term may  have benefitted from  this, so  that it is  not too unreasonable  to say that Scotch  whisky 
is a  very price sensitive industry. 
4.60:  The  UK  market for  Scotch  whisky  is  not only sensitive to price changes but 
the level of prices themselves.  That  is  to say,  in a  period when real  incomes are constrained price 
sensitivity becomes enhanced, and in appreciation of this fact the whisky market  (and  other areas of the 
spirits  market) has  become the subject of market segmentation.  This approach to marketing  has already  been 
discussed  in  relation to the beer market, but whereas with beer this segmentation on  price has moved  up-
market  (ie. from  ordinary bitters and lager to premium-priced brands) it has moved  down-market in  the 
spirits  trade.  For many years  the main brands of Scotch and gin on sale in  the home market have been in 
standard bottles of 26~ fl.ozs.  and of 70° Pro of spirit, with vodka  in  standard bottles  but of 65.5° Proof 
spirit.  During  recent years there have emerged two other product groups  to stand alongside the standard 
brands; that  is, secondary  brands and sub-norm products.  It  is  important that these relatively new product 
groups be clearly defined.  The  sub-norm products ore 100 per  cent  Scotch whisky( or gin or vodka) but are 
retailed in  smaller than standard bottles sizes and/or less than  70°Pro~f Spirit.  The secondary  brands are 
most  commonly found  in  the Scotch market,  comprised of 100 per cent Scotch whisky but being blends which 
possibly contain whiskies that have matured for a  shorter period of time than for standard blends. 
141 4.61:  Segmentation of the blended Scotch whisky product  market  is  replicated 
in  the structure of their retail prices; secondary brands are cheaper than standard brands, with sub-norms 
being cheaper still.  At the top of the  price structure in  this segmented blended Scotch market are the 
distillers' de luxe brands,  wherein the youngest whisky used  in  blending is  probably more than 8 or as much 
as 12 years old, or older.  It  is  perfectly possible therefore, for a  producer to be represented  in  the retail 
market by de luxe, standard, secondary and sub-norm brands although in  practice the producers of the main 
standard brands are not usually involved with sub-norm brands.  This  is an important point as far as 
competition in  this market is  concerned, for  sub-norms compete  ~n lower prices directly with standard brands. 
Many sub-norms have reached the market through promotions as grocery retailers own-brands and  in  the 
wholesale cash and carry trade.  When sub-norms receive shelf-space alongside standard Scotch brands the 
price difference is  significantly large and attractive.  However,  the unwary consumer in  selecting a  sub-
norm  in  preference to a  standard Scotch may not realise that the Scotch is  less than 70° Proof spirit and/or 
that the volume of spirit is  2 fluid ozs. or more  less than a  standard bottle, and this may well be a  factor of 
their success in  penetrating the market.  Figures given at a  recent seminar* showed  that sales of 12 bottle 
cases of secondary and sub-norm Scotch rose from 510,000 cases in  1974 to 1.8 m.  cases in  1976- an 
increase of 2.1 times.  This overall position was comprised of a  rise from  465,000 to 810,000 cases for 
secondary brands- almost 75 per cent  up whilst sub-norms grew six fold,  from  45,000 to 270,000 cases. 
The possibility therefore,  that these cheaper brands may  have taken market share from  the standard brands 
is a  rea I one . 
4.62:  That sub-norms are able to retail at prices cheaper than standard brands is 
directly related to the way in  which Duty  is  charged on  the alcoholic content of a  bottle of spirits.  At the 
standard 70° Proof the alcoholic content is  around 40 per cent  and in  the fiscal  year 1975-76 the standard 
rate of Duty on  Scotch whisky was £2.80 per bottle of 26* fl.  ozs.  Lowering  the Proof spirit to 65.5° 
reduces the alcoholic content to below 40 per cent  and was equivalent at that time to a  saving of around 
7 .5p. per fluid  ounce in  Duty and V .A.  T.  Furthermore,  reducing the bottle size reduces the volume of 
spirit so that for  each fluid ounce removed a  saving of around 3.5p. could be made. 
4.63:  Secondary brands appear in  standard bottle sizes containing standard 70° . 
Proof spirit.  They have been specifically designed to retail at prices below standard brands and still 
generate profits in  a  market in  which retail margins can be fairly slender.  Arthur Bell  & Sons  Ltd.  are the 
distillers of the U.K's brand  leading Scotch whisky,  Bell's but they also produce a  secondary brand sold 
under the name of The  Real  Mackenzie.  The  following  quotation taken from  the Bell's Annual Report and 
Accounts for  1976 would seem to confirm the policy of price segmentation in  the Scotch market: 
11The Real 
Mackenzie has established itself as a  brand which successfully complements Bell's by selling into a different 
price sector of the domestic Scotch whisky market."+  Sales of BeiJls Scotch whiskies to the U.K. market 
* 
+ 
11Two Way Traffic
11  Drinks  industry seminar organised by Off-Licence News and held at the 
London  Hilton,  March 2nd  1978.  Figures quoted by Mr.  D.  Hayward 
Marketing Director, White Horse Distillers Ltd.  (A.D.C. L.  subsidiary). 
Arthur Bell  & Sons  Ltd.  (1976)Annual Report  &Accounts p.4. 
142 rose from  £65.6 m.  in  1975 to £96.21 m.  in  1976, or by 47 per cent  ,  whilst sales of The Real  Mackenzie 
increased from  £2.9 m.  to £5.5 m.  over the same period, or by 90 per cent.*  In  addition, sales of The 
Real  Mackenzie were equivalent to 4.4 per cent  of BeJI•s  home market sales of Scotch in  1975 and 5.7 per 
cent  in  1976. 
4.64:  Teacher (Distillers) Ltd.  produce anotherof the U. K's  leading brands of 
standard blended Scotch whisky, Teacher•s Highland Cream as well as providing the market with its 
secondary brand,  Kings  Royal.  The Distillers Co.  Ltd.  introduced a secondary brand of Scotch to the home 
market during  1977 through  its subsidiary company White Horse Distillers Ltd., the brand being known as 
The Claymore.  White Horse Distillers Ltd.  began a  programme of comprehensive research in  1973 into the 
need for a secondary brand of Scotch and the criteria to be met for the successful  launch of a  new product 
into this market.  The Claymore was the result of this research but it was  not until  September 1977 that the 
product became available to consumers.  At tl':is time  Neilsen data given at a seminar+ reckoned The 
Claymore•s market share to be 0.72 per cent  ,  but that only four to five months  later it had  risen to 4.30 
per cent. 
4.65:  The  launching of manufacturers• secondary brands must doubtless be 
viewed as strategies designed to capture market share from  other main brands.  However,  where one 
manufacturers' main and secondary brands stand alongside each other, and where the latter is  competing 
with a  lower price,  it must  necessarily expose the main standard brand to the risk of losing market share. 
Just how  far manufacturers may be prepared to let this substitution go is  difficult to know.  It  seems to be 
the case that the association between a  company's main and secondary brand  is  not promoted at the point of 
sale in  retail outlets.  For  example, White Horse Distillers Ltd.  market a  popular brand of Scotch in  the 
U. K,  White Horse  but The  Claymore•s label  indicates .it  to have been distilled in  Scotland by A. Fergusson 
& Co.  Ltd.  -an existing company specially utilized by White Horse  (or  D.C~L.)for the development  of 
The  Claymore  brand.  Similarly, a  Teacher's subsidiary,  Clyde Distillers Ltd.,  is  credited on the Kings 
Royal  label, as opposed to Teacher itself.  The blurring  of the common  ownership of main and secondary 
brands may  in  itself represent a  constraint on switching  to secondary brands in  that if for example, a Teacher 
secondary  brand  (sold as such) alongside a  Teacher main brand was perceived as just a  cheaper  version of the 
same  product, there could be a  consequent shift in  sales to the cheaper (lower profit?) product.  If this were 
the case the benefits  of this attempt at product differentiation would be lost so fhat the need_ for clearly 
defined  brand  identities,  in  this respect, would seem to confirm the secondary brand  as a  product market 
in  its own  right. 
*  Arthur Bell  & Sons  Ltd.  ( 1976)  op. cit. 
+ 
11Two Way Traffic 
11  op. cit. 
143 4.66:  During a  period when personal  incomes in  real terms have been growing 
only slowly or not at all the offer by manufacturers of relatively cheaper substitutes  represents one way for 
them to retain or attract the consumers' spending power that is available.  The presence of secondary and 
sub-norm brands reflects a distinct move  towards trading down  in  the Scotch market, and that there has 
recently been a  real element of this in  the spirits market as a whole was  inferred earlier from  consumers' 
expenditure data in  paragraph 4. 11.  Whether or not the success of secondary and sub-norm products can be 
sustained, and whether or not the major producers are attracted to the retail sub-norm market*could  largely 
depend upon what happens to personal  incomes.  A rise  in  real personable disposable incomes could well 
witness a  switching of consumers' preferences back to standard brands and/or the disappearance or less 
general availibility of secondary and sub-norm products. 
4,67:  Speaking at the Off-Licence  News seminar** and quoting  Nielsen data 
for  October/November 1977,  Mr.  Derek  Hayward indicated the Scotch whisky market to have a  value at 
retail selling prices of around £900 m.  This estimate is  based on a  market of approximately 12m. cases, 
(144m. bottles) with the on and off-trades each claiming a 50 per cent  share, and where in  the on-trade 
the standard one-sixth of a gill measure retails at 30p., and the bottle in  the off-trade sells at an average 
price of £4. 15.  Within the off-licensed trade the Nielsen data also showed that grocery retailers 
accounted for 40 per cent  of Scotch whisky sales and the specialist retailers, 60 per cent.  These data are 
given in Table 4.25 as are the shares attributed to the Co-operatives, multiple retail grocers,  independent 
retail grocers, the brewers and other specialist drinks' retailers.  The balance between the shares of the 
off-trade passing through grocers and specialist retailers are susceptible to seasonal variations,  in 
particular the influence of the Christmas period.  Data from  the Nielsen Liquor  Index+ indicates that in 
the months of December and January the share of sales volume in whisky moves  in  favour of the grocers by 
around 4 percentage points: that is  from  around 40 per cent  to 44 per cent.  The growth in  the off-I  icensed 
take-home market has already been noted as was the faster rate of growth within this sector handled by  the 
grocery trade as opposed to the specialist off-licences.  The latter point can be discerned for  whisky sales 
from,  once again,  the Nielsen  Liquor  Index.  Indexing  unit sales of whisky against 100 in  June/July 1975 
produced an index of 236 for specialist off-licences by December/January 1976/77 whilst that for sales 
through grocers stood at 333.  These figures serve to emphasise the increasing relative importance of grocers 
in  the off-licensed retail whisky market. 
* 
** 
+ 
According to The Grocer, October 22nd 1977,  food  brokers  Jenks Bros.  launched a sub-
norm  Scotch,  Royal  Heather produced for them by  International Distill.ers and Vintners 
(I.D.V.) the Grand Metropolitan subsidiary which distills and markets two  leading 
brands of spirits;  namely,  J  & B Rare Scotch whisky and Smirnoff vodka. 
"Two Way Traffic"  op. cit. 
The Grocer  April  16th 1977 p.68. and p.73. 
144 TABLE  4.25 
Shares in  Off-licensed Scotch Whisky lv\arket,  1977* 
per cent 
Grocers 
Co-operatives  8.9 
Multiples  25.2 
Independents  5.8  39.9 
Specialists 
Brewers  25.2 
Others  34.9  60.1 
100 
* 12 months ended Oct./Nev. 1977 
SOURCE:  Nielsen data quoted at Off-licence News seminar 
(See footnote to para 4.61  for  fu II  reference). 
145 4.68:  Price competition in  the retail grocery trade has  intensified during recent 
years, (although never absent from  the industry since the advent of supermarkets and the abolition of resale 
price maintenance) and has rubbed off on the alocholic drinks trade.  Similarly, abolition of resale  price 
maintenance and the relative ease with which an off-licence can be obtained now,  compared with, say, 
15 years ago, has encouraged and witnessed the growth of specialist drinks' retailers,  many selling at cut-
prices.  In  addition,  just as the own-branding of packaged grocery products reflects one aspect of price 
competition, so have such own-branding policies been applied in the alcoholic drinks market.  In  the 
Scotch whisky market the Augustus Barnett chain of around 180 off-licences has  its own  brand of Scotch as 
do the multiple retail grocers Sainsbury and Waitrose.  However,  it would seem that the need for Scotch 
whisky to be strongly associated with Scotland by the 'brand' name chosen means that secondary and sub-
norms  in  particular are of greater importance in  the grocery trade as a  whole than are retailers' private 
labels.  In  this respect it is  interesting to note that the Co-operative movement's retail stores sell a 
secondary Scotch under the title of Robertson's Yellow  Label.  This whisky  is  produced exclusively for them 
by the Distillers Company and it  is debatable whether or not this product can be considered as the Co-op's 
own-brand. 
4.69:  Except in so far as a  brewer may own a  distillery company, the distillers 
do not own  retail outlets and therefore,  unlike the brewers, do not have what amounts to guaranteed retail 
distribution for an important part of their production.  In  the on-licensed trade it  is  often the brewers' 
practice to stock both brand leading whiskies together with what are known as 'house' or 'pouring• brands; 
the latter being served to a  customer who asks for a whisky but does not specify any particular brand of 
whisky.  The whiskies adopted by brewers as 'house• brands are invariably those produced by  brewery-
owned distillers or where an independent distiller has entered into an agreement with a  brewer.  The 
Monopolies Commission  Report on the Supply of Beer in  1969* stated that 
11Long  John Whisky and Grant's 
Stand  fast whisky,  produced  by the non-brewery owned d isti II eri  es Seager Evans  and Wi II iam  Grant and 
Sons respectively, have been adopted by a  number of brewers as 
1house
1 brands;  other brands of whisky 
adopted by  brewers include Ballantines  (George Ballantine); Cutty Sark (Berry Brothers and Rudd);  Queen 
Anne (Hill Thompson) ••••.••  ;  Bonnie Charlie (Charles Kinloch, a  Courage subsidiary) and Teacher's and 
Bell's whiskies
11
•  In  the off-licensed trade this situation is  likely to be  somewhat reversed, for  in the 
words of the Monopolies Commission,* 
11 
•••••  ( •••• customers almost invariably specify the brands of wines 
and spirits they want and where the highly advertised long established  'proprietary brands', i.e. non-
brewery owned brands,  are most  I  ikely to be the ones chosen) •••••• 
11
• 
4.70:  Today,  the existence of cut-price off-licence chains and the introduction 
of secondary and sub-norm products may  have altered this balance between proprietary and other brands to 
some degree.  However,  the general distinction between consumer choice being constrained by what 
brewers are prepared to offer in their public houses as opposed to the consumer being relatively free to state, 
*  The  Monopolies Commission (1969) op. cit. paras. 69 and 70. 
146 and have satisfied, his choice in  off-licences, remains broadly valid.  It  is  for  this reason that the 
independent (ie. non-brewer) Scotch whisky distillers are forced  in  their dealings with the retail trade to 
to treat the on and off  ... licensed sectors as two different markets.  In  not owning and having direct control of 
retail outlets the distillers' influence over the relative demand for their proprietary brands in  on and off-
licensed premises is  limited to the advertising necessary to sustain consumer demand and promotional prog-
rommes and special deals mode with individual retail operators.  In  their marketing approach, therefore, the 
independent distillers are not unlike a  food  manufacturer selling-in to the grocery trade. 
4.71:  The brewers  policy of promoting a  'house brand' of whisky  in  the on-trade 
is  not limited to the  largest brewers,  but is a general trade practice which can effectively reduce the 
distribution and sales of the products of the non-preferred distiller.  This  is  not a  new  practice as the 
quotations from  the Monopolies Commission's  1969 report make dear, but  is  certainly likely to have become 
more extens·ive in  its application since this time, favouring some brands of spirits rather than others..  There 
are,  in  the main,  two reasons to support this contention; first of oil, the merger activity within the brewing 
industry, and secondly,  the more direct role taken by  brewers in  spirit distilling. 
4.72:  The possibility that a distillers' products {whether as house or proprietary 
brands) available in  one brewers' pubs could become de-listed almost overnight after being taken-over by 
another brewer is a  reol one.  This  happened to the D.C.l. when Courage ltd. acquired the brewers  John 
Smiths Tadcaster Brewery  ltd. in  1970.  After a  take-over, de-listing  can of course apply to oil types of 
alcoholic and soft drinks, and not just Scotch whisky.  In  1975 Whitbread & Co. acquired the distillers 
long  John  International  ltd. giving  immediate distribution to its main brand of Scotch whisky  1  long John, 
in  Whitbread's 7,000 or so  public houses.  According to an article in  the Sunday Times*  the widespread  · 
distribution so  suddenly accorded to  long John was expected to produce a 40 per cent  volume growth in 
one year.  Few  brands could expect to achieve such growth particularly when the same source*  indicates 
that no advertising was planned in  the home market. 
4.73:  The financial problems faced by the Scotch whisky industry and discussed 
in an earlier paragraph were enough  in  1976 to force Teacher (Distillers) ltd.- an independent firm  for 
165 years- to approach Allied Breweries with a  view to a  take..;.over.  The acquisition was completed 
before the end of the year, at a time when Allied's only direct interest in  Scotch whisky was through its 
subsidiary Stewarts and a  little known brand of Scotch called Cream of the Barley.  Allied had, and still 
maintains a  30 per cent  interest in William Grant & Sons  (Standfast) ltd. - the U.K. marketing company 
for Grant's Standfast Scotch which is  used as the 'pouring' brand in Allied pubs.  According to an article 
+ 
in  the Financial Times  Allied was at the time of acquisition "Teacher
1s main customer in  the U. K, 
11  so 
that the brand was most  likely already receiving large scale distribution throughAIIied
1s 7,500- 8,000 
*  The Sunday Times  August 7th 1977. 
+  The Financial Times 
11The  Lex  Column
11  October 14th  1976, 
147 pubs and 950- 1,000 off-licences.  That Teacher's Highland Cream could eventually replace Grant's 
Standfast as the pouring brand  is  a  possibility and one that could undermine the stability of the consortium 
distiller.*  Perhaps the most  important outcome of this merger is  that as Teacher's Highland Cream  is 
reckoned to be the second best selling brand of Scotch in the U.K. (after Bell's) Allied's role in  the 
production and wholesaling of Scotch whisky has been considerably strengthened. 
4. 74:  In  addition to brewers strengthening their interests in spirit distilling 
through mergers there has recently been a  merger within the distilling industry itself.  In  December 1977 
Seagram Distillers Ltd.  (the U.K. subsidiary of  Canadian distiller The Seagram Company  Ltd.,  reported 
to be the world's largest producer and distributor of distilled spirits and wine) took over Scotch whisky 
distiller The Glenlivet Distillers Ltd.  having previously acquired the 27 per cent  stake in Glenlivet held 
by  Imperial Group's brewing subsidiary Courage.  Seagram Distillers has had notable interests in  Scotch 
whisky for some years;  it is  represented in  the U.K. Scotch market  by three brands, the de-luxe Chivas 
Regal and 100  Pipers and  Passport;  it distributes Glenlivet malt whiskies in the United  States as well as 
using Glenlivet malts in the blending of its whiskies.  The company has also been noted for being the 
world's second largest exporter of Scotch, and next to the D.C. L.  having the second  largest holding 
of stocks of Scotch whisky.  Adequate stocks of whisky are vital for any company endeavouring to develop 
its Scotch brands,  as well as providing a  basis for  the blending and development of new brands,  so that the 
Glenlivet stocks so acquired no doubt strengthen Seagram's position in  this respect.  Although the greater 
part of Seagram's U.K.  Scotch production is  exported the major constraint on the distribution of all its 
drinks' products in the U.K.  is  the extent to which it can gain representation in  the brewers' tied estate, so 
that aggressive marketing policies directed towards the free and grocery trades represent alternatives. 
In  other U.K. drinks markets Seagram's leading brand is  in dark rum,  with gin also being important,  but 
with vodka and white rum  being less so. 
4.75:  The brewers' control over their tied estates is sufficient to give the major 
brewers a  strong element of buying power when negotiating with independent distillers for purchases of 
Scotch c:md  other spirits.  Table 2. 11  showed that in  1975 the Big-6 brewers owned around 37,000 public 
houses equivalent to almost 75 per cent  of all brewery-owned pubs.  An indication of the possible extent 
of buying power amongst the Big-6 is given by Table 4. 26, which shows the estimates of pubs owned by 
each brewer.  In  addition,  the number of outlets in  brewers' retail off-licence chains must  not be 
forgotten: Allied Breweries has around 900 such outlets trading as Victoria Wine; Watney Mann  - Truman 
has nearly 600 shops under the Westminster Wine and  Peter Dominic names; and Courage have around 320 
off-licences in  the Arthur Cooper chain.  For buying on this scale the possibility that the larger brewers 
may be able to negotiate outside distillery company's normal  terms is a possibility that cannot be ignored, 
but whether the consumer benefits from  any of these additional discounts is a  question which cannot be 
answered here. 
*  In  addition to Allied, Whitbread and Bass Cherrington have a  30 per cent share  in 
Grant's (Stand fast) and William Grant  & Sons  Ltd.,  10 per cent. 
148 4.76:  To support the notion that the larger brewers possess and use their buying 
power it  is  interesting to refer to the 1974 Annual Report and Accounts of The Gfenlivet Distillers Ltd.  One 
of Glenlivet
1s blended Scotch whiskies is the Queen Anne  brand which is  the house-brand of Scotch in 
Courage pubs, as well as being distributed in  England and Wales by Saccone and Speed  Ltd., the Courage 
wine and spirit merchanting subsidiary.  In  his  1974 review the chairman of Glenlivet  found  that although 
Queen Anne  was 
11enjoying ever-increasing sales in  England and Wales,
11  they were 
11unlikely to contribute 
to the overall trading profit  of the compani' as they were not 
11able to achieve a realistic home trade price!
11 
4.77:  It  would seem that having been readily adopted by a  brewer for  special treat-
ment as a  house-brand  the product of any distiller can fall  out of favour just as quickly.  Until  very 
recently Bass Cherrington  had  the sole British  distribution rights to The Distillers Company•s VAT  69  brand of 
Scotch  vJ,isky.  As a  result of the E. E. C. decision concerning  D.C. L
1s dual pricing pol icy, the D.C. L. 
raised the price of VAT  69  by around 50p per bottle.  Press reports indicate that this price rise was  unacc-
eptable to Bass Cherrington  who dropped the brand  in  favour of another.  The  replacement brand chosen by 
Bass  Cherrington is that of Highland Queen  from  MacDonald Martin  Distilleries Ltd., a  company which  in 
the year to  March 1977 had a  turnover of only £6.  8m.  Bass will  sell this brand  into the free-trade but  it  is 
not  certain  whether, or to what extent  if at all,  Bass will sell the brand  in  its tied-estate for  it already has 
Grant Standfast  as a  pouring brand.  Nevetheless, this deal  is  of obvious benefit to MacDonald  Martin 
though, 
11there is  no doubt  that the deal was won  by offering the group  (Bass  Cherrington) very  favourable 
price terms. 
11+ 
4.78:  The competitive pressures on  trade selling prices faced by distillers as a  result 
of brewers• buying power,  is  likely to be enhanced by  the growth in  sales to the take-home market through 
the retail grocery trade, albeit on a  lesser scale.  The  Co-operative Society has already been  described as 
having the U. K
1s largest chain of retail off-licences.  Allied Suppliers (encompassing  Liptons,  Preston, 
Templetons and Galbraiths) has around 1,200 stores, Tesco have around 740, and Fine  Fare and  International 
Stores (including F.J. Wallis shops) around 650 each.  Not all of these stores have  or are ever likely to have 
off-licensed  departments  but with the trend towards  larger store size and more  off-licences being granted, 
space allocated to in-store off-licences is  likely to  increase.  This  in  itself represents a  source of additional 
competition  within the take-home market with respect to the specialist  off-licence chains and those owned 
by brewers. 
4.79:  The factors which have been at work  in shaping the Scotch  whisky market 
(many of which are equally relevant to other spirits• markets) and described in  the preceeding  paragraphs 
have, more than anything else perhaps,  contributed to an erosion of traditional brand  loyalties.  As a  result, 
brand and company market shares have certainly altered over the years, affecting some  companies more than 
others. 
*  TheGienlivet Distillers ltd.  (1974) Annual Report and Accounts. p.6 
+  The  Financial Times  June 3rd,  1978 
149 4.80:  In  endeavouring to present details of how  brand and market shares have 
changed it is  not always possible to present data that are necessarily consistent in  terms of the source from 
which they are taken or  the date to which they relate.  However,  the figures quoted here are sufficient 
for  the relative changes that have taken place in the U.K. Scotch market to be recognised, although the 
market shares stated may  not in absolute terms describe the precise share of any one brand or company. 
4.81:  The Distillers Co.  ltd.  markets Scotch whisky in  the U.K. under a  variety 
of brand names,  each relating to different blends of Scotch whisky or single malts.  In  the blended whisky 
market the most widely known D .C.l. brands are Johnnie Walker (but more of this brand later),  Haig, VAT 
69, White Horse, Black and White and Dewars.  It  was brands such as these which, according to the 
Monopolies Commission* gave D. C .l. about a 75 per cent  share of the U.K. Scotch whisky market in 
1959/60.  By  1966/67 this same report stated D.C. t•s Scotch market share to have fallen to about 50 per 
cent.* ·  It  is  believed that D. C .l. preserved its 50 per cent  share of this market until probably around 3 
or 4 years ago, since when,  its share  has been quoted at 37 per cent  , +although many other  commentators 
in the financial press have placed it lower at around 33 per cent  ,  for Autumn,  1977. 
4. 82:  After D.C. l. the two most  popu lor brands of Scotch have for  many years 
been the main brands of Arthur Bell  & Sons  ltd., and Teacher (Distillers) ltd.  For  1966/67, the Monopo-
lies Commission*  credited these two as having around 29  per cent  of the U.K. market between them, and 
it is estimated that this was comprised of 16 per cent  for Teacher
1s and 13 per cent  for Bell's.  More 
recently, an article in the financial pres/ has reversed the position of these two brands in  reckoning Bells' 
share of the market to be 22 per cent  ,  and Teachers• share to have remained the same as that in  1966/67 at 
16 per cent.  It  should be noted that Bells•  share places it in  the position of having the largest share of the 
U. K.  market for any one brand of Scotch whisky. 
4.83:  These market share data are summarised  in Table 4. 27 which show that 
whereasD.C.l
1s share fell by  13 percentage points between 1966/67 and 1976/77, the combined shares of 
Bell's and T  eacher
1s rose by 9 percentage points over the same period.  Whilst these figures in themselves 
are by  no means sufficient for  it to be stated conclusively that D. C.l. has  lost share primarily to Bell's/ 
Teacher
1s they do exemplify the point that other brands- whether standard, secondary or sub-norms- have 
gained considerably at D. C.l
1s expense.  As  far as concentration in the Scotch whisky market is concerned 
*  The Monopolies Commission(l969)op.cit.para.65 
+  de Zoete & Bevan - Stockbrokers (1978) Seminar: The Retailing of Wines and Spirits through 
Specialist Off-licences.  Figure quoted for Oct ./Nov. 1977 taken from 
paper given by  N.B. Baile,  Chairman and Managing Director, Oddbins 
U.K.  ltd. 
I  The  Financial Times  March 15th 1978. 
150 TABLE 4.26 
Estimates of Big-6 Brewers
1  Ownership of Public Houses,  1975. 
Brewer  No. of Pubs 
Bass  Cherrington  8584 
Allied Breweries  7474 
Whitbread  7104 
Watney Mann/f  ruman  6808 
Courage  5550 
Scott  ish  & New  cast I  e  1480 
37000 
TABLE 4.27 
Estimates of Company Shares in  U.K. Scotch Market. 
Year  Share of Top-3  Companies/Share (%) in  Rank  Order. 
{%)  1  2  3 
1960  75*  D.C.L. 
(75)  ( ..... )  ( ... ) 
1966/67  79  D.C. L.  Teachers  Bells 
(50)  (16)  (13) 
1976/77  75  D.C. L.  Bells  Teachers 
(37)  (22)  {16) 
*  One company only. 
SOURCES:  see paras. 4.81 and 4.82 and footnotes. 
151 reference may be made to Table 4.27 and the following  point made:  since 1960  the level of market 
concentration  would appear to have fallen,  for whilst  this factor may be quantified at 75 per cent  in both 
1960 and today,  it was accounted for  by one firm  in  1960, but shared between three in  1976/77.  Further-
more,  the same three firms  (D.C.L., Bell's and Teacher's) accounted for a smaller combined market share 
in  1976/77 (75  per cent) than they did  10 years earlier (79  per cent).  There seems  little doubt that the 
influential position  of the main firms  has been constrained during recent years by firms  represented  in  the 
market by  lesser known  brands,  many receiving  the brewers•  special attention for promotion.  It  is  under-
stood  that it is  to this reason that the D .C .L. ascribe,  in  the main, their significant loss of market share in 
Scotch  whisky. 
4.84:  The Distillers Company's share of the Scotch whisky  market is  likely to be 
subjected to further pressures and challenges as a  result of the decision of the E.E.C's Competition 
Directorate* handed down  in  December 1977 and concerning one of D .C.L's trading practices.  It  is  there-
fore relevant to consider what this E.E.C. decision was, what led up to it, and how  the D.C.L. reacted to 
it. 
4.85:  It  is  the D.C.L's practice to distribute its  products  in  overseas markets 
through the appointment  of sole distributors who are obi iged to finance  promotional activity  1  for  the brands 
they import  1  from  their own funds.  Scotch  whisky  is  exported to around  180 countries, representing a 
diversity of national markets where trading conditions and the competitive  atmosphere are shaped by  national 
legislation and taxation  policies which often discriminate against the  product.  In  the case of the Contin-
ental E.E.C.,  taxation policies favour locally  produced spirits, and in  France the advertising of Scotch 
whisky  is banned.  The  competitive disadvantage that such  institutional  arrangements place upon  D .C  .L's 
sole distributors requires them to engage in  promotional  activity  1  a  cost which  is reflected in  their sales 
prices.  In  the  UK,  on the other hand,  D.C.L's 1,000 or so wholesale  customers benefit from  not having to 
"  carry the additional burden of promotional costs which are borne by D .C .L's brand-owning subsidiaries in 
their  national advertising campaigns.  Research  carried  out by the  D .C .L. themselves has produced two 
important findings;  first of all, that the additional cost carried by  sole distributors  in  maintaining  an 
effective sales force,  media and other advertising, and keeping three  months stock of the brand etc. worked 
out at around  £5  per case (12 bottles).  Secondly, that U.K.  wholesalers and  sole distributors traditionally 
purchased at virtually t~e same prices- in  December 1977 U.K. wholesalers  paid about 3p per bottle  less 
than sole distributors.  It  was the differential between  the price at which  U.K. wholesalers  could  obtain 
supplies of Scotch and  that at which sole distributors had to sell  (after incurring promotion costs)  that gave 
rise to the unofficial or parallel  market in  exports of certain brands  of Scotch whisky. 
4.86  Exports of Scotch whisky via the parallel market accelerated during  1974 
*  Offidal Jpurnal of t~e European Communities. decision  IV.28.282: The Distillers Co ltd,Conditions 
of Sale and Price Terms.  Dec~mber 20th 1977.  O.J.No.l50.Vol.2l.February 22nd 1978 pp16-33. 
152 and continued during the early part of  1975 despite the fact  that D.C.L's U.K. C01ditions of Sale prohi-
bited such exports.  As a  result, parallel exports damaged the sole distributors ability to compete effectively 
as well as.threatening the credibility of Scotch brands.  In  June 1975 D.C.L. took action to reduce the 
financial  incentive for  parallel exporting by an amendment to its trade terms to U.K. wholesalers  whereby 
those buyers intending to export D .C.l. Scotch were required to declare that fact thereby making  themselves 
ineligible for  U.K. discounts.  Furthermore,  the company reserved the right to charge a  U.K. wholesaler 
gross prices if it was later discovered that purchases of Scotch on which discounts had been obtained, were 
in  fact exported.  To  have taken more direct action, such as forbidding  U.K. customers to export to the 
Common  Market would have been contrary to E.E.C. rules on  free trade, but D.C.l. continued to insist 
that U.K. wholesalers should not export to countries outside the E. E. C.  The new  trade-terms  introduced 
by D.C.l. constituted a dual-pricing structure to the same customer,  that is,  ore price for sales into the 
U.K. market and another price for  exports to other E.E.C. countries.  It  was this aspect of dual-pricing 
(to  the same customer) and its effects that were brought to the E.E.C's attention. 
4.87:  According to a  report in  the Financial Times 
11A Group of companies trading in 
the Glasgow area and owned by the same people - A. Bulloch & Co.; A. Bulloch  (Agencies),  John Grant 
(Blenders),  Inland  Fisheries and Classic Wines- found  that D .C .l. meant to enforce  it new  terms of trade 
when some of the whisky they had bought at the home  trade price and sold to another U.K. dealer subsequ-
ently turned up  in  supermarkets in  France and Belgium.  D.C.l. asked for further payment or in  its terms 
'repayment of the U.K. discounts•- and refused to sell the Bulloch group any more Scotch under bond 
except at the gross price.  Duty paid sales continued,  however. 
11* 
4.88:  The E.E.C. Competition Department's investigation of D.C.l's dual pricing 
pol icy began after the Bulloch companies complained to the European Commission that dual pricing prevented 
para lie  I exports and was therefore contrary to Article 85  of The Treaty of Rome.+  Rejecting D .C ,l
1s 
arguments that dual pricing was necessary to protect its sole distributors,  the Commission ruled that Article 
85  had  indeed been infringed, as dual pricing amounted to a  restriction on  the free movement of goods and 
a  distortion of competition (within the Community).  The Commission therefore required D.C.l. to end  its 
practice of charging any one  U.K.  wholesaler a  higher price for Scotch destined to other E.E.C. markets 
than the price charged for supplies to the domestic market.  This decision was officially communicated to 
D.C.l. on December 21st,  1977 and accordingly D.C.l. immediately changed its terms to comply with the 
ruling. 
4.89:  The  D .C.l. have appealed against this decision to the European Court of Justice 
in  luxembourg,  but their immediate reaction in  December 1977 was to announce that the world's best sell-
ing  brand of Scotch and that most  in demand by parallel exporters,  namely Johnnie Walker Red  label  was 
to be immediately withdrawn from  the U.K. market,  thereby protecting their sole distributors, and that they 
*  The  Financial Times, August 31st,  1977. 
1Distillers Company Versus the E.E.c.• 
+  Please see next page for extract of Article 85. 
153 Article 85 of The Treaty of Rome 
1.  The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the common market: all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common 
market, and in  particular those which: 
(a)  directly or indirectly fix  purchase or selling prices or 
any other trading conditions; 
(b)  I  imit or control production,  markets,  technical development, 
or investment; 
(c)  share markets or sources of supply; 
(d)  apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties,  thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage; 
(e)  make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obi igations which, 
by  their nature or according to commercial usage,  have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2.  Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this 
Article shall be automatically void. 
3.  The provisions of paragraph 1 may,  however,  be declared 
inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between 
undertakings; 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of 
undertakings; 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,  while 
allowing consumers a  fair share of the resulting benefit, and 
which does not: 
(a) 
(b) 
impose on  the undertakings concerned restrictions which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
\ 
afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in  respect of a  substantial part of the products 
in  question. 
154 would seek price rises for  their other main standard brands of Scotch in  the order of around £6 per case or 50 
pence per bottle.  This action was to leave the Haig  brand of Scotch as D.C. L's  best selling brand in  the 
U.K., behind which considerable advertising support was to be placed. 
4.  90:  Shortly after this initial move D.C. L.  also withdrew the de-luxe Scotch Dimple 
Haig  from  the U.K. market and after negotiations with the  Price Commission some  main brands of Scotch 
were increased in price, though not all to the extent sought by the company.  The prices of Black  and White 
and VAT  69 were raised by around 50 pence per bottle wholesale; the Price Commission  reduced the 50 pence 
rise wanted for  Dewar's to 25 pence and allowed no rise for  the White Horse brand.  Two deluxe whiskies 
also achieved price rises of 25 pence per bottle each, namely,  Johnnie Walker Black  Label  and the 
Antiquary.  No price rise was sought for  Haig, or the other 40 or so D.C.L. brands in  the U.K. 
4.  91:  The  Distillers• Company continues to believe that its dual pricing pol icy  is 
entitled to the benefit of Article 85(3) but their appeal to the European Court may take up  to 18 months to 
be heard and pronounced upon.  It  has been speculated that refusal to supply the U.K. market could be 
construed as a  breach of_ Article 86*,  if this were the case it would be necessary for  the Commission to prove 
that D.C. L.  has a  dominant role in  the market,  but the problem  is  which is  the relevant market.  Some  may 
take the view that the relevant market  is all alcoholic beverages, others all spirits, and some simply Scotch 
or gin, or vodka. 
4.92:  The removal  of Johnnie Walker Red  Label  from  the U.K. market has  left a  gap 
in  the Scotch market that D.C. L's  competitors have  been anxious to fill  with the result that competition 
has  intensified.  In  April  1978, D.C.L. introduced a  new  blend of Scotch whisky to fill  the opening  left 
by  Johnnie Walker.  The  new  brand is a standard blend known as John Barr  which will be promoted as a 
brand in  its own  right rather than as a  successor to Johnnie Walker.  The problem for  D.C.L, however, is 
that a  new  brand of Scotch cannot become established in  the whisky market overnight and there are plenty 
of other brands of longer standing that are relatively better placed to compete for  Johnnie Walker's past 
market share.  {At  the same time, as John  Bar~  is  not an established brand, either here or abroad, D.C.L. 
are unlikely to be too concerned about the development of a  para lie  I market in  this product)  There can be 
little doubt that the withdrawal of Johnnie Walker  has had  the effect of reducing still further D.C.L's share 
of the U.K. Scotch market, to below the 37 per  cent share the company held around  the Autumn of 1977. 
4.93:  A side effect of the E.E.C. decision has been the dropping by  Bass  Cherrington 
Ltd.  of its sole British distributors' rights to D.C. L's VAT 69, already mentioned in  paragraph 4.77.  The 
price rise taken by this brand could make it virtually impossible for D.C. L.  to find another distributor so  that 
in  the short-term at least D. C. L's  market share must  suffer once again.  It  does not, therefore, seem  to::>  un-
reasonable to contemplate a  current Scotch whisky market share for D.C. L.  in  the range, of 20-30 per cent. 
*  Please see next page for  extract of Article 86. 
155 Article 86 of The Treaty of Rome 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the  common  market or in a  substantial part 
of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the  common 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in  particu Jar,  consist in: 
(a)  directly or indirectly imposing  unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b)  limiting production, markets or technical developments . 
to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c)  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage; 
(d)  making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, 
by their nature or according to commercial  usage,  have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
156 4.  94:  The Scotch whisky market is  highly competitive with competition on price being 
the overriding factor which has  led to the increasing relative importance of lesser known brands and the 
emergence of new types of Scotch products.  Although the majority of distillery companies are not brewery-
owned the brewers' control of retail outlets, particularly in. the on-trade, endows them with considerable 
power not only in  negotiating buying prices for  Scotch but in  favouring certain brands rather than others.  It 
is  this latter point, together with the pace of mergers in  the brewery industry over past years, that has been 
the main cause in  the fall of D.C.L's market share.  Ostensibly, therefore, the fall  in  D.C.L's market share 
has seen a  reduction in  market concentration.  However, whether or not this trend is  likely to continue or be 
reversed  is debatable.  It  may be dependent upon further merger activity for the industry's financial prob-
lems,  exacerbated as they may be by pricing difficulties in  the market,  could lead to other independent 
distillers like Teacher seeking the protection of other distillers or more diversified concerns.  The recent 
upheaval in  the  U.K. Scotch market created by the E.E.C. decision onThe Distillers Co.  Ltd. and the 
removal of Johnnie Walker  Red  Label  serves as an added impetus for cut-throat competition.  At the 
present time, therefore, the outcome for the. level of market concentration ~emains uncertain. 
157 Gin 
4.95: 
11Gin is made from  a  basic mash of corn or barley and juniper berries, 
with a  variety of fruits and spices added.  These ingredients are compounded to produce a  vapour of 
alcohol which is condensed back il1to  liquid form  and bottled 
11
• *  It  has a distinctive odour and generally 
appears as either a  colourless or straw coloured liquid.  Unlike Scotch whisky, gin can be produced any-
where in  the world,  but the U.K. gin market remains free from  such competition as imports of gin are 
negligible.  The  U.K. gin market, again unlike Scotch whisky,  is free from  the constraint that the spirit 
for domestic consumption must  legally have been matured for 3 years prior to sale.  In  theory therefore, 
once gin has been distilled,  it can be bottled, distributed and drunk all in  the same day. 
4.96:  Gin is an old established market in  the U.K. and although its popularity 
may  have been boosted by the scarcity of Scotch during and for some time after the last war,  it has recently 
lost out in  its share of the total spirits market,  to the relatively newer {as far as the U.K. market is 
concerned) white spirits, especially vodka.  The reasons for this would appear to stem from  the image that 
gin has of being an older persons drink, and vodka a younger persons drink.  Sales of gin are probably 
shared fifty-fifty between the pub and the off-licence, though with the general trend to take-home sales 
this balance could have shifted slightly in  favour of the off-licence. 
4.97:  The factors influencing competition in  the U.K. gin market are largely 
the same as those identified for  Scotch; namely, the brewers• promotion of house brands at the expense of 
proprietary brands,  the buying power of the larger brewers and retailers possibly enabling them to obtain 
additional discounts (which may or may  not be passed  on to the consumer), and the existence of retailers• 
private labels and sub-norm products which contribute to the price competition that is extensive for  this 
product. 
4.  98:  The single most  popular brand of gin in  the U.K.  is that of Gordon's, 
distilled by The Distillers Co.  Ltd., whose other main gin brands are Booth's and High and Dry.  In  the 
early 1960's W & A Gilbey Ltd.  and United Wine Traders  Ltd.  merged to form  International Distillers and 
Vintners Ltd.  (I.D.V.) which are now  part of the Grand Metropolitan group which distributes the Gilbey 
brand of gin.  I. D. V.  a~so distribute through their parent company's (Grand Metropolitan)Westminster Wine· 
and  Peter Dominic outlets their other brands of gin, Military and Chelsea.  James Burrough  Ltd.has been an 
·.independent distillerof gin (and more recently vodka)since 1820 and produces the Beefeater brand of which 
.some  80 per cent  is exported, equivalent to around two-fifths of all U.K. gin exports.  Seagram Distillers 
Ltd.have during recent years put considerable promoti.on behind their White Satin brand of gin.  Some  U.~. 
brewers also operate gin  distilleries, the output of which often goes into providing the brewer with his house-
*  Walshe.G  (1974)  Recent Trends in  Monopoly in Great Britain  C.U.P.  p.66. 
158 brand of gin.  For  example,  Bass Cherrington's house-brand of gin, Whitehall,  is  produced by  their 
subsidiary  tv\arshall  Tap low  Ltd.  G. & J. Greenall a  subsidiary of brewers Greenall Whitley have 
significant  interests in gin distilling as do J. & W.  Nicholson  (Holdings)  Ltd.  It  is  understood that 
Scottish & Newcastle Breweries' house brand of gin, White Crystal  is  bought in  bulk from  outside suppliers • 
Whitbread & Co have the Plymouth brand of gin, and in  the autumn of 1977 they acquired James Hawker 
& Co  Ltd., producers of the brand  leading Pedlars sloe gin. 
4.99  In  1957 Whitbread introduced Squires gin to be the house brand in  its 
pubs, and according to the Monopolies Commission* 
11in  1959 a  small  number of other brewery groups reached 
agreement with Whitbread to set up Squires Gin Ltd.  to produce and bottle gin for sale in  their tied houses, .... 
Most of the brewery companies in  the U.K. are now  members of the gin consortium
11
•  In  1961  Squires Gin 
Ltd.  introduced a  new brand  named Corn hill being a  straw coloured I  iquid  in a  clear bottle, whereas 
Squire's was colourless and in a green bottle.  These two brands correspond  in  colour of the gin and bottle 
to the D.C. L's  brand  leading gins of Booth's and Gordon's,  respectively.  Appendix 7 to the Monopolies 
Commission report** shows that for  major brewers  Allied, Courage, Watney tv\ann and Whitbread, all in 
1968 had  Squire's and Cornhill gin as their house brands. 
4.100  Table 4.28 endeavours to summarise,  by reference to various sources,  how 
market shares in gin have changed over the years.  These data in  as far as they go are not entirely consistent. 
Leaving aside the Monopolies Commission's 60 per  cent  for  D.C. L's  Gordon's and Booth's brands i.n  1968 
it would seem that these two brands which reputedly held around 90 per  cent  of 1967's gin market, retained 
a 70/15 per  cent  share in  1975/76.  The  E. E.C's report on  D.C. L's  conditions of sale and price term/ 
noted that D.C. L's sales of gin over the  years 1973,  1974 and 1975 
11amounted to approximately 70 per cent 
of the total gin sales in  the United  Kingdom
11
•  If  1967's assessment of 90 per  cent  for  D.C.L's two leading 
brands is  reasonably correct then D.C. L.  have certainly suffered a  loss  in  the market share, though still 
holding onto the greater part of the market.  It  is  most  likely that much of D.C.L's reduced role has been 
due to the policy of the brewers who not only sponsor their house brand but possibly promote other gin 
brands in  their tied houses rather than D.C. L.  brands.  In  the free-trade D.C. L.  brc:;mds  undoubtedly fare 
much better even in  the face of strong price competition from  lesser known  brands reaching the market vi a 
special deals with supermarkets and cut-price off-licence chains.  Concentration in  the gin market therefore 
may  be considered to have fallen since 1967 when one firm accounted for around 90 per cent  of the market, 
whilst today the gin brands of three firms  possibly share between 80 and 85  per  cent  of this market. 
*  The  Monopolies Commission(l969)op'.cit.para' 66 
**  The Monopolies Commission(l969)op.cit.Appendix 7 p. 146 
+  Official Journal of the European Communities op.cit .p. 17 
159 TABLE  4.28 
Market Shares in  the U.K. Gin Market 
Brand  Company  Market Share per cent 
1975/76  1969  1968  1967 
Gordons  D.C.l.  55/60  60  ) 
60  90 
Booths  D.C.L.  15  20  ) 
High  & Dry  D.C.l.  5 
Squires  *Squires Gin Ltd.  7/8  10  20  7 
White Satin  Seagram  8 
Gilbeys  I.D.  V  /Grand Met.  5 
Beefeater  James Burrough  5  5 
SOURCES:  1967  Govett & Sons  (1967) a  stockbrokers• report entitled 
1Distillers,  the 
Industry and the D .C.l. 
1  cited in Walshe  (1974) op. cit. p.67. 
1968  Monopolies Commission  (1969) op. cit. para. 66. 
1969  E.I.U. data in  I.P.C. Marketing Manual of the U.K.  (1977). 
1975/76  The  Financial Times  various special reports on  spirits. 
*  A brewers consortium company. 
160 Vodka 
4.101:  Vodka  is an odourless and colourless distilled spirit which like gin is  not 
legally required to be matured during any minimum  period of time.  Unlike both Scotch whisky and gin, 
which are long  established product markets in  the U.K., vodka  is a  comparatively young product; the 
U.K•s second and third  leading brands,  Cossack from  the D.C.L. and Vladivar from  the distilling 
subsidiary of brewers Greenall Whitley, respectively, were both introduced in  1961.  It  is  for this reason 
that vodka  is  generally considered to appeal to a  younger-aged market than either Scotch or gin, a  factor 
which has given rise to its rapid growth in  consumption.  With the exception of a  small  volume of Russian 
and  Polish vodkas,  the U.K. market  is  relatively free from  competitive imports. 
4.102:  The brewers have significant interests in  U.K. vodka production, a  point 
noted by the 1969 Monopolies Commission report.*  At this time the Commission's report stated that the 
Smirnoff brand marketed by  I.D.V., a  subsidiary of Grand Metropolitan since 1972,  a~counted for about 
50 per cent  of the U.K. vodka market,  Cossack the D.C.L. brand claimed 16 per cent  ,  and the 
remaining one-third was in  hands of two brewers• brands,  Romanoff and Charrington
1s  Imperial.  This 
report also indicated that 
11Romanoff,  the consortium vodka, was until September 1965 a  house brand of 
Allied Breweries; at that time Allied put the brand at the disposal of the Brewers•  Society which arranged 
a  consortium company in  which some 25 brewery companies are now shareholders. 
11*  It  is  understood that 
towards the end of 1976 the Romanoff brand has,  in  the main,  been owned by Allied Breweries and 
Whitbread & Co., and marketed by their wine and spirit subsidiaries, Grants of St.  James's and Stowells 
of Chelsea, respectively. 
4.103:  The factors which have affected the development of market shares in 
vodka  have not been unlike those operating in  the Scotch and gin markets.  New brands of vodka have 
emerged, which  in  not being able to gain access to brewers• tied estates have been sold through the off-
licensed sector at prices highly competitive with the leading brands.  Examples of such new  vodka 
brands are Borzoi from  James Burrough  (the Beefeater gin distiller) and Orloff from  Seagram.  Sub-norm 
vodkas in  smaller bottles and retailers own-labels have also been a  feature of this market during recent 
years. 
4.104:  The development of the Vladivar brand has been particularly successful 
in  challenging the market leadership of Smirnoffand Cossack.  Launched  in  1961, Vladivar
1s first  10 
years were confined to distribution through the tied estate of its parent company,  brewers Greenall Whitley 
based in  the north west of England.  This was followed by a  period of selling-in to the free trade at 
*  The  Monopolies Commission  (1969) op. cit. para. 68. 
161 competitive prices as well as establishing a  reciprocal deal with Bass  Cherrington to distribute VAT  69 
Scotch whisky in  Greenall pubs, and thereby giving Vladivar on-sales in  Bass  pubs.  Behind these 
activities was placed an original and humorous cinema advertising campaign with the result that Vladivar's 
market share had risen from  a  negligible proportion in  1968 to around  16 per cent  in  1975 and a  company 
cIa  i  med  *  20 per cent  for  1977. 
4.105:  Distribution through the pubs of the U. K's  largest brewer no doubt 
contributed to Vlad ivar's success and increasing acceptability in  the free-trade.  The same may  prove true 
for  Romanoff,  which upon adding the expertise of Whitbread to that of Allied towards the end of 1976, 
immediately gave Romanoff acess to 1,900 managed Whitbread pubs,  with the brand no doubt being whole-
saled by both Allied and Whitbread in  the free-trade.  The  Financial Time/ noted that the appearance of 
Romanoff as the house-brand of vodka  in  Whitbread pubs was achieved at the expense of D.C. L's  Cossack. 
This  is another example of a  non-brewer's brand being de-listed and was obviously not healthy for Cossack's 
market share at the time. 
4.106:  More reeently,  Northern Foods was unsuccessful  in  its bid to acquire the 
share capital of Nottingham brewer James Sh_ipstone  & Sons.  However,  Greenall Whitley made an offer 
for this same brewer which was acceptable to the Shipstone board and Greenall's acquired Shipstone during 
June 1978.  This merger was cleared by the Secretary of State for  Prices and Consumer  Protection, who 
decided not to refer the proposed merger to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission./  It  is  intended that 
the merged company will retain the separate trading names and identities of the original companies for  they 
operate in  trading areas which do not overlap: Greenall's is  based  in  the north west of England whilst 
Shipstone serves the East  Midlands.  Nevertheless,  it is  not unreasonable to entertain the thought that 
Greenall's Vladivar vodka could become the house-brand in  Shipstone pubs, and that with 25  per cent  of 
Greenall's sales currently in  the free-trade,  Shipstone's 10 per cent  free-trade sales could boost Vladivar's 
market penetration. 
4.107:  The data in  Table 4.29 has been assembled from  a  variety of sources so 
that the relative positions of the main brands may be considered.  f:rom  Table 4.29 it has been possible to 
draw up concentration ratios for the top-2 and top-3 firms  in  the vodka market at various years between 
1968 and 1977, and this is  presented at Table 4.30.  This table must  be considered with extreme caution: 
it has been prepared using data from  a  number of sources each of which must  inevitably be subject to 
sampling errors, and for this latter reason no significance should be attached to the 1 per cent  increase 
between 1975 and 1977  in  the share of the vodka market held by the three main firms. 
*  The  Grocer  March 25th 1978. p.48. 
+  The  Financial Times  October 2nd  1976.  Report on Wines & Spirits. 
f  Trade and  Industry  June 23rd  1978.  p. 656.  HMSO. 
162 TABLE 4.29 
Market Shares in  U.K. Vodka  Market 
Brand 
Smirnoff 
Cossack 
Vladivar 
Romanoff 
Borzoi 
Orloff 
SOURCES: 
TABLE 4.30 
Market Share per cent 
Company  1977  1975  1970  1968 
I.D.V./Grand Met.  45  50  55  50 
D.C. L.  c.25  23  20  16 
Greenall Whitley  20  16 
* 
James Burrough 
Seagram  •  0  • 
1968  The Monopolies Com.mission  (1969)op.cit.para 68 
1970 
1975 
1977 
* 
The Grocer  March 25th 1978. p. 48. 
The Financial Times  various special reports on spirits 
The Grocer  op. cit. except for  Cossack's 25  per cent. given in  Official 
Journal of the European Communities op. cit. p. 17. 
A brewers  consortium company,  the main owners of which are Allied 
Breweries and Whitbread & Co. 
Estimates of Market Shares held by  Top-2 and Top-3 firms  in  U.K. Vodka Market. 
Top-2 
1968  66 
1970  75 
1975  73 
1977  70 
per cent 
Top-3 
89 
90 
163 4.108:  Over the period 1968-1977 Smirnoff vodka has clearly held onto the 
position of being the No.  brand, pursued at a  fair distance by Cossack.  It  is  quite likely, however, 
that since 1970 Vladivar and more recently sub-norms,  new  brands, and own-labels have restrained or even 
taken market share from  the two leading brands.  In  terms of market concentration,  the top-2 firms  have 
seen their combined market shares rise from  ar·:>und  66 per cent  in  1968, to 75 per cent  in  1970, but 
falling back to 73 per cent  and 70 per cent  in  1975 and 1977, respectively.  With the continuing 
competition from  Vladivar, brewers' brands such as Romanoff and new and sub-norm products the vodka 
market two-firm concentration ratio could in  a  few  years time return to the 66 per cent  it was  in  1968. 
164 -------------------------------------~--
Brandy 
4.109:  The best measure of brandy consumed  in  the U.K.  is  that given by the 
volume of the spirit imported into the country and which is available in  the Customs and Excise reports. 
This data has been set out for  the period between 1969 and  1976 in  Table 4.31  which shows that whilst 
imports of brandy peaked in  1974 at 2.8m. proof galls.  1  brandy's share of all spirits consumed  in  the U.K. 
peaked a  year earlier at 9.4 per cent.  Indeed,  brandy's total spirits market share has steadily declined 
since 1973 to stand at 7.5 per cent  in  1976,  which  is  less than it was able to claim in  1969 and almost 
the same as in  1970. 
4.110:  There are two distinct segments to the brandy market; namely, the fine 
brandies from  the Cognac region of France and what are known as grape brandies originating from  other 
parts of France, as well as Spain,  Italy and Germany.  In  fact,  it may  be as well to refer to the latter as 
non-cognac brandy for  it is  perfectly possible to distill brandy from  agricultrual produce other than grapes, 
f.:>r  example, from  maize.  The limited data presented in  the middle section of Table 4.31  shows that 
whilst the volume of cognac consumption has decreased between 1973 and  1976 exactly the reverse has 
occurred for non-cognac brandies. 
4. 111:  There are few products which do not suffer an adverse effect upon demand, 
at least in  the short-term,  in  the face of price rises.  Brandy  is  no  exception to this rule with price 
increases being fuelled particularly by the fall  in  the value of the£ sterling in  relation to the French franc 
and by Duty charges in  general.  It  is  instructive to cite the case of Martell the U.K. brand leader in  this 
market,  for  it raised  its prices eleven times between February 1973 and June 1977 solely because of 
increased Duty and the declining value of the pound, whilst its first producer price rise for four years came 
in  February 1977. *  It  should be be borne in  mind that the Revenue Duty levied on  brandy is  not 
discriminatory with respect to other domestically produced spirits so that the widening retail price gap 
between, for example, Scotch whisky and brandy may be almost wholly attributable to the declining 
sterling exchange rate.  The Grocer** states that five years ago this differential stood at around £1  per 
bottle whereas our own  researches in supermarkets today places 3-star cognac at around £2 per bottle more 
than the most  popular brands of Scotch.  When it comes to the 5-star V. S .0.  P.  brandies, the up-market 
cognacs, then the difference is getting towards £4 per bottle more than the brand-leading whiskies. 
*  The Financial Times.  June 28th 1977. Survey on  Beer,  Wines and Spirits. 
'**  TheGrocer  August 20th.  1977 P.48. 
165 4.112:  The possibility that price rises  have caused brandy drinkers to change to 
other spirits drinks should not be ignored but the brandy trade has not sat idly by doing nothing about the 
downturn  in  demand that has befallen it.  It  has reacted in a  manner not uncharacteristic of other sectors 
of a  price sensitive alcoholic drinks industry,  by  introducing new and sub-norm products.  The growth in 
consumption of non-cognacs is  perhaps best viewed in  this way - a gap in  the market being filled by  th~ 
offer of a product of the same alcoholic strength as cognac (70° Proof spirit), with a similar but  less 
distinctive taste at a  retail price directly competitive with Scotch.  Non-cognacs are represented in  the 
U.K. market today by brands such as Three Barrels, White Swan,  Bardinet, and Ansbach.  Sub-norm 
brands can be retailed at less than standard brandy prices because their lower alcoholic strength attracts a 
lower rate of Duty.  One such sub-norm brandy introducted to the U.K. market in April  1977  is  that of 
Emile Marcel, distributed by  Italian wineshipper G. Belloni and Sons,  which is available in  standard 
bottles of 24 fl. ozs., but of  only 52.5° Proof spirit.  At that time its V .A.  T. and Duty  inclusive price 
worked out at around £3.53 per bottle, wholesale (and  before any discounts) leaving a  fair amount of 
margin for  it to be competitively priced against other spirits.  However,  non-cognacs of 70° Proof will 
attract the same duty element as brandies of 70° Proof,  so  that the former are likely to be relatively less 
profitable than the fine cognac. 
4.113:  The brand-leaders in  the cognac market, Martell and  its closest rivals 
Courvoisier and Hennessey,  have recently introduced their quality products in  half-litre bottles.  It  is 
debatable whether these are considered new or sub-norm products (recognising that there is  no difference 
in  quality compared to the contents of the standard bottle size) but the position that they take up  in  the 
market at the moment on price alone puts them at about £1.25 to £1.80 per bottle less than their 
comparable standard bottle prices, and only about 30p. to 50p. more than the brand-leading whiskies. 
The extent to which smaller bottle sizes and sub-norm brands are likely to attain a  permanent place in  the 
market may  be dependent upon  the timing of any recovery in  consumers' spending power.  It does not 
appear too unreasonable to postulate that should this spending power increase significantly in  the near 
future thenthese 'new' products may  w~ll disappear from  the market as rapidly as they arrived. 
4.114:  Finally on this point, a  new brandy in  the cognac class has received 
additional promotion  in  the U.K. market during the past two years;  marketed under the appellation 
Armagnac,  it fits  into the brandy price structure to bridge the gap between the cognac and non-cognac 
brandies.  The two most  common  brands of Armagnac availaule in  the U.K. at the moment are Janneau 
distributed by  Matthew Clark & Sons and Marquis de Caussade distributed by the Cadbury Schweppes 
subsidiary,  Courtenay Wines. 
4.115:  At present the total  U.K. brandy market,  in  terms of volume consumed, 
would appear from  Table 4.31  to be split two-thirds in  favour of cognacs and one-third to non-cognacs. 
The distribution of the brandies from  these two segments is, however,  quite different: some 60 per cent  of 
cognac sales are reckoned to be across the bar through on-licensed premises whilst the bulk of non-cognac 
166 sales are made through off-licences.  Within the cognac sector itself there are two clear sub-divisions; 
namely,  3-Star cognacs and the finer,  more mature 5-Star V. S .0.  P.  brands, with 90 per cent  of total 
cognac sales being in  the former category.  At the moment sales of cognacs through specialist off-licences 
QS  Opposed  tO  grocery StoreS are probably in the ratiO Of 2:11  SO  there WOUld  Seem  tO  be SOme  potential for 
additional sales through the grocery sector. 
4.116:  From  the brand share data that is available it  is  quite clear that lv\artell 
is, and has been for a  number of years, the U.K. market leader in  cognac.  The primacy of this position 
is  being fiercely challenged by Courvoisier which may well  have doubled its market share since 1969. 
Indeed,  in  endeavouring to establish the growing strength of the Courvoisier brand a  letter to the Financial 
Times from  the lv\anaging  Director of Courvoisier's U.K. agents quoted market research data for December 
1976 which credited lv\artell as being available in  61  per cent  of all outlets, Courvoisier in 50 per cent, 
Remy  lv\artin  in  26 per cent  ,  and Hennessey in  19  per cent.  Amongst on-I  icensed premises,  however, 
Courvoisier was available in 56 per cent  ,  Martell  in 53 per cent  and Hennessey in  18 per cent.* 
4.117:  Estimates of the retail value of the U.K. brandy market have been made by 
the E.I.U.** which give values of£90m.  in  1973, £100m.  in  1974and £130m.  in  1975.  This same source 
has been used  to compile the brand share data for  1969 given in  Table 4.32, which clearly shows Martell  in 
the lead with a 50 per cent  market share and its nearest rival,  Courvoisier, with an 18 per cent  share. 
The data in  T~ble 4.32  for  1974;75 has been compiled from  various sources (indicated in  the footnote to the 
Table) and is  intended to describe the relative positions in  the market at that time.  Since 1969 it would 
seem that Courvoisier have been particularly ',uccessful  in  developing their role in  the market although 
Martell has maintained its  leading rank with around 40 per cent  against Courvoisier
1s 30-35 per cent. 
4. 118:  The distribution of brandy in  the U.K.  is  undertaken by agents and these, 
together with their parent companies are listed in  Table 4. 33  •  No precise market share data is available 
for the non-cognac sector of the brandy market but the Three Barrels brand would seem to be the 
acknowledged leader.  The  U.K. agent for this brand  is also the agent for Courvoisier and is  J.R.  Phillips 
and Co.  Ltd.  - jointly owned  by Allied Breweries,  and Whitbread & Co.  Hennessey cognac is  handled by 
the Grand Metropolitan subsidiary Gilbey whilst the Bass  Charrington subsidiary Hedges and  Butler deals 
in  the Remy  Martin cognac brand.  The Distillers Co.  Ltd.  acquired a  majority interest in  Thos.  Hine & Co. 
of France in  1971  and assumed  responsibility for the distribution of Hine cognac in  the U.K.  J.R. 
Parkington & Co.  Ltd.  as a  division of Pernod  International represents Bisquit cognac and Salignac (U.K.) 
Ltd.  handle the cognac of the same name.  Until  May  1976 Salignac cognac was dealt with by  Bass 
Cherrington but when Remy  Martin introduced a  3-Star cognac at that date Bass  relinquished the Salignac 
*  Letter to The Financial Times,  from  the Managing Director of J.R.  Phillips & Co.  Ltd.  July 7th.  1977. 
**  E.I.U. estimates in  I.P.C. Marketing lv\anual of the U.K.  1976. 
167 TABLE 4.31 
Volume of Brandy  Imports and Share of U.K. Spirits Consumption,  1969-76 
Year  Volume  in  Cognac  Non-Cognac  Brandy's Share of  U.K. 
m  •  Proof ga II s •  only  (by difference)  Spirits Consumption (%) 
m.  Proof galls 
1969  1.4  8. 1 
70  1.3  7.4 
71  L7  8.6 
72  1.9  1.6  0.3  8.8, 
73  2.3  2. 1  0.2  9.4 
74  2.8  2.1  0.7  8.8 
75  2.5  1.6  0.9  7.7 
76  2.4  1.6  0.8  7.5 
SOURCE:  Customs and  Excise. 
TABLE 4.32 
Brand  Shares in  U.K.  Brandy Market 
Brand 
Martell 
Courvoisier 
Hennessey 
Remy  Martin 
Hine 
Bisquit 
SOURCE: 
per cent 
1969  1974/75 
50  40/43 
18  30/35 
10  14 
5  5-10 
5 
5 
1969 - E  .I  •. U. 
1974/75 - various,  but mainly Financial Times  reports on  Beers,  Wines 
and Spirits,  1976,  1977. 
168 agency and a  new and separate company was formed  to represent the brand.  Unlike the brands mentioned 
so  far,  the brand  leader Martell  is  handled  in  the U.K. by an independent company Matthew Clark & Sons 
-and according to The  Financial Times this arrangement has existed since 1883. * 
4.119:  On the basis of the brand share data in  Table 4.32 the two main brands 
t-ltartell and Courvoisier together accounted for  68 per cent  of the brandy market in  1969.  Adding 
Hennessey as the third main  brand produces a  3-brand concentration ratio of 78 per cent  at that date. 
Taking the lower of the two estimates for  1974;75 gives the top two brands 70 per cent  of the market and 
the top three 84 per cent.  There must  be some doubt attached to the significance of the plus two 
percentage points in  two-brand ratio between 1969 and 1974;75, but what is  clear in  relation to the top 
two or top three brands,  bearing in  mind  rank order has not changed, are the gains made in  market share 
by the second and third  ra~king bronds at the expense of the most popular brand.  This would seem to be 
the relative position and it would be unwise to be more definitive about changes in  market concentration 
more particularly as the data makes no allowance for  the non-cognac brandies.  Indeed,  it is a debatable 
point as to whether or not cognacs and non-cognacs should be considered as one or two separate markets. 
*  The  Financial Times  December 21st.  1977. 
169 TABLE 4.33 
Brandy:  U.K. Agents and their Parent Companies 
Brand 
Cognacs 
Martell 
Courvoisier 
Hennessey 
Hine 
Remy  Martin 
Bisquit 
Salignac 
Non-cognacs 
Three Barrels 
White Swan 
Bardinet 
Stock 
Fundador 
Ansbach 
Armagnac 
Janneau 
U.K. Agent 
(Distributor) 
Matthew Clark & Sons  Ltd • 
J • R  •  Phi II ips & Co •  Ltd • 
G i I  bey  /I.  D • V. 
Cognac Hine SA 
Hedges & Butler  Ltd. 
*J.R.  Parkington & Co.  Ltd. 
** 
J.R.  Phillips & Co.  Ltd. 
Calvert Wine & Spirit Co.  Ltd. 
James Burrough  Ltd, 
Matthew Clark & Sons  Ltd. 
Parent Company 
Matthew Clark & Sons (Holdings) 
Ltd. 
Allied & Whitbread 
Grand Metropolitan  Ltd. 
The Distillers Co.  Ltd. 
Bass  Charrington  Ltd. 
Pernod  lnternat  iona I 
Salignac (U.K.) Ltd. 
Allied & Whitbread 
Seagram Distillers Ltd. 
(Italy) 
(Spain) 
(Germany) 
Matthew Clark & Sons (Holdings) 
Ltd. 
Marquis de Caussade  Courtenay Wines  Cad  bury Schweppes Ltd. 
* 
** 
J.R.  Parkington became a  subsidiary of Pernod  International on 
April  lst 1977. 
It  is believed that Food  Brokers  Ltd.  distribute to the grocery trade, 
and George Ballantine & Son  Ltd.  (Scotch distilling subsidiary of 
Hiram Walker & Sons  (Scotland) Ltd.) distribute the brand  in  Scotland. 
It  is further believed that Salignac (UK)Ltd.  is a  subsidiary of 
Hiram Walker & Sons. 
170 Rum 
4.120  In  terms of volume consumed rum  rates as the most  important imported 
spirit and the third most  popular of all spirits after whisky and gin, although as Table 4.20 has shown 
volume has steadily declined from a  peak of 3.6m.  Proof gallons in  1974 to 3.2m.  Proof gallons in  1977. 
Similarly, rum's share of the total  U.K. spirits• market has declined from  11.2 per cent in  1974 to 9.2 per 
cent in  1977 (fable 4.21) placing it in  fourth place, having been usurped by vodka  in third place. 
4.121  The most  recent estimates of the retail sales value of the rum  market 
indicates it to be around the £120-130m.  mark, with 65 per cent of these sales passing through the  on-
licensed trade.  The total rum  market breaks down  into two distinct segments;  dark rum and white rum. 
The former  is a  long established market in  the U.K., whilst the latter is  much more recent, responding  like 
vodka to the growing  interest in  white spirits.  The dark rum  market itself is comprised of two types; 
namely the traditional Jamaica rums and the Demerara blends imported from  Guyana to which consumption 
has  increasingly switched over the past years.  Supplies of white rum  originate from  Cuba, Mexico,  Brazil 
and  Puerto Rico. 
4.122  The brewers • interests 'in the dark rum  market are confined to their 
house brands rather than to any direct interest in  leading brands.  However,  the Monopolies Commission 
report of 1969*  noted that brewery owned groups probably supplied around 50 per cent of the U.K. market, 
whilst the Economist  Intelligence Unit reporting in  1.965  **  indicated the two leading non-brewer owned 
groups to hold around 60 per cent of the market between them with their brands of Jamaican and Demerara 
rums.  It  may  be inappropriate to compare these two figures because of uncertainty as to how  the white 
rum  market has been treated. 
4.123  Unfortunately, there is  little more recent information available with 
which to update the relative shares of this market held by brewery and non-brewery groups,  afthough the 
genera  I impression seems to be that, independent rum  rnakers  are most  important in  the dark rum  market 
whilst brewers•  brands are strongest in the white rum  marke.t.  Next to brewers' house-brands the two most 
important companies supplying the dark rum  market are United  Rum  Merchants Ltd.  (believed to be jointly 
owned by Booker McConnell  Ltd.  and Hiram Walker (Scotland) Ltd,)and Seagram Distillers Ltd.  U.R.M. •s 
main brands of dark rum are Lamb's  Navy  Rum  ,  Lemon  Heart  and Black  Heart.  Seagram's main brand 
is Captain Morgan  and with  13 per cent of the market is  reckoned to be only marginally behind  Lamb's 
Navy, the market leader.  The white rum  market is dominated by brewers• brands_ which receive national 
distribution.  Bass Charrington are sole U.K. distributors for the Bacardi brand, the market leader which 
·*The Monopolies Commission  (1969)op. cit. para. 67 
**  E.I.U. Retail  Business  No. 92 October 1965,  p.28 
171 which has held on to an 80 per cent share of this market for a  number of years.  The number two brand in 
white rum  is Courage's Dry  Cane with a  15  per cent share.  Seagram also produce a  white rum,  Tropicana 
as do U.R.M. with .Santigo. 
172 Wine 
4.124  For purposes of levying duties on wines,  H.M. Customs and Excise 
classify the wine market into two sectors;  namely light and heavy wines, the difference being determined 
according to alcoholic strength.  The market is  provided for mainly by  imports but in addition domestically 
produced British Wines attract different rates of excise duty with the distinction between light and heavy 
varieties being maintained.  light wines, of lower alcoholic strength than heavy wines, are mainly still 
and sparkling table wines, whereas heavy wines are represented by sherry,  (mainly from  Spain but also 
from  South Africa and Cyprus) port and vermouths.  British wines are of the sherry and port type, dessert 
and tonic wines and include cider and perry. 
4. 125  The growth in consumption of the different types of wines has already 
been mentioned at paragraph 4.14 and in  Table 4.8, whilst the shares of the wine market held by the 
different types of wine is  set out here in  Table 4.34.  Still and sparkling table wines can be seen to 
account for the largest share of the market, a  share  which has risen from  just under 32 per cent in  1971 
to 41  per cent in  1977.  Port,  sherry,  Commonwealth and British wines each represent smaller shares 
of the market in  1977 than they did in  1971.  Vermouth,  on the other hand,  has behaved contrary to this 
trend,  its market share having risen steadily from  8.3 per cent in  1971  to 14.4 per cent in  1977.  Just 
how  appropriate it  is  to consider these products  as one wine market is  debatable, for sherry and vermouths 
are often drunk as pre-dinner drinks,  table wine with a  meal and port after a  meal. 
4. 126  Estimates of the size of the table wine market in  terms of volume consumed 
are given in  Table 4.35.  The bulk of this market between 1970 and  1975 has been supplied by wines from 
E.E.C. countries and the total market has doubled  in  size from  17 to 34m. galls. over this period. 
Spark I  ing  table wines  (champagne and non-champagne varieties) have suffered a !educed share of the 
total table wines market,  their share standing at just under 8 per cent in  1975 compared with  11  per cent in 
1970.  In  terms of value at retail selling prices,  E .I. U. * has estimated the table wines market to have 
grown by £100m.  between 1973 and  1975, to stand at £400m.  in  1975.  The bulk of U.K. wine imports 
have traditionally been provided by France,  Italy, Germany and Spain though in  recent years Moroccan, 
Hungarian and Argentinian wines have been delivered to the U.K. market.  In  terms of colour and style 
white, red and rose varieties are available, of which white probably accounts for around half of the U.K. 
market, red about 40 per cent, and rose 10 per cent.  Most wines in the U.K. are retailed through the 
off-licensed trade, possibly as much  as 70-75 per cent.  Within this sector  Nielsen data given in Table 
4.36 shows the grocery trade to have accounted for roughly 31  per  cent of wine sales  in  the year to 
October/November 1976,  leaving the balance of 69 per cent in the hands of specialist retailers. 
*  E.I.U. Retail  Business  No  .•  225,  Nov.  1976. 
173 TABLE 4.34 
Shares in  U.K. Wine Market,  1971-77 {years ending 31st March) 
per  cent 
Wine Type  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
Still Table Wine  27.7  30.1  30.6  33.0  32.5  36.6  37.5 
Sparkling Table Wine  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.1  3.3  3.6  3.6 
Port  2.9  2.7  2.8  2.6  2.0  2.1  2.0 
Sherry  16.5  16.4  15.3  13.5  11.3  11.9  14.0 
Vermouth  8.3  8.5  9.0  10.6  12.8  14.2  14.4 
Commonwealth Wines  13.0  11.9  11.9  9.3  10.2  9.5  8.0 
British Wines  22.7  20.9  19.4  18.7  21.2  15.5  14.8 
Other Wines  4.8  5.3  6.7  8.2  6.7  6.6  5.7 
Base for  Percentages  48.4  55.4  64.8  83.5  79.4  74.8  83.7 
{m.  gallons) 
SOURCE:  derived from  Customs and  Excise. 
174 TABLE  4.35 
Estimates of U.K. Table Wine Consumption,  1970-75 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974 
light Still Wine 
E.E.C.  9.5  10.8  14.4  20.4  20.7 
3rd Countries  5.9  8.3  8.6  11.3  11.7 
15.4  19. 1  23.0  31.7  32.4 
Sparkling Wine  1.9  2.2  2.7  3.3  2.8 
(of which Chanpagne)  ( 1.0)  (1 • 1)  (1. 3)  {1. 3)  (0.7) 
17.3  21.3  25.7  35.0  35.2 
SOURCE:  E  • I. U.  Reta i I Business  No • 225,  Nov.  1976,  based on  H.M. Customs  & Excise. 
TABLE 4.36 
Shares in  Off-licensed Wine Market,  1976* 
Grocers/Supermarkets 
Co-ops. 
Multiples 
Independents 
Spec ia I  ist  Off-I  i  cences 
*  12 months ended Oct./Nov. 1976. 
% 
2.7 
20.9 
7.1 
30.7 
69.3 
100.0 
SOURCE:  Nielsen  liquor  Index,  published  inThe Grocer,  April  16th,  1977, p. 68 
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m.  galls. 
1975 
21.7 
10.2 
31.9 
2.7 
(0.7) 
34.6 4.127  Up  to the last war the consumption of wine in  the U.K. could generally 
hove been regarded as the preserve of the wealthier classes.  Even  into the 1960
1s many consumers 
probably regarded wine as something to be drunk only on special occasions such as at wedding receptions 
and at Christmas.  However  1  the increase in  foreign travel and holidays, the rise in  meals eaten outside 
the home and the appearance of wine in  grocery stores, particularly self-service,  have all served to 
increase the U.K. consumers•  exposure to Continental wine drinking habits and to erode previously 
conceived attitudes to wine drinking.  Nevertheless, with U.K. wine consumption at around  10  bottles 
per head per annum there is a  long  way to go to reach the French and  Ita I  ian  levels of around  150 bottles 
per head each year. 
4. 128  Wine consumption has increased  in  popularity and as such the structure 
of the market has changed from  what it was even 10 or 15  years ago.  At that time perhaps around 50 per 
cent of the wine market was accounted for by fine wines,  that is  in  the main vintage wines matured over 
a  number of years in  cask or bottle and originating from  areas delimited by government legislation.  Today 
fine wines probably represent about 15  per cent of the market in  volume terms.  Non-vintage wines 
from  controlled areas, such as the •Appellation d
1origine control(e•  (AC) wines ,of France, also reach 
the U.K. market and their share of the market could be around 25 per cent.  These wines are often 
marketed under Continental brandnames  or under the name of the vineyard in  the controHed areas from 
which they come, and receive U.K. distribution from  the largest brewery c,ompanies down  to the smallest 
independent wine shippers and merchants, whose name usually appears on  the label.  This  leaves the 
greater part of the market, 60 per cent by volume,  to branded table wines in  which brewers• brands play 
a  significant role, but alongside which exist the brands of independent merchants and the private labels 
promoted by grocery retailers.  Much of this wine, as sold at retail,  is  blended wine from  different 
areas of one country, or even blends of wine from  different countries.  This segmentation of the market 
is  reflected in  the price structure with the branded table wines exhibiting the cheaper prices and the 
fine wines the most  expensive. 
4.129  Whilst the fine wines represent a  very specialised market it  is  particularly 
to the branded sector that the majority of consumers look for  their purchases.  The proliferation of brands 
in  this sector has  led  to a  high degree of fragmentation,  to the extent that few  brands are able to claim more 
than 8 per cent each of the table wine market.  The data set out in  Table 4.37 although relating to 
1973;74 makes the point:  some 78 per cent of white table wine was provided for  by other than the most 
popular brands of white wine.  The comparable statistic  in  red wines was 85  per cent,  in  sparkling wines, 
49 per cent and in  rose wine, 47 per cent. 
4.130  Set  againt the brand names in  Table 4. 37 are the names of the companies 
owning the brands concerned, which in  most  cases are one or other of the U.K. •s  major brewing companies. 
It  has been estimated that more than 50 percent of the wine entering the U.K.  is  imported by 5  large 
176 TABLE  4.37 
Brand  Shares in  U.K. Table Wines Market (1973-74) 
White Wine  (per cent)  Rose  (per cent) 
Don Cortez  4  Allied  Mateus  32  Bass 
Charles Kinloch  3  Courage  Hirondelle  8  Bass 
Blue  Nun  3  H.  Sichel  Charbonn ier  3  R & C Vintners 
Lutomer Reisling  4  Teltscher Bros.  Nicolas  3  Allied 
Hirondelle  2  Bass  Justina  2  Grand Met. 
Corrida  2  Whitbread  Corrida  2  Whitbread 
La  Vista  2  Courage  Don Cortez  2  Allied 
Nicolas  Allied  La  Vista  Courage 
Justina  Grand Met.  Others  47 
Others  78 
SEarkling White  (per cent)  Red  (per cent) 
(non  Champagne) 
Veuve de Vernay  28  R & C Vintners  Hirondelle  7  Bass 
Gancia Spumante  18  Nicolas  3  Allied 
Bosco  5  Don Cortez  3  Allied 
Others  49  La  Vista  2  Courage 
Others  85 
SOURCE:  Mintel Aug.  197 4 based on  manufacturers research. 
177 groups of brewers.  However,  there are some  brands of wine that are independent of brewery ownership and 
are distributed in  the U.K.  by the independent brand owne-sand sole agents.  These are often popular 
wines, and are purchased by the brewers for sale in  their licensed premises so  that it has been further 
estimated that the largest brewers could account for 75 per cent of the retail market in table wines. 
4.131  Some of these non-brewery owned brands are mentioned in Table 4.37· 
Blue  Nun, for example,  is  perhaps the leading brand  in  the U.K. market for German wines, and is 
imported to the U.K. by H.  Sichel & Son.  For Yugoslavian wines,  the U.K.  brand  leader is  probably 
Lutomer Riesling  imported and distributed by T  eltscher Bros.  The best selling non-champagne spark I  ing 
white wine is  Veuve de VernaM  the sole distributors in  the U.K. for this brand beirg R & C Vintners- the 
wine and spirit merchanting division of food,  household products and toileteries manufacturer Reckitt & 
Colman.  R & C. Vintners are also responsible for Charbonnier  branded wine,  Moussec sparkling wine 
and Bull's Blood  Hungarian red wine.  In  the Champagne market, the leaders with around one-third of 
this market are Moet and Clandon. 
4.132  Most wine merchants whether allied to brewers or independent are,with 
few exceptions, engaged in the import o/ bottle or bulk of numerous wines from  different countries, although 
there may be an element of specialisation by some. This has led many merchants, particularly the brewery-
owned ones to develop their own brands of national wines.  Allied  Brewerie~, for example,  introduced 
Don Cortez  in  1968 as its brand of spanish wine,  NicolasJor French wines, Goldener Oktober in German 
wines and Sansovino in  Italian wines.  Whitbread have Corrida as their brand of Spanish wine  - for which 
the company claims 
11rather less than 20 per cent of the total  U.K.  market for Spanish wines
11
- and 
Langenbach  (from  the German company of the same name in which they have a  90 per cent stake) in 
German wines.  When Bass  Cherrington introduced Hirondelle as possibly the first branded table wine it 
was promoted  simplyas a  table wine rather than as the wine of a  particular nation.  Originally, the 
contents of a  Hirondelle bottle came from  Morocco,  then later Austria and Bulgaria whilst more recently 
becoming based on  Italian red, white and rose wines.  Bass  Hirondelle has probably become the leading 
branded wine alorg with Mateus Rosewhich the company distributes and which has around 30 per cent 
of the rose wine market. 
4.133  The branding of national wines has no doubt helped to expand the total 
market but the comparative success of these wines is  likely to be dependent upon a  price structure which 
reflects the relative producer costs and movements in  the' sterling exchange rate.  It  has been the relative 
strength of sterling against the  Italian lira which has contributed to the volume growth of Italian wines in 
the U.K.  market.  Table wines in the U.K. also attract the burderi of Customs & Excise duties,  increases 
of which often result in a  dampening of consumer demand as measured by clearances from  bonded ware-
houses.  Price, rises which have resulted from  increases in  Excise duty often lead to consumers' trading down 
to cheaper wines and the trade has tended to be responsive to their demands.  The contents of a  standard 
wine bottle varies between 68 and 75 cis. and in endeavouring to offer value for  money at the cheaper 
178 end of the market distributors have introduced 1 and 2  litre bottles.  However,  recent duty increases 
have tended to make the 2litre bottles too expensive so that H litre bottles have recently appeared. 
4.134  The  Excise duty imposed  by the U.K.  upon  imported wines is 
considered by the EEC  to be excessive, to the extent that these duties discriminate against wine but 
in the favour of domestically produced alcoholic beverages such as beer.  As such the EEC  would 
like to see wine duties reduced.  Wine traders in the U.K. would most  likely endorse the view that 
a  significant reduction in  the duties on wine would provide them with a  potentially large increase 
in  the market. 
Fortified Wines 
4.135  Fortified wines are wines woose alcoholic content has been strengthened 
by the addition of spirits.  Sherry,  por~ vermouth and the British  and Commonwealth styles of port and 
sherry, and dessert and tonic wines are such beverages.  The value of the retail market in  Fortified Wines 
has been shown by E. I. U.  data to have been around £400m  in  1975*  and the shares of this market held by 
the different varieties are given in Table 4.38. 
4.136  Brewers'  interests in the fortified wine trade are well developed through 
most  stages of the distribution channels; that is,  for example,  from  the ownership of vineyards in  the 
Sherry producing regions of Spain, to the importation, bottling, branding and distribution through their 
own and free-trade outlets.  In  the British Wines market,  for  instance,  it has been estimated that Allied 
Breweries through its subsidiary Vine Products ltd., probably holds around three-quarters of the market. 
On the other hand,  in  the  market for vermouth the brewers' role is  relatively less well advanced although 
some are taking up  U.K. agencies for the U.K. distribution of second-line European brands. 
4.137  The styles of Spanish sherry available on the  U.K.  market are of the 
sweet,  medium and dry varieties and over recent years there has been a  noticeable shift in  consumer 
preferences towards the medium and dry types at the expense of the sweet ones.  Numerous distributors' 
brands and retailers' own-labels make up this market in  which the sherry products of two companies are 
estimated to have equal  leading shares.  These two firms are Harveys, a  subsidiary of Allied Breweries, 
with such brands as Bristol  Cream,  Bristol  Dry,  Club Amontillado, and the luis Gordon Group ltd -
controlled by a  Spanish company Pedro Domecq S .A. - with its Domecq and Double Century brands, 
giving each of them around 23 per cent of the market.  This data is given in Table 4. 39 which shows 
·in addition,  that the sherry brands of Gonzalez Byass  (especially the Tio  Pepe range)  claimed around 
* E  . I. U.  Reta i I Business  No.  224 0 ct .  197 6 
179 TABLE  4_.38 
Shares by Value and Volume in  U.K.  Fortified Wines Market,  1975 
Percentage of Retai I Market: 
by Value  by Volume 
Sherry  30  22 
Vermouth & Aperitifs  26  28 
British Fortified Wine  26  32 
Cyprus Sherry  9  12 
Port  6  3 
S. African & Australian 
Fortified wines  3  3 
SOURCE:  E.l. U.  Retail  Business  No. 224 Oct. 1976  (E.I. U & Trade Estimates) 
180 TABLE 4.39 
Brand  Shares in  U.K.  Sherry Market 1976 
Brand 
Domecq 
Harveys 
Gonzalez Byass 
Wi II iams  & Humbert 
Sandeman 
Own-Label 
Others 
per cent 
23 
23 
15 
5 
5 
19 
10 
SOURCE:  E. I. U.  Retail  Business  No. 224 Oct. 1976 
TABLE  4.40 
Brand Shares in  U.K.  Port  Market 1976 
Brand  Per  cent 
Cockburn  25 
Sandeman  25 
Croft/Gilby  20 
Ferreira  5 
Dow/Warre  5 
Others  20 
SOURCE:  E.I.U. Retail  Business  No. 224 Oct.  1976 
TABLE  4.41 
Brand  Shares in  U.K. Vermouth Market,  1976 
Brand 
Martini 
Cinzano 
Dubonnet 
Neilly Prot 
Own-label & Others 
Per  cent 
45-50 
30 
12 
2 
6-11 
SOURCE:  E.I.U. Retail  Business  No. 224 Oct. 1976 
181 15  per cent of the 1976  market,  those of Williams and Humbert  (mainly Dry  Sack)  - a  firm  controlled 
by the Spanish company  Union  Exportadores S .A. - had 5 per cent., and Sandeman  sherries for  which 
Bass  Charrington has the agency, also with 5 per cent.  Own-labels at this date were thought to 
account for  19 per cent of the U.K.  sherry market.  Allied Breweries and Bass Charrington also 
distribute their own brands of Cyprus sherry,  Mosaic  .from Allied and Emva  from  Bass,  with the 
latter thought to be the brand  leader. 
Port 
4.138  According to the dabin Table 4.40  joint leadership would seem 
to be as much a  feature of the  port market as it is  in  the sherry market.  In  the port market A II ied 
1s 
subsidiary Harveys with its Cockburn  brand had around one-quarter of the 1976 market as did 
Sandeman, the brand distributed by  Bass  Charrington.  Croft from  Grand Metropolitan•s wine and 
spirit distilling. subsidiary  I.D. V. claimed 20 per cent of the  U.K.  port market in  1976 with 
Whitbread•s Ferreira  brand at 5 per cent.  Other brands,  no doubt including some own-labels 
took one fifth  of this market. 
Vermouth 
4.139  Vermouth is a  blend of light and heavy wines often spiced with herbs 
and this  market  in  the U.K.  is  reckoned to be worth around £120m at retail selling prices, and split 
20 per cent on-trade and 80 per cent off-trade.  This drink has been  the fastest growing product type with-
in  the U.K. wine market.  A threefold increase in  consumption  (Table 4. 8) between 1971  and  1977 has 
seen this products• share of the U.K. wine market rise from  8.3 per cent in  1971  to 14.4 per cent in  1977. 
(Table 4.34).  The market is  provided for  by  French and Italian vermouths in a  variety of styles, that is 
Rosso  (sweet red),  Bianco (sweet white) and Secco (dry white), although the two main suppliers have 
recently introduced a  rose vermouth.  Bianco represents the largest share of the vermouth market whilst the 
drier types are the focus for growth. 
4.140  The  leading  U.K. brands are the Italian Vermouths from  Martini and 
Cinzano with the French Dubonnet and Neilly Prot  brands in  less prominence. The market shares attributable· 
to these four.  vermouths are given in Table 4.41 for 1976 in  wnich Martini  is  clearly the leader with a 
45-50 per cent share compared to Cinzano
1s  second place with 30 per cent,  (however,  this data does con-
\  ----
flict with that from  another source* which credits Martini  with 65 per cent and Cinzano with 21  per cent) 
Dubonnet with 12 per cent,  Neilly Pratwith 2 per cent and own-label and other brands with between  6 and 
11  per cent.  Martini and Cinzano are bottled and distributed in  the U.K. by the brand owning companies 
of the same names,  whilst Dubonnet is distributed by a  Schweppes subsidiary Courtenay Wines ltd., and 
*  The Financial Times  June 28th 1977 Supplement on  Beers,  Wines and Spirits. 
182 Neilly Prat  by  Matthew Clark & Sons  until  Neilly  was acquaired by  Martini  during the first  half of 1977. 
4.141  The  growth that the vermouth market has experienced, particularly 
since the early 1970s,  has  led to the development of new  products such as the dry and rose  varieties and the 
appearance of new  brands,  promoted  in  the main by brewers.  Riccadonna,  ltalis second best selling 
vermouth has since August  1975 been the  vermouth brand of brewers Courage  Ltd., though up  to this date 
it was handled in  the U.K. by a  Beecham subsidiary,  F.S. Matta.  St.  Raphael  is Whitbread's brand of 
French vermouth, and Allied Breweries has the ~otrix brand. 
4.142  The  vermouths referred to so  far are generally known as wine-based 
products but there are also spirit-based products considered as such because their alcoholic strength  is  that 
much greater than ordinary vermouths that they are taxed at a  higher rate.  The best known  product  in  this 
market  is  Campari, a  brand distributed  in  the U.K. by a  Beecham's subsidiary,  Findlctter Matta Agencies. 
Cider 
4.143  Cider is a  drink which is  consumed  in a  manner similar to that for  beer, 
that is, by pint and half-pint measures.  It  is available in  a  variety of styles: sweefand dry, sparkling and 
still, and present developments are in  producing a  cider which may  be consumed as a substitute for wine. 
Some 60 per cent of cider sales are made through the off-licensed trade and amongst this sector the grocers' 
share is around 45  per cent  with the larger portion handled by the specialist retailers.  The size of the 
cider market  is  small  however, when compared with beer: The  Monopolies Commission  noted when it 
reported in  1969 that "cider sales in  the U.K. run at the level of about ••• 2 per cent of beer sales."* This 
relative position  is  little changed today, with 1975's 40.5m: bulk barrels of cider production equivalent 
to 2~-3 per cent of that years' beer consu· nption. 
4. 144  In  their Report on  the Supply of Beer, The Monopolies Commission* 
noted that "about 60 per cent of the cider market is  now  supplied  (and  has been for the past few  years) by 
H.P. Bulmer  Ltd."  Allied Breweries acquisition of Showerings,  Vine  Products and Whiteways Ltd.  in  1968 
brought to the brewers the cider brands  of Whiteways,  Coatesand Gaymers- brands which  The  Monopolies 
Commission  in  1968 thought to hold around 20 per cent of the market.  At this same date, and  from  the same 
source the third main supplier of cider was given as the Taunton Cider Co.  Ltd.  with a  15  per cent share. 
As three of the U. K's  major brewers- Bass,  Guinness and Courage - as well as other brewers had signifi-
cant  interests in Taunton Cider, The  Monopolies Commission stated that "the brewers' share of cider 
production in  the  U.K.  is  now  over 35  per cent."* 
4.145  The three companies mentioned so  far continue to be the main 
*  The Monopolies Commission  (1969) op. cit. para 76-77 
+  The Brewers' Society Statistical Handbook(l976) op. cit .data only refers to makers of the  National 
Association of Cider Makers. 
183 suppliers of cider in the U.K. with Bulmers maintaining market  leadership (Bulmer's brand of Woodpecker 
cider is  possibly the brand leader with a  27 per cent market share).  Estimates of Bulmer's current total 
market share vary between 60 and 63 per cent so tha.t on the whole their position in  the market is  little 
different from  what it was  10 years ago.  The brewers' present share in  the cider market is  not known  but it 
is a  market which continues to be supplied by  between 10 and 20 small  firms.  One of these, the Merrydown 
Wine Co. has given figures which show  it to hold 0, 9 per cent of the U.K. cider market by volume,  1.2 
per cent of the total market at retail selling prices and 2.0 per cent of the take home  market at retail 
II.  .  +  se  mg  pn  ces. 
-------------- + 
Th~Grocer June lOth  1978 p.52. 
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j 5:  SOFT DRINKS  - PRODUCT  lv\ARKETS  , lv\ARKET  SHARES AND PRICES 
Introduction 
5.1  It  is convenient to consider the U.K. soft drinks market as being comprised of 
three  principal products;  namely,  concentrated soft drinks,  unconcentrated soft drinks and fruit juices. 
In addition, the comparatively small  but growing market for mineral waters in  the U.K. will also be dealt 
with in this chap_ter. 
Concentrated Soft Drinks 
5.2  Concentrated soft drinks are more commonly known as squashes and cordials, 
which in the main  have to be diluted with water before being consumed.  Besides the fruit base from  which 
the squash or cordial  is derived the final  product usually contains a  number of additives such as colouring 
and flavouring agents, preservatives and sweetners, as well as water.  There are two methods by which the 
fruit base is obtained, the most  popular today being that of comminution whereby the whole fruit  is  crushed 
and used.  According to Retail  Business* some 67 per  cent  of concentrated soft drinks were produced by 
this method  in  1974 compared with 40 per cent  in  1962.  The  increased use of the comminution method has 
all been at the expense of the other method used for producing concentrated soft drinks, that is, the 
extraction method where juice  is extracted from  the fruit.  There seem to be two reasons why the commin-
ution method has grown in  use;  first of all because it is more economical than the extraction method  and 
secondly because the end product with a  fruitier flavour is more popular with consumers. 
5.  3  The volume of U.K. consumption of concentrated soft drinks is  set out in 
Table 5. 1 for the period 197  4 to 1977.  This data is given in terms of concentrated volumes,  but to 
facilitate comparison with other sectors of the soft drinks market the concentrated volume can be multiplied 
by 5 to give an indication of 'ready to drink' equivalent volumes.  This is  the practice of the Soft Drinks 
_ tv\anufacturers who assume that 10 gallons of concentrated soft drinks equal 50 gallons on a  'ready to drink' 
*  E.I.U. Retail Business  No.214.  December 1975 
187 TABLE 5.1 
U.K. Consumption of Concentrated Soft Drinks,  1974- 1977 
units : concentrated volume OOO's gallons. 
U.K.  PRODUCED 
Year  Squashes  Comminuted*  Others  Total  Exports  Imports 
& 
Cordials 
1974  22700  47463  19802  89965  2502  234 
1975  26285  57898  19193  103376  2304  261 
1976  28226  63685  17298  108842  777  198 
1977  25509  55243  16153  96905  1830  148 
SOURCE:  Business Monitor PQ 232 and Brewers' Society Statistical Handbook 
*  Comminuted- all parts of fruit  included, i.e. pulp, peel,  juice etc. 
N. B.  Soft Drinks in  solid or powder form are excluded. 
TABLE 5.2 
Distribution of Concentrated Soft Drinks,  1974 
Value  Volume 
%  % 
Grocers 
On-licensed trade 
Caterers  1 
Confectioners,  Tobacconists &  fi.Jewsagents 
Other (including Chemists) 
48 
18 
17 
6 
11 
SOURCE: E.l. U.  Retail  Business  No.214.Dec. 1975 
TABLE 5.3 
67 
8 
4 
7 
14 
Distribution of Concentrated Soft Drinks in  the Grocery  Trade,  1974 
Multiples 
Co-ops 
Symbol  Groups 
Independents 
SOURCE:  E.I.U. Retail  Businessop.cit. 
Value 
% 
50 
16 
22 
12 
188 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
Concentrated  Ready to 
Volumes  Drink 
equ iva I  ents 
87697  438485 
101333  506665 
108263  541315 
95223  476115 basis.  Between  1974 and 1977 the volume of concentrated soft drinks consumed in the U.K. rose by 
8.5 per cent  ,  though in absolute terms the volume drunk in  1977 was less than in the  peak year of 1976. 
5.4  On the supply side, the structure of the concentrated soft drinks market is 
characterised by a  large number of small producers and a  small  number of large producers.  Although the 
small  producer may be of importance in a  particular locality or region he is becoming increasingly less 
important in  national terms.  The strength and survival prospects of the small  producer have usually lain 
with the fact that he serves the smaller neighbourhood shops of a  particular area as well as meeting 
consumers' needs directly bywayofadoo..-to-door delivery service.  The bulk of this trade has relied upon 
the deposit paid returnable bottle.  However,  the growth in  the national market for squashes and cordials 
has come through the larger shops and supermarkets of the grocery trade which, for obvious reasons,  prefer 
the use of the no-deposit non-returnable bottle.  Indeed,  it has been reported recently* that door-to-door 
deliveries of the Corona brand may be phased out over the next 4-5 years.  Today, Corona is a  top selling 
soft drink of the Beecham Group but the  brand began its life 95 years ago in  South Wales as a door-to-door 
delivered product.  The reasons given for withdrawing this system of distributing the brand are that some 
25 per  cent  of bottles are not returned by customers and the rising cost of glass therefore adds to costs; 
consumers are reluctant to pay deposits; and that supermarkets dislike deposit-returnable sales. 
5.5  Table 5.2 shows that s~me 48 per cent  of the value of trade in concentrated 
soft drinks passed through retail grocers in  1974, and of that Table 5.3 shows that 50 per  cent  was dealt 
with by multiples.  Brand  share data for squash sold through the grocery trade are available because this 
sector of the trade is subject to continuous audits by market research companies.  Other sectors such as the 
on-licensed and catering trades are not so well researched s:>  that  the brand-share data that will be given 
should be treated with caution in  that they do not fully reflect the total distribution of the products 
concerned.  However,  before setting down the brand-share data it will be useful  to mention the leading 
companies and the brands concerned. 
5.6  + 
It  has been stated  that the  larger producers control more than 40 per. cent. 
of the concentrated soft drinks market in value terms,  and that the three main producers and their brands 
are as follows:  Producer 
Beecham Group Ltd. 
Beecham Foods  Ltd. 
Corona  Ltd. 
Reck itt & Colman  Ltd. 
Colman Foods  Ltd. 
Cadbury-Schweppes Ltd. 
Schweppes  Ltd • 
*  The Grocer. lv\arch  11th 1978.p.28 
+  E  .I. U.  Retai I Business op. cit. 
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Brand 
Quosh 
Corona 
Robinsons 
Schweppes,  Rose's,  Kia-Ora 
Suncrush, Sunfresh Of the branded products in the grocery trade Robinsons and Quosh are generally acknowledged to be the 
leaders in  the squash market.  The  brand share data for the grocery trade is summarised  in Table 5.4, and 
shows Robinsons with 18 per  cent  in  1974 and Quosh  with 15  per cent.  Included  in  the Robinson's 
share of 18 per cent  is 5 per cent. for  its brand of Robinson's Barley Water.  This brand is part of an 
important sub-market of the squash market which is  perhaps best described as 
1hea lth drinks' in that the 
products are marketed or perceived by the consumer as having certain vitamin or dietary properties.  As 
such, these products receive wide distribution in  the U.K. through chemists and are often positioned near 
proprietary medicines in  supermarkets.  Beecham's has a  number of brands in  this sub-market; namely, 
Ribena  (blackcurrant drink),  PLJ  (pure  lemon  juice), Schloer (apple juice), and C-Vit (vitamin C based 
drink), and  Lucozade.  Schweppes
1  Roses  lime  juice (2-3 per  cent  share of the squash  market in  1974) 
could also be included  in  this category as could the whole new market in  low-calorie drinks,  but more of 
this in a  later paragraph. 
5.7  Returning to the brand share data in Table 5 .4, the three Schweppes• brands, 
Suncrush,  Kia-Ora, and Sunfresh together accounted for about 14 per cent  of the 1974 market.  The 
Tree Topbrand shown  in Table 5.4 to hold 2 per  cent  of the market in  1974 was thought to hold around 
6 per  cent  in  1972.  This brand was introduced by Vander Bergh  (a  Unilever subsidiary) in  1960 with the 
marketil")g  of the product taken over by Batchelors (another Unilever company)in 1970.  It  is believed that 
the product was withdrawn from  the market during 1975. 
5.8  What Table 5.4 does not reveal  is  the relative importance of'retciiler1s private 
labels in the squash market.  Retail  Business*  has suggested that in  1974 the Co-op
1s own-labels represented 
14 per.cent. of the value of the squash market,  J. Sainsbury's 8.5 per  cent  and Tesco
1s 2 per cent.  If 
this was so then the Co-op and Sainsbury brands would  rank equal third  (with Schweppes) and fourth, 
respectively.  The Co-op, Sainsbury and Tesco combined brand share  of 24.5 per  cent  in  1974 was thought 
to represent just 'over half of the total own-label market in squashes, whilst own-label sales of squashes in 
1970 were considered to resprasent some 40 per cent  of the total market's value.  A final point worth 
noting on market shares,  is that in  1962 the leading brand of squash was Schweppes• Suncrush' which held 
.:.uound  20 per  cent  of the market; today, no  one brand of squash has more than a  20 per cent  market 
share. 
Unconcentrated Soft Drinks 
5.9  In  Table 5.5 the data on  U.K. consumption of unconcentrated soft drinks 
is set down for  the years 1974-1977, which shows an increase in  volume consumed over the period of 15.4 
per  cent.  As with concentrated soft drinks, consumption of the unconcentrated variety was  less in  1977 
than it had  been during the previous year.  Imports have been of I  ittle importance, accounting for around 
0.5 per  cent  of 19771s domestic consumption.  It  is clear from  the table that the bulk of both production 
* E. I. U.  Retail  Business op. cit. 
190 TABLE  5.4 
Brand Shares in  sales of Squashes and Cordials through the Grocery Trade,  1974 
Brand  Value  Volume  Brand  Owner 
%  % 
Robinsons  18  14  Reckitt & Colman 
Quosh  15  14  Beecham 
Suncrush  5  5  Schweppes 
Kia-Ora  5  6  Schweppes 
Sun fresh  4  3  Schweppes 
Corona  4  3  Beecham 
Tree Top  2  1  Unilever 
Own  Label/Other  47  54 
SOURCE:  E.l. U.  Retail  Business op.cit 
TABLE 5.5 
U.K. Consumption of Unconcentrated Soft Drinks,  1974- 1977 
U.K.  Produced  Lemonade, Flavoured 
Aerated Water, Other 
Year  Carbonated*  Non- Other  Total  Soft Drinks  Total 
alcoholic  Con sump-
wines  tion 
and ciden  Exports  Imports 
1974  357705  244  7590  365539  3630  1270  363179 
1975  390982  274  7621  398877  4478  1547  395946 
1976  428059  83  10164  438306  6336  1819  433789 
1977  418933  222  9219  428374  11689  2365  419050 
.  . .  SOURCE:  Busmess Monttor PQ.232 and Brewers Soctety Stattsttcal Handbook 
* including soda  water and cola-based minerals. 
191 and consumption is of carbonated drinks,  whose volume consumed rose by 17 per  cent  over the 4 year 
period. 
5.10  Besides being the largest sector of the national  market for soft drinks, the 
market for carbonated soft drinks exhibits a  number of features which set it apart from  the rest of the trade. 
Carbonates embrace a  number of product markets,  the first of which may be distinguished as that for 
1mixers
1 as opposed to the product  being consumed 
1straight
1
• 
1 Mixer 
1  is a  term applied to a  soft drink that 
is  mixed with an alcoholic drink.  By  this definition certain squashes,  cordials, and fruit and vegetable 
juices that are generally added to alcoholic drinks may also be considered as mixers,  but it is  in  carbonated 
mixers that the largest market is to be found.  Of the carbonates drunk straight the largest product market 
is that for colas, which is  thought to be the most  popular single type of soft drink.  Of the non-cola 
carbonates drunk straight,  lemonade is  probably the biggest  market complemented by a  large number of 
different flavoured fizzy drinks. 
5.11  Soft drinks can, of course, be purchased in  on and off-licensed premises 
but these two outlets only assume real importance in  the case of mixer drinks.  This  introduces an additional 
competitive element into the marketing of soft drinks in  general and mixers in  particular; namely,  the role 
of the brewers in  their production and distribution.  Some of the major U.K. brewers have developed 
extensive interests in  their own brands of mixers and other soft drinks and offer these in  their tied houses  in 
preference to other brands,  such as Schweppes.  Sch~eppes is  the acknowledged brand  leader in  the mixer 
market and is  likely to be available in most areas of the licensed trade, but the brewers• actions do, 
however, act as a  constraint upon Schweppes• penetration of this market.  Having said this, though,  it is 
believed that Schweppes are exclusive suppliers to Scottish & Newcastle Breweries• which does not  have its 
own brand of mixers.  Also, as recently as January 1978* Schweppes signed a 4 year agreement with Grand 
Metropolitan to give Schweppes• products shelf space in  Watney and Truman pubs and off-licences alongside 
Grand Metropolitan•s own  brand of Club mixers. 
5.12  The carbonated drinks market has also been one in which new product 
development and the introduction of new brands has played an important role.  In  terms of new product 
development Schweppes have been and continue to be the notable innovators.  The mixer  market was more 
or less established by  Schweppes and they were the  main suppliers until the early 1960's.when 
competition from  the brewers commenced.  In  the early 1950's Schweppes introduced Bitter lemon  and  in 
1965 their low  calorie _?limline range of mixers came onto the market as the first of a  new generation of 
drinks aimed at the health-diet-slimming conscious consumer.  It  was not until  1977 that Canada Dry(UK) 
limited, the soft drink manufacturing and marketing subsidiary of brewer Bass Cherrington, added its own 
line of low-calode, drinks to its existing range of mixers •.  The Canada Dry brand, which takes second 
place in  the mixer market to Schweppes,  is  produced  'in  the U.K. under I  icence from  the Canada Dry 
Corporation of America.  During  the auturm of 1977 it was announced that Schweppes were test marketing a 
*  The Financial Times.  January lOth  1978 
192 new brand of mixer known as Russchian and intended mainly for  vodka  (the spirits• growth market) but also 
for  the otherwhite  spirits, gin and white rum.  In  the spring  of 1978 whilst Russchian was still being test 
marketed Canada Dry  (UK)  Ltd.  announced the nationa I launch of their own  vodka  mixer,  Vostok. 
5.13  The  introduction of low-calorie (often abbreviated to lo-cal) drinks is a 
development which has not been confined solely to the mixer market.  This  is a  fast growing market and no 
doubt as its total size expands estimates of market value will become more precise, for at the moment the 
information that is available is  by no means comprehensive and is  likely to be subject to more than the 
usual  errors.  Amongst carbonates, cola drinks were the first  to present a diet/lo-cal product.  This market 
took-off in  the U.S.A.  in  the late fifties to early sixties with an abortive attempt made to establish the 
product in  the U.K.  in  the mid-1960's.  The brand, Tab,  from  the Coca Cola Company was withdrawn when 
cyclamates were banned and not re-introduced to the U.K. until  1975.  The  re-introduced Tab  was not in 
fact a  cola, although the 'sugar free' Tab  that is promoted today has been a  cola since March  1976. 
,Pepsi Cola has introduced Diet Pepsi and together with Tab  probably represent the leading brands in  the 
lo-cal market.  Today,  lo-cal products are in  evidence in  most areas of the canned and bottled carbonates 
market as well as in  squashes and fruit  juices. 
5.14  Carbonated drinks encompass a  wide range of different markets,  not  just  in 
terms of the product,  that is mixer, straight, cola, or lo-cal, but also in  terms of packaging and distrib-
ution.  Carbonates are sold at retail  in  either standard sized cans of 11 .5 fl.ozs. or in a  variety of sizes 
of glass bottles and plastic containers.  Sales are also made through grocers, where the product  is  rapidly 
approaching the sta.tus of being a  basic commodity purchase like tea or coffee, and  In  the on-licensed and 
catering trades.  It  is  not surprising  therefore, that carbonated drinks as a  whole attract  a  considerable 
amount of advertising, the level of which has risen from  £3m.  in  1973,  to £4.  9m.  in  1975 and to £6.4m. in 
1976. 
5.15  Before going on to consider market shares it is  relevant to indicate the 
companies which supply the market, and these fall  into four groups.  First of all, as with the concentrated 
soft drinks industry,  there are a  large number of local/regional firms supplying carbonated drinks.  Next, 
there are the brewers that sell  their own  brands, then the own-brands of retail grocers, and lastly the 
established producers of the nationally branded products,  such as Schweppes and Beecham.  The  local/ 
regional producers cannot easily be dismissed  but they are declining in  relative importance in  the face of 
competition from  the heavily advertised nationally distributed brands  The following quotation is  useful  in 
describing the structure of the market for canned carbonates in  the U.K.: 
11Superficially,  it is a  fragmented 
market with 68 nationally distributed I  ines  joined in  battle for market shares alongside 136 own-label and 
100 reg iona I brands. 
11* 
*  The Grocer  June 11th 1977 P  .78 
193 5.16  In  Scotland, the most  popular soft drink is  reputed to be lrn  Bru  from 
A.G.Barr & Co. Ltd., which also has its own brand of Strike  cola, and Tizer  which it acquired when  it 
took over Tizer Ltd.  in  1972.  Larkspur Soft Drinks were acquired by Northern Foods  Ltd.  when they took 
over  Clover Dairies in  1976.  Larkspur is  now  part of Northern Food
1s wholly owned brewer North Country 
Breweries, and produces a  range of lemonades, colas, mixers,  cordials and special products like dandelion 
and burdock.  G. Barraclough are a  Bradford  based soft drinks manufacturer producing a  range of drinks 
under the Gee Bee  brand name.  Other important regional names are Carters Gold Medal Soft Drinks and 
Shows of Huddersfield. 
5.17  The Canada Dry brand of carbonated soft drinks and mixers has already been 
mentioned as being the own-brand of brewer Bass (harrington.  The marketing company Canada Dry  (UK) Ltd. 
is also responsible for the distribution of Bass Charrington
1s brand of shandy known as Shandy Bass when made 
with ale and lemonade, and as Shandy Pilsnerwhen made with lager and lemonade, the latter being a 
relatively new product to be marketed in  cans.  Canada Dry  (UK)Ltd.  a I  so distribute the Hooper Struve 
brand of family size packs of carbonates.  Allied Breweries Ltd.  have a  number of subsidiaries which 
between them have interests in all areas of the U.K. soft drinks market; namely,  Britvic  Ltd.,  Minster 
(Soft  Drinks)Ltd ., and  Showerings,  Vine Products and Whiteways Ltd.  Fruit juices, squashes and mixers 
are produced under the Britvic brand name, shandy,  lemonade and cola come from  the Minster company 
and non-alcoholic ciders and cider shandy from  the Showerings company.  Whitbread & Co. acquired soft 
drink manufacturer R. White & Sons. Ltd.  in  1970 and continue to produce and market their range of bottled 
and canned carbonates under the R.White label.  Whitbread also sell a  range of squashes,  cordials and 
ordinary and lo-cal mixers under the Rawlings  brand name, as well as distributing the Tizer brand  in 
London and Southern England  under licence from  A .G.  Barr. 
5.  18  Cantrell and Cochrane Ltd.  is a  soft drinks manufacturing and marketing 
company formed  in  1969 by a  number of brewers together with Schweppes.  Whitbread & Co. originally 
had an interest in  this company but at the end of 1977 the shareholdings were as follows:  Cadbury Schwe-
ppes 38 per.cent.,  Imperial Group (through its Courage brewing  subsidiary) 27 per  cent  ,  Grand 
Metropolitan (through Watney Mann
1s original holding)30 per  cent  ,  and brewer Greene,  King  & Sons  Ltd. 
with 5 per cent.  Early  in  1978 Grand Metropolitan acquired the Cadbury Schweppes  share to raise their 
holding in Cantrell and Cochrane to 68 per  cent  ,  and leaving the Courage and Greene,  King  interests 
unchanged.  Cantrell and Cochrane
1s brand is Club which is  reckoned to be particularly strong  in  the 
market for  mixer drinks sold  in  the on-licensed trade 
5.19  Coca-Cola is  manufactured and distributed in Great Britain by two franchise 
holders; namely, the Beecham Group Ltd.  and Grand Metropolitan Ltd.  The  Beecham Group is  responsible 
for distribution in the North of England and Scotland through its subsidiary Coca  Cola Bottlers  (Scotland 
and Northern)Ltd., and Grand Metropolitan for the South of England through its subsidiary Coca Cola 
Southern Bottlers Ltd.  In  Northern  Ireland the brand  is  handled  by Coca Cola Bottlers (Uister)Ltd.  In 
194 addition to handling Coca Cola the franchise holders also undertake the distribution of other carbonated 
products from  the Coca Cola Company,  brands such as Fanta  (orange),  leed (lemonade),  lilt (pineapple and  -- -- --
grapefruit crush),  Tab  (lo-ca·l  cola), and Fresco  (lo-cal grapefruit flavour). 
5.20  As well as being  involved in  the squashes and cordials market, and sharing 
in  the franchised distribution of Coca Cola products, the Beecham Group Ltd.  has other extensive  interests 
in  canned and bottled carbonated drinks.  Beecham's Corona  is  probably the brand  leader in  bottled fizzy 
drinks (with R.White's  the number two brand  in  this market) as well as producing a  similar range of 
flavours  in  cans.  Tango is another Beecham brand of flavoured carbonates sold  in  bottles and cans.  In  the 
mixer market Beecham has two brands selling ordinary and lo-cal varieties, namely Hunts and  ldris.  The 
ldris  brand also has canned shandy and ginger beer.  Top  Deck  is  the Beecham brand leader in  the canned 
shandy market, and also has  limeade and lager and cider shandy selling under the same label.  Jokers  is 
a  brand of canned carbonate in  four flavours aimed very much at the children's market and Bitter Sweet 
in  three fresh  fruit flavours is sold  under the Hunts  label as a  lo-cal carbonate and was  introduced during 
1977 at the same time as lilt. 
5.21  Cadbury-Schweppes ltd. through the Schweppes brand  have market leader-
ship  in  mixer drinks with their ordinary and Slimline range of mixers.  Mixers are sold  in a  variety of bottle 
sizes according to the market in  which they are to be sold;  that is,  small  bottles in  the on-licensed trade 
that are of sufficient volume to go with a  measure of spirit.  In  the off-licensed and grocery trade the 
capacity of mixer bottles extends up  to half a  litre.  The fortunes of the  mixer market are very much 
dependent upon  how  sales of spirits are affected by duty and other price rises.  The cost of a  measure of 
spirit to which a  mixer is added can make for a  very expensive drink.  Between  1973 and 1976 spirits' 
prices rose on average by almost 50 per  cent.  (fable 4.5) and it is  thought that this caused the mixer 
market to be somewhat  less  buoyant than it had  been •  To  cushion the further effects of increases in the 
price of spiri1s Schweppes have started to advertise mixers as a  drink  in  their own  right, to be 
drunk  'straight'.  It  is  thought that this will  help to give soft drinks in general, and mixers in  particular 
a  more adult image and thereby increase sales. 
5.22  Some of Schweppes  carbonated drinks also appear in  1  H- fl.oz. cans under 
the Schweppes brand name and others as Cresta  and Cariba.  The second line brand in  the U.K. cola 
market is  Pepsi  Cola which  is  manufactured and distributed,under licence from  PepsiCo. Inc., by Schweppes. 
The brand  is  represented in  the lo-cal  market by  Diet Pepsi  which was introduced during  1975.  Both 
Pepsi  Cola and Diet Pepsi are available in  bottles and cans and it is  believed that  R.Whites undertakes 
some  bottling and distribution of the product as may other companies. 
5.23  Coca Cola is  reckoned to be the world's biggest selling carbonated soft 
drink with  1977 sales of around £1.266bn., followed  by  Pepsi  Cola  in  second place, and 7-Up a distant 
third with£  107m.  of world  sales in  1977. 2:J:£ is a  lemon and lime soft. drink which has been in  the U.K. 
195 TABLE 5.6 
tv\ain  Producers and Brands of Carbonated Soft Drinks 
Producer 
Beecham Group Ltd 
Beecham Foods and Corona 
Coca Cola Bottlers (Scotland 
and Northern)Ltd 
Cadbury Schweppes  Ltd  • 
Schweppes 
Grand Metropolitan  Ltd. 
Cantrell and Cochrane 
Brand 
Corona 
Tango 
Hunts 
ldris 
Top  Deck 
Jokers 
Bitter Sweet 
Coca Cola 
Tab 
Fanta 
Leed 
Lilt 
Fresco 
Schweppes 
Slimline 
Cresta 
Cariba 
Pepsi  Cola 
Diet  Pepsi 
7-Up 
Club 
Comment 
Range of canned and bottled flavoured drinks, 
ginger beer and shandy. 
Range of canned and bottled flavoured drinks. 
Ordinary and lo-cal mixers. 
Mixers,  shandy and ginger beer. 
Shandy,  cider shandy,  I  imeade and lager. 
Canned flavoured drinks. 
Canned flavoured drinks. 
Cola. 
Lo-cal cola. 
Orange. 
Lemonade. 
Pineapple and Garpefruit crush. 
Lo-cal grapefruit flavour drink. 
Mixers,  shandy,  lemonade and orange drinks. 
Lo-cal mixers. 
Canned flavoured drinks. 
Canned carbonate. 
Cola. 
Lo-ca I co  Ia • 
Lemon and I  ime drink. 
Ordinary and lo-cal mixers and other flavoured 
carbonates. 
Coca Cola Southern Bottlers Ltd.  as for  Coca Cola Bottlers (Scotland and  Northern)Ltd. 
Allied Breweries Ltd. 
Showerings, Vine Products 
and Whiteways Ltd. 
Britvic 
Minster  (Soft  Drinks) Ltd. 
Whiteways 
Britvic 
Minster 
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Cider shandy and non-alcoholic apple cider 
(Cydrax) and pear cider (Peardrax). 
Ordinary and lo-cal mixers. 
Shandy,  co Ia,  lemonade 
(continued •••••••  ) TABLE 5.6 (continued) 
Main  Producers and Brands of Carbonated Soft Drinks  (Continued) 
Producer 
Whitbread & Co Ltd. 
Bass Cherrington  Ltd. 
Canada Dry  (UK) Ltd. 
Brand 
R.  White 
Rawlings 
Tizer 
Canada Dry 
Shandy Bass 
Shandy  Pi Isner 
Hooper Struve 
Comments 
Canned and bottled flavoured carbonates 
(Brand  leader in  lemonade). 
Ordinary and lo-cal mixers. 
Canned and bottled flavoured carbonates- under 
licence from A .G .Barr. 
Ordinary and lo-cal mixers, and cola. 
Ale Shandy 
lager Shandy. 
Flavoured carbonates. 
SOURCE:  Company Reports,  trade price lists and various editions of The Grocer. 
197 since 1952  when the franchise was handled by brewers,  Fuller,  Smith & Turner.  The franchise was  later 
taken over by  ldris  Limited  but passed to Beecham upon  their acquisition of ldris in  1967.  Beecham already 
had  its own  range of fizzy drinks (e.g. Corona) and possibly because it did not promote 7-Up sufficiently, 
the 7-UpCompany in  1974 did not renew the Beecham franchise for  the product and it  left the U.K. market, 
albeit temporarily.  The  U.K. franchise for 7-Upis now  in  the hands of Schweppes. 
5.24  The major producers of carbonated drinks in  the U.K. and their brands are 
summarised  in  Table 5.6 and estimates of the value of the retail market are presented in Table 5.7.  The 
data for  1973 and 1974 given in Table 5 .7aretaken from  a  different source than the data for  subsequent 
years, and for this reason they are not strictly comparable.  With this in  mind,  however,  the value of the 
retail market in  carbonated soft drinks has been estimated to have increased from  £375m. in  1973,  to £499m. 
in  1975 and to £660m.  in  1977.  The value ot the total  U.K. soft drinks market has grown  from  £790m.  in 
1975 to around the £1,000m. mark  in  1977, so  that in  1977 sales of carbonates were responsible for 66 per 
cent of the whole market.  Sales of colas in  1977 are shown  to have been worth £235m.  equivalent to 
36 per cent of 1977's carbonated drinks market.  Mixers and lo-cal drinks together had sales of £120m.  in 
1977, or 30 per cent of the market.  The rest of 1977's market valued at £225m.  was shared between shandy 
and other carbonated drinks.  Lo-cal drinks worth £16m.  in  1977 were nearly all of the mixer type so  that 
lo-cal mixers could be said to represent some 8 per cent of all mixer sales.  In addition, canned lo-cal 
drinks are thought to have accounted for  19 per cent of sales of all canned carbonates in  1977. 
5.25  The relative importance of the channels of distribution for  carbonates and 
colas is  given in  Table 5.8 which shows the grocery trade to be the single most  important outlet.  However, 
the combined shares of the other outlets exceeds that for grocers alone. 
5.26  The three main segments of the carbonated drinks rnarket are carbonates other 
than colas, colas, and mixers, and estimates of brand shares in  each of these sectors are given  in  Tables 
5.9, 5.10 and 5.11,respectively.  Table 5.9 shows that the Beecham brand Corona  is  the clear leader in 
the market for carbonated drinks other than colas.  R.  White had  10 per cent of this market in  1977 with its 
range of products,  though it is  thought that the company sells the brand  leading lemonade with 40 per cent 
of lemonade sales.  With the exception of Whitbread's ownership of  R.White the market  is  relatively free 
from  brewery owned competition. 
5.27.  Estimates of brand shares in  the  U.K. cola market vary  widely depending 
upon  the source from  which the data has been extracted .  What remains undisputed, however,  is  the market 
leadership of Coca Cola over its nearest rival  Pepsi  Cola.  The data in  Table 5.10 indicates Pepsi  Cola 
to have gained market share at the expense of Coca Cola,  but there is  uncertainty as to exactly which 
market the data refers.  Given the 35 per cent share of the market attributed to mainly own-label  brands 
of cola, the data in  Table 5.10 may  only relate to sales of colas through the grocery trade.  It  is  quite 
likely that  Pepsi  Cola has gained some market share,  but both Coca Cola and  Pepsi are increasingly 
198 TABLE 5.7 
Estimates of the value of the Carbonated Drinks market 
Product  1973  1974 
Cola  124  150 
Mixers~  80  100 
Lo-cal  9  13 
Shandy  25  31 
Others  137  170 
375  464 
SOURCE:  1973and 1974,  E.I.U. Retail  Business op.cit. 
1975  1976 
~215 
499  596 
£m. at r.s.p. 
1977 
235 
184 
16 
~225 
660 
1975- 77. mainly Euromonitor,  Market Research Great Britain.  July 1978 and September 1978 
* excluding lo-cal mixers 
+mainly lo-cal mixers. 
TABLE 5.8 
Estimates of shares in  the distribution of Carbonates and Colas, by type of outlet,  1977 
per  cent 
Carbonates  Colas 
G~~  ~  ~ 
Confectioners, Tobacconists & newsagents  15  12 
Off-licences  12  12 
On-licences  12  11 
Cafes  8  18 
Other  15  13 
100  100 
SOURCE:  Euromonitor,  Market Research Great Britain. op.cit 
199 TABLE 5.9 
Estimates of brand shares for Carbonates other than Colas,  1977 
Brand 
Corona 
R.  White 
Barr 
Alpine 
Schweppes 
Hunts 
Others 
per  cent 
37 
10 
9 
7 
6 
5 
26 
Brand-owner 
Beecham 
Whit  bread 
A .G.  Barr 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Beecham 
SOURCE:  Euromonitor,  lv\arket Research Great Britain, op.cit 
TABLE 5.10 
Estimates of brand shares for Colas,  1974 and 1977 
Brand 
Coca Cola 
Pepsi Cola 
Others 
1974 
45 
20 
35 
er cent 
1977 
42 
23 
35 
SOURCE:  1974 E.I.U. Retail  Business op.cit. 
Brand  Owner 
Beecham and Grand Metropolitan 
Cadbury Schweppes 
lv\ainly own-labels 
1977 Euromonitor,  lv\arket Research Great Britain op.cit. 
200 facing the challenge of grocery retailers' own  brands and those from  the brewers.  As  far as the whole of 
the cola market is  concerned it is  thouglt that Coca Cola probably had about 60 per cent of the market in 
1974 as against 58 per cent today, and that for  Pepsi,  its share has risen over the same period from  around 
25  per cent to 29 per cent.  Of the lo-cal market thought to be worth £16m.  in  1977, some £3.6m.  is 
reckoned to have been in  lo-cal colas with the Coca Cola brand Tab probably having at least a 50 per cent 
share. 
5.28  The data in  Table 5. 11  on  estimates of brand shares in  the mixer market has 
been compiled from  a  variety of sources and for this reason must  be treated with care.  The general consen-
sus would seem to be that  Schweppes have  fallen behind in  this market, their share having fallen from 
about 70 per cent in  1968 to around 49 to 55 per cent today.  The main reason for this decline can be 
attributed to the entry of brewers into the mixer market, which is  the sector of the soft drinks trade in  which 
they are most  strongly represented.  The  lo-cal mixer market was probably worth around £10m.  in  1977 with 
the Schweppes Slimline range as market leader.  Schweppes' share of this market has probably fallen in  line 
with its share of the mixer market as brewers and others have introduced their own  lo-cal mixers.  However, 
one estimate has credited Schweppes
1  Slimline as having a  90 per cent share of the lo-cal mixer market in 
1974. 
5.29  In  the shandy sector of the carbonated drinks market Beecham's Top  Deck 
brand  is  the leader as the data for canned shandy sales throogh grocers shows and which is  set out in Table 
5. 12. 
Fruit Juices 
5.30  Expressed  in  terms of 'ready to drink' equivalent gallons the  U.K. fruit 
juice market  increased in  volume by 56 per cent between 1974 and 1977.  This data is set out in  Table 
5.13 which also shows that imports rose dramatically in  1976 and 1977, to account for  18.7 per cent of 
1977's domestic consumption.  Although fruit  juice may be the smallest sector of the soft drinks market it 
has shown  the fastest growth and is the market in which prices are set as a  premium.  Certain fruit  juices, 
and this excludes fruit based squashes and cordials, have for  some time been consumed as a  mixer with 
various alcoholic drinks.  They have,  however, gained in  popularity in  two ways,  first of all as a  drink to 
be consumed each day with breakfast and secondly as a  drink forming  part of a  health/dietary regime. 
5.31  The product appears in  four main forms;  as a  pure juice packaged in  either 
cans, bottles or cartons, as a  frozen concentrate which when mixed with water produces a  particular 
volume of juice; as a  packaged liquid based upon reconstituted fruit;  and as a  powder of dried fruit and 
other ingredients vVhich  becomes a  juice when mixed with water.  The powdered or instant form  is a  recent 
innovation and reflects the entry to the market of new firms.  Table 5.14 shows that of the volume of 1974
1s 
fruit  juice market  1  77.5 per cent was comprised of non-frozen juices, 7.5 per cent was frozen juices and 
15  per cent was of the instant variety. 
201 TABLE 5. 11 
Estimates of brand shares for Mixers 
Brand 
Schweppes 
Canada Dry 
Hunts 
Rawlings 
Britvic 
Club 
Others 
1968 
c.70 
1974 
55 
20 
5 
5 
7 
8 
per cent 
1975  1977* 
57  52 
14  17 
12 
6 
11-12 
11-12 
12 
SOURCE:  1968;74 E.I.U. Retail  Business op.cit. 
1975  Euromonitor,  Market Research Great Britain, Dec.l975. 
1977 The Financial Times,  January lOth  1978 
* on  licensed trade only 
TABLE 5.12 
Estimates of brand shares for sales of canned shandy through grocers. 
Brand 
Top  Deck 
Canada Dry 
Corona 
Schweppes 
Other 
per cent 
for the year  to 
March 1975 
34 
5 
4 
3 
54 
SOURCE: E.l. U.  Retail  Business op.cit. 
Brand  Owner 
Beecham 
Bass Cherrington 
Beecham 
Cadbury Schweppes 
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Brand  Owner 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Bass Cherrington 
Beecham 
Whitbread 
Allied Breweries 
Grand Metropolitan, Courage, 
Greenall Whitley TABLE 5.13 
U.K. Consumption of Fruit Juices,  1970- 1974 
OOO's gallons 
*  U.K.  Produced  Exports of  Imports  Total 
Year  Concen- Unconcen- Total  in  Fruit & Veg.  Concen- Other fruit  consumption of 
trated  trated 
11Ready to  Juices  trated  & veg. 
11Ready to drink 
11 
Fruit  Fruit  Drink
11  Fruit &  juices  equivalents. 
Juices  Juices  equivalents  Veg .Juices 
1974  4881  9688  36123  1321  2397  307  41810 
1975  5033  16866  42031  1615  3114  362  49888 
.................................... '-""' 
1976  4542  22827  45537  604  12484  57417 
1977  5691  25355  53810  817  12218  65211 
SOURCE:  Business Momtor PQ232 and Brewers' Society Statistical Handbook 
* vegetable juices,  including tomato juice, produced by  U.K. manufacturers,  excluded. 
203 5.32  Most fruit juice consumed  in  the U.K.  is orange juice- possibly accounting 
for 50 per cent of sales- followed by grapefruit juice and tomato juice each with around  17-18 per cent of 
sales.  Nearly all vegetable juice consumption is of tomato juice which is drunk as a  breakfast juice, 
an aperitif, or in  pubs 'straight' or as a  mixer.  It  is a  popular drink and is  usually considered as part of the 
fruit  juice market. 
5.33  Within the grocery trade some 46 per cent of fruit juice sales are made 
through multiple shops,  16 per cent through Co-operatives and 38 per cent through independents.  An 
important part of the distribution of fruit juices takes place through the door-to-door deliveries of milk 
distributors.  Just as milk  is a  perishable product so  too is  the juice delivered in this manner;  it  is  usually 
vacuum packed in  hermetically sealed cartons giving the product two days life once the carton has been 
opened.  An  important brand in  this market is  Farmer~s Wife  from  Unigate  Ltd.  Estimates of retail sales 
of fruit and vegetable juices in  the U.K. are given in  Table 5.15, which shows the value of the market 
to have grown from  £36m.  in  1974 to possibly £147m.  by 1977- a  fourfold  increase helped by considerable 
price rises. 
5.34  The companies involved  in  supplying fruit  juices to the grocery trade are 
mainly food  processors whose household brand names are more familiar in  other food  product markets.  In 
addition, own-label fruit juices are of considerable importance as are the producer brands from  countries 
exporting juices to the U.K.  The result is a  highly fragmented market in  terms of the different brands 
available,  some of which are presented in  Table 5.16 along with market share data for sales in  supermarkets. 
When the data is  Table 5.16 is adjusted to account for sales outside supermarkets, the brand share data in 
Table 5.17 may be taken as an estimate of the relative position of the main brands in  the national market 
for fruit  juices.  Birds  Eye  Florida orange juice is generally considered to be the market leader in frozen 
concentrated juices,  but is  being challenged by Findus and many own-label products.  In  canned juices 
libby's  are thought to have a  10 per cent share.  Libby's  most  recent product is  called  Libbyls  'C' or 
Triple'C'. This product is very much at the forefront of the health/dietary market in fruit juices because of 
its advertised vitamin  •c• content.  It  is  not,  however, a  pure orange juice and  is  comprised of reconstituted 
orange juice, oranges, sugar,  citric acid, flavouring,  colouring, saccharin and preservatives.  Similarly, 
Kellog
1s with Rise 
1n
1  Shine, aimed at the breakfast juice market,  is of a  powdered  'instant' formulation 
made from  dried whole oranges, sugar,  fruit acids, emulsifier, edible gum, emulsifying salt, natural 
flavouring,  vegetable oil, glucose and colouring.  This  is a  relatively young product in the fruit juice 
market as is Apeel sold under the Birds  name from  Genera I Foods which was .launched during the first half 
of 1978. 
204 TABLE 5.14 
Fruit Juice Market by Type,  1974 
Non-frozen 
Frozen 
Instant 
per cent 
Volume of reconstituted 
equivalent. 
77.5 
7.5 
15.0 
SOURCE:  E.l. U.  Retail  Business  No.215,  January 1976 
TABLE  5.15 
Retail  Sales of Fruit and Vegetable Juices 
Year  £M. 
1974  36 
1975  60 
1976  102 
1977(e)  147 
SOURCE:  Euromonitor.  Market Research Great Britain op.cit. 
205 TABLE 5.16 
Estimates of Brand  Shares in Sales of Fruit Juices through Supermarkets,  1977 
Brand  per cent  Brand Owner 
Libby  28.4  Libby, McNeill  and  Libby 
Kellogg  6.5  Kellogg Co 
Birds  Eye  5.9  Unilever 
Jaffa  5.5 
J. Sainsbury  5.5  Retailers own brand 
Co-op  5.0  Retailers own  brand 
Marks & Spencer  4.5  Retailers own brand 
Schweppes  3.0  Cadbury Schweppes 
Safeway  2.8  Retailers own brand 
Tesco  2.8  Reta i I  ers own brand 
Britvic  1.8  Allied Breweries 
Other  28.3 
SOURCE:  Euromonitor.  Market Research Great Britain op.cit. 
TABLE 5.17 
Estimates of Brand Shares in  the U.K.  Fruit Juice Market,  1977 
Brand 
Schweppes 
Libby 
Britvic 
Kellogg 
Birds  Eye 
J. Sainsbury 
Jaffa 
Others 
per cent 
20 
18 
16 
4 
4 
3 
3 
32 
Brand Owner 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Libby,  McNiel I and  Libby 
Allied Breweries 
Kellogg Co 
Unilever 
Retailers own brand 
SOURCE:  Euromonitor.  Market Research Great Britain,  1977 
206 Mineral Water 
5.35  Mineral waters from  indigenous sources have been available for domestic 
consumption for  many years.  This product market has,  however,  been in  the backwater of the U.K •. 
drinks industries until about 1972-73 when the market began to develop as imports from  continental 
Europe  increased.  The relative youthfulness of this product in  the U.K. means that most  information about 
the market originates from  the trade as opposed to any independent research.  Accordingly, trade sources 
suggest that imports of mineral waters have grown since 1972 as follows: 
1972  1 . 4m • I  i  tres 
1974  3.7m.litres 
1975  4. 8m .litres 
1976  7.  8m • I  it  res 
1978  11 •  Om .I itres  (estimate) 
The imported volume of 11.  Om .I itres expected for  1978 could have a  retail market value of £4m. which 
together with sales of domestic mineral waters at £1m.  gives a  total market value of £5m.for 1978. 
5.36  The main point of difference between domestic mineral waters and the 
imported varieties is  that the U.K. has no  naturally carbonated spring water.  Thus,  U.K. bottled waters 
with the word  'sparkling• associated with the brand name will have been carbonated by artifical means, 
whereas imported  varieties are generally still or naturally gaseous.  Some continental brands do,  however, 
contain manufactured bubbles. 
5.37  Expansion of the U.K. market for mineral waters would seem to lie with 
the health properties claimed for the  imported product; that is, as an aid to slimming or as an aid to 
digestion.  For slimmers some waters are supposed to contain elements which quicken the  rate at which 
fats are burned up.  As a  digestive aid the alkaline content of some waters is  thought to counteract acidity, 
whilst others claim diuretic properties.  For  U.K. waters,  purity rather than chemical contents is  empha-
sised. 
5.38  The main brands of mineral waters bottled from  U.K. springs are listed in 
Table 5.  18, together with information on their brand owners and sources where known. The  leading 
domestic brand  in  lv\alvern water, bottled and sold by Schweppes.  The growth in  imports of mineral waters 
has possibly led to renewed  interest in  domestic spring waters, for  in  1976 bottling at Cwm  Dale Spring, 
Church Stretton, Shropshire recommenced after having ceased in  1939.  The product is  now sold  under the 
brand name Aqua  Pura.  Ashbourne water,  from  Derbyshire,  has been around for  many years but has 
recently received the marketing attentions of Nestle who carbonate the water artificially.  Crystal Water 
is  sold under the Rawlings  label by Whitbread & Co., the product  being bottled in  Gloucester by their 
207 TABLE 5.18 
Main brands of Mineral Waters from  U.K. sources. 
Brand 
Malvern 
Aqua Pura 
Ashbourne 
Champneys 
Fairlawn 
Strathmore 
Crystal Water 
Source 
Malvern Hills,  Hereford and Worcester 
Cwm  Dale Spring,  Church Stretton., Shropshire 
Ashbourne,  Derbyshire 
Forfar,  Scotland 
Priest
1s Well, Skenfrith,  South Wales. 
SOURCE:  The Financial Times.  July 2nd  1977 and June 29th 1978 
TABLE 5.19 
Main brands of Mineral Waters from  Continental sources. 
Brand  Source 
Perrier  Vergeze,  Nimes,  France  naturally spark I  ing 
Vichy  Vichy,  France  naturally sparkling 
Evian  Evian  les Bains, Lake Geneva, 
France  still water 
Vol vic  Auvergne,  France  sti II  water 
Isabelle  st iII  or spark I  i  ng 
Centrex  Vosges,  France  still water 
SOURCE:  The Financial Times.  July 2nd  1977 and June 29th 1978 
Brand  Owner 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Nestle 
Whitbread & Co. 
U.K. Agents 
Aqualac Spring Waters* 
Aqualac Spring Waters* 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Aqualac Spring Waters* 
*Aqua  lac Spring Waters Ltd.  owned 70 per cent by Aqualac(a subsidiary of Perrier-Preval group) and 
30 per cent by Cadbury Schweppes (through Schweppes
1subsidiary ,  Courtenay Wines). 
208 soft drinks subsidiary R.White & Sons  ltd.  According to the Financial Times*,  from  which most  of this 
information  is  taken,  the first five named brands in  Table 5. 18 ore thought to account for around 
20 per cent of the U. K.  market for  bott I  ed waters. 
5.39  Seventy per cent of the U.K. market for min era I waters is  in  the hands of 
six brands*, all believed to be French  in  origin.  These are listed  in  Table 5.19 in  what is  thought to be 
the rank order of brand  leadership.  Perrier is  the acknowledged leader amongst imported brands, and 
together with Vichy and Contrex,  is  marketed in  the U.K. by Aqualac Spring Waters ltd.  Prior to 1973, 
however,  Gilbey Vintners (part of Grand Metropolitan) held the U.K. agency for  Perrier and Schweppes 
handled Vichy.  In  1973 Aqua lac entered the U.K. to develop a  more positive marketing role for  these 
two brands, as well as for Contrex, claimed to be the brand  leading still water in  France.  Aqualac 
assumed  responsibi I  ity for  marketing to the grocery trade, agreeing to leave the on-I  icence business to 
Schweppes.  In  f.Aorch  1977, Aqua lac and Schweppes formed a  new company- Aqua lac Spring Waters  ltd~ 
to handle the Perrier, Vichy and Contrex brands!  Aqualac Spring Waters ltd.  is  owned 30 per cent by 
Cadbury Schweppes (through Schweppes' subsidiary Courtenay Wines) and 70 per cent by Aqua lac  (a  sub-
sidiary of the French group Perrier-Preval).  According to the Financial Times*  the six brands listed  in 
Table 5.19 account for  some 70 per cent of the U.K. mineral waters market, whilst Aqualac claimed in 
November 1977+ that  "Perrier and Vichy have getting on  for two thirds of the U.K. market. 
11 
5.40  In  addition to Perrier,  Vichy and Contrex, Schweppes are also involved  in 
the  U.K. distribution of other brands of imported mineral waters, such as Badoit, Vittel and San  Pellegriro 
Brands such as these, together with Malvern water enable Schweppes to handle some  65  per cent  l  of the 
market for mineral waters. 
Prices of Soft Drinks and Mixers,  in  licensed Premises . 
5.41  Prices of certain soft drinks and mixers sold  in on-licensed premises were 
examined by  the Price Commission,@' in  November 1976.  The terms of reference for this inquiry were 
announced by the Secretary of State for  Prices and Consumer  Protection in  the House of Commons on 
August 5th 1976 after a  period of frequent price rises and complaints to the Department of Prices and 
Consumer  Protection and the Price Commission.  In  the main, these complaints concerned three issues: 
* 
+ 
l 
!1 
(a)  the high prices charged for mixers 
(b)  the high charges made for some  mixed drinks 
such as shandy and lager and I  ime. 
and  (c)  the high prices charged for  soft drinks sold 
as such, for example lemonade and ginger beer  ,and for 
cordials diluted with water,such as orange and lime. 
The Financial Times  July 2nd  1977 and June 29th 1978 
The Grocer.  November 5th 1977 
The Grocer.  July 1st  1978 
Price Commission.  Soft Drinks and Mixers in  Licensed  Premises.  f.Aorch  1977 HMSO 
209 5.42  As far as mixers are concerned one type of complaint received by  the 
authorities related to the fact  that in  terms of price per fluid ounce, a  tonic water bought in a  pub could 
cost three times more than if bought in a  supermarket.  The  Price Commission did point out;  however,  that 
the comparison  is  not an entirely fair one, for  the reasons already stated in  this report at paragraph 3.75. 
Nevertheless,  the Commission felt it was necessary to have an indication of prices for' certain soft drinks 
and mixers sold  in grocers and off-licences,for comparisons between these prices and those  of the on-
licensed trade were invariably made by the public.  The  products chosen by  the Commission for  study in 
the on-licensed trade are listed below, and the price comparisons with the off-I  icensed trade for  the 
relevant products are given in  Table 5 .20. 
Soft Drinks and Mixers:  Tonic water, 4 fl.oz. 
Tomato  juice, 4 fl.oz. 
Lirr.e  cordial, one measure 
lemonade,  half pint 
lemonade splash 
soda splash 
Mixed Drinks:  Shandy {bitter and lemonade), 1 pint 
Lager and lime,  1 pint 
Gin and tonic 
5.43  The data in Table 5.20 indicates that the prices charged in  the on-licensed 
trade are higher than in  off-licences and considerably higher than in grocery stores.  Sales of soft drinks 
and mixers do, however,  respresent a  small  proportion of sales in  pubs and other licensed premises.  In 
the case of managed houses such sales in  November 1976 accounted on average for 5 per cent of sales, 
compared with 15 per cent for wines and spirits and 65  per cent for  beer*~  These averages are shown  in 
Table 5.21 to vary considerably both between and within the different classes o£ on-licensed premises. 
5.44  The data in Table 5.22 reveals considerable variation in  the prices of soft 
drinks, mixers, and mixed drinks (shandy,  lager and  lime and gin and tonic) throughout the U.K. As with 
the prices of beer and spirits considered in  Chapter 3, prices in  London and. S. E.  England tend to be the 
highest by comparison with the U.K. average, and those in  Scotland the lowest.  In  terms of the different 
types of on-licensed premises in which these drinks are consumed Table 5.23 shows that prices in  managed 
houses were lower than in  tenanted and free  pubs, and that prices in  railway stations and airport bars were 
considerably more expensive than in  public houses and hotels. 
5.45  In  relation to the figures contained in  Table 5.22 the Price Commission 
drew attention to certain trade practices used  when charging for mixed drinks.  Gin and tonic is generally 
charged at the price for the sum of its constituents, that is,  the price of a  4 fl.oz.bottle of tonic water 
plus the price charged for a  1/6th gill measure of gin.  The  price of a  pint of lager-and-lime is  usually 
charged at the price of a  pint of lager plus a  charge for  the shot of lime.  In  these instances, Table 5.22 
*  Price Commission(March 1977) op.cit. para. 1.7 
210 TABLE 5.20 
National average prices for  selected soft drinks and mixers,  November 1976 
Grocers  Independent 
and multiple 
off-licences 
Tonic water  4 fl.oz *  **  6.7 
Tonic water  8! fl.oz  9.4  10.0 
Fruit juice  4 fl.oz *  9.7  10.5 
Lime  cordial  1 fl.oz +  1.1  1.2 
Lemonade  !  pint  +  5.1  5.4 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (March  1977)op.cit.  Table 2 
*  returnable bottles 
**  not normally sold 
+  out of a  large bottle usually 26-30 fl.oz. 
TABLE 5.21 
Sales of Soft Drinks and Mixers as a  percentageof total sales 
Tenanted and free pub I  ic houses 
Managed public houses 
Hotel  bars 
Airport bars 
Railway station bars* 
Percentage range 
found 
1 - 20 
2- 12 
6- 17 
11  - 13 
14- 21 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (March  1977)op .cit.  Table 1 
* excluding cafeteria-type licensed bars. 
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Public house 
off-I  i  cences 
9.9 
11.5 
13.2 
1.2 
6.7 
new  pence. 
Tenanted and free 
public houses 
11.7 
** 
14.8 
2.3 
10.8 TABLE 5.22 
Average erices in  licensed eremises bl region,  November 1976 
lowest price bars of tenanted and free eubl ic  houses,n~w  pence 
Rest  of 
London  S.E.  England  Scotland 
England  & Wales 
Mixer (4.oz)  12.9  12.4  11.7  11.0 
Fruit  juice (4 oz)  16.4  15.3  14.3  13.9 
Lime  cordial (shot)  3.4  3.0  2.5  1.2 
Lime  cordial  (oz)  2.6  2.7  2.2  1.4 
Lemonade H  pt. )  12.4  12.2  10.3  7.9 
Lemonade (splash) *  3.2  2.5  2.0  2.0 
Soda (splash)  *  1.7 
Bitter (1  pt.)  28.2  26.9  24.1  24.9 
lager  (1  pt.)  35.7  34.1  30.3  27.3 
Shandy  (1  pt)  28.8  27.1  24.0  24.7 
Lager  & I  ime  (1  pt)  39.1  37.1  32.5  27.7 
Gin & tonic  40.3  39.5  37.9  ** 
Gin (1/6th gill)  27.4  27.1  26.2  21.8 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (lv\arch  1977)op.cit.  Table 3 
* when  charged 
**  not  comparable because of different size measure. 
TABLE 5.23 
N. 
Ireland 
10.3 
15.9 
2.4 
1.2 
14.0 
2.0 
2.0 
33.6 
33.3 
33.6 
33.8 
** 
23.3 
Average eric  es  in  I  i  censed erem i  ses bl tlee of out I  et  I  November 197 6 
U.K.  Range 
Average 
11.7  8.0-14.0  8.5-12.0 
14.8  10.0-19.9 10.0-18.0 
2.7  1.0- 6.0  1.0- 4.0 
2.3  1.0- 7.2  0.6- 4.0 
10.8  5.0-18.0  5.0-14.0 
2.3  1 .0- 6.0  1.0- 3.0 
1.7  1.0- 2.0 
26.0  20.5-36.0 20.5-28.0 
31.6  25.0-42.0 25.0-34.0 
26.1  20.0-36.0 20.0-28.0 
33.8  25.0-46.0 28.1-35.4 
**  33.0-44.0 33.5-41.4 
25.8  18.7-30.0 23.3-32.0 
U.K. averages of lowest price bars, new  pence. 
Tenanted  lv\anaged 
and free  houses  Hotels 
houses 
Mixer(4 oz)  11.7  10.5  11.4 
Fruit  juice (4 oz)  14.8  13.9  14.9 
Lime  cordial  (shot}*  2.7  2.7  2.7 
Lime  cordial  (oz)  2.3  2.4  2.8 
Lemonade  H  pt.)  10.8  10.5  11.5 
Lemonade  (splash)*  2.3  1.7 
Soda  (splash)*  1.7 
Bitter  (1  pt)  26.0  23.6  24.9 
Lager  (1  pt)  31.6  28.8  31.1 
Shandy  (1  pt)  26.1  23.3  23.9 
lager & I  ime  (1  pt)  33.8  31.5  33.5 
Gin and tonic  37.5  36.4  37.4 
Gin (1 /6th g iII )  25.8  25.9  26.0 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (lv\arch  1977)op. cit.  Table 4 
* average where charged 
n .a. not applicable 
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Rail Nay  Airport 
station bars  bars 
14.0  13.0  .. 
18.0  16.0 
3.0  4.0 
3.6  4.0 
n.a.  n.a. 
31.5  32.0 
37.0  38.0 
31.0  32.0 
40.0  38.0 
47.5  42.5 
33.5  29.5 shows that the price charged for a  shot of lime ranged from  1p to 7p1  and the Commission  noted that there 
was  little likelihood that any allowance would  be made for  the volume of lager displaced.  In  the case of 
shandy  1  the Commission found  that in  70 per cent of cases shandy was charged for at the price of bitter  1 
rather than at the cost of the constituents.  lemonade is  cheaper than bitter so  that a  pint of lemonade 
shandy ought to be charged at less  than a  pint of bitter.  On the basis  of the U.K. averages in  Table 5.22 1 
half a  pint of bitter is  shown  to have cost 13p and half a  pint of lemonade 10.8p, making 23.8p per pint 
of shandy.  The  price in  fact  charged, according to Table 5.22 was 26.1p in  November 1976, or an 
additional  2.3p above the price of the constituents.  The Commission found  that only in  18 per cent of 
cases was a  fifty-fifty mixture of lemonade and bitter charged for at a  price equal to the sum  of the 
constituents.  In  many other cases the price of shandy was greater than for a  comparable volume of bitter, 
representing a  further additional charge.  The practice of charging for shandy in  this manner had' been a 
source of complaint to the Price Commission from  consumers who felt they had  been unfairly charged.  The 
Commission found  the practice to be widespread and recommended  in  their conclusions that the practice 
should cease. 
5.46  The  Price Commission were able to obtain historica I data from  managed 
houses so that in  Table 5.24 changes in  cost and selling prices for  four selected  soft drinks are compared 
over the period from  November 1973 to November 1976.  During this period,  the selling price charged for 
a  4 fl.oz mixer rose on average by  82 per cent  1  for  the same volume of fruit  juice the increase was 57 
per cent, for one fluid ounce of lime cordial  is  was 93 per cent and for  half a  pint of lemonade, 73 per 
cent.  Excluding duty increases,  the selling price of bitter in  managed pubs rose by 54 per cent*  over the 
same period , lager by 50 per cent* and gin and whisky each by  37 per cent.*  In  the absence of excise 
duty, therefore, the increases in  the selling price of soft drinks were much  higher than for alcoholic drinks. 
At the same time, the cost price increases of the soft drinks given in  Table 5.24 were also greater than the 
duty exclusive cost price rises for alcoholic drinks;  that is,  for  bitter 42 per cent,  lager 36 per cent, gin 
13 per cent and whisky  17 per cent.  The cost price paid for  mixers rose by  92 per cent over the three 
year period, for  fruit  juice the rise was 59 per cent, and for  lime cordial and lemonade it was 83 per cent 
and 70 per cent,  respectively.  In  the case of mixers,  the Price Commission commented that "the price 
increases on mixers made by  the manufacturers have been correctly notified  (where this  is  required) and 
conform with the Price Code.  But  in  some  important instances the manufacturer has taken advantage of the 
facility in  the Code which enables him  to spread his prices unevenly over his  range of products; and above 
average increase have been  'loaded' on  products such as the 4 fl.oz.mixer,  which  is  extensively sold  in 
public houses"  + 
5.47  In  Table 5.25 data on  the gross percentage margins earned on selected soft 
drinks in  the lowest  price bars of tenanted and free pub I  ic  houses  is  set out by reg ion as at November 197  6. 
A comparison with certain alcoholic drinks is also provided.  Not only do London  and South East  England 
Price Commission  (March  1977)op.cit.para 3.11 and Table 5. 
+  Price Commission  (March  1977)op.cit.para 3. 14. 
213 TABLE 5.24 
Comparison of selling and cost price increases for  selected soft drinks,  November  1973-November 1976 
lowest price bars of managed  houses. 
Mixer 
4 fl.oz. 
Cost price,  November 1973  (p)  2.4 
Cost  increase  (p)  2.2 
Cost price,  NovEmber  1976 (p)  4.6 
Cost price increase  (per cent)  92 
Selling price,  November 1973  (p)5.7 
Price  increase  (p)  4.7 
Selling price, November 1976 (p)10.4 
Selling price increase (per cent)  82 
Difference between percentage 
Selling  and Cost price increases  -10 
Fruit  Juice 
4 fl.oz. 
4.1 
2.4 
6.5 
59 
8.7 
5.0 
13.7 
57 
-2 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (lv\arch  1977)op .cit.  Tables 5,7 and 8 
TABLE 5.25 
Average gross percentage margins by  region,  November 1976 
Lime  Cordial  Lemonade 
fl. oz.  half pint 
0.6  2.0 
0.5  1.4 
1.1  3.4 
83  70 
1.4  6.0 
1.3  4.4 
2.7  10.4 
93  73 
+10  +3 
lowest price bars of tenanted and free public houses,new pence 
Rest  of 
London  -S.E..  England  Scotland  N.  U.K.  Range 
England  & Wales  Ireland  Average 
Mixer  55.4  55.1  51.3  46.3  55.2  52.3  19.9-71. 1 
Fruit Juice  55.0  52.7  48.7  45.8  56.0  50.6  25.3-66.1 
Lime  cordial  50.3  60.8  52.1  35.5  22.9  52.3  1.0-89.3 
Lemonade  62.4  64.5  63.1  51.8  64.0  62.2  12.9-85.4 
Gin  52.1  52.6  50.3  41.9  44.7  49.6  34.8-57.2 
Whisky  50.5  51.3  48.8  41.6  43.3  48.2  33.6-56.3 
Bitter  36.9  35.2  31.8  34.8  44.9  34.4  21.1-49.2 
lager  42.8  39.1  36.4  33.4  45.3  38.2  20.5-52.6 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (lv\arch  1977)op.cit.Table 9 
214 have higher prices than the U.K. average for soft and alcoholic drinks,  but margins  in  these areas are also 
greater than the national average.  Similarly,  lower prices in  Scotland are mirrored by  lower margins. 
What is  most  evident from  this table,  however,  is  that the gross percentage margins on soft drinks and 
mixers tend to be greater than for  alcoholic drinks. 
5.48  United  Kingdom average gross percentage margins and implied percentage 
mark-ups are presented in  Table 5.26 for  certain soft drinks and mixers sold  in  different types of on-
licensed premises, as at November 1976.  The selling and cost prices for  managed  houses given in  this 
table differ slightly to those given in  Table 5.24.  This  is  because Table 5.24 only includes data supplied 
by brewers for both 1973 and 1976, whereas in  Table 5.26 data is  included from  a.ll  brewers participating 
at 1976.  It  should also be noted that cost prices paid by managed houses are not necessarily the prices 
paid by the brewer landlord but more  nearly reflect the brewers•  internal transfer price to his managed 
pub.  However,  Table 5.26 shows that gross percentage margins and mark-ups are likely to be considerably 
higher in  hotels and  railway and airport bars,  than in  tenanted, free and managed public houses.  Within 
the  public house trade gross margins varied from  51  per cent for  fruit  juice sold  in  tenanted and free pubs 
to 66 per cent earned from  sales of lemonade in  managed pubs.  The mark-ups which correspond to these 
gross margins were 106 per cent for  fruit  juice and  192 per cent for  lemonade.  Over the three years from 
November 1973 the Commission indicated  that the gross  percentage margin on  mixers fell by 3 per cent, 
on fruit  juice it remained unchanged, on  lime cordial  it fell  by 5 per cent, and on  lemonade it rose by 
1 per cent. 
5.49  The  Price Cor;mission's concluding comments on  the price of mixers sold  in 
licensed premises are of interest.  Their in,,estigation showed that on average a gross profit margin of 
54 per cent was taken in  public houses on the mixers they considered,  representing a mark-up of well 
over 100 per cent.  Comparable average gross margins on spirits were 49 per cent, and for  bitter 33 per cent. 
The Commission found  it difficult to avoid the conclusion "that in  most  outlets the profits taken on  mixers 
such as tonic water are too high and consequently the prices are also too high"*  The situation as far as 
high prices are concerned was felt to have been compounded by  the manufacturers• practice of 'loading• 
price increases, as referred to earlier.  Whilst the 'loading• by  manufacturers in  cash terms,  may  not be too 
great, the appf:_ation  by publicans of a  mark-up of 100 per cent to 150 per cent magnifies the price to 
the customer.  In addition, publicans were found  to dislike the use of the halfpenny so  that a  bar price 
increase amounting to just over 1p would  most  likely result in a  2p selling price increase to the consumer. 
In  consequence, the l.oading  of price increases, the high mark-up applied by publicans, and the rounding 
up of price increases were considered by  the Commission as 
11responsible  for a  price level for mixers which 
+ 
is  not  justified .••·  The Commission  concluded •tthat manufacturers and licensees could between them ensure 
that the price charged at the bar for  tonic water and other mixers was reduced by at least 2p" : 
* Price Commission  (March  1977)op.cit.para.4.3 
+Price Commission  (March  1977)op.cit.para 4.4 
+  Price Commission  (March  1977)op.cit.para 4.5 
215 TABLE  5.26 
Average Gross Percentage Margins and Mark-ups by type of outlet,  November 1976 
U.K. average of lowest price bars. 
Tenanted &  Managed  Hotels  Railway  Airport 
Free Houses  Houses  Station  Bars 
Bars 
Mixers: 
Selling price  (p)  11.7  10.5  11.4  14.0  13.0 
*cost price  (p)  5.6  4.7  4.2  3.7  3.6 
Gross margin  (per cent)  52  55  63  74  72 
Imp I  ied mark-up  (per cent)  109  123  171  278  261 
Fruit Juice: 
Selling price  (p)  14.8  13.9  14.9  18.0  16.0 
*cost price  (p)  7.2  6.6  6.2  5.4  5.3 
Gross margin  (per cent)  51  53  58  70  67 
Imp I  ied mark-up  (per cent)  106  110  140  233  202 
Lime Cordia I: 
Selling price  (p)  2.3  2.4  2.8  3.6  4.0 
*cost price  (p)  0.9  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.9 
Gross margin  (per cent)  61  54  68  80  78 
Imp I  ied mark-up  (per cent)  155  118  211  414  344 
Lemonade: 
Selling price  (p)  10.8  10.5  11.5  n.a.  n.a. 
*cost price  (p)  4.1  3.6  3.6  3.7  3.5 
Gross margin  (per cent)  62  66  69 
Implied mark-up  (per cent)  163  192  219 
SOURCE:  Price Commission  (March 1977)op.cit.  Tables 4,6 and 10 
*average cost price of most  recent purchase. 
216 PricesofSoft Drinks and Mixers in  Retail  Grocers 
5.50  The  results of price surveys conducted by Development Analysts  Ltd. 
amongst retail grocers in  the Croydon,  Greater Manchester, and Glasgow areas during  July 1977 were 
discussed  in  Chapter 3 in  relation to beer and spirits' prices.  During  these same surveys prices data was 
collected for a  number of soft drinks and mixers and these results are summarised for the Croydon,  Greater 
Manchester, and Glasgow areas in  Tables 5.27, 5.28 and 5.29, respectively.  Liquor  licences are not 
required for the sale of non-alcoholic drinks so  that prices information was gathered from  more shops and 
supermarkets for  soft drinks than for beers and spirits.  Thus,  in  Croydon, data was obtained from  28 
shops,  in  Manchester from  38 shops and in  the Glasgow area from  43 shops. 
5.51  For  the soft drinks listed  in  Tables 5.27- 5.29 the average prices were,in 
July 1977,much lower generallyfor Manchester than for  Glasgow and Croydon.  Of the three areas, 
Croydon appears to be the dearest, but only slightly ahead of the Scottish prices.  The magnitude of the 
relative price differences for soft drinks in  the Croydon, Manchester and Glasgow survey areas are 
considerably greater than the relative price differences for  canned beer and spirits presented earlier in 
Tables 3.30- 3.32 and Table 3.36.  The relative price differences are narrowest for Scotland and at 
their widest in  Manchester, so  it would seem that there could be much to gain from  shopping around  in 
the Manchester area. 
5.52  On the whole, the own  label soft drinks of grocery retailers tend to be 
cheaper on average than their branded counterparts.  In  the case of mixers,  however, and on  the basis of 
prices per fluid  ounce the Hunts brand of mixers are shown  to have been a  cheaper purchase than  .either 
the Schweppes mixers or the own  label products in  July 1977.  The 500 ml.bottle for  mixers is a  market 
in  which Hunts  are reckoned to have taken a  lead, and the setting of their prices lower than their 
competitors may  have been the main method  by which they achieved this.  According to information 
given at a  seminar in  March 1978,* the price differential in  favour of the Hunts brand  may now  have been 
eroded.  This source indicated that in  1976 the national average price for a 500 mi.  mixer was  15 .2p 
for Schweppes and  14.5p for  Hunts,  but that the average price in  1977 had  equalised for the two brands 
at 15. 1p. 
5.53  Price Commission data reproduced here at Table 5.20 shows that in 
November 1976 the national average  price in grocery stores for an 8~ fl.oz.bottle of tonic water was 
9.4p.  The average price for  this size and type of mixer is shown  by our price survey research to have 
been 9.5p in Manchester, 9.9p in  the Glasgow area and lO.Op  in  Croydon  in  July 1977. 
* 
11
Tw~ Way  Traf~ic  ....  op.cit. Figures quoted by  John C .Carson,  Marketing Director, Schweppes,and 
bel1eved to ongmate from A.C.Nielsen. 
217 TABLE 5.27 
Retail erice of selected soft drinks  in  grocerl shoes  in  the Croldon area, Jull 1977 
Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Price  Price  Price  Price  Equivalent 
Difference  Price 
per fl.oz. 
{e)  {e)  {e)  (%)  (e) 
COLAS 
Coca Cola  11.5 fl.oz.can  12.5  15.0  10.0  50.0  1.08 
~ I  itre bottle  17.8  20.0  15.5  29.0  1.01 
1 I  itre bottle  26.2  29.0  23.0  26.1  0.74 
Pepsi  Cola  11.5 fl.oz.can  13.3  16.5  9.5  73.7  1.16 
8.5 fl.oz.bottle  9.6  11.0  7.5  46.7  1.13 
25  fl.oz. bottle  21.1  26.5  17.5  51.4  0.84 
Diet  Pepsi  11 . 5 fl •  oz . can ·  12.6  14.5  9.5  52.6  1.09 
Strike  11  fl.oz .can  11.5  11.5  11.5  0  1.04 
lrn  Bru  11  fl.oz.can 
Gee Bee  1 litre bottle  19.0  19.0  19.0  0  0.54 
Own  label  11 .5 fl.oz.can  10.7  12.0  9.0  33.3  0.93 
Own  label  l  litre bottle  21.1  25.0  18.5  35.1  0.60 
MIXERS- TONIC 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  10.0  11.5  7.5  53.3  1.18 
500 mi.  17.6  19.5  14.0  39.3  1.00 
Hunts  500 mi.  15.6  18.0  13.5  33.3  0.89 
Canada Dry  10 fl. oz.  10.0  10.0  10.0  0  1.00 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  8.5  10.0  7.5  33.3  1.00 
MIXERS- BITTER  LEMON 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  1  o. 1  11.5  7.5  53.3  1.19 
500 mi.  17.6  19.0  14.0  35.7  1.00 
Hunts  500 mi.  15.8  18.0  13.0  38.5  0.90 
Canada Dry  10 fl.oz. 
Own  laoel  8.5 fl.oz~  9.6  12.0  8.0  50.0  1.13 
MIXERS- DRY GINGER 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  10.0  11.5  8.5  35.3  1.18 
500 mi.  18.0  19.5  16.0  21.8  1.02 
Hunts  500 mi.  15.1  18.5  13.0  42.3  0.86 
Canada Dry  10 fl.oz.  11.5  12.0  11.0  9.1  1.15 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  10.8  14.5  8.0  81.1  1.27 
LO-CAL MIXERS 
Tonic- Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  10.0  11.5  7.5  53.3  1.18 
Hunts  500 mi.  15.5  18.0  13.0  38.5  0.88 
Bitter lemon  - Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.9  11.0  7.5  46.7  1.16 
Hunts  500 mi.  15.8  18.5  13.0  38.5  0.90 
Dry ginger - Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.6  11.0  7.5  46.7  1.13 
.. Hunts  500 mi.  14.6  18.0  13.0  38.5  0.83 
OTHER CARBONATES 
7-Up  11.5 fl.oz.can  13.3  16.0  9.5  68.4  1.16 
8.5 fl.oz.bottle  9.5  11.0  7.5  47.7  1 .12 
Tizer  11  fl. oz. can  13.2  16.0  11.0  45.4  1.20 
34 fl.oz.bottle  24.0  25.0  22.0  13.6  0.70 
R.White lemonade  26 fl.oz. bottle  20.1  23.0  17.0  35.3  0.77 
Corona  lemonade  26 fl.oz. bottle  23.8  25.0  23.0  8.7  0.92 
Own  label  lemonade  1 I  itre  bottle  20.7  24.0  18.5  29.8  0.59 
Top  Deck shandy  ll.5 fl.oz.can  14.4  15.0  12.5  20.0  1.25 
Shandy Bass  15.5 fl.oz .can  17.2  18.0  16.0  12.5  1.11 
Own  label shandy  11.5 fl.oz.can  12.4  14.5  10.5  38.1  1.08 
(continued ............  ) 
218 TABLE 5.27 {continued) 
Retail  prices of selected soft drinks in grocery shops  in  the Croydon area, July 1977 
Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Price  Price  Price  Price  Equivalent 
Difference  Price 
per fl.oz. 
{p)  {p)  {p)  (%)  {p) 
SQUASHES AND CORDIALS 
Quosh Orange  25~ fl.oz.bottle  26.5  31.0  22.5  37.8  1.04 
Ribena  Blackcurrant  17~ fl.oz.bottle  53.6  59.5  48.0  24.0  3.06 
11 ~ fl.oz. bottle  39.4  42.0  36.0  16.7  3.43 
Robinson 
1s Barley Water  25~ fl.oz.bottle  34.8  37.5  29.0  29.3  1.36 
Own label orange squash  25~ fl.oz.bottle  21.9  26.0  18.0  44.4  0.86 
SOURCE: Development Analysts Limited.  Price Survey, Ju.ly  1977 
219 TABLE 5.28 
Retail  Erices of selected soft drinks in  arocer~ shoEs  in  the Greater Manchester area,  Jul~ 1977 
Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Price  Price  Price  Price  Equivalent 
Difference  Price 
per fl.oz. 
{e)  {E)  {E)  (%)  {E) 
COlAS 
Coca Cola  11.5 fl.oz.can  11.4  14.5  9.5  52.6  0.99 
-!  I  itre bottle  16.2  19.0  12.5  52.0  0.92 
1 litre bottle  24.1  29.0  20.5  41.4  0.68 
Pepsi Cola  11 . 5 fl . oz . can  11.6  14.5  9.5  52.6  1.01 
8.5 fl.oz.bottle  9.9  12.5  7.5  66.7  1.16 
25  fl.oz.bottle  20.3  22.0  17.5  25.7  0.81 
Diet Pepsi  11.5 fl.oz.can  12.7  14.5  9.5  52.6  1.10 
Strike  11  fl . oz •  can  10.2  10.5  10.0  5.0  0.93 
lrn  Bru  11  fl.oz .can  12.5  13.5  11.5  17.4  1.14 
Gee Bee  1 I  itre bottle 
Own  label  11.5 fl.oz.  11.0  12.0  9.0  33.3  0.96 
Own  label  1 litre bottle  20.3  22.5  19.0  18.4  0.58 
MIXERS- TONIC 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.5  11.0  7.5  46.7  1.12 
500 mi.  16.3  19.5  13.5  44.4  0.93 
Hunts  500 mi.  13.8  16.5  12.5  32.0  0.78 
Canada Dry  10 fl. oz.  10.1  13.5  8.0  68.8  1.01 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  9.1  10.0  7.5  33.3  1.07 
MIXERS- BITTER  LEMON 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.ozs.  9.5  12.0  7.5  60.0  1.12 
500 mi.  16.9  19.5  14.0  39.3  0.96 
Hunts  500 mi.  13.5  15.0  12.5  20.0  0.77 
Canada Dry  10 fl.oz.  10.0  13.5  8.0  68.8  1.00 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  9.1  9.5  8.5  11.8  1.07 
MIXERS  - DRY GINGER 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.6  12.0  7.5  60.0  1.13 
500 mi.  15.9  19.5  13.5  44.4  0.90 
Hu'nts  500 mi.  14.6  22.5  12.5  80.0  0.83 
Canada Dry  10 fl.oz.  10.2  13.5  8.0  68.8  1.02 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  9.2  10.0  8.5  17.6  1.08 
LO-CAL MIXERS 
Tonic- Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.2  11.0  7.5  46.7  1.08 
Hunts  500ml.  14.0  15.0  13.5  11. 1  0.80 
Bitter lemon  - Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.4  11.0  7.5  46.7  1.10 
Hunts  500 mi.  13.8  15.0  13.5  11.1  0.78 
Dry ginger- Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.2  12.0  7.5  60.0  1.08 
Hunts  500 mi.  14.1  15.0  13.5  11.1  0.80 
OTHER CARBONATES 
7-Up  11.5 fl.oz.can  11.7  14.0  9.5  47.4  1.02 
' 8.5. fl. oz. bottle  8.5  8.5  8.5  0  1.00 
Tizer  11  fl.oz.can  12.2  13.5  10.5  28.6  1.11 
34 fl. oz. bottle  23.6  26.0  21.5  20.9  0.69 
R.White lemonade  26 fl.oz .bottle  18.6  21.0  17.5  20.0  0.72 
Corona  lemonade  26 fl.oz.bottle 
Own  label  lemonade  1 litre bottle  20.1  22.5  18.0  25.0  0.57 
Top Deck  shandy  11.5 fl.oz.can  14.0  15.5  12.0  29.2  1.22 
Shandy  Bass  15 .5 fl. oz.  can  14.8  16.0  13.5  18.5  0.95 
Own  label shandy  11 •  5 fl •  oz •  can  12.4  15.0  8.5  58.8  1.08 
(continued ....•.....••  ) 
220 TABLE 5. 28  {continued) 
Retail  prices of selected soft drinks in  grocery shops in  the Greater Manchester area,  July 1977 
Average  Highest  lowest  Relative  Average 
Price  Price  Price  Price  Equivalent 
Difference  Price 
per fl.oz. 
{p)  {p)  {p)  (%)  {p) 
SQUA.SHES AND CORDIALS 
Ouosh orange  25~ fl.oz.bottle  25.2  30.0  22.5  33.3  0.99 
Ribena  blackcurrant  17~ fl.oz.bottle  51.2  56.0  44.0  27.3  2.92 
11 ~ fl •  oz •  bott  I  e  39.3  48.0  36.0  33.3  3.42 
Robinson's Barley Water  25~ fl. oz. bott  I  e  31.6  36.0  29.0  24.1  1.24 
Own label orange squash  25~ fl. oz. bott  I  e  23.2  26.0  19.0  36.8  0.91 
SOURCE: Development Analysts limited.  Price Survey,  July 1977 
221 TABLE 5.29 
Retail  ~rices of selected soft drinks in  groce~  sho~s in the Glasgow area, Jull 1977, 
Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Price  Price  Price  Price  Equivalent 
Difference  Price 
per fl.oz. 
{E)  {E)  {E)  (%)  {E) 
COlAS 
Coca Cola  11.5 fl.oz.can  12.4  14.0  11.0  27.3  LOB 
~ litre bottle  18.7  . 22.0  17.0  29.4  1.06 
1 I  itre bottle  24.7  29.0  19.0  52.6  0.70 
Pepsi Cola  11 .5 fl.oz.  12.2  1'4.0  10.5  33.3  1.06 
8.5 fl.oz.bottle  10  .. 2  13.5  8.5  58.8  . 1.20 
25  fl.oz .bottle  21.5  25.5  20.0  27.5  0.86 
Diet  Pepsi  ·  11.5 fl.oz.can .  11.7  14.0  10.5  33.3  1.02 
Strike  11  fl. oz.  can  11.6  14.0  10.5  33.3  1.05 
lrn  Bru  11  fl . oz . can  12.9  14.0  11.5  21.7  1.17 
Gee Bee  1 I  itre bottle 
Own  label  11 .5 fl. oz.  can  11.2  13.5  8.0  68.8  0.97 
Own  label  1 I  itre bottle  20.5  21.5  18.5  .16.2  0.58 
MIXERS- TONIC 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  9.9  11.0  8.0  37.5  1.16 
500 mi.  17.9  19.0  15.0  26.7  1.02 
Hunts  500 mi.  14.4  17.5  12.5  40.0  0.82 
Canada Dry  10 fl.oz.  13.0  14.0  12.0  16.7  1.30 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  8.8  10.5  8.0  31.2  1.04 
MIXERS- BITTER  LEMON 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  10.2  12.0  8.0  50.0  1.20 
500 mi.  17.6  19.0  14.0  35.7  1.00 
Hunts  500 mi.  14.8  18.5  12.5  48.0  0.84 
Canada  Dry  10 fl.oz.  12.0  12.0  12.0  0  1.20 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  8.8  10.5  8.0  31.2  1.03 
MIXERS  - DRY GINGER 
Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  1  o. 1  11.5  8.0  43.8  1.19 
500 mi.  17.6  19.0  14.0  35.7  1.00. 
Hunts  500 mi.  14.5  17.5  12.5  40.0  0.82 
Canada Dry  10 fl.oz.  11.0  12.0  10.5  14.3  1.10 
Own  label  8.5 fl.oz.  8.9  11.0  8.0  37.5  1.05 
LO-CAL MIXERS 
Tonic - Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  10.0  11.0  8.0  37.5  1.18 
Hunts  500 mi.  14.5  14.5  14.5  0  0.82 
Bitter lemon  - Schweppes 8.5 fl.oz.  10. 1  11.0  8.0  37.5  1.19 
Hunts  500 mi.  13.2  14.0  12.5  12  0  0.75 
Dry ginger- Schweppes  8.5 fl.oz.  10.3  11.0  8.0  37.5  1.21 
Hunts  500 mi.  13.2  14.0  12.5  12.0  0.75 
OTHER CARBO NATES 
7-Up  11.5 fl.oz.can  11.8  14  0  10.5  33.3  1.03 
8.5 fl.oz.bottle  9.9  11.5  9.0  27.8  1.16 
Tizer  11  fl.oz.can  12. 1  14.0  10.5  33.3  1.10 
34 fl.oz .bottle  22.9  25.0  21.5  16.3  0.67 
R.White lemonade  26 fl.oz. bottle 
Corona  lemonade  26 fl.oz. bottle  23.2  26.0  19.5  33.3  0.89 
Own  label  lemonade  1 I  itre  bottle  20.4  21.5  18.5  16.2  0.58 
Top  Deck  shandy  11 •  5 fl •  oz . can  13.2  15.0  11.5  30.4  1.15 
Shandy Bass  15.5 fl.oz .can  17.3  20.0  15.5  29.0  1.12 
Own  label shandy  11.5 fl.oz.can  12.9  14.5  11.5  26.1  1.12 
(continued ...•...  ) 
222 TABLE 5.29 (continued) 
Retail  ~rices of selected soft drinks in  ~rocerl sho~s in  the Glasgow area, Jull 1977 
Average  Highest  Lowest  Relative  Average 
Price  Price  Price  Price  Equivalent 
Difference  Price 
per fl.oz. 
{E)  {E)  (~)  (%)  {E) 
SQUASHES AND CORDIALS 
Quosh orange  25! fl.oz.bottle  25.3  31.5  21.0  50.0  0.99 
Ribena  blackcurrant  17~ fl.oz.bottle  54.1  64.0  46.0  39.0  3.09 
11~ fl.oz.bottle  40.5  47.0  36.0  30.6  3.52 
Robinson's  Barley Water  25~ fl.oz.bottle  33.6  36.0  29.0  24.1  1.32 
Own label orange squash  25~ fl.oz. bottle  22.5  28.0  14.0  100.0  0.88 
SOURCE:  Develo~ment Analysts  Limited.  Price Survey,  July 1977 
223 APPENDICES APPENDIX  1 
SUMMARY  TABLE  OF  PRODUCT  MARKET  SHARES ------------------------------------------------, 
APPENDIX  1, TABLE  1 
Summary Table of Product N\arket Shares 
Product  N\arket 
leading firms and their Rank  (per cent share in  parenthesis) 
N\arket  Year  Share 
N  %  1  11  111  1V 
Beer  1969  4  ...  Bass Cherrington '-\llied  Watney  Whitbread 
1972  4  63  Bass  (19)  '-\llied  (17)  Grand Met  (14)  Whitbread  (13) 
1974  4  62  Bass  (20)  '-\llied  (16)  Grand Met  (14)  Whitbread  (12) 
1975  4  62  Bass  (21)  ~llied  (16)  Whitbread  (14)  Scottish & 
Newcastle  (11) 
1976  4  62  Bass  (20)  Allied  (17)  Whitbread  (13)  Grand Met  (12) 
lager*  1969  4  92  Bass  (34)  Harp*  (25)  Allied  (17)  Carlsberg  (16) 
1972  '  5  94  Bass  (33)  Harp*  (21)  Allied  (16)  Carlsberg  (12) 
& Whitbread  (12) 
1974  4  83  Bass  (30)  Harp*  (21)  Allied  (18)  Whitbread  (14) 
1976  4  80  Bass  (28)  Harp*  (21)  Allied  (17)  Whitbread  (14) 
Scotch  1960  1  75  D.C.L.  (75)  ...  .  ..  )Other distillers, 
Whisky 1966/73  79  D.C.L.  (50)  Teacher  (16)  Bells  (13)  )brewers' brands, 
1976/73  75  D .C.L.  (37)  Bells  (22)  Teacher  (16)  )own  labels 
1977/8 2  <56-57  D.C.L.  (<33)  Bells  (23-24)  Teacher  (. .  .  )  )and sub-norms. 
Gin  1967  1  90  D.C.L.  (90)  ) 
1969  1  80  D.C.L.  (80)  )  Other distillers,  brewers• brands,own labels and sub-norms. 
1975/6 1  70  D .C .L.  (70)  ) 
Vodka  1968  2 
.  ' 
66  I.D.V./  D .C .L.  (16}  )Other distillers,  ... 
Grand Met(50)  ~brewers• brands,  1975  3  89  I.D.V./  D.C.L.  (23)  Greenall's  (16) 
Grand Met(50)  )own  labels, 
1977  3  90  I.D.V.  D.C.L.  (25)  Greenall's  (20)  ~and sub-norms.  Grand Met(45) 
Brandy  1969  3  78  N\artell  (50)  Courvoisier  (18)  Hennessey  (1 0)  )  Independent 
]974/5 3  84-92  Martell  (40-43)  Courvoisier (30-35)  Hennessey  (14)  ) shippers,  brewers, 
) own  labels, non-
) cognacs. 
Dark  1969  .  .  .  ...  United  Rum 
Rum  Merchants ( ..•  )  Seagram  ( ... )  ) 
1976  .  .  .  ...  United  Rum  ) Brewers' brands. 
Merchants( .•.  )  Seagram  ( ... )  ) 
White  1969  1  80  Bass  (80)  ...  ) U.R.M., Seagram, 
Rum  Cherrington  ) brewers 
1  brands. 
1977  2  95  Bass  (80)  Courage  (15)  ) 
Br anded  probably Bass Cherrington, but fragmented market also supplied by 
Table  other brewers,  independent wine shippers and merchants,  food  manufacturers 
Wines  and distributors• own  labels. 
British  1  75  Allied 
I 
Wines  Breweries  (75) 
(cont mued ..•...  ) 
229 APPENDIX  1, TABLE  1 (continued) 
Summary Table of Product Market Shares 
Product  Market 
leading firms and their Rank  (per cent share in  parenthesis) 
Market  Year  Share 
N  %  1  11  111  lV 
Sherry  1976  2  46  (Allied  ) 
(Breweries  (23)  )  Independent shippers,  brewers• brands, own  label and 
(luis Gordon  ) non-Spanish sherries. 
(Group  (23)  ) 
Port  1976  3  70  Allied  I.D.V./  ) 
Breweries  (25)  Grand Met.  (20)  )  Independent shippers,  brewers 
1  brands 
Bass  )  and own  labels 
Charrington(25)  ) 
Ver- 1970  2  ...  tv\artini  ( ... )  Cinzano  ( ... )  ) other brands, 
mouth  1976  3  (87-92)  Martini  (45-50)  Cinzano  (30)  Dubonnet  (12)  ) especially brewers• 
) brands and own-
) labels. 
Cider  1968  3  95  HP  Bulmer  (60) ·  Allied  (20)  Taunton+  (15)  )independent cider 
Breweries  )makers and own 
1976  1  60  HP  Bulmer  (60)  Allied  ( ...  )  Taunton+  ( ... )  )labels. 
s  quashes 
and  974  3  51  Beecham  (19)  Reckitt &  (18)  Schweppes  (14)  ) independent 
ordiqls  Colman  ) producers and own 
) labels 
Non 
cola  1977  3  58  Beecham  (42)  Whit  bread  (1 0)  Schweppes  (6)  )independent producers, 
carbon- )brewers • brands and 
ates  )own  labels . 
Cola  1974  2  85  Coca Cola (60)  Pepsi Cola  (25)  ) independent  producers, brewers• brands 
1977  2  87  Coca Cola (58)  Pepsi Cola  (29)  ) and own  labels. 
Canned 1975  3  46  Beecham  (38)  Bass  (5)  Schweppes  (3)  ) independent producer 
Shandy 
~harrington  ) brewers 
1brands and 
s 
) own  labels. 
Mixers  ~968  1  c.70  Schweppes (c.  70) 0  brewers,  independent producers 1  brewers• brands 
~977  1  50-52  Schweppes  (50-52)~  and own  labels. 
Fruit 
977  3  54  Schweppes (20)  libby•s  (18)  Allied  (16)  . producer brands, food 
Juice  Breweries  manufacturers, own 
labels 
Mineral 
Waters  977  1  65  Schweppes (65)  II  independent bottlers,  importers, and brewers•  brands  ... · . 
{continued ••.. ; •....  ) 
230 APPEND IX  1, TABLE  1  (continued) 
Summary Table of Product lv\arket Shares 
FOOTNOTES: 
*  Harp  lager Ltd.  This  is a  consortium company established for  the brewing and distribution 
of the Harp brand of lager.  The shareholdings in  Harp  Lager  Ltd.  as are follows: 
Arthur Gu  inness Son  & Co Ltd. 
Courage Ltd. 
Scottish & Newcastle Breweries  Ltd. 
Greene,  King  & Sons  Ltd. 
Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries  Ltd. 
32.  7 per cent 
32.  7 per cent 
32.7 per cent 
< 2.0 per cent 
< 2.0 per cent 
Adjusting for  these shareholdings, one source** has  estimated company shares in  the U.K. 
lager market in  1975 as: 
Bass Cherrington 
Whitbread 
Allied Breweries 
Grand Metropolitan 
27. 4 per cent 
16.3 per cent 
16.0 per cent 
11.3 per cent 
+  Taunton Cider Co. Ltd  • This  is a  consortium company established for the manufacture and 
distribution of cider.  The shareholdings are as follows: 
Arthur Gu inness Son  & Co  Ltd. 
Courage  Ltd • 
Bass Cherrington  Ltd. 
Greene,  King  & Sons  Ltd. 
28.7 per cent 
28.7 per cent 
28. 6 per cent 
? 
**Fielding,  Newson-Smith & Co. (Sept .1976)Lager in  the U.K.: A Growth Market 
231 APPENDIX  2 
CORRECTION  TO  MEASURES  OF  BEVERAGES  FIRMS' 
PROFITABILITY  WHICH  APPEARED  AS  ADDENDUM 
TABLE  2  IN  PREVIOUS  REPORT APPENDIX 2 
1:  In  the first part of this report on  the U.K.  Beverages industry there 
appeared two tables, one for  1969 and one for  1974, which ranked a  sample of firms  in  the industry 
according to comparative measure of performance.*  Since the publication of this report an error has been 
discovered  in  the compilation of the data for  1974 and it is  the purpose of this Appendix to correct this 
mistake. 
2:  Before  identifying the error it will  be useful  to re-state how  the rankings 
of the comparative measures of performance are derived +.  For each firm  in  the sample the following data 
may be extracted from  an analysis of company accounts: 
Turnover  (denoted as variable 
101 1) 
Net Profit (denoted as variable 
104
1
) 
Cash Flow (denoted as variable  105 1) 
total sales excluding inter-group sales 
cash flow  ,  less depreciation provisions. 
i.e. net profit before tax. 
the definition  used  here is  that given to us  by the 
EEC.  It  is a gross cash flow  comprising gross trading 
profits~fter charging directors fees and emoluments, 
pensions to past directors, superannuation payments, 
compensation for  loss of life, auditors• fees etc. )and· 
other income  (from  investments dnd other sources) 
before allowing for depreciation provisions,  plus 
prior year adjustments other than tax,  less hire of 
plant. 
Own Capital (denoted as variable 
107
1
)  this EEC  term  is given as the sum  of issued ordinary 
and preference share capital plus total reserves. 
*A Study of the Evolution of Concentration in  the Beverages Industry for  the United  Kingdom, 
Part One:  Industry Structure and Concentration, 1969-1974.E.E.C.Brussels.April 1977.Addendum P.247 
+The detailed methodology is  contained in, R. Linda  Methodology of Concentration Analysis Applied 
to the Study of Industries and Markets.  EEC  Brussels.  September 1976. 
235 3:  For  each sample firm  the following  ratios are computed: 
net erofit  (04) 
sales  (01) 
Ratio R1, 
net erofit  (04) 
own  capital  (07) 
Ratio R2, 
cash flow  (05) 
sales  (01) 
Ratio R3, 
Ratio R4,  cash flow  (05) 
own  capital  (07) 
Each  ratio is  expressed as a  percentage and ranked  in  descending order of size.  By adding the value of 
the ith firms  rank on  Ratio R1  to the value of its rank on  R2,  R3,  and R4 a  total score is  obtained 
representing the ith firms  performance score.  In  turn,  the performance scores so obtained for  each firm 
are ranked enabling performance amongst the sample firms to be compared. 
4:  The error that has been discovered in  the original table for  the 1974 sample 
of 58 firms  concerns Grand Metropolitan Ltd. and the value of own  capital used for that company.  In  the 
original table the value of own  capital given for Grand Metropolitan was £817 .2m., but should,  in  fact, 
have been £442.2m. for  1974.  This means that the ratios R2 and R4  computed for Grand Metropolitan 
are wrong, as is  their ranking on  these ratios and hence the total performance score and ranking on 
performance are incorrect.  These errors have been ammended and the corrected tab  I e of comparative 
performance appears here as Appendix 2, Table 1. 
5:  The corrections have had the following effect : 
Grand Metropolitan  Ltd .(1974)  Original  Corrected 
version  version 
Value of Own Capital  £817.2m.  £442.2m. 
Rank  on absolute value for Own Capital  1st  1st 
Ratio  R2  7.0 per cent  12.8 per cent 
Ranking  on  R2  57th  45th 
Ratio R4  9.1 per cent  16.8 per cent 
Ranking on  R4  57th  45th 
Performance Score  220  196 
Ranking on performance score  57  51 
Thus,  whereas Grand Metropolitan was originally shown  to have ranked 57th out of a  sample of 58 firms, 
the corrected data place the company at 51st position in  the performance table.  The reca leu lotion and 
ranking of firms on  Ratios R2 and R4  has altered the scores of some other firms  but not to the extent that 
their relative positions have changed. 
236 6:  In  pub I  ishing their Seventh Report on Competition  Pol icy* the EEC, 
unknowingly used the data from  the incorrect version of the table of comparative performance to produce 
Table 23 on pages 228 and 229 of the Seventh Report.  In  this table  the 58 sample firms  for  1974 are 
ranked according to their performance scores derived from  Appendix 2, Table 1.  The column headed 
'Size  Ranking' indicates the rank of each firm  by the size of turnover.  The next column expresses the 
turnover of the ith firm  as a  percentage of the turnover of the largest firm  in  the sample;  that is ,Grand 
Metropolitan  Ltd.  with a  1974 turnover of £970m.  It  is  the final  column of Table  23, which appears in 
the Seventh Report on  Competition  Policy, that is  incorrect.  This column expresses the value of the ith 
firms' own capital as a  percentage of  the own capital of the sample firm  with the greatest value on  this 
variable.  This firm  is, again, Grand Metropolitan  but the incorrect value for own capital has been used; 
that is,  £817.2m.  instead of £442.2m.  The corrected version of this table appears here as Appendix 2, 
Table 2. 
* Seventh Report on Competition Policy.  EEC  Brussels. April  1978 
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APPENDIX  2, TABLE  1 
COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE  IN THE  U.K.  BEVERAGES  INDUSTRY 
(All  Values are in £m  ., and rates are per.cent.) 
Rank 
in  Score 
Ratio 04  Ratio 04  Ratio 05  Ratio 05 
01  07  Of  07 
Score 
Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate 
2  5  1  6 
1  14 
29.3  27.1  33.5  30.9 
4  3  4  4 
2  15 
24.3  29.0  26.8  31.9 
1  7  2  14 
3  24 
30.1  24.8  31.9  26.3 
10  11  8  11 
4  40 
18.3  23.4  21.9  26.9 
25  4  16  2 
5  47 
11.6  27.4  15.0  35.2 
20  6  17  5 
6  48 
12.4  26.2  14.9  31.4 
11  14  10  15 
7  50 
18.0  22.8  20.6  26.2 
8  10  11  21 
7  50 
19.4  23.7  19.9  24.4 
13  17  13  12 
9  55 
15.9  22.5  19.0  27.0 
7  16  9  24 
10  56 
20.8  22.6  21.1  23.8 
----- - -
1974 
Number of firms  in Sample= 58 
Turnover  Net Profit  Cash Flow  Own Capita 
(01)  (04)  (05)  (07)  Name of firm 
Rank  Value  Rank  Value  Rank  Value  Rank  Value 
58  53  54  56  Macallan- + 
Glenlivet 
1.6  0.5  0.5  1.8 
30  15  15  23  Highland  + 
Distilleries 
10.8  2.6  2.9  9.1  Co. 
14  9  9  10  Hiram Walker  + 
& Sons 
34.7  10.4  11. 1  42.1 
25  19  19  21  Glenlivet  + 
Distillers 
12.2  2.2  2.6  9.5 
24  26  25  38  North British  + 
Distillery Co. 
12.8  1.5  1.9  5.4 
8  6  6  8  Scottish & 
Newcastle 
199.7  24.8  29.8  94.8  Breweries 
32  23  23  27  Mansfield 
Brewery Co 
10.3  1.8  2. 1  8.1 
41  27  29  35 
Boddingtons 
7.7  1.5  1.5  6.2  Breweries 
16  13  13  15  Wolverhampton 
& Dudley 
21.6  3.4  4.1  15.2  Breweries 
56  40  44  50  Oldham 
Brewery Co 
3.6  0.8  0.8  3.4 1'-.:l 
~ 
\0 
COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE  IN THE  U.K.  BEVERAGES  INDUSTRY  (Continued) 
(A II  Values are in  £':':~.,  and rates are per. cent.) 
Rank 
Turnover 
in  Score  Ratio 04  Ratio 04  Ratio 05  Ratio 05  (01)  01  07  01  07 
Score 
Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Value 
6  21  6  25  51 
11  58 
21.5  21.3  23.5  23.4  5.0 
28  1  29  1  39 
12  59 
11.4  44.0  13.3  51.4  8.2 
9  24  7  2~  26 
13  63 
19.0  20.4  22.2  23.8  12.0 
20  12  20  13  19 
14  65 
12.4  23.1  14.4  26.7  15.6 
16  19  14  19  46 
15  68 
14.2  21.8  16.3  24.8  6.6 
3  28  3  41  57 
16  75 
26.8  18.6  26.8  18.6  1.8 
23  15  24  18  2 
17  80 
12.4  22.7  13.6  25.0  617.1 
12  27  12  . 31  22 
18  82 
17.2  18.7  19.3  21.0  13.2 
39  2  45  3  50 
19  89 
9.2  30.1  10.3  33.9  5.1 
22  18  28  22  43 
20  90 
12.4  22.5  .  13.4  24.3  7.1 
1974 
Number of firms  in Slmple =58 
Net Profit  Cash Fl.ow  Own Capita  I' 
(04)  (05)  (07)  Name of Firm 
Rank  Value  Rank  Value  Rank  Value 
33  34  40  Hardy & 
Hansons 
1.1  1.2  5.1 
35  37  55  Tomatin  + 
Distillers Co. 
0.9  1.1  2.1 
17  17  19  Home  Brewery 
2.3  2.7  11.2 
22  22  24  Greene, King 
& Sons 
1.9  2.2  8.4 
35  38  43  Burtonwood 
Brewery Co. 
0.9  1.1  4.3  (Forshaws) 
52  57  53  Robert MacNish + 
& Co. 
0.5  0.5  2.6 
1  1  2  The Distillers  + 
Co. 
76.4  83.9  336.1 
18  20  17  Marston, 
Thompson  & 
2.3  2.5  12.1  Evershed 
55  56  57  St. Austell 
Brewery Co 
0.5  0.5  1.5 
39  41  46  S .A.  Brain 
&Co 
0.9  0.9  3.9 
--------------------~ 
,j;;;. 
Q 
COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE  IN  THE  U.K.  BEVERAGES  INDUSTRY  (Confinued) 
(All  Values are in  £m., and rates are per.cent.) 
Turnovsr 
Rank  Ratio 04  Ratio 04  Ratio 05  Ratio 05 
in  Score  Of  07  Of  07 
(01) 
Score 
Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Value 
5  40  5  44  38 
21  94 
21.8  15.9  24.4  17.8  8.4 
31  23  26  17  3 
22  97 
10.9  20.4  13.5  25.2  594.1 
14  22  40  28  36 
23  104 
15.9  20.7  10.9  22.1  8.9 
44  13  41  7  6 
24  105 
8.4  23.0  10.9  30.0  271.8 
17  31  21  39  35 
25  108 
13.6  18.3  14.3  19.3  9.2 
46  8  48  8  17 
26  110 
8.2  24.0  9.7  28.2  19.2 
15  41  15  43  47 
27  114 
15.4  15.8  16.2  17.8  6.3 
30  37  18  29  44 
27  114 
11.2  16.8  14.6  21.9  6.7 
41  9  51  16  48 
29  117 
8.7  23.9  9.5  26.1  6.3 
32  30  30  26  37 
30  118 
10.9  18.3  13.2  22.3  8.5 
1974 
Number of firms  in  Sample =58 
Net Profit  Cash Flow  Own Capital 
(04)  (05)  (07)  Name of Firm 
Rank  Value  Rank  Value  Rank  Value 
24  24  18  lv\atthew  Brown 
&Co 
1.8  2.0  11.5 
2  2  4  Allied 
Breweries 
65.1  80.1  318.4 
28  30  31  James 
Shipstone & 
1.4  1.5  6.9  Sons 
7  7  7  Arthur Guinness 
Son  & Co. 
22.8  29.7  99.0 
29  32  32  Drambuie  + 
Liqueur Co 
1.2  1.3  6.8 
25  26  33  James  + 
Burrough 
1.6  1.9  6.6 
38  39  37  McMullen 
& Sons 
0.9  1.0  5.8 
41  40  42  Eldridge  Pop& 
& Co. 
I 
0.8  0.9  4.5 
48  51  54  Frederic 
Robinson 
0.5  0.6  2.3 
37  35  41  J .A.  Deven ish 
&Co 
0.9  1.1  5.0 t-.:l 
~ 
1-' 
COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE  IN THE  U.K. BEVERAGES  INDUSTRY  (Continued) 
(All  Values are in  £m., and rates are per.cent.) 
Turnover 
Rank  Ratio 04  Ratio 04  Ratio 05  Ratio 05  in  Score  Of  07  Of  07 
(01) 
Score 
Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Value 
47  25  37  10  42 
31  119 
8.2  19.3  11.5  27.0  7.5 
27  34  27  33  13 
32  121 
11.5  17.4  13.4  20.4  36.2 
34  35  35  32  4 
33  136 
10. 1  17.3  12. 1  30.0  572.1 
19  48  22  52  33 
34  141 
12.6  12.2  13.9  13.4  9.7 
56  19  57  9  12 
34  141 
4.3  21.8  5.4  27.6  48.1 
18  51  19  55  53 
36  143 
13.5  11.3  14.6  12.2  4.5 
24  44  25  50  55 
36  143 
15.2  12.9  13.5  14.2  4.1 
37  42  33  34  21 
38  146 
9.4  15.5  12.4  20.4  13.2 
45  39  36  27  20 
39  147 
8.3  16.0  11.5  22.2  14.9 
35  35  38  40  45 
40  148 
9.8  17.3  11.2  19.2  6.6 
1974 
Number of firms  in  Sample= 58 
Net Profit  Cash Flow  Own Capital 
(04)  (05)  (07)  Name of firm 
Rank  Value  Rank  Value  Rank  Value 
45  43  51  Hall  & 
Woodhouse 
0.6  0.9  3.2 
12  12  12  Vaux 
Breweries 
4.2  4.8  23.8 
3  4  3  Bass 
Cherrington 
57.8  70.0  334.0 
32  31  20  Higsons 
Brewery 
1.2  1.4  10. 1 
20  18  22  Teacher  + 
(D ist iII ers) 
2.0  2.6  9.4 
46  49  39  tv\acDona ld  + 
tv\artin 
0.6  0.6  5.3  Distilleries 
50  53  45  Buckley•s 
Brewery 
0.5  0.6  3.9 
30  28  28  Daniel Thwaites 
& Sons 
1.2  1.6  8.0 
31  27  29  H. P. Bulmer  ** 
1.2  1.7  7.8 
44  46  47  Border  Breweries 
(\Nrexham)" 
0.6  0.7  3.8 '-"=' 
~ 
'-"=' 
COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE  IN THE  U.K.  BEVERAGES  INDUSTRY(Continued) 
(All  Values are in £m., and rates are per.cent.) 
Turnover 
Rank  Ratio 04  Ratio 04  Ratio 05  Ratio 05 
in  Score  Of  07  Of  07 
(01) 
Score 
Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Value 
42  32  44  30  9 
40  148 
15.5  10.9  10.3  21.7  72.6 
50  29  50  20  40 
42  149 
11.3  11.2  9.6  24.6  7.8 
36  33  43  38  15 
43  150 
16.9  10.7  10.6  19.9  25.2 
40  38  39  35  29 
44  152 
15.9  9.3  11. 1  20.3  10.8 
29  52  2~  51  11 
45  155 
18.4  6.8  13.7  13.7  52.2 
26  50  32  53  54 
46  161 
19.0  7.7  12.8  12.9  4. 1 
33  49  31  49  18 
47  162 
18.1  7.8  13.2  14.4  18.9 
38  47  33  46  52 
48  164 
16.2  8.2  12.4  16.2  4.6 
54  26  55  37  10 
49  172 
9.1  11.6  5.6  20.0  60.3 
51  46  47  42  7 
l50  186 
11.7  8.3  9.8  17.9  222.7 
- ------------ --
1974 
Number of firms  in  Sample = 58 
Net Profit  Cash Flow  Own Capital 
! 
(04)  (05)  (07)  Name of firm 
Rank  Value  Rank  Value  Rank  Value 
10  10  11  Seogram  + 
Distillers 
6.3  7.5  34.6 
47  45  52  Fuller  ,Smith 
& Turner 
0.6  0.7  3.0 
16  16  16  Long  John  +: 
lnternat  i  ona I  I 
2.4  2.7  13.5 
I 
34  33  36  Davenports 
C.B.& Brewery 
0.9  1.2  5.9  (Holdings) 
11  11  9  Greenall 
Whitley & Co 
5.9  7.2  52.3 
54  55  44  Morland & Co. 
0.5  0.5  4.1 
21  21  13  J.  W. Cameron 
& Co 
2.0  2.5  17.3 
56  52  48  Charles Wells 
0.4  0.6  3.5 
14  14  14  Arthur Bell  + 
& Sons 
3.2  3.4  16.9 
8  8  6  Courage 
15.1  21.8  121.9 
- -- --~ 
~ 
~ 
COMPARATIVE  PERFORMANCE  IN  THE  U.K.  BEVERAGES  INDUSTRY  (Continued) 
(All  Values are in £m., and rates are per.cent.) 
Turnover 
Rank 
in  Score  Ratio 04  Ratio 04  Ratio 05  Ratio 05  (01) 
Score  Of  07 
Rank  Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank 
53  45  53 
51  196 
5.9  12.8 
48  54  46 
52  201 
7.8  1  o. 1 
43  58  42 
52  201 
8.5  6.1 
52  53  52 
54  205 
6.3  10.1 
57  55  56 
55  204 
2.4  9.1 
58  43  58 
56  206 
1.5  12.9 
49  56  49 
57  210 
7.7  9.0 
55  57  54 
58  223 
4.9  8.0 
All firms are brewers unless denoted as follows: 
Of  07 
Rate  Rank  Rate  Rank  Value 
45  1 
7.7  16.8  969.7 
53  5 
10.0  12.9  339.8 
58  49 
10.9  7.8  5.9 
48  27 
9.2  14.9  12.0 
36  23 
5.4  20.1  12.9 
47  28 
1.8  15.6  11.6 
56  34 
9.6  11.3  9.7 
57  31 
6.2  10. 1  10.6 
+  spirits•  manufacturers 
*  soft drinks manufacturers 
**cider makers 
1974 
Number of firms  in  Sample =58 
Net Profit  Cash Flow  Own Capital 
(04)  (05)  (07)  !\lame of Firm 
Rank  Value  Rank  Value  Rank  Value 
4  3  1  Grand 
Metropolitan 
56.8  74.2  442.2 
5  _5  5  Whitbread 
&Co 
26.6  34.0  264.0 
51  50  26  Everards 
Brewery 
0.5  0.6  8.2 
41  36  30  Sam Smiths 
(fadcaster) 
0.8  1.1  7.5 
57  47  49  A .G .Barr  * 
&Co 
0.3  0.7  3.5 
+I  58  58  58  Dalmore, 
Whyte & 
I 
0.2  0.2  1.3  tv\ackay 
I 
43  42  25  Young  & Co
1s 
Brewery 
I 
0.7  0.9  8.3 
49  48  34  Toil ernarche 
& Cobbold 
0.5  0.7  6.4  Breweries APPENDIX 2, TABLE  2 
Coq~orate Profitabilit}:': and Size disparit}:':  in  the United  Kingdom- Beverages,  1974 
- being a  corrected version of the table which originally appeared as Table 23 on  pages 228 and 229 
in  the Seventh Report on Competition Pol icy.* 
Profitabi I  ity 
Firm 
Size  01  ::>:.  07  :x:. 
Ranking  Ranking 
I  x100 
I 
X 100 
01  :x:1  07  :x:l 
1  tv\acallan-G len I  ivet  58  0.16  0.40 
2  Highland Distillers  Co.  25  1.11  2.06 
3  Hiram Walker & Sons  11  3.57  9.53 
4  Glen  I  ivet Distillers  21  1.25  2.16 
5  North British Distillery Co.  31  1.31  1.25 
6  Scottish & Newcastle Breweries  8  20.59  21.45 
7  tv\ansfield  Brewery Co  29  1.06  1.83 
7  Boddingtons
1  Breweries  38  0.79  1.41 
9  Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries  14  2.23  3.45 
10  Oldham Brewery Co  55  0.37  0.76 
11  Hardys & Hansons  45  0.52  l.  15 
12  Tomatin Distillers Co  50  0.85  0.48 
13  Home  Brewery  20  1.24  2.54 
14  Greene,  King & Sons  19  1.61  1.90 
15  Burtonwood  Brewery Co. (Forshaws)  43  0.68  0.97 
16  Robert  tv\acNish  & Co.  57  0.19  0.59 
17  The Distillers Co.  2  63.64  76.06 
18  tv\arston,  Thompson  & Evershed  18  1.36  2.74 
19  S t Austell  Brewery Co.  56  0.53  0.35 
20  S .A. Brain  & Co.  43  0.73  0.88 
21  tv\atthew  Brown  & Co  27  0.87  2.61 
22  Allied Breweries  3  61.27  72.04 
23  James Shipstone & Sons  34  0.92  1.55 
24  Arthur Guinness Son  & Co  6  28.03  22.40 
25  Drambuie  Liqueur Co  34  0.95  1.53 
26  James Burrough  24  1.98  1.50 
27  McMullen & Sons  40  0.65  1.30 
27  Eldridge,  Pope  & Co  41  0.69  1.02 
29  Frederic Robinson  54  0.65  0.52 
30  J .A. Devenish  39  0.88  1.14 
31  Ha II  & Woodhouse  49  0.77  0.72 
32  Vaux Breweries  13  3.73  5.39 
33  Bass Cherrington  3  59.00  75.58 
34  H  igsons  Brewery  25  1.00  2.29 
34  Teacher (Distillers)  17  4.96  2.13 
36  tv\acDonald  tv\artin Distilleries  46  0.46  1.21 
36  Buckley•s Brewery  51  0.42  0.89 
38  Daniel Thwaites & Sons  22  1.36  1.82 
39  H.P.Bulmer  22  1.54  1.76 
40  Border  Breweries  (Wrexham)  46  0.68  0.87 
40  Seagram Distillers  9  7.49  7.83 
42  Fuller,  Smith & Turner  46  0.80  0.68 
43  Long  John  International  14  2.60  3.06 
44  Davenports C.B.& Brewery(Holdings)  32  1.11  1.34 
(continued ..........•  ) 
244 APPEND IX  2, TABLE  2  (continued) 
Corporate Profitability and Size Disparity in  the United  Kingdom- Beverages,  1974 
Profitab i I ity 
Ranking  Firm 
45  Greenall Whitley & Co 
46  Morland & Co 
47  J.W.Cameron & Co 
48  Charles Wells 
49  Arthur Bell  & Sons 
50  Courage 
51  Grand Metropolitan 
52  Whitbread & Co 
52  Everards Brewery 
54  Sam  Smith  (Tadcaster) 
55  A .G .Barr & Co 
56  Dalmore, Whyte & MacKay 
57  Young  & Co•s  Brewery 
58  Tollemache & Cobbold Breweries 
01  x.  =the turnover of the ith sample firm 
I 
01  :x:1 = the turnover of the largest sample firm. 
(Grand Metropolitan ltd.  £970m.) 
07  :x::.  = the own  capital of the ith sample firm. 
I 
07  :x::1 =the own  capital of the largest sample firm. 
(Grand Metropolitan ltd.  £442m.) 
Size 
Ranking 
9 
51 
14 
53 
11 
6 
1 
5 
37 
28 
36 
41 
29 
32 
*  Seventh Report on  Competition Policy.  EEC  Brussels. April  1978 
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01  ::X::.  07  ::x::. 
I  I 
Q  1 
X  1  QQ  Ql  X  1  QQ 
::X:: 1  ::X:: 1 
5.38 
0.42 
1.95 
0.47 
6.22 
22.97 
100.00 
35.04 
0.61 
1.24 
1.33 
1.20 
1.00 
1.09 
11.82 
0.93 
3.91 
0.80 
3.84 
27.58 
100.00 
59.74 
1.87 
1.69 
0.79 
0.30 
1.88 
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